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Abstract (English version)
This thesis investigates the interaction between the sector balance sheets in
Denmark, as they are crucial for understanding the impact and transmission of
economic shocks and policies for the economy. This is particularly important
in the context of rapid financial balance sheet expansion that preceded the
Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The thesis thus addresses four key objectives:
The first is to identify what the primary source of change in sector balance
sheets is; the second is to empirically identify the connections and dependencies
(interactions) between the three primary sectors - the private sector (PRI), the
government sector (GOV) and the foreign sector (ROW); the third is to explore
the implications of these interactions, and extends this analysis to include a
disaggregated PRI - split into the household sector (HH), the non-financial
corporate sector (NFC) and the financial corporate sector (FC); and, the fourth
is to assimilate these interactions into a single macroeconomic framework -
in order to examine the transmission of economic shocks or policy measures
throughout the economy - and to use this framework to investigate the causes
and implications of the unprecedented expansion of private debt relative to
disposable income of Danish HH. The thesis addresses these issues within the
Post Keynesian economic paradigm and the Babylonian mode of thinking,
where path dependency and a pluralist approach to method and methodology
are encouraged. This is accomplished in the form of five independent, but
progressive and related articles which use several methods:
The first article, Money at first principles: A social value theory of money, is a
theoretical investigation of how money creation is linked to debt, and explains
how this is connected to institutional level balance sheets. The article argues
that the source of change in the structure of the balance sheet of an economic
agent is an imbalance between the level of money available from income, and the
level required for expenditures. Any shortfall is satisfied through the demand
for credit in exchange for debt. These budget constraints can be aggregated
to find sector level net funding requirements. Money is defined according to
four base concepts, the monetary unit, the monetary token, the monetary space
and social value. These base concepts are then used to argue that the demand
for debt of all sectors plays an important role in the flow of funds, and in
the relative balance sheet positions of all sectors. It is further argued that
government should play an active role in debt accumulation, and so opens the
i
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discussion on sector interdependence.
The second article, Sectoral balance analysis: Evidence from Scandinavia, uses
the Sector Balance Analysis (SBA) approach to analyse long historical datasets.
The methods include a descriptive analysis of the trends in sector net lending
(NL), long-run correlation statistics between the sectors, and a range of lagged
correlation estimates relative to the output gap in order to examine the extent
to which each sector pro- or counter-cyclically net lends relative to economic
expansion. The article investigates the interaction between sector level net
lending requirements for Denmark, Norway and Sweden between 1950 and
2017, and argues that there is reason to doubt generalised theories about sector
level interactions. In particular, the Ricardian Equivalence (REH) predicts
a negative correlation between PRI and GOV. The analysis also reveals this
negative correlation, but, contrary to REH, the correlation is explained by the
automatic stabilising mechanisms in the three Nordic countries, rather than by
the behaviour of rational agents. The Twin Deficits Hypotheses (TDH) predicts
positive correlation between GOV and ROW, and a similar result is observed in
the analysis for Norway. This, however, is the result of international oil revenue
flowing to GOV. Furthermore, the article contends, with the aid of historical
record, that the present positive trade balances of each country can best be
explained by the history of investment and development in each.
The third article, Sectoral balance analysis: Short run deviations from long run
patterns, uses a rolling correlation window to test the stability of the long-run
relationships between sector net lending positions identified in article two. On
the basis of the rolling correlations, it is argued that long run patterns observed
at the sector level do persist for extended periods of time, but that these
relationships change significantly over time. The results also illustrate that
these deviations can be explained by specific economic incidents, which cause
at least one sector (most often PRI) to change behaviour for a certain period
of time. In addition to evaluating the persistence of relationships, the analysis
provides a simple way to identify structural breaks in the behaviour of individual
sectors. The main conclusion of the article is that long-run correlation patterns
between PRI, GOV and ROW, break down at different points and for varying
lengths of time.
The fourth article, Sektorbalancer i Danmark efter krisen, extends the SBA
approach by disaggregating PRI into HH, NFC and FC in order to evaluate
ii
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the logic of the Danish austerity policies introduced after the GFC. It suggests
that the consolidation of debt by FC and NFC was largely offset by flows from
ROW, and that the improvement in GOV NL was driven by a boost to demand
from HH borrowing (counter-cyclical net lending). The article focuses on the
automatic stabilising functions built into the Danish welfare state, and provides
the argument that while GOV is the one sector where decision making can (in
theory) be centralised, it is also the sector that is designed to be most passive
to the changes in the other sectors (particularly PRI). It is asserted that a
government deficit should be expected in periods of recession, and that it would
thus be illogical to introduce contractionary fiscal policy that would further
reduce national income - since the recovery of the GOV budget relies on a
reversal of PRI net savings behaviour.
The fifth article, Flexible rate mortgage loans: An SFC model of the impact
of mortgage credit innovations on Danish balance sheet stability, is the main
analysis of the thesis, and presents a hybrid of the empirical investigations of the
SBA approach, and theoretically driven behavioural structures. With the use of
the System of National Accounts (SNA), the paper implements a fully empirical
stock flow consistent (SFC) model of the Danish economy, estimated on data
for the period 1995 to 2016. Taking a narrower focus, to address the Household
sector (HH), it addresses the main changes in the composition of the HH sector
balance sheet. The primary aim is to test the sensitivity of household responses
to an unanticipated increase in interest rates, or a fall in property prices. The
model is based on Byrialsen & Raza (2019), with the central modification
to include a split in household debt between fixed- and flexible-interest rate
borrowing. This focus is largely due to a shift in the composition of HH debt
that occurred following innovations in products and legislation between 1996
and 2007. Within the setting of the macroeconomic model, it is argued that
household responses to economic shocks have become more sensitive as a result
of the innovations in the mortgage financing sector. The effects throughout the
transmission channels are amplified as a result of the migration of mortgage
borrowing from fixed- to flexible-interest rate products, with amplified general
effects to key economic indicators. The article thus recommends policy actions
that promote the migration from flexible- to fixed-interest rate products as far
as possible, in order to minimise macroeconomic instability in the event of a
negative shock.
iii
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Supplementary to the SFC model presented in article five, the thesis outlines
three potential modifications for future research. These modifications include,
firstly, the integration of household refinancing; secondly, the integration of
credit risk, defaults and loan to value ratios; and finally, the circular integration
of household and pension fund balance sheets.
In relation to the primary objectives of the thesis, it is concluded that, the
primary source of change in sector balance sheets is the creation of debt, and
that the balance sheets of the institutional sectors are directly dependent on
one another. Consequently the behaviour of one sector should not be analysed
independently of the other sectors. It is thus argued that the dependent nature
of sector flows and balance sheets restricts the plausible outcomes of economic
policies. In relation to the expansion of household debt in Denmark, it is argued
that the primary causes are a combination of financial innovations and the
liberalisation of the Danish mortgage finance system. The implication of which,
is that HH balance sheets have become more sensitive to potential economic
shocks - and as a result, so has the Danish economy.
iv
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Denne afhandling undersøger interaktionen mellem sektorbalancer i Danmark,
da disse er af afgørende betydning for at forstå effekterne og transmissionen af
såkaldte økonomiske “shocks” og politikker for en økonomi. Dette er især vigtigt
i konteksten af den hurtige udvidelse af finansielle sektorbalancer forud for den
finansielle krise. Afhandlingen adresserer dermed fire overordnede formål: Det
første er at identificere primære kilder til forandringer i sektorbalancer; Den
anden er empirisk at identificere sammenhænge og afhængigheder mellem de
tre primære sektorer – den private sektor (PRI), den offentlige sektor (GOV) og
den udenlandske sektor (ROW); Det tredje formål er at udforske implikationer
af disse interaktioner, og udvider analysen med en opdeling af PRI i tre sektorer
– husholdningssektoren (HH), den ikke-finansielle virksomhedssektor (NFC) og
den finansielle virksomhedssektor (FC); Endeligt er det fjerde formål at integrere
interaktionerne i et samlet makroøkonomisk framework – med formålet at
undersøge transmissionen af økonomiske shocks eller politiske ændringer igennem
økonomien – og at bruge frameworket til at undersøge årsager til og implikationer
af den hidtil usete udvidelse af ratioen mellem den private gæld og disponibel
indkomst i den danske husholdningssektor (HH). Afhandlingen adresserer disse
anliggender med afsæt i det Post-Keynesianske økonomiske paradigme og den
Babylonske tankegang, hvori stiafhængighed og en pluralistisk tilgang til metode
og metodologi tilskyndes. Dette opnås gennem fem uafhængige, men beslægtede
og opbyggende artikler.
Den første artikel, Money at first principles: A social value theory of money,
er en teoretisk udforskning af, hvordan pengedannelse er forbundet til gæld,
og forklarer, hvordan dette er forbundet til regnskabsbalancer på institutionelt
niveau. Artiklen argumenterer for, at kilden til forandring i en økonomisk
agents balancestruktur, er en ubalance mellem niveauet af disponible penge
fra indkomst og niveauet for påkrævede udgifter. Ethvert underskud dækkes
gennem efterspørgslen af kredit i bytte for gæld. Disse budgetbegrænsninger
kan aggregeres til netto finansieringsbehov på sektorniveau. Penge defineres ud
fra fire grundlæggende principper; den monetære enhed, det monetære symbol,
det monetære rum og social værdi. Disse grundprincipper anvendes til at
argumentere for, at efterspørgslen efter gæld i alle sektorer spiller en vigtig rolle
i forhold til pengestrømme og i forhold til de relative sektorbalancepositioner
i alle sektorer. Endvidere argumenteres der for, at staten bør spille en aktiv
v
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rolle i forhold til gældsakkumulering, og åbner derved diskussionen om sektorers
indbyrdes afhængighed.
Afhandlingens anden artikel, Sectoral balance analysis: Evidence from Scan-
dinavia, anvender Sector Balance Analysis (SBA) som fremgangsmåde til at
analysere langvarige historiske datasæt. Metoden inkluderer en deskriptiv anal-
yse af tendenser i sektorers nettoudlån (NL), langsigtede korrelationsstatistikker
mellem sektorer, samt en række af laggede korrelationsestimater relativt til
output-gabet, for at estimere timingen, hvormed hver sektor netto-udlåner
relativt til økonomisk ekspansion. Artiklen undersøger interaktionen mellem
nettoudlånskrav på sektorniveau for Danmark, Norge og Sverige i perioden
1950-2017 og der argumenteres for, at der er grund til at betvivle anvendelighed
af generaliserede teorier om sektorinteraktioner. I særdeleshed prædikterer
Ricardiansk Ækvivalens Hypotesen (REH) en negativ korrelation mellem PRI
og GOV. Analysen påviser denne negative korrelation, men viser at korrela-
tionen er forklaret af automatiske stabiliserende mekanismer i de tre nordiske
lande og ikke, som beskrevet af REH, af adfærden hos rationelle agenter. Twin
Deficit Hypotesen (TDH) prædikterer positive korrelationer mellem GOV og
ROW, hvilket findes at være tilfældet i Norge. Dette er til gengæld drevet af
indkomstflow til GOV fra indtægter fra internationalt oliesalg. Endvidere viser
artiklen, med brug af historisk data, at nuværende positive handelsbalancer
mellem hvert land, bedst kan forklares af historiske investeringer og udviklinger
i hvert land.
Den tredje artikel, Sectoral balance analysis: Short run deviations from long
run patterns, bruger rullende korrelations vinduer til at teste stabiliteten af
langsigtsrelationer mellem sektorers netto udlånspositioner identificeret i den
anden artikel. På baggrund af de rullende korrelationer argumenteres der for, at
langsigtsrelationerne observeret på sektoralt niveau empirisk kan identificeres i
lange perioder, men at relationerne ændrer sig signifikant over tid. Resultatet
illustrerer også, at de store afvigelser kan forklares ud fra specifikke økonomiske
hændelser, som medfører at mindst én sektor (oftest PRI) ændrer adfærd i
en periode. Udover at evaluere vedholdenhed i relationer, viser analysen en
simpel måde at identificere strukturelle brud i de individuelle sektorers adfærd.
Hovedkonklusionen i artiklen er, at langsigtskorrelationer mellem PRI, GOV og
ROW bryder ned på bestemte tidspunkter, og derfor varierer over tid.
vi
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Den fjerde artikel, Sektorbalancer i Danmark Efter Krisen, udvider SBA til-
gangen ved at disaggregere PRI i HH, NFC og FC med det formål at evaluere
logikken af danske recessionspolitikker introduceret efter den finansielle krise.
Den foreslår at konsolideringen af FC og NFC gæld blev udlignet af flows fra
ROW, og en forbedring af GOV netto udlån var drevet af stigning i efterspørgslen
efter husholdningslån (anti-cyklisk i forhold til netto lån). Artiklen fokuserer
på automatiske stabiliserende funktioner bygget ind i den danske velfærdsstat
og foreslår, at mens GOV er en sektor, hvor beslutningstagning (teoretisk) kan
centraliseres, er det også sektoren, der er designet til at være mest passiv i
forhold til ændringer i andre sektorer (særligt PRI). Der fremsættes, at statsligt
underskud kan forventes i perioder med recession, og at det vil være ulogisk
at introducere kontraktiv finanspolitik der kan reducere national indkomst –
eftersom GOV budgettet afhænger af en vending i PRIs netto låneadfærd.
Den femte artikle, Flexible rate mortgage loans: An SFC model of the impact of
mortgage credit innovations on Danish balance sheet stability, er hovedanalysen
i artiklen, og præsenterer en hybrid af de empiriske undersøgelser af SBA til-
gangen, og teoretisk drevne adfærdsstrukturer. Med brug af SNA (System og
National Accounts) introducerer artiklen en empirisk stock flow konsistent (SFC)
model af den danske økonomi, baseret på data for perioden 1995-2016. Med
fokus på husholdningssektoren adresserer den hovedændringer i kompositionen
af husholdningssektorens balance. Det primære fokus er test af husholdningernes
følsomhed over for uventede ændringer i renter, eller fald i huspriser. Mod-
ellen er baseret på Byrialsen og Raza (2019), med modifikationer som splitter
husholdningsgæld i fast- og variabelt forrentede lån. Dette fokus skyldes æn-
dringer i husholdningers gæld som følge af innovationer i finansielle produkter
og lovgrundlag i perioden 1996 og 2007. Ud fra den makroøkonomiske model,
argumenteres der for at husholdninger reagerer på økonomiske shocks ved at
være mere følsomme, som følge af de finansielle innovationer. Effekterne styrkes
som resultat af migration af husholdningslån fra fast- og fleksibelt forrentede
produkter, med forstærkede generelle effekter på økonomiske nøgleindikatorer.
Artiklen foreslår politisk handling, der kan understøtte migration fra fleksi-
belt til fast-forrentede produkter så vidt muligt, med det formål at minimere
makroøkonomisk ustabilitet i tilfælde af negative shocks.
Supplerende til SFC modellen i kapitel fem, præsenterer afhandlingen tre
potentielle modifikationer som kan undersøges i fremtidig forskning. Disse
vii
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modifikationer inkluderer først en integration af husholdningers refinansier-
ingsmuligheder, derefter integration af kreditrisiko, misligholdelse af lån og
lån til værdi-ratioer, og endeligt den cirkulære integration af husholdninger og
pensionsfondes finansielle balancer.
I relation til afhandlingens overordnede formål, konkluderes det, at den primære
kilde til ændringer i sektorers finansielle balancer er dannelsen af gæld, og at
balancerne for institutionelle sektorer er direkte afhængige af hinanden. Som
følge heraf bør adfærden i en sektor ikke analyseres uafhængigt fra andre sektorer.
Der argumenteres for, at den afhængige karakter af sektorbevægelserne og
balancerne begrænses af plausible økonomiske politikker. I relation til udvidelsen
af husholdningers gæld i Danmark, argumenteres der for, at den primære årsag
er en kombination af finansielle innovationer og liberaliseringen af det danske
lånesystem for husholdningslån. Implikationen er, at husholdningssektorens
finansielle balance er blevet sensitivt over for potentielle økonomiske shocks, og
som resultat heraf, er den danske økonomi også blevet det.
viii
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Introductory remarks
This dissertation consists of an introductory section, including a literature
review and methodological contextualisation, four self-contained but progressive
articles, an abbreviated future research agenda and a conclusion. Each of the
four articles can be read independently, and due to the similarity of topics they
do contain some overlap.
The main aim of the thesis is to investigate the dynamic interaction of sector
balance sheets. The five main institutional sectors are the household sector
(HH), the non-financial corporate sector (NFC), the financial corporate sector
(FC), and these first three sectors are collectively called the private sector
(PRI). The fourth is the government sector (GOV) and the fifth and final is
foreign sector (or, rest of the world, ROW). To assist with the flow between
the otherwise independent articles, a brief inter-leading paragraph is included
between them.
Context
This work began in November of 2016, in the middle of a turbulent decade,
and is nearing completion in the first months of 2020, shortly after the tenth
anniversary of the global financial crisis (GFC). It could be argued that the
GFC began in earnest with the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 15th September
2008. By 2014, the OECD (Ollivaud & Turner, 2014) estimated that among
all OECD countries the median potential output loss was roughly 2.75%. For
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland and Slovenia
the estimated loss was more than 10% (Ollivaud & Turner, 2014). Eleven
years after the crash, the USA, with Donald Trump as president, appears to
be on a modestly positive growth path, and China’s growth appears to have
slowed marginally. After recent tariff battles in an ongoing trade war, there
is uncertainty regarding future trade relations between the United States and
China, as well as the potential (and actual) spillover effects for other countries
(Bhattarai, Chatterjee, & Park, 2019; Li, He, & Lin, 2018). Far-right and far-left
political movements have emerged as serious political contenders, and there
have been a wave of protests and anti-austerity movements in France, Belgium,
Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Greece (Fominaya, 2017). The United Kingdom has
just exited from the European Union under the stewardship of Boris Johnson,
and will now go through the arduous two-year process of disentangling itself
2
Introduction, 3
and building a new international profile outside of the European Economic Area
(EEA) (McGrattan & Waddle, 2020). The unconventional monetary policies of
quantitative easing (QE), and the ECB’s bond-purchase program are still in
force, as Euro-zone economic growth has remained low. As noted by European
Commission’s Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (2020),
“elevated policy uncertainty as well as geopolitical and social tensions continue
to weigh on global growth prospects.” It is perhaps needless to say that the
global financial crisis (GFC) had, and continues to have, dramatic impacts, not
only on the financial but also on the real economic circumstances of virtually
every country around the world.
The aim of this work is to examine the macroeconomic interactions of sector
level balance sheets for the Danish economy and, thereby, to contribute to the
understanding of the developments that led to the GFC, and the implications
of the decisions of economic agents during this time for macroeconomic stability.
Much like many other developed nations, Denmark went through a process
of financial liberalisation in the late 1990s. Adjustable rate mortgages were
introduced in 1996 (Skinhøj, Gottschalck, Kunde, & Isaksen, 2019), and as
noted by Laustsen (2009), a range of credit market innovations occurred between
then and 2007. These are discussed in more detail in the article containing
the empirical model in Article 5, but the general effect was to reduce the cost
of borrowing and to make credit more readily accessible to borrowers. These
changes also had significant impacts on the behaviour of PRI.
The developments in the sectoral financial assets and liabilities can be observed
in the total aggregate financial balance sheet (FBS) for Denmark. Between 1995
and 2017, the size of the total FBS of Danish institutional sectors effectively
doubled in relative size, from around 7.5 times GDP to just over 14 times
GDP1.1. As can be seen in Figure 1.11.2, the relative size of financial stocks grew
1.1Data sourced from Eurostat, and the author’s own calculations. A similar plot for each
of the institutional sectors can be found in the appendix in Section 10. The general patterns
for each sector reflect a similar degree of financial expansion. The one exception might be
GOV, which reduced its financial footprint considerably between 2000 and 2006.
1.2The asset classes indicated follow the ESA 2010 (Statistical Office of the European
Communities., 2013) classifications and are abbreviated in the chart for brevity. F1. Monetary
gold and special drawing rights (SDRs) are excluded from the HH analysis as the total value is
negligible and is only held by FC. The full names of categories are as follows: Monetary gold
and special drawing rights (F1), Currency and deposits (F2), Debt securities (F3), Loans (F4),
Equity and investment fund shares (F5), Insurance, pensions and standardized guarantee
schemes (F6), Financial derivatives and employees stock options (F7) and Other accounts
(F8)
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rapidly prior to the Dot-Com crash in 2001, stabilised briefly before accelerating
between 2000 and 2007 leading up to the GFC, and then fell in 2008. Total
assets and liabilities recovered through 2011 and since 2016 has remained almost
constant. This is a substantial change in the relative scale of the financial sector
in Denmark. It also constitutes a significant change in the overall balance sheet
structures of each of the underlying sectors. To understand the role that each
sector played in this, and the causal mechanisms were that drove the expansion,
it is necessary to examine more disaggregated data.
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Figure 1.1: Financial Assets and Liabilities: Denmark
Each stage of rapid expansion (between 1995 and 2000, and again between 2001
and 2007) appears to be associated with a surge in the real GDP growth rate
(as illustrated by the dotted line against the right-hand axis). The constant
increase in the outstanding volume of FBSs, however is measured relative to
total incomes in Figure 1.1. This implies that the growth in income has not
kept pace with growth in the FBS. The non-consolidated data in the plot could
possibly be halved, since the assets of one party will necessarily be the liabilities
of another, but the relative scale would still double from roughly three times
GDP in 1995 to around six times GDP in 2017. The growth in FBSs appears
not to have had any discernible impact on another key macroeconomic indicator,
gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), or investment.
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Figure 1.2: Total economy: Gross fixed capital formation less depreciation
After the deduction of depreciation (or consumption of fixed capital) from
investment, as shown in Figure 1.2, the actual additions to capital stocks per
sector were less than five per cent of GDP per annum1.3. The effect of this is
captured in Figure 1.3, which shows that fixed capital stocks (also measured as
a proportion of GDP) have remained relatively unaffected. Figure 1.3 illustrates
that the levels of fixed capital stock relative to GDP have been almost perfectly
static. The dotted line in the chart illustrates real GDP growth through the
period, as measured on the right-hand axis. The sharp decline in 2009, coinciding
with the global financial crisis (GFC), can be seen to have some impact on
HH, as the prices of property fell. It would appear, from these illustrations,
that there were no lasting effects on the physical stock of capital relative to the
aggregate level of income. It should also be noted, that this measure includes
physical property, such as HH dwellings and corporate property, where price
inflation should have helped assets keep pace with financial market changes.
On the surface it would appear that, generally speaking, the changes to the real
economy did not reflect the changes that occurred on the financial side.
1.3This is not an ideal measure, since investment is a major component of GDP, but it does
give a clue as to the relative importance of fixed capital investment, and the contribution
towards total national income.
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Figure 1.3: Total economy: Fixed assets
The rise in prominence and influence of the financial markets has received
both strong support and strong critique. Before the financial crisis, it was
common for authors to promote the deregulation of capital markets in favour
of the expansion of financial services, and the deepening of financial markets
(Darrat, 1999; Nazmi, 2005). These results supported the financial liberalisation
thesis, as did many others, and helped to drive policies of privatisation and
deregulation, such as those of the Washington Consensus1.4. As Isenberg (2006)
identified, financial liberalisation and the promotion of competition between
financial services provided strong impetus for financial innovation, largely in
the name of improved efficiencies, reduced costs and greater flexibility.
Others, such as Arestis & Demetriades (1997), were not convinced, and pointed
to painful failures of financial liberalisation and deregulation in Latin America
and the fallibility of post hoc theoretical revisions regarding the sequencing
(between real and financial markets) and necessary pre-conditions (pre-financial-
reform of the real sector) for success. Isenberg (2006) agreed that the progressive
1.4These policies were prescribed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)
to developed and developing economies alike. As noted in Williamson (1993), the prescription
for economic success included Fiscal Discipline, Public Expenditure reprioritisation, and Tax
Reform. Financial Liberalization should be implemented where “the ultimate objective is
market-determined interest rates. . . ”, and Exchange Rate controls should be used to promote
exports. Trade Liberalisation and the use of tariffs rather than quantitative restrictions.
Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment. Privatization of all state enterprises, and deregulation
and the removal of impediments to new entrants and competition. Finally, Property Rights
should be secured.
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rounds of deregulation fostered competition and innovation, and mergers and
acquisition allowed large conglomerate banking enterprises to provide comprehen-
sive financial services (or what Davies, Richardson, Katinaite, & Manning (2010)
called the universal bank), but that the interconnectedness and interdependence
of the underlying components of these institutions introduced contagion risks
between markets. One common theme to financial crisis is that the participants
in the period of euphoria seldom see the crisis coming, or if they do expect a
crisis, they behave as though they will be able to avoid the crisis if it were to
arrive. Some participants take risks that they are not equipped or prepared
for, and it is only in the crisis that they they become aware of their position
or realise that it is not possible to offload the risks that they accumulated
prior. In relation to contingent risk in reinsurance “retrocessionaires”, Buffet
(2001, p. 10) remarked, “After all, you only find out who is swimming naked
when the tide goes out.” It is sometimes easier said than done to know if you
“have a bathing suit on”, and Davies et al. (2010) supported the argument that
deregulation and unchecked financial development contributed to the GFC -
primarily because the many important contingencies and dependencies were
concealed in the presence of rapid innovation, just as the resources available to
regulation were depleted. They also noted that the internal dependencies large
conglomerate financial “universal banks” were often difficult or impossible to
penetrate as an external observer.
More recently, Lavoie (2012) related the growth in prominence of financial
markets to broad acceptance of the principles of neoliberalism, and, amongst
others, the focus of central banks on inflation, the impacts of globalisation and
a shift in focus from a stakeholder corporate policy to a shareholder corporate
policy. He related these issues to “financialisation”1.5, and argued that contrary
to the favourable orthodox view of financial markets as places of complete
information, that they were in fact quite the opposite, and were characterised
by fraud and misinformation. He emphasised the need for more realistic views
of financial markets.
Several prominent theories (re)emerged to explain the the apparent increase in
macroeconomic fragility and the “financialisation” of the economy. Caverzasi
1.5As Sawyer (2013) explained, it is a rather ill defined term. As a field of study we can
follow Sawyer (2013) and accept Epstein (2005)’s definition of the concept as “the increasing
role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the
operation of the domestic and international economies.”
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& Godin (2015a) identified the theory of Capital Market Inflation (CMI) by
Toporowski & Gicquel (1999), wherein equity price increases trigger portfolio
demand in response to capital gains in the secondary market. This theory
can also be connected to the re-emergence the Minskian (1970, 1992) financial
instability hypothesis (FIH), which details the tendency of capitalist systems
towards periods of euphoria. As he (Minsky, 1978, p. 92) later noted, at
some point economic interventions prevent “fragile financial relations from
leading to debt deflations and deep depressions”. He explained that these
periods of “euphoria” involve excessive risk-taking, inadequate or insufficient
regulation. Caverzasi & Godin (2015a), and Girón & Chapoy (2012) argue that
this is precisely what preceded the GFC in the USA, with rapid and unchecked
expansion of sub-prime lending to borrowers with questionable credit-worthiness.
The interaction between HH and FC resulted in the rapid expansion of debt on
the balance sheets of HH. The difference this time, they noted, was that the
initial lenders recognised the risks, repackaged the risky loan assets in order to
offload the risks. FC in the USA, thus restructured the risky assets on their
balance sheets and used investment markets to shift the assets to the balance
sheets of other members of FC, HH and NFC. Unfortunately, this spread the
risk beyond the borders of the USA, and well beyond the banking sector. When
the USA government failed to provide a guarantee on Lehman Brothers, and
they filed for bankruptcy, markets reacted globally. German, UK and US money
market bid-to-ask spreads rose to triple, four times and five and a half times
in less than one month respectively (Nationalbank, 2009, p. 28), liquidity
collapsed and bid-to-ask spreads tripled in the widely used credit default swap
market. Property and mortgage debt markets were some of the hardest hit.
Denmark was no exception, with property prices falling by roughly 20% from
the peak in 2006 to the trough in 2011. This forced regulators to change the
capital assessment criteria on covered bond portfolios for major Danish credit
institutions, as covered mortgage bond capital rules were affected by changes
in the loan to value ratios of the underlying bonds (Danmarks Nationalbank,
2016, p. 35).
Whether or not these developments have been or are problematic is a complex
question to answer, and it is important to establish where strong connections
might exist. We can take the net financial wealth position for each sector as
a point of departure, as in Figure 1.4. From the perspective of net financial
8
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assets (i.e. assets less liabilities), relative to GDP, the solvency of each sector is
unremarkable. With the exceptions possibly of HH with assets of approx. 174%
of GDP, and RoW, with liabilities of 52% of Danish GDP at the end of 2017.
From this figure, FC and HH appear to be strongly (inversely) related up until
the crisis, and then diverge.
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Figure 1.4: National net financial wealth
Net positions are somewhat misleading for several reasons. Firstly, net positions
conceal the case where assets and liabilities expand simultaneously - i.e. gross
changes in balance sheet magnitude. Secondly, it is not possible to observe
changes in composition that occur within the asset and liability categories. As
a result, the interactions between sectors are somewhat obscured. Plotting the
progression of balance sheet composition reveals similarities across the sectors
and provides an initial indication of how the sectors might be related. It reveals
that the bulk of changes in the HH balance sheet asset position, and a significant
portion of the positive net asset position reflected in Figure 1.4, are the result of
a rapid rise in the portion of financial assets held in equities and pension assets.
On the surface this seems good, a simple excess in accumulation of assets over
liabilities. A more detailed examination of the underlying changes in each1.6,
however, reveals that the bulk of changes in the value of both the equity and
pension assets of HH came in the form of price changes (or revaluations). From
a net balance point of view, in Figure 1.4, NFC appears to be in significant
1.6As can be found in the appendix in Section 10.3.2
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deficit, but outstanding equity liabilities are marked-to-market1.7, and by far
the greatest proportion of the downward trend is simply a mirror of the rising
equity prices observed for HH1.8. This simple analysis illustrates a possible
relationship between the level of HH assets, the level of NFC liabilities and
capital gains on NFC equity. To contrast this, the increase of liabilities for HH
was driven by the active acquisition of greater quantities of debt - most of which
is mortgage debt. If equity prices were to fall, this relationship may prove to be
risky for HH.
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Figure 1.5: HH: Financial Assets and Liabilities
The Danish HH is of interest for another reason. Even before the crisis broke,
Denmark was recognised as having the highest level of HH debt to disposable
in come in the world (Girouard, Kennedy, & André, 2006). This can again be
seen through the lens of the sector balance sheet. HH financial assets, as shown
in Figure 1.5, as a proportion of GDP, doubled from around 155% to just over
300% of GDP. Liabilities, rose from just under 75% of GDP to a peak of around
150% of GDP in 2009 (just over 300% of HH disposable income). Financial
deregulation, relaxation of borrowing criteria and product innovation have been
1.7For accounting purposes, assets are valued at the current market value, rather than at
par value or initial sale value.
1.8Additional evidence of revaluation and transactions components in the change of stocks
for each sector can be seen in the appendix, in Section 10.4. The data presented is collected
from Eurostat, and includes the author’s own calculations.
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suggested as the leading causes of this trend (Scanlon, Lunde, & Whitehead,
2008). Paradoxically, in spite of the highest global level of debt to disposable
income, the Danish central bank (Danmarks Nationalbank, 2016) and the IMF
(Sheehy, 2014) report that there are no serious threats to financial stability.
This, it is argued, is because of a peculiar set of institutional arrangements that
insulate HH from negative shocks. At the height of the GFC, Skinhøj et al.
(2019, p. 6) illustrated that the number of forced sales only rose to around 500
from around 150 per month, and the arrears ratio on mortgage payments rose
to around 0.5% from an average of around 0.25%1.9. Although large in terms
of percentage change, according to an OECD study (André, 2016), they are
substantially lower than those for the other countries, such as the UK1.10, USA,
Ireland or Spain.
A significant concern in the context of the Danish economy is that although
Denmark maintains a sovereign currency, the Danish Krone is pegged to the
Euro. In order to maintain the currency peg, and to avoid currency speculation,
the Danish Nationalbank is thus compelled to keep Danish interest rates in
line with those set by the European Central Bank. The consequence of which
is that Danish interest rates are to a large extent, outside of the control of
Danish authorities. The interest rates faced by HH therefore followed European
interest rates to the lowest ever recorded levels during the crisis, which may
explain the modest impact described by Skinhøj et al. (2019). If interest rates
increase, however, so will the rates faced by Danish borrowers. The impact
of the cumulative decisions of sector participants leading up to the crisis, for
the macro economy, depends the transmission of economic shocks or policy
measures throughout the economy. As noted above, these transmissions are
determined by the web of connections between sectors.
Objectives
To achieve an adequate understanding of how the sector level balance sheets are
connected, it is necessary to unpack these interactions progressively. To do so,
the thesis thus addresses four key objectives: The first is to identify what the
primary source of change in sector balance sheets is; the second is to empirically
1.9The proportion of total mortgage payments at least 105 days overdue.
1.10The UK (peaked at around 2%), US (peaks per product category were: sub-prime-
adjustable products over 6%; prime adjustable over 3%; sub-prime-fixed 3%; prime fixed just
under 1%), Ireland (rose to over 12% by 2014) or Spain (peaked at over 5%)
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identify the connections and dependencies (interactions) between the three
primary sectors (PRI, GOV and ROW); the third is to explore the implications
of these interactions, and extends this analysis to include a disaggregated PRI
(split into HH, NFC and FC); and, the fourth is to assimilate these interactions
into a single macroeconomic framework - in order to examine the transmission
of economic shocks or policy measures throughout the economy - and to use
this framework to investigate the causes and implications of the expansion of
PRI debt relative to disposable income of Danish HH.
Research agenda
In order to located the research in the literature, the Literature Review covers the
core literature for the thesis. It describes the Post Keynesian link between debt
and money creation, and highlights the importance of the system of national
accounts and recent developments in financial account record-keeping. It links
the creation of money and debt to the net financing requirements of a sector,
and introduces Sector Balance Analysis (SBA) as a tool for both historical
analysis and identification of structural breaks. It provides an introduction
to stock-flow consistency and stock-flow consistent models, and an outline of
the most prominent Danish macroeconomic models. Finally, it locates the
research in the economic methodology literature, and discusses some theory
of science and methodological considerations. An additional basic outline of
the structures of SFC models is provided for readers who are not familiar with
the framework. An appendix, Appendix: Balance sheet descriptive analysis, is
a preliminary investigation into the underlying stock and flow characteristics
of the five institutional sectors of Denmark, and for the most part is used to
inform the analysis contained in the articles.
The first objective of this thesis is to identify the primary source of change
in sector balance sheets. The first article, in Article 1, is titled Money at
first principles: A social value theory of money, and takes the first step, and
investigates how money creation is linked to debt. It further explores what the
moral and ethical implications are of a redefinition of money creation (as an
endogenous extension of credit), and questions the current role of money in our
understanding of economic growth and development. Finally, it helps to answer
the question of how money creation is linked to aggregate sector positions. In
particular, how government (GOV) budget decisions are connected to private
12
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debt. The description of budget limitations can be applied at an aggregate level
to understand the accumulation of claims and counter-claims between sectors.
In terms of the second objective, and due to the closed accounting system, it
is relevant that the net position of each sector is suspended in balance with
all other sectors, and that the possibilities faced by each sector are shaped
by the collective positions of all other sectors. This condition provides crucial
information regarding the possible outcomes of economic policy under different
conditions. Beyond the flow of funds data available, it also means that the
relative sizes of flows and stocks of each sector can be compared in order to
identify likely interactions. In the wake of the GFC, several countries in Europe
have endured an extended period of low interest rates and centrally imposed
austerity measures. One of the primary motivations for these measures is the
idea that the external balance in each country cannot be positively affected by
GOV debt driven spending. There has been a strong focus on the benefits of
balanced GOV budgets at a European level, and this has translated into policy
in the form of EU imposed limitations of GOV indebtedness and fiscal deficits.
Part of the motivation for these policies is that the interactions between sectors
have been framed as long-run norms and generalisable theories. This leads into
the second analysis.
The second article, Sectoral balance analysis: Evidence from Scandinavia, ad-
dresses the second objective, to establish empirical evidence of interactions.
The Sector Balance Analysis (SBA) approach is used to analyse long histori-
cal datasets, in order to explore the extent to which the government (GOV),
private (PRI) and foreign (ROW) sectors are connected at an aggregate level.
The methods include a descriptive analysis of the trends in sector net lending
(NL), long-run correlation statistics between the sectors, and a range of lagged
correlation estimates relative to the output gap in order to examine the extent
to which each sector pro- or counter-cyclically net lends relative to economic
expansion. The article investigates the interaction between sector level net
lending requirements for Denmark, Norway and Sweden between 1950 and 2017.
It considers whether, or to what extent, each sector is in control of their net
lending positions, and finally it addresses the question of how generalisable
the findings for each of the Scandinavian economies really are, and whether
generalised theories should be used to justify general economic policy. It is also
the first time SBA is applied to longer historical datasets for the purpose of
13
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historical analysis.
The third article, in Article 3, is titled Sectoral balance analysis: Short run
deviations from long run patterns. As the title suggests, the paper explores
the stability of the long-run relationships between sector net lending positions
identified in Article two. Where Article 2 explores the extent to which a cross-
country comparison is valid, this article uses a rolling correlation window to
evaluate the extent to which the long-run patterns for each country persist over
time. The implication being that if they are not stable, then policy prescriptions
should be adjusted accordingly. In addition to evaluating the persistence of
relationships, the analysis provides a simple way to identify structural breaks
in the behaviour of individual sectors. It is thus predominantly focused on
the second objective. The SBA approach, applied to the three primary sectors
(GOV, PRI and ROW), thus provides a strong foundation for understanding
the aggregate level dependencies between sectors, and some of the risks related
to property income flows.
The third objective, to explore the implications of these interactions, is addressed
in the fourth article, Sektorbalancer i Danmark efter krisen, and extends this
analysis to include a disaggregated PRI, and builds on the SBAs from Articles
2 and 3 for policy analysis. This separation also permits a more complex
description of the flows between the sectors, and takes the analysis a step closer
to understanding HH accumulations in a macroeconomic context. The article
focusses on the Danish austerity policies introduced after the GFC. Particularly,
the interactions related to the Danish welfare state, and the role of government
in response to periods of economic recession or crisis.
The fifth and final article, Flexible rate mortgage loans: An SFC model of the
impact of mortgage credit innovations on Danish balance sheet stability, is the
main contribution of the thesis, and presents a hybrid of the empirical investi-
gations of the SBA approach, and theoretically driven behavioural structures.
With the use of the System of National Accounts (SNA), the paper implements
a fully empirical stock flow consistent (SFC) model of the Danish economy,
estimated on data for the period 1995 to 2016. It thus addresses the fourth
objective, and uses the model to investigate the innovations to the mortgage
financing industry in Denmark leading up to the GFC. It will also address
the two key risk factors identified above: an increase in interest rates; and, a
possible property market response.
14
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Finally, three additional modifications are identified as Future research perspec-
tives, and the final section, Conclusion, provides a brief overview of the main
findings in the context of the research objectives.
15
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2.1 Introductory remarks
The purpose of this review is to cover the core literature in each of the key
areas of this thesis, namely the social value theory of money, systems of national
accounts, sector balance analysis, stock-flow consistent (SFC) models and Danish
macroeconomic models. The literature has been reviewed by a combination of
traditional methods and structured searches of the academic literature.
The content of the review follows a simple progression; firstly, money is defined
and linked to the creation of debt. This link is based on economic theory from the
Post Keynesian economic paradigm, which differs in some fundamental ways from
what is largely considered to be mainstream economic theory. These differences
stem from a difference in the philosophical and methodological foundations of
each. Of the two broader paradigms, the Post Keynesian paradigm provides a
closer representation of reality when we consider descriptions of money.
The Post Keynesian link between debt and money creation is the cornerstone of
financial balance sheet expansion, and the attention to the rigidities of accounting
and banking systems make the paradigm perfectly suited to analysing data
stored in the form of national accounts. Recent developments in the system
of national accounts have made it possible to analyse the interaction between
the financial side of the economy and the real side within a closed accounting
system. At an national level, this is achieved by aggregating the economy up to
the main institutional sectors.
The most advanced form of analysis within the Post Keynesian paradigm,
Stock-Flow Consistent (SFC) models, incorporates Post Keynesian theoretical
behaviours into medium to large systems of simultaneous equations. One of
the main authors in the SFC tradition, Wynne Godley (1999a), also promoted
another form of analysis, sectoral balance analysis (SBA). SBA can be used to
inform the modeller of some of the main interactions between the institutional
sectors. Much like the money creation and debt link for the private individual,
sectors as a whole have incomes and expenditures and accumulate debts and
assets. SBA allows an SFC modeller to build an understanding of the net
financing requirements of each of the sectors over time. This knowledge is
invaluable in the complex task of building a large empirical structural model
of an economy. It is also instructive for policy limitations, depending on the
pre-existing economic conditions.
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The final part of the literature review is a slight divergence into the fundamental
structure of SFC models, as the basic structural characteristics of SFC models
are not included in Article 5, which presents the empirical SFC model.
The review below is an attempt to cover the core literature behind this chain of
logic, and these main topics also represent the tools and analyses presented in
the articles that follow.
2.2 Money and social importance
The literature on money is extensive, as a result it is necessary to be selective
in terms of the literature included in this section. This inclusion is to support
the work in Article 1, and first presents something of a controversy regarding
the connection between debt and money creation.
Most will agree that money is of central importance in an economy. Broadly
speaking, the definition of money has been dominated by what has come to be
known as the mainstream view. This is particularly the case for the definition of
the role that the banking sector plays in the creation of money. Money is most
commonly defined by its functions as a means of payment, store of value or unit
of account (Acemoglu, Laibson, & List, 2015, p. 621; Blanchard, Amighini, &
Giavazzi, 2013, p. 67; Frank, Bernanke, & Kaufman, 2007, p. 648; Mishkin &
Eakins, 2016, pp. G-11). The creation of money is then typically described by
the money multiplier2.11, where a deposit is made in a bank, which can then
lend a portion of that deposit, dependent on the level of the fractional reserve
requirements set by the central bank.
In recent decades, an alternative economic paradigm, the Post Keynesian (PK)
paradigm, has emerged that challenges this description. According to PK
authors, such as Moore (1983a) and Palley (2002), the money multiplier is
based on outdated and outright incorrect monetarist theory, and promotes
the idea that it is possible for a central authority of some kind to control
the supply of money into an economy - an exogenous money supply2.12. In
pedagogical representations this is captured by a vertical supply of money curve
in the market for money. They further argue that this misguided description
2.11See for example Silber & Ritter (1983, p. 51), Kelly (1993, p. 309), Mishkin (2007, p.
374), Kidwell, Blackwell, Whidbee, & Peterson (2009, p. 52), Madura (2010, p. 103), Pilbeam
(2010, p. 78).
2.12This is particularly relevant for Denmark, where monetary policy is limited to the
maintenance of a fixed exchange rate to the Euro. (Spange & Toftdahl, 2014)
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of money creation has wide-reaching social and political implications, some of
which are explored further in Article 1. The circuit theory of money (CTOM),
which echoes the PK theory, developed simultaneously in France, the earliest
publications of which were by Le Bourva (1959, 1962). As a form of validation
of the concrete description of money creation provided by PK and CTOM
authors, simple pedagogical explanations have also recently been provided by
S&P’s chief economist Sheard (2013), the Bank of England (McLeay, Radia, &
Thomas, 2014) and the Bundesbank in Germany (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2017).
A central argument by PK authors was that the money multiplier description
was out of line with reality. This was relatively easy to demonstrate2.13, but
the challenge that PKs wished to make was at a deeper level. Both CTOM
and PK theory explained that money is created by banks in the process of
lending. Although this is similar to the money multiplier, the one fundamental
difference is that PK and CTOM authors believe that there is no initial amount
of money that is floating around in the economy waiting to be deposited2.14.
The trigger for growth in the money stock therefore cannot be the supply of a
deposit, but must rather be the demand for new money - this demand is then
accommodated by the central bank through the issue of central bank reserves
(see, A P Faure, 2013). This was initially illustrated pedagogically, in direct
contrast to the classical, monetarist and neo-classical (CMN) schools2.15, as a
horizontal money supply curve2.16. CTOM and PK therefore emphasise that the
2.13Moore (1983b) presented formal causality tests and micro-theoretic models of banking.
The institutional arrangements of modern banking, and the present instruments of monetary
and interest rate policy were covered by Arestis & Eichner (1988), Lavoie (1996), Lavoie
(2006), and Dow (2006). The temporal ordering of lagged fractional reserve accounting
was also covered by Godley & Cripps (1983) and Godley & Lavoie (2012), and number of
additional studies have since emerged showing the disconnection between the level of the
fractional reserve requirement and the level of money in circulation in an economy. In addition,
qualitative descriptive explorations of bank and central bank processes were provided by Kock
(1954), Le Bourva (1992) and Faure (2008), and these clearly show that the timing of bank
loan issuances and the delayed settlement of bank-to-central-bank reserve requirements make
it impossible (within modern banking institutional structures) that causality could run from
reserve requirements backwards to the level of broad money in circulation.
2.14Further history of the development of money and banking systems is available in Smith
(2014).
2.15The strongest objections raised were against monetarists, and the money multiplier
explanation should perhaps not be used as device to coerce a broad array of economists into
the objectionable category of “orthodoxy”. It was not only the money multiplier in of itself
that was the target of the initial PK critique, but the application of monetarist policies, based
on a modified versions of the quantity theory of money (Kaldor, 1970).
2.16This was disputed amongst Post Keynesian authors but resolve as a difference in focus,
rather than in fundamental beliefs about the money creation process. Those who believed
that all demand for credit could be and generally was accommodated by the central bank
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productive process in the economy is triggered by this initial demand. Money,
then, is considered to be endogenously determined by the participants of the
economy - and so cannot be exogenous.
For PKs, this endogeneity was reflective of a broader truth - if the volume of
money was a direct reflection of the volume of production in the economy, it was
impossible that money could be a simple lubricant in the economic system. This
idea, that money was a neutral element for long term growth prospects, was,
and still is, a central component of CMN theories, and one of the foundations
of the theory of a long-run general equilibrium. To accept the endogeneity of
money creation (and thus to reject the neutrality of money) was, to PKs (Moore,
1983b), to reject the notion of general equilibrium. The relevance of long term
averages was questioned in the light of structural and technological changes, and
the growing belief if the market mechanism as a self-managing, self-correcting
force was rejected. The endogeneity of money was thus a cornerstone of much
broader theoretical critiques.
For the present discussion, and the sections to follow, these assertions have
some important implications. Firstly, as will be discussed in Article 1, the
composition of debt is very important, as the purpose for which it is borrowed
will have implications for how the economy develops in the future.
Secondly, when the expansion of the stock of money is tied to the expansion of
debt, as Faure (2013; 2014) has described in great detail, the provision of a loan
by a bank results in the expansion of the balance sheets of both the borrower
and the lender. The borrower experiences an increase in deposit assets (money)
and a simultaneous increase in a debt liability (the loan contract). The lender
experiences the inverse, the deposits are a liability for the bank, and the loan is
an asset. This is as true for a sector as a whole as it is for an individual. It
also means when someone borrows from a commercial bank, by virtue of dual
entry accounting, it results in the expansion of both the borrower and lender’s
were dubbed horizontalists (such as, Moore, 1983b), and those that argued that the central
bank would impose some kind of limits (thus adjusting the shape of the supply curve to be
somewhat upward sloping) were called structuralists (see, Goodhart (1989), Palley (1991),
Palley (1996)). As note by Dow (2006, p. 37), the main emphasis of earlier authors was
that a vertical money supply curve was illogical, and the primary aim was to contradict the
monetarist view, and that the structuralist view simply introduced additional considerations.
Lavoie (2006, p. 19) also identified several reasons why the suggested structural constraints
might not be relevant over very short time-frames - allowing the supply of money curve to
take a variety of forms, depending on the length of time considered.
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balance sheet2.17. For example, if the private sector borrowed from the financial
corporate sector, then both the private sector and financial corporate sector
balance sheets would increase in size by the same amount as the loan. This can
then be observed at an aggregate level in the balance sheet data for each of the
institutional sectors. As a result, developments in the scale of financial balance
sheets is a reflection of credit extension, and developments in the composition
of financial balances sheets reveal a great deal about how the initial credit was
utilised, and the interaction between the borrowing and lending sectors. Balance
sheet analysis in general thus provides a window into the distributional and
developmental effects of credit creation. The appendix to the thesis provides
such a simple balance sheet analysis for Denmark. Although it does not answer
any specific question, it provides useful information about the progression of
the financial balance sheets of each sector.
Thirdly, the future levels of macroeconomic indicators are not pre-determined
by any long-run forces, but are the result of active intervention by various
economic participants. The economy then is not on any long run trajectory,
but is the cumulative result of continuous active intervention - it is therefore
path-dependent. Davidson (2003) described this feature as non-ergodic, and
Dow (2010) described it as non-deterministic. This feature makes the long term
nature of the economy very difficult to predict. As noted by Dow (2010, p. 4):
“If the system’s internal structure is evolving in a non-deterministic
manner, and the influences to which it is subject in the future are
not known (or all knowable) in advance, then the scope for using
frequency distributions to quantify a probabilistic or stochastic
expectation is lacking.”
As she discussed, this does not close the possibility for ordinal probabilistic
outcomes. In other words, it is still possible to estimate with some degree
of probability whether one event is more likely to occur than another. The
argument is rather that longer term predictability is problematic - as is reflected
in the relatively short-term focus in the empirical model in Article 5.
The process of economic activity in a credit based economy, or as Keynes (J.
Keynes, 1933) described, a monetary production economy, can be captured in
2.17Both the deposit and loan components must simultaneously be recorded against both the
borrower and lender, resulting in four simultaneous additions. See A P Faure (2013) for a
pedagogical explanation.
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comprehensive macroeconomic stock-flow consistent (SFC) accounting models.
SFC models are the most advanced form of analysis in the PK paradigm,
and incorporate PK theoretical behaviours into medium to large systems of
simultaneous equations. The recent protagonists for the use of these models
were Wynne Godley and Marc Lavoie, who provided what could be seen as a
quantitative synthesis of many Post-Keynesian theoretical perspectives (Wynne
Godley, 1999b; Godley & Lavoie, 2001, 2005, 2012). Together with the growing
availability of financial market data, these models took cognisance of the
inclusion of a detailed financial side to the economy, particularly the mechanical
flow of money.
As noted in the brief introduction above, Wynne Godley (1999a) promoted
the use of Sectoral Balance Analysis (SBA) as a tool explore the interactions
between sectors. In particular he explored the impact of sustained patterns of
surplus or deficit funding requirements between the sectors. SBA respects the
legalities and rigidities of accounting practices, much like the SFC tradition,
but focuses primarily on the net lending or net borrowing requirements of each
sector. Much like the money creation and debt link for the private individual,
sectors as a whole have incomes and expenditures and accumulate debts and
assets. As financial assets or debts grow, they also generate proportional income
or expenditure flows - or property income.
Wynne Godley (1999a) used SBA to identify unsustainable patterns in the
US economy. Later, Godley (2000) also used SBA to predict many of the
difficulties faced by the US economy as a result of the excessive accumulation
of debt by households. More recently, there have been relatively few examples
of SBA used for economic analysis, and none that use SBA for historical event
analysis. The only examples to be found through structured searches of the
literature were Barbosa-Filho, Rada, Taylor, & Zamparelli (2006), Barbosa-
Filho, Arnim, Taylor, & Zamparelli (2008) and Glötzl & Rezai (2018). The
focus of these analyses are primarily to test the validity of two main theoretical
positions; Richardian equivalence, which refers to the intertemporal smoothing
of household consumption; and the twin deficits hypothesis, which, in it’s
simplest form, predicts that deficits in the public sector will result in greater
foreign deficits for the country in question.
Article 2 below contributes to the SBA literature with an application to historical
analysis, where SBA is used to reinterpret historical economic events from the
23
Literature Review, 24
perspective of sector financing requirements. It also contains an historical review
of the development of sectoral accounts in the three Scandinavian economies
of Denmark Norway and Sweden. Article 3 extends the use of SBA further,
as a tool for the identification of structural breaks in historical data. The use
of rolling windows, applied to the correlation of net lending and borrowing
positions between the broader sectors, allows the analyst to identify changes in
the general pattern of sector interactions. This identification strategy identifies
most major changes in expenditure and income patters for each of the sectors.
In general, SBA, especially when applied together with a balance sheet analysis,
allows an SFC model builder to develop a detailed understanding of the net
financing requirements, and the drivers thereof, for each of the sectors over time.
These analyses, however, would not be possible without accurate and reliable
data. The collection of this data, and the history of the development of these
datasets is of great relevance for the future prospects of both SBA and SFC
modelling.
2.3 System of National Accounts, SBA and social ac-
counting
This section reflects briefly on the importance of the development of the System
of National Accounts (SNA) for economic analysis. The structure of national
accounts and the statistical work required to produce a systematic, dual en-
try accounting, stock, flow and stock-flow consistent national framework are
prerequisites for empirical SBA and SFC modelling.
As noted in the section above, the balance sheets of each economic unit, or
collectively of each sector, allow us to observe and map interesting and useful
behaviours in an economy. We can observe the changes in aggregate balance sheet
because of the availability of aggregated national accounts statistics. Fortunately
in modern times these are organised in the systematic dual entry accounting
format of internationally standardised systems of national accounts (SNA).
While several scholars in several countries around the world had attempted to
measure the national income and product in various ways, it was Morris A.
Copeland that was responsible for the development of the first flow-of-funds
accounts for the USA between 1944 and 1952 - initially covering the period 1936
to 1942. Early works are also attributed to James Meade and Richard Stone of
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England, who, together with Copeland, contributed greatly to the establishment
of the 1953 United Nations System of National Accounts (SNA53)2.18.
The first report linked to the United Nations, and which emphasised the
need for standardised accounts was published in 1947 by the United Nations
Statistical Commission (UNSC), by a committee of experts. The project was a
continuation of work that was started as the result of recommendations made
at an international conference in 19282.19 - work that was unfortunately later
interrupted by the Second World War. This was followed in 1953 by the first set
of 6 accounts and 12 tables. Revisions followed in 1960, 1964, 19682.20, 19932.21
and 2008.
Although a more complete description of the developments is provided in Article
2 below, it is relevant here to mention that some efforts were simultaneously
under way in Scandinavia. In Denmark, the earliest records of estimates of
national income are from the late 1800s and early 1900s2.22, but as noted by
Abildgren (2008), the development of separate accounts for the institutional
sectors occurred fairly late. Abildgren (2008) also noted that the first complete
set of annual flow-of-funds accounts for the institutional sectors of Denmark
were only produced in 2001 by Statistics Denmark (DST), covering from the
end of 19942.23. The first quarterly statistics were only produced from 2004 by
Danmarks Nationalbank2.24. Where Denmark has lagged behind in publication
of quarterly financial statistics, the country has excelled in the establishment of
2.18Historic versions of the SNA can be found at https://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/
hsna.asp .
2.19As noted in the preface of Stone (1947), the work began in response to “Recommendations
V(I) of the Final Act of the International Conference relating to Economic Statistics, Geneva.
14 December 1928.”
2.20At this point the SNA were extended to include balance sheets and input-output tables.
In addition, there was increased focus on constant prices.
2.21The 1993 version provided a more complete synergy with international accounting systems.
2.22Christensen, Hjerppe, Krantz, & Nilsson (1995) provides a fairly detailed historical
account of the development of national accounts in Denmark.
2.23Abildgren (2008) has more recently constructed a variety of annual financial stock
statistics from 1875 to 2005, the general nature of which appear to be very robust when
checked against more comprehensive recent DST data. Abildgren (2012) has consequently
constructed non-seasonally adjusted quarterly flow data for the period 1948 to 2010, using
largely the same indicator variables as Statistics Denmark for the decomposition of annual
statistics to quarterly. Where indicators were available he used the Proportional Denton Least
Square Method, and where not, he used the mechanical least-squares method - both of which
were the recommended methods of the IMF manual on quarterly national accounts.
2.24As noted by Abildgren (2008), both the quarterly and annual sets were produced in
accordance with the European System of National Accounts (1995), ESA95, which was the
European version of the United Nations system of national accounts, SNA93. The latter
being the first to fully detail the inclusion of financial accounts.
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micro-data collection and storage. Enormous efforts of DST, universities and
public administration have produced data at the level of the individual and firm
for all members of the population, and all firms. The data covers a range of
tax, income, health, employment and education categories and is now some of
the most detailed, complete and accessible2.25 in the world. These micro-data
are used for a detailed understanding of the composition of household mortgage
debt in Denmark in Article 5 below. As noted above, Article 2 includes a
review of these developments in Scandinavian countries, and will therefore not
be discussed further here.
As useful and powerful as the SNA have become, there is an important caveat
to how broadly the information contained therein should be applied. The
history of the recording of national accounts statistics differs between regions,
with the initial focus being on a measurement of national income, or national
product. The measurement and definitions of concepts, however, can rarely be
reconciled perfectly. Copeland (1935) recognised from an early stage that there
are significant limitations in the construction of data driven definitions. As
he explained in the excerpts below, such an approach makes definitions much
clearer, even if they do not capture the full scope of a more morally acceptable
definition.
“When we define our basic economic concepts in terms of the meth-
ods of measuring them statistically, their meaning is clarified and
made more precise. The concepts also become less neat and we may
be compelled to recognize certain ambiguities, to reckon with two
definite meanings instead of one vaguer one.” (Copeland, 1935, p.
377)
“The ethical significance of the concepts of national wealth and
national income has been emphasized. To be sure they are ethical
in a somewhat narrow sense - they conceive our society and its
organic and inorganic environment in collectivist terms as a system,
a system serving exclusively human wants, and serving only those
human wants the means of satisfying which can be measured in
dollars.” (Copeland, 1935, p. 381)
The importance of excluding intermediate consumption and the problems of
2.25Accessibility is contingent on many criteria, but provided the researcher is willing to live
up to those criteria, the process by which to access the data is quick and simple.
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double counting were one such ambiguity. His argument was that by starting
with measurement, the contents of a measured concept might be clearer than if
one started with a concept for which measurement was not possible. This had
and continues to have very serious implications for the content of these mea-
surements, and the inferences that can be drawn from them. National accounts
by definition only include records of economic activity where a transaction has
taken place. As a result, many valuable social and household activities are
excluded from the general reckoning of GDP.
He also made clear that while the ethical composition of concepts (or their
definitions) was important, this should not prevent or detract from the value
of using measurements in order to come to some very valuable insights about
the economy. The risk of such an approach is that the practitioner, that makes
use of the data to draw insights, might lose touch with the statistician that
compiles the data from a variety of sources. His conclusion (Copeland, 1935, p.
386) was not unclear about the potential to link such measurements to more
ethical and moral social considerations, noting that,
“Development in this direction of social cost accounting should do
much to bring about a closer articulation of the theory of value and
distribution with statistical measurement.”
It is these ethical and moral considerations that inspire much of Article 1, where
an attempt is made to reconcile the definition of money with the concept of
social value. More recent developments on alternative measures of economic
performance have be presented by Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi (2010), which has
already stimulated several active measures of economic performance in terms of
social progress - rather than purely monetary criteria.
The advances in data collection and the statistical recording infrastructure
have been profoundly influenced by advances in technology over the past fifty
years. Computing and data storage technology has today made it possible to
collect vast quantities of data in exceptional detail. Whereas in Copeland’s
time, the collection of statistical material could quite literally be measured in
physical volumes. Although discussion of the ethical considerations have been
extensive, many of these discussions took place in the time before statistical
or data-driven alternatives were possible. It is important that the moral and
ethical considerations are again brought to the forefront. As mention, this is in
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part what is attempted in Article 1.
The simultaneous construction of financial and real accounts, which developed
in earnest after the 1993 revision of the SNA, allows for cross-verification of
the net funding requirement of each sector. By this it is meant that changes
in the financial assets of each sector can be cross-verified against transactions
that take place in the real side of the economy. As noted above, SBA involves
the assessment of institutional sector flows and stock accounts, but it pays
particular attention to the accounting identities that require all sector flows (and
associated financial stocks) to net sum to zero. This ability to cross reference the
real and financial flows allows us to draw connections between the cumulative
actions of the participants in each sector (for example, a fall in the general
propensity to invest) and the ultimate financial and real position that the sector
ends up in (possibly with lower overall demand, lower employment, but with
positive net financial balances).
The importance of these relationships was recognised by Wynne Godley around
1974, as he noted in (W Godley & Lavoie, 2007, p. xxxvi), Godley & Cripps
(1974) was the first account of their acknowledgement of the importance of
the net lending identity (that should net sum to zero) for economic analysis.
This was followed by several publications (Cripps & Godley, 1976, 1978) while
working as the Cambridge Economic Policy Group (CEPG), culminating in
the book Godley & Cripps (1983). Godley continued to develop models, and
ultimately, via a number of correspondences, wrote what is now broadly used as
the textbook for stock-flow consistent modelling in 2007, with the updated 2012
version, Godley & Lavoie (2012), published posthumously. Godley is recognised
by several economists, such as Bezemer (2009) and Fiebiger (2013), as a key
contributor to the emergence of sector balance analysis (or sector financial
balance analysis), and thereafter SFC modelling.
The formal modelling work of Godley, in Godley & Lavoie (2012), is the basis
of the final article in this thesis, Article 5, but unlike many modern models,
the model was not an adaptation of a model from one of the chapters of the
book. The model adheres to the SFC rules, but the accounting identities and
the aggregation choices are based on the national accounts of Denmark, and
the peculiar features of the balance sheets of each sector.
In order to provide some context to where the model fits into the existing
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literature, some of the more recent developments in SFC modelling are discussed
below.
2.4 Post Keynesian Stock-flow consistent models
This section will be divided into two very brief sections. The first is a brief
description of what is meant by stock-flow consistency, as these are the fun-
damental rules of the SFC model in Article 5. The second covers the SFC
literature that has addressed the problem of expanding household debt, a short
summary of the current macroeconomic models in used at major institutions in
Denmark, and a brief history of SFC models for the Danish economy.
Dos Santos (2006), Caverzasi & Godin (2013), Caverzasi & Godin (2015b) and
Nikiforos & Zezza (2017) provide surveys of the literature, each progressively
covering the most recent publications. As noted by Nikiforos & Zezza (2017),
“accounting consistency is just one side of the SFC approach, with a demand-led
economy and an explicit treatment of the financial side being the other.” The
first step, however is to describe the accounting consistency.
2.4.1 Stock-flow consistency
Stock-flow consistency describes a set of models that observe strict accounting
rules. Nikiforos & Zezza (2017) delineated this further, specifying that such
models should be consistent across three dimensions, flow, stock, and stock-
flow. Flow consistency is further sub-divided into horizontal (inter-sector) and
vertical (intra-sector) consistency. The names come from the spreadsheet-like
transactions flow matrix (TFM), as illustrated in Table 2.2, reproduced from
Godley & Lavoie (2012, p. 7) in Section 2.6.2. The flows can be somewhat
confusing at first, but are designed to connect the financial and real components
of the economy.
Horizontal consistency requires that any inflow (income) to one sector must be
identically matched by an outflow (expense) from another sector. Wages, for
example would be an outflow for firms, and an inflow for households. Vertical
consistency reflects an internal consistency between the real and financial aspects
of each sector. Financial flows are considered in a lower part of the table, and
must net out the real flows that occur in the TFM. These are calculated at
the end of each observation period (I.e. after any consumption or investment
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decisions). While it may seem counter intuitive, at the end of a period, any
positive balance remaining after expenditures must be recorded as a negative
flow out of the recipient sector. For example, if households choose to hold
deposits at the end of a given period, any positive balance for households after
real flows will be marked as a negative flow in the deposits row, as cash must
flow out for HH to acquire deposits. The sector that provides the financial or
fixed asset in exchange for these outflows (for example if the financial sector
provides deposit securities) must record a positive flow (or inflow)2.26.
Stock consistency is treated similarly, and applies to all financial stocks. All
financial assets must always be reflected by equivalent counterpart liabilities.
Physical assets, such as fixed property are permitted to accumulate without
counter-balancing liabilities. Taken again from Godley & Lavoie (2012), Table
2.1 (in Section 2.6.1) represents a highly simplified balance sheet for a closed
economy. Stock-flow consistency requires that all flows are fully accounted
for in the accumulation of stocks. Capital gains are treated separately in a
revaluations matrix, but are also fully reflected in stock values. Price adjustments
can be driven by changes inside the model, but do not in themselves represent
transactions and so are recorded separately.
Stock-flow consistency is thus a means of delimitation, or a restrictive covenant
for model construction, rather than a specific model type or method. The
restriction requires that the model is formulated with at least some attention
paid to the macro-implications of a modelling choice. In many ways this limits
the modeller from introducing behaviours that are not consistent with reality.
Or, as Nikiforos & Zezza (2017) described this, it imposes constraints that
reduce the degrees of freedom available to the builder.
2.4.2 SFC models of household debt
Household debt has been a feature of SFC models since the 2007-08 global
financial crisis (GFC). Lavoie (2008) was one of the first models to introduce
household debt, but this was initially limited to consumer credit.
2.26For example, if the household sector allocates 100 euros of all income to deposits, the
“Deposits” line (or row) will contain (€-100) in the household column, and plus (€+100) in the
banking sector column. This reflects the transfer of purchasing power to the banks in order
to “purchase” deposit securities. The same would be true for any transfer to the financial
sector for financial assets, or the non-financial corporate sector for equities. The purchase of
equities from the NFC would result in a negative flow for HH and a positive flow for NFC.
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The sub-prime mortgage crisis in the USA, and similar links to mortgage
borrowing in other countries, spurred the introduction of household debt to
models. Due to the mortgage borrowing context, it was commonly linked to
the introduction of a more defined property market. There are very few SFC
models of real estate property and mortgage markets available in the literature.
The main works include, Zezza (2008), Fontana & Godin (2013), Khalil (2011),
Effah (2012), Beckta (2015) and Nikolaidi (2015).
To investigate wealth distribution effects, Zezza (2008) built a theoretical model
to which he introduced both mortgage debt for capitalist households and firm
debt for the non-financial corporate sector.
Zezza (2008) is a central model in the literature related to mortgage debt
accumulation, and utilised the PK theory of mark-up pricing by firms to set up
a property market, where households purchase houses from firms. House prices
can then be determined in a supply and demand framework, where excessive
build up of inventories, or low demand for houses can result in a fall in prices for
new houses. A key feature in the model was a differentiation in the propensities
to consume our of wealth for the two classes of households presented.
As a means to evaluate the effects of financialisation (the recent prominence of
financial markets), Treeck (2009) developed a synthetic model where households
are split between workers and rentiers, where rentiers borrow, but the model is
intended to discuss financialisation, and so did not focus on mortgage borrowing.
Some time later, Khalil (2011) presented three models as part of a PhD disserta-
tion, the first introduced mortgage borrowing by households, where households
are also purchase houses - based largely on the structure of Zezza (2008). The
second model excluded household debt, but modelled the interactions of two
economies. The third model re-introduced household debt in the multi-country
setting, where he captured interbank debt, and the effects of a credit crunch.
As noted by Beckta (2015), it is the first model to introduce rental income as
an opportunity cost. Like Khalil (2011), the model in Article 5 below includes
depreciation of houses.
Effah (2012) introduced non-performing loans in a single model with a variety
of simulations (or experiments).
Beckta (2015) expanded on this feature, based also on the Zezza (2008) mark-up
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pricing of houses by the NFC sector, he introduced cyclicality to the level of
the mark-up. Households accumulate mortgage debts, and use the mortgages
to purchase houses that are produced by the NFC sector. A key feature
introduced by Beckta was a large number of conditional behaviours (operators)
in the behavioural equations for each sector. He, like Khalil (2011), modelled
the returns on houses as the real (net of potential rental income) returns of
investment in houses. He, like Effah (2012), also introduced non-performing
loans, together with capital adequacy ratios in the commercial banking sector.
Unlike the empirical model in Article 5 below, his model also allowed interest
rates to adjust according to a modified Taylor rule. Nikolaidi (2015) has
since constructed a detailed theoretical model that is able to incorporate the
securitisation of household debt. An aspect of the model that is potentially very
useful for further developments of the present work is the inclusion of credit
rationing, where desired loans are not necessarily satisfied by the financial sector.
This is the model with the most advanced financial sector in the literature, and
provides a guide to the inclusion of debt securitisation for future work.
Although each of these models provide useful tools for the integration of real-
estate and debt markets into the SFC framework, they do not link the mortgage
lending system to the complete set of national accounts data, nor do they
address conditions in the Danish economy. The labour required for developing
such a model is a limiting factor of fully empirical macroeconomic SFC models,
which is a key motivating factor for the current work. SFC models are also only
produced by a narrow portion of economic modellers, and thus the number of
empirical SFC models to focus on the Danish system are limited.
The housing market in the model in Article 5 is driven by house prices, and
the relative shift in house prices and construction costs. A major innovation to
housing markets was introduced by Byrialsen & Raza (2019), where investment
in houses is undertaken by households as a sector. The relative attractiveness
of houses as an investment opportunity then determine the household demand
for debt. The supply of debt, however, is not presently restricted.
The present work extends the analysis of household debt by incorporating
one of the many innovations made to mortgage products over the last decade.
Article 5 provides a detailed discussion of these innovations, and identifies the
introduction of flexible-interest mortgage products (or adjustable rate mortgages,
ARMs) as a major change in the Danish mortgage system. This additional layer
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of detail in the nature of debt has not yet been covered in the SFC literature
that includes household debt. It is also the first to do so in a fully empirical
model.
The section below provides a brief introduction to the most prominent macroe-
conomic models used in Denmark, and rounds this section off with the recent
development of SFC models by the MaMTEP2.27 research group in Aalborg.
2.4.3 Existing Danish macro-economic models
There are several macroeconomic models operated by official bodies in Denmark,
although each provides somewhat different insights, and most are not directly
accessible. If they are accessible it is generally with a substantial fee. Stephensen,
Ejarque, Høegh, Kronborg, & Bonde (2017) provide a brief summary of the core
characteristics of DREAM and ADAM, the two most prominent models outside
of the Danish central bank (Danmarks Nationalbank). The ADAM (Annual
Danish Aggregate Model) model is operated by Statistics Denmark, and is a
highly detailed and effective structural econometric model, which, as described
by Stephensen et al. (2017, p. 2), “is a large model and produces data output
that serves as a data-repository for projections of macroeconomic variables
including detailed government incomes and expenditures.” It contains over 2500
equations, and is fully consistent with the system of national accounts.
In addition to these models, the Danish Economic Council also maintains the
SMEC (Simulation Model of the Economic Council) macroeconomic model,
which is used to supplement the semi-annual report of the council. Bocian,
Nielsen, & Smidt (1999) provide a description of the model. The council
also employs a variety of other models, including some computable general
equilibrium (CGE) models.
The Danish national bank model, Mona (from, “Model” and “Nationalbank”),
is a quarterly model of the Danish economy (Nationalbank, 2003). As noted
by Nationalbank (2003, p. 13), it is a business-cycle model, and is “a synthesis
between the pure short-term model where prices are never changed and the
pure long-term model where volumes always balance because prices clear the
market.” The model is ultimately a long-run equilibrium model, and is well
suited to estimating variations in quarterly monetary demand.
2.27The Macroeconomic Methodology, Theory and Economic Policy research group, at Aalborg
University in Denmark.
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The Danish research institute, DREAM (which stands for Danish Rational
Economic Agents Model) developed several models, including the dynamic CGE
model, dubbed DREAM, the SMILE model (Simulation Model for Individual
Life-cycle Evaluation) as described in Hansen, Stephensen, & Kristensen (2013),
which is a micro-data based projection model, and a static CGE model called
REFORM. Several member of this group are also involved in the most recent
development of the MAKRO model. This model is intended to be a combination
of micro-simulation features, which inform an overlapping generations (OLG)
long run component, and the structural econometric features of the ADAM
model (Stephensen et al., 2017). MAKRO is still under development, but a key
component of it is intended to be the life-cycle spending and savings patterns
of each annual cohort in Denmark. SMILE has recently been use, based on
micro-data, to forecast morbidity in Denmark (Bjerregaard & Hansen, 2019).
This is likely to contribute to the MAKRO project in the long run.
A more recent model form to emerge is the stock-flow consistent (SFC) group of
models, which will be discussed in more detail below. There are essentially three
SFC models that have been developed for Denmark. The first was developed
by Godley & Zezza (1989), and was closely followed by a second by Godley &
Zezza (1992). After this, the tradition died out in Denmark, until it was revived
more recently by Byrialsen (2016) and M R Byrialsen & Raza (2018).
Byrialsen (2016) was used to analyse household debt in Denmark, and was
adaptation of the model presented in Chapter 12 of Godley & Lavoie (2012),
which was rebuilt as a growth model for the Danish economy. It was also
used to illustrate developments in key indicators in the Danish economy to
discuss alternative scenarios with regards consumption parameters, as well as
the potential impacts of austerity measures. M R Byrialsen & Raza (2018)
later reconstructed the model in order to investigate the effects of changes in
unemployment benefits for the Danish economy. In particular it illustrated
the sensitivity of macroeconomic models of labour markets to changes in the
participation rate.
Mikael Randrup Byrialsen and Hamid Raza, over a period of three years, then
developed a fully empirical model of the Danish economy. The present author,
together with Jesper Eriksen, prepared the code to source and organise much of
the data used in the model, but only participated as an observer to the initial
stages of the construction of the model. The latest published version of the
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model is Byrialsen & Raza (2019), and the model presented in Article 5 is
based primarily on this model, although with a number of minor alterations, as
explained in the appendix of Article 5, Section 7.10.
The choice to use and further develop a Post Keynesian SFC model is based on
both practical and theoretical reasons. As mentioned above, the Post Keynesian
paradigm was chosen partly due to the descriptive accuracy of the money
creation process. This is, however, only part of the motivation. A greater
motivation is the pragmatic approach to the development of knowledge in
the paradigm. The section below provides some of the meta-methodological
reasoning behind this belief.
2.5 Methodological approaches
This section briefly explores, in relation to PK and CMN schools of thought,
the hierarchy of philosophy (paradigm), methodology, theory and method. PK
theory of the money creation process has, as noted above, been shown to be
more realistic than the CMN money-multiplier approach, and is therefore chosen
as the framework for this thesis. To understand some of the implications of
this choice, it is necessary to briefly explore the foundations of both the PK
and the mainstream perspectives. This requires a short description of the
methodological foundations of each.
The underlying philosophical grounding for the so called “mainstream” views on
money and monetary management were explored by Dow (1985), Chick & Dow
(2001) and Chick & Dow (2002). Chick (2003) also summarised a comparative,
critical analysis of the methodological and philosophical foundations of New
Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) and Keynesian and PK schools of thought. In brief,
the outcome was that the economy and social relations cannot be accounted for
by atomistic theories of science, which the CMN are due to decomposition of
the economy into atomic components - commonly described as being “micro-
founded”. These foundational differences are discussed further below.
Dow (2001, p. 12) defined a paradigm as a “disciplinary matrix based on
a particular world view and communicated by exemplars”, and where one’s
perspective “determines the core beliefs about the nature of the subject matter
and the questions asked, whereas the disciplinary matrix provides the theoretical
and empirical tools used to answer these questions.” She (Dow, 1999, p. 21)
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also noted that there was a descending hierarchy of meta-methodology, these
were philosophy, then methodology, and finally method. This tiered structure is
the basis for the determination of reliability and validity of results in research.
Once the over-arching structures are accepted, a theory can be constructed on
the basis of the results of a method that is considered valid and reliable. This
validity and reliability, she explained, are driven by mathematical formalism in
the CMN schools.
The PK paradigm, she explained, is part of the Babylonian mode of thinking.
This approach argues that in order to understand a problem in its entirety,
one must approach it from multiple perspectives. A plurality of methods
and methodologies are therefore recommended in order to get a more nuanced
understanding of the problem at hand. Dow (1999, p. 22) identified that Lawson
(1997) and Fleetwood (1999) had presented similar philosophical foundations
under the name critical realism. The overlap was not considered problematic,
as she (Dow, 1999, p. 22) explained that they both “emphasize the organic
complexity of human agency and social reality, which prevents the identification
of causal laws; rather, the emphasis is on studying the various causal forces at
work in the system, and their evolution, in order to build up knowledge that is
as reliable as possible, with a view to action.” To PKs and to critical realists,
she argued, the aim should not be to provide axioms or universal truths, but to
try to understand the immediate reality of the economy.
This perspective, Dow (1999) contrasted with the the CMN schools. She
described the orthodox methodology as following the Cartesian/Euclidean
mode of thought, and that it relied on deductive logic, applied “to a single
set of axioms in order to arrive at universally applicable conclusions”. This
critique was directed mostly at the New Neo-Classical Synthesis (NNS), and
New-Keynesianism, whom she and Chick (2003) considered to place too much
emphasis on long-term historical means, which form the basis for general
equilibrium theory. Chick (2003, p. 321) summarised the differences succinctly
in Figures 2.6 and 2.7 (Chick, 2003, p. 311) below.
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Figure 2.6: Mode of thinking: Cartesian/Euclidean (Chick, 2003, p. 321)
Figure 2.6 above illustrates the orthodox link between methodology and theory,
where the economy is considered to be summative (or atomic), and the real
and financial side considered separately. Leading up to the global financial
crisis, many prominent institutions placed a lot of emphasis on various forms of
dynamic static general equilibrium (DSGE) models.These are typically long-run
models and involve a substantial amount of intertemporal smoothing. This
smoothing is driven by optimisation behaviours that typically link to a long run
target or rate, which PKs reject pre-emptively. Another key criticism of the
DSGE approach was the neglect of the financial side of the economy. This is
reflected in the schematic above, with monetary factors (to the right), considered
separately from real (the classical dichotomy). Money and debt therefore do
not play a major role.
Time is also considered quite differently in these depictions of the two paradigms.
The orthodox framework above is a long-run system, and under the long run
equilibrium condition, the neutrality of money implies that money (M) is
considered only as a source of changes in prices (P). Individual rationality is
the source of intertemporal optimisation, information is assumed to be perfect
and thus, capital accumulation is efficient. In the long run it is only the core
elements of the system that are preserved, and which guide the system, and
thus, time or the sequence of time are of no significance.
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Dow (2007) noted clearly that more recent developments in orthodox circles of
economics have addressed the complications of reality, but that this has resulted
in greater variety, or ‘pluralism’, of theory rather than of methodology. The
second figure below, Figure 2.7 shows what Chick (2003, p. 311) calls organicism.
This approach rejects the idea of any long run predictability or equilibrium, and
replaces it with path dependency. Atomism is replaced by the theory that the
sum of the many interactions between the underlying elements of the economy
(the “organic” sum), is greater than the sum of its parts. Perfect information is
rejected as an impossibility, and uncertainty regarded as the general case for all
decision-making. Especially in the generation of expectations.
Figure 2.7: Mode of thinking: Babylonian (Chick, 2003, p. 311)
Those expectations drive all elements of aggregate demand, although each
agent’s expectations are determined by their subjective perceptions of limited
information. The theory of investment therefore relies on behaviour that is not
rational in an objective or perfect-information sense. Since the all economic
agents act under the general case of uncertainty, the is not knowable, and the
future structure of the economy is equally obscured. Path dependency together
with this uncertainty implies that the future is not pre-determined, stated
otherwise, it is not a deterministic outcome. This proposition requires that the
sequence of events in time should be taken seriously.
The model presented in Article 5 below is constructed accordingly. Participants
do not have access to future information, and make decisions in the consecutive
periods based on the most recent information available. In addition, the
accumulation of stocks of assets or debts over time can result in significant
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structural changes to the economy - particularly with regards property income
flows. The model is essentially constructed to be path dependent, and does not
rely on any optimisation or mean reversion. All behaviours are estimated based
on previous behaviours, but these are only used to inform possible events in the
short term - as there are likely to be unforeseeable events in the long term that
change the structure of the economy.
Dow (2010), in opposition to the use of purely mathematical, or historical
statistical tools, argued that if “the system’s internal structure is evolving in a
non-deterministic manner, and the influences to which it is subject in the future
are not known (or all knowable) in advance, then the scope for using frequency
distributions to quantify a probabilistic or stochastic expectation is lacking.
Keynes believed that this was particularly the case with social systems.” Moore
(1991, p. 128) further argued against the presumption of some form of long
run mean reversion or equilibrium, that “in the real world there is no unique
general equilibrium position toward which the economy is tending. Moreover,
for a credit money (monetary production) economy, it is not analytically valid
or heuristically useful to postulate one.”
Since the sequence of events is considered important, so is the finance that is a
pre-requisite for investment. Money, and access to money, are considered crucial
in this framework. The creation of money is an important part of this process,
and is described in greater detail below. Ultimately, however, in monetary terms,
it is not possible for monetary savings to pre-date the creation of that money.
Neither is it possible to have excess capital or resources prior to investment.
Logic therefore requires that demand for money pre-dates money creation,
which subsequently pre-dates investment, then production, then revenues, then
savings. It may be possible to re-invest out of retained earnings, but the causal
flow cannot be initiated by savings. In short, investment leads to savings, and
not the reverse. These features are again captured in the model in Article 5,
where savings and net lending positions are passive to the ongoing activities
of each sector. The model is also demand driven, in the sense that it is the
demand for investment that determines the level of economic activity, and this
in turn determines the level of wages and incomes in all sectors. The extent
to which this results in positive or negative savings for each of the individual
sectors is not clear in advance, since the ultimate level of savings depends on
the actions taken by all sectors.
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The model does not tend to any general equilibrium in the short or long term.
Money and the creation of money are not neutral, since economic growth
depends on an increase in demand, which is indirectly dependent on the demand
by the private sector to invest. This in turn requires borrowing (that is, money
creation) in order to be realised. Money is therefore a significant determinant
of the future path of the economy. Further details on the behaviours of each of
the sectors can be found in the appendix of Article 5, Section 7.10.
A final section to the literature review is provided below, and provides a basic
introduction to the structure and components of SFC models.
2.6 A short introduction to SFC models
This final section of the literature review is intended to provide the reader with
a concise introduction to SFC models. If the reader is familiar with SFC models,
and the contents of Godley & Lavoie (2012), they can comfortably skip this
section and continue to Article 1.
An SFC model is a simultaneous equation type model, based on national
accounting balance sheets that solves over multiple iterations (ordinarily over
500). SFC models are typically aggregate macroeconomic models of an economy,
and as the name suggests, they include the flows and stocks of that economy. In
each period the interactions of the sectors generate flows back and forth between
them. The net accumulation of the activity of the participants of each sector
are calculated by offsetting the flows in each period. Net positive positions in
each period are reflected in an accumulation of financial assets. Net negative
positions in the accumulation of financial liabilities.
The model simultaneously accumulates and adjusts stock variables, which affect
(through property incomes, such as rents or interest), and are affected by, the
interaction between the institutional sectors. The following is a brief outline
based on Godley & Lavoie (2012). Because of the accounting background of SFC
models, it is convenient to represent the underlying components as matrices.
In construction of a model, the universe of possible assets and liabilities is
one of the first decisions to be made. The number of sectors must be decided
simultaneously, and the distribution of the assets can then be made between
them. This distribution is illustrated in the generic balance sheet matrix (BSM),
Table 2.1, below. Thereafter, the flows that will be modelled in the economy are
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identified. These include all flows of money between the broader sectors, and
are typically modelled according to theoretical guidelines of the initiation of
productive activity in the economy, a generic example of a matrix representation
is in the transactions flow matrix (TFM), Table 2.2, below. The final matrix
that must be constructed is the glue that binds the balance sheets to the flows.
It is the representation of the expected allocation of financial wealth at the end
of any given period - this also includes any capital gains or income earned on
financial products. This matrix is represented in Table 2.3 below, and is called
a full integration matrix.
These tables represent the core structures in the economy, but the behaviours
and interactions between the sectors must be defined separately. The matrix
representation provides a guide to how the accounting identities of the system
should be constructed in order to ensure that all flows can be accounted for,
just as they would be in reality.
2.6.1 Balance sheet matrix
The first matrix is set up for the balance sheets of sectors that will be included
and essentially determines the level of aggregation for the economy, as well as
the stock variables that will be featured in the model.
Table 2.1: Balance sheet matrix: BSM
Stocks Households Firms Banks Government Σ
Financial stocks
Loans −L +L 0
Cash +Hh +Hb −H 0
Deposits −∆M −M 0
Bills +Bh −Bh 0
Equities +e · pe −ef · pe −eb · pe 0
Tangible stocks
Tangible capital +Kh +Kf +K
Sum (net worth) NWh NWf NWb NWg K
The example in Table 2.1 above, from Godley & Lavoie (2012, p. xx), includes
five financial assets and a generic sum of all tangible capital. Where a stock is
typically held as an asset it is preceded by a plus (+) sign, and liabilities by
a minus (−). This is a very basic example of a closed economy balance sheet
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across four domestic sectors. As can be seen from the sum (Σ) column and
sum (Σ) rows, horizontal consistency is maintained. The only component that
does not net to zero in the final sums is tangible capital (K). If tangible capital
was excluded from the assets of all sectors, the sum of all sectors’ financial net
wealth would necessarily be zero, as the creation of any financial asset is offset
via accounting records by an entry into balance sheet of the counterpart owner.
Every asset is thus a liability of someone else, and vice versa.
2.6.2 Transactions flow matrix (TFM)
The transactions flow matrix, as illustrated above in Table 2.2, then determines
the flows between each sector in each period. A revaluation matrix is then
constructed to adjust all assets and liabilities for capital gains or losses in each
period - this will alter the nominal level of stocks of the applicable securities
or assets for start of the next period. As is the case in reality, all transactions
require quadruple entry accounting consistency in order to avoid any leakage
in the model. Behavioural equations then define the manner in which flows
and capital gains affect stocks, and the manner in which stock variables in turn
affect flows.
Table 2.2: Transactions flow matrix: TFM
Firms
Flows Households Current Capital Banks Government Σ
Real flows
Consumption −C +C 0
Investment +I −I 0
Govt Expenditures +G −G 0
Wages +WB −WB 0
Profits +FDf −Ff +FUf 0
Taxes and transfers −T +T 0
Financial flows
Change in loans +∆Lf −∆L 0
Change in cash −∆Hh −∆Hb +∆H 0
Change in deposits −∆M +∆M 0
Change in bills −∆Bh −∆Bb +∆B 0
Change in equities −∆e · pe +∆e · pe 0
Σ 0 0 0 0 0
As mentioned above, these flows can be confusing to begin with. Here, a plus
sign preceding an entry in the table indicates that funds flow into the sector,
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and a minus that funds flow out of the sector.
The confusion arises in the financial flows part of the table. This part of the
table explains how each sector either funds its shortfall, or allocates its excess
funds. Funds are considered in a rather abstract manner here in order to
accurately portray the budget constraint of each sector in each period. For
example, once the household sector has received all incomes (in this case WB
and FDf ) and paid all expenses and taxes (in this case C and T ), it is likely
to have a residual. This residual must then be allocated amongst a variety of
options.
The abstraction is that the remaining “funds” must flow out of the household
sector as a result of some kind of asset allocation decision. If the household
wishes to hold some of those “funds” in the form of bank deposits then this
is recorded as a negative flow of funds (−M) for households and a positive
flow (+M) for banks. In exchange, banks issue a liability against themselves
(deposits) and receive the funds. Although in reality receipt of wages is likely to
have been in the form of an electronic transfer into a bank account, and deposits
would simply be a residual bank balance after any spending or alternative asset
allocations.
The same abstraction applies to changes in all financial and physical assets. As
a result, all flows are accounted for a the end of each period, and after all asset
allocations, all sectors respect the strict budget constraint.
2.6.3 Transactions and revaluations matrix
As noted by Godley & Lavoie (2012, p. 44), the full integration of both changes
from both transactions and revaluations can and possibly should be completed
in a single table with the effects on net wealth recorded in a more complete
fashion. As illustrated below in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3 above begins in the first row with the wealth of each sector from the
previous period (NW ). The signs on each of the entries which follow refer to
changes in the nominal value of the assets to which each apply. For example,
the change in loans (∆L) us added to banks, this means that an increase in
the number of loans in the economy will add to the level of loan assets held
by banks. It will also add to the loan liabilities held by households or firms
(represented by −∆L for each). An increase in assets is thus reflected as plus
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Table 2.3: Full integration matrix: Including revaluations
Effect on Assets (+) and Liabilities (-) Households Firms Banks Government Central Bank Σ
Changes arising from transactions
Net worth, end of previous period NWh−1 NWf−1 NWb−1 NWg−1 0 K
Change in loans −∆Lh −∆Lf +∆L 0
Change in cash +∆Hh +∆Hb −∆H 0
Change in deposits +∆M −∆M 0
Change in bills +∆Bh +∆Bb −∆B +∆Bcb 0
Change in equities +∆ef · pef + ∆eb · peb −∆ef · pef −∆eb · peb 0
Change in tangible capital +∆kh · pk +∆kf · pk +∆k · pk
Changes arising from revaluations
Capital gains in equities +∆pef · ef−1 + ∆peb · eb−1 −∆pef · ef−1 −∆peb · eb−1 0
Capital gains in tangible capital +∆pk · kh−1 +∆pk · kf−1 +∆pk · (kh−1 + kf−1)
Sum (net worth) NWh NWf NWb NWg K
(+), and an increase in liabilities by a minus (−). The central bank is assumed
to issue physical cash (or high powered money, H) as a liability, which is held
by households and banks. Deposits (M) are issued by banks, and government is
assumed to issue bills (B). The nominal value of new equities that are acquired
by transactions are recorded as a change in equities, and here calculated by the
change in quantity in prices (∆e), multiplied by the current price of equities
(pe). In the example above, both banks and firms are permitted to issue equities.
Tangible capital, like equities, has a price(pk) and a real quantity (k) component.
Since both equities and capital are subject to revaluation on the basis of price
changes, it is important that we can account for capital gains in the model.
This is captured in the lower portion of the table under Changes arising from
revaluations.
In the case of equities, the total value of assets (or liabilities for the sector that
holds other end of the security) is determined by the total volume of the stock
held at the end of the previous period (e−1) is multiplied by the change in prices
(∆pe). This provides an adjustment to the current level of assets and liabilities
outstanding. The same is true for tangible capital in the example above, where
∆pk is multiplied by k−1 to calculate the capital adjustment.
The final line of the table reflects the sector level net wealth at the end of the
period, after taking all transactions and revaluations into account.
2.6.4 Model construction
Pedagogical models can be constructed with as few as ten equations, and can be
solved mathematically for descriptive purposes. Models that are more realistic
require greater complexity, ranging from around 60 equations for relatively
simple models to over 150 equations for models with multiple sectors or sub-
44
Literature Review, 45
sectors. Such models cannot be solved analytically due to the complexity of
the network of simultaneous equations. Theoretical models can typically be
solved through simulation and calibration, while empirical models typically
include an element of estimation to a greater or lesser degree. The interactions
between agents (or sectors) within the models depends on the specification of
behavioural equations and thus parameters by which variables in the model
interact.
Resolution of the model requires completeness, or as Godley & Lavoie (2012) call
it, an adding up constraint. As they note, this ensures that even in the simplest
formulation of the model “everything comes from somewhere and everything
goes somewhere.” The model thus requires a theoretical understanding of real
world relationships at a functional level, on top of which data is fitted in an
attempt to replicate the current state of the economy.
With regards the design of the model, the level of realism must be balanced
with the usability of the results of the modelling process. Complex construction
obscures interpretation, and the more components, and thus behavioural equa-
tions, that are included in the model, the more difficult it is to identify clear
lines of causality.
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Money at first principles
3 Article 1: Money at first principles: A social
value theory of money
Introductory remarks
This article addresses the first research objective and is a theoretical investigation
of how money creation is linked to debt. This is necessary as a base concept, as
there is a direct connection between the creation of debt and the expansion of
assets and liabilities and financial balance sheets. As noted in the introduction,
the article explores the moral and ethical implications of a redefinition of money
creation as an endogenous extension of credit. It further questions the current
role of money in our understanding of economic growth and development. This
is the first step in understanding the interconnections between sector level
balance sheets.
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Abstract
The term ‘money’ is inadequate for a deep discussion of the fundamental nature
of economic interactions. As a concept, money has been explored at length
and yet there exists little consensus on the origins and fundamental nature of
money. As a result, money is often presented non-specifically. This obfuscates
the process of money creation, and therefore the accountability that should be
associated with that process. It is proposed here that the concept should be
decomposed into core components – these are, the monetary unit, monetary
token, social value and the monetary space. These base concepts are then used
to argue that the demand for debt of all sectors plays an important role in the
flow of funds, and in the relative balance sheet positions of all sectors. It is
further argued that government should play an active role in debt accumulation,
and so opens the discussion on sector interdependence.3.1
3.1 Introduction
The question of what money is and where it comes has once again captured
the interest of economists. Following the crisis of 2007-09, two prominent
central banks, the Bank of England (McLeay et al., 2014) and the Bundesbank
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2017), have provided explanation of the lending driven,
endogenous nature of the money creation process3.2, calling into question the
popular textbook definition of money creation through the money multiplier
process. In addition, the recent growth in prominence of electronic crypto
currencies, such as bitcoin and Etherium, has motivated many to question if
they are in fact money (Baek & Elbeck, 2015; Bjerg, 2016), or more generally,
what money is. The modern textbook definition of money (Acemoglu et al.,
2015, p. 621; Blanchard et al., 2013, p. 67; Frank et al., 2007, p. 648; Mishkin
& Eakins, 2016, pp. G-11) has not much changed in recent decades, and can
typically be summarised into functional definitions (means of payment, store of
value, unit of account), instrumental classifications (typically in the scope of
monetary policy), and is almost always related to the tale of commodity medium
3.1This article benefited from comments from several colleagues and I would like to express
my gratitude especially to Finn Olesen, Mogens Ove Madsen and Mikael Randrup Byrialsen.
All errors remain entirely my own.
3.2The theoretical and empirical grounds for the assertions of the central banks was well
documented by authors from the Post Keynesian (Chick, 1978; Lavoie, 2006; Moore, 1988),
and the monetary circuit (Bossone, 2001; Graziani, 2003; Lavoie, 1992; Le Bourva, 1959)
schools of thought.
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of exchange evolution. The new forms of money, or private moneys, that have
recently emerged are then typically discussed within the same discourse - a
discourse which has obscured a large portion of accountability that should
be attached to money, and the creation of money. It also obscures important
interconnections between economic agents, and the sectors to which they belong.
The observable economic system is recorded through the practice of accounting,
and all transactions are conducted according to money-based prices. Money
and the monetary system are thus inseparable from the analysis of the economy.
As noted by Christensen, Hansen, & Lilkær (1997), money is central to the
functioning of a modern economy, as wages are paid in the form of money,
sale of goods is in the form of money and profits are realized in the form of
money. Value, and relative value, in the past, the present and the future, is
almost always denominated in a money of some kind, as noted by Chick (1978)
relative monetary prices (even in modern barter transactions) depend on the
money prices of other resources. The money, or the value of money, provides a
reference point for decision making to all economic agents3.3. Economic agents
are thus bound to both money and monetary pricing as an integral aspect of
thinking and planning. Questions regarding the nature of money are therefore
fundamental to the study of economics, where the vast majority of data is
denominated in one or another money (unit of currency, or price based on a
unit of currency).
The failing, however is not in the appreciation of the uses or benefits of money,
but in the taxonomy used to discuss monetary matters. The term ‘money’
is inadequate for a deep discussion of the fundamental nature of economic
interactions. As a concept, money has been explored at length and yet there
exists little consensus on the origins and fundamental nature of money. As a
result, money is often presented non-specifically. This obfuscates the process
of money creation, and therefore the accountability that should be associated
with that process. It is proposed here that the concept should be decomposed
into core components – these are, the monetary unit, monetary token, social
value and the monetary space. These core components are entirely separable
in theory, but in practice are necessarily interdependent. Critically important
is that no single component alone can be called money, although functional
3.3As she (Chick, 1978, p. 46) explained, “In the determination of reserve price, the seller’s
imputation of the value of his goods in other potential exchange situations than the one he is
presently facing is an important factor, along with the articles’ use-value to himself.”
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definitions of ‘money’ often discuss these as characteristics, and use the term
‘money’ to describe each separate component interchangeably. As noted by
Chick (1978), depending on the application or question asked, the functional
and instrumental definitions of money vary dramatically. The identification of
the core nature, or origin of money has proven equally tricky, and theories of
money have been discussed by economists for time immemorial in the absence
of consensus. It is proposed here that the fundamental nature of the monetary
token was identified and well described by Innes (1913) as the credit theory of
money in 1913, but that this was only one component, and a satisfactory theory
of the origins of money has only been developed more recently. The argument
here is not that the components to be presented are new, but more that they
are not adequately considered in the modern definition of money.
In connection with responsibility and direction of this validation in society is a
powerful narrative of the efficiency of market mechanisms. Unfortunately, market
failures are not uncommon, and two of the major market failures highlighted by
Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins (2005) is the limitation of environmental pollution and
the innovation and diffusion of technologies that could help to solve the problem.
Some would argue that these market failures are the primary responsibility of
public bodies and governments. The implication here is that money, and money
creation are and should essential components of any discussion public finance
and the provision of public goods. This is not presently the case, as noted by
Rosen (2002), “the fundamental issues are not financial (that is, relating to
money). Rather, the key problems relate to the use of real resources.”
The most broadly accepted and distributed history of money is arguably that of
Adam Smith, and later Paul Samuelson, as the evolution of commodity based
money from truck and barter, on the basis of improved efficiency (reduction of
transactions costs) and appropriateness for trade. Contrary to this, authors such
as Ingham (1996, 2000, 2004), Wray (Goodhart, 1998; Tymoigne & Wray, 2013;
Wray, 2004, 2015) and Bell (Bell, 1998, 2001; Fullwiler, Bell, & Wray, 2012)
have argued that the simplicity of such an evolutionary view lacks credibility
from a historical perspective. They present an alternative modern money
theory of the origin that encompasses sociological preconditions, social relations
and tangible manifestations of different forms of ‘money’, monetary systems,
and hierarchical structures of monetary tokens. Their theory and findings
suggest that institutions and social dynamics have been both necessary and
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instrumental in the development of the money-based economic systems to be
found in most countries today, and consequently, that money could not have
evolved independently as a simple lubricant for markets. As many readers will
point out, the authors of “Modern Money Theory” have been heavily associated
with the chartalist views of Knapp (1924), and the recent emergence of bitcoin
and other cryptocurrencies and cyber currencies appear to contradict the theory,
but this is largely due to a misreading of the MMT3.4, and the inadequacy of
the modern definition of money to account for the monetary space. As will be
seen below, tracing the origins of ‘money’, as they have done, is very useful
when attempting to identify the core components of the concept.
More to the point of this article, proposed here is a social value theory of money,
where money is deconstructed into its fundamental components - the most
important of which is the concept of social value. Using the terminology to be
described shortly, the monetary unit is argued to have logically preceded the
monetary token (or credit), and both require a monetary space within which
they are made valid. The token represents a credit between participants within
the monetary space, typically created against a debt to a third-party banking
(or bank-like) institution. Social value is then validated through the use of
monetary tokens in transactions (purchase and sale). All modern economic
activity, as recorded through the practice of accounting, is thus dependent on
the ongoing creation debts and credits, where the credits are then used for this
purchase/sale based validation of value.
The primary aim here is to clarify the institutional nature of the monetary
unit and the credit-based nature of the monetary token, and to emphasise the
importance of acknowledging that the future is, as Keynes described, fundamen-
tally uncertain, and thus non-deterministic (or, in Davidson (2003)‘s taxonomy,
non-ergodic). The credit based monetary system permits those with access to
credit creation facilities to direct the generation of and maintenance of social
value in society, and in so doing, to determine what aspects of society will
be validated through exchange for monetary tokens. What this means is that
those who are empowered to create money with debt are both responsible and
3.4In a response to critics Tymoigne & Wray (2013) explained that several of the major
critiques have missed the pedagogical purpose of presenting the benefits of a sovereign currency
and focused heavily on inflationary implication of policy application and technical details
regarding modern institutional arrangements. Or as they wrote, “The critique of lack of
descriptiveness misses the point.” (Tymoigne & Wray, 2013, p. 13)
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accountable for doing so – for better or for worse. This makes credit markets
fundamentally political in nature, and the decisions to regulate or not regulate,
or how heavily to regulate credit markets are therefore political. Either actively
through regulation or passively by omission. To fully explain these assertions,
the core components of ’money’ are presented in the next section. That is,
socially contextual value (or social value), the monetary unit and the monetary
token or credit, and the monetary space.
3.1.1 The structure of the remainder of this paper
The remainder of the paper includes a more detailed description of the core
components of money in Section 3.2. This is followed by a brief explanation
of the credit theory of money with some reference to the origins of money
in Section 3.3. Section 3.3.1 explains the creation of monetary tokens within
modern banking systems, provides additional historical and logical context and
touches on some social-structural limitations in the development of monetary
systems. Section 3.4 is a discussion of some implications of this alternative
interpretation of money and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Definitions of society, the monetary unit, monetary
token, the monetary space and social value
First is the monetary unit3.5, this is an intangible, abstract divisor (or numeraire).
Similar to the principle presented by Orrell (2016), it allows us to understand
abstract, intangible, subjective, socially contextual and immeasurable underlying
‘value’ in terms of specific numbers. Similar also, as noted by Innes (1914), to
any unit of measurement such as metres for length or kilograms for weight, the
monetary unit is simply a numerical denominator for value. It is what Orrell
refers to as a quantum, and reflects an attempt to quantify and relativise value.
As such, it is the source of relative pricing. Like any unit of measurement, it
is most useful when perfectly stable. Importantly, there is no finite number of
units of measurement. There is no fixed quantity of meters or grams; there
may be a limited quantity of the medium (‘value’) that is to be measured, but
3.5A concept that Ingham (2004, p. 176), and as he noted, several other authors, including
Keynes (1930), Enaudi (1936) and Bloch (1954), referred to as the “money of account”. The
shift in nomenclature here is in order to avoid the use of the term money. Wray (2001, pp.
7–9) argued, along similar lines to Keynes, that this is a concept to which a name is given,
or a “title” in Keynes’ words. This title can then be represented at par or at a variety of
exchange rates by any token that is seen fit to serve the purpose.
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the unit of measurement itself is essentially infinite. Also, as in the quantity
theory of money, a certain quantity of value can be divided into any number of
individual parts, the choice of which depends largely on simplicity of calculation
and usage3.6. Monetary units are also perfectly homogeneous, in that each
unit is exactly equal to any other unit and represents one monetary unit of
value. The monetary unit is the equivalent of what other authors Keynes (1930)
have described as money of account. Ingham (1996) noted Keynes (1930) in
emphasising, “Money of Account, namely that which Debts and Prices and
General Purchasing Power are expressed is the primary concept of Theory of
Money.”
The monetary token or credit3.7, this is a countable item, which could be
tangible (such as a coin or a note) or intangible (such as a deposit record, or
an accounting record). These are items that are created in finite quantities,
and can be held physically or on record. A monetary token may or may not be
generally accepted, but for the purposes of a discussion of the modern capitalist
banking system, it is important to note that each token, like each monetary
unit, is perfectly homogeneous. Each token is also a non-specific transferable
record of credit against the resources of society. They may be created by any
private or public agent, provided that they are recognised and accepted as valid
records of credit. In the creation of these credits there is a simultaneous creation
of an equivalent debt. As noted by Rochon & Rossi (2013), they are essentially
elements of a system of social memory for credits, against which, at some point,
a debt was incurred3.8.
While the monetary unit and monetary token are separable at a conceptual
level, they are now in practice exceedingly integrated. In modern systems, one
monetary token is typically equivalent to one monetary unit of value, although,
3.6It is pragmatic to choose a size that makes daily usage simple for transacting. The
metric system has been adopted by most modern systems, with single digits applicable to
the purchase of commonly purchased low value items. $1 divided into 100c with the cost
of a loaf of bread in America currently just under $1. A notable exception was the British
Pound, which previously divided into 20 shillings and 240 pence; it has subsequently been
decimalised and since 1971 divides into 100 pence.
3.7In Chick (1978, p. 46) this is called a “money asset”, Ingham (2004) used the term
“means of payment”, and Wray (2001, p. 8) referred to “money things”.
3.8The emphasis here is that the token is a credit, and that the credit is not the same
thing as the debt. The credit, if accepted provides access to resources, but the debt can be
either explicit or implicit. This is because, in a given monetary space, all participants are
willing to accept the token in exchange for assets, goods, services or settlement of debt. They
are therefore part of the collective that will provide resources in exchange for the credits,
implicitly settling the debt that the collective held as contra to the credit of the token holder.
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as demonstrated by Innes (1913, p. 393), this has not always been the case3.9.
The unit of measurement must be associated with a medium, and the token
is created in order to represent a portion of that medium. To this end, a
combination of Innes (1913, 1914), Ingham (1996, 2004), Wray (2001) and
Rochon & Rossi (2013), may provide a transparent and historically accurate
answer. The medium to which the monetary unit applies is an abstract quantum
of value, which will be called social value. Social value is dependent on, to
use Ingham (1996)’s terminology, social structural conditions. This is because
the value of a good or service depends on the needs of the agent assessing
the benefits of having the good or receiving the service, and is thus entirely
subjective, and dependent on the environmental context in which it exists.
The monetary space is defined here as the collection of economic agents that
recognise the monetary unit as a means of assessing value (i.e. relative pricing)
and are willing (and able) to accept a monetary token in exchange for goods
or services. This space may be defined by physical borders, social class, leg-
islative limitations, direct institutional or interpersonal relations, or any other
social construction. In most countries today, the monetary space, for generally
accepted monetary tokens, is most broadly defined by the state border – as
noted by Ingham (2004, p. 200) this was not the case 15th and 16th century
Europe. What is most important is that within the monetary space, the credits
that are created in favour of a borrower are accepted and trusted. society then
comprises all those agents that live or participate in the ongoing activities of the
monetary space. Included in the definition of society here are social constructs,
institutions and infrastructure.
A monetary token is created to record a non-specific credit for a particular level
of value that is acquired initially by the acknowledgement of a debt. Later
(due to homogeneity), those tokens can be acquired by any member of society
in exchange for the supply of an asset, a good or service of value. Over time
these tokens have acquired a range of attributes, including transferability, homo-
geneity, general acceptance, divisibility, geographic boundaries and importantly,
3.9Commerce and trade continued unabated, both at a retail and in large scale for centuries
in the absence of any money or monetary unit. In successive centuries, Innes (1913, p. 394)
provided a number of examples to demonstrate the maintenance of commerce with a various
combinations of credit recording systems and credit trading systems, as well as examples for
most of the major European financial centres of the use of monetary tokens where prices in
terms of the monetary unit and monetary token were not aligned.
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denomination in a particular monetary unit. This means that the monetary
token is indirectly subject to the same contextual dependency as the monetary
unit and the concept of social value. If tokens are created for the purpose of
purchase, the buyer does not provide alternative goods in exchange – as this
would effectively be barter and there would be no need for tokens and thus no
record of any outstanding debt. The point made here is that credits represented
by monetary tokens are utilised to acquire something of value from society, and
that their existence logically requires the existence of a debt3.10.
The global society has become so acclimatised to the existence of monetary
tokens, that it almost exclusively demands settlement of payment in them.
Those with monetary tokens are in a position of surplus credits. Those who
would like to sell goods or services in exchange for monetary tokens are in a
position of resource surplus, but would first have to find a willing buyer in
order to gain monetary credits (tokens) against society – one might say that
they are implicitly dependent on those with surplus credits as a result of their
willingness (and desire) to accept credits in payment for their goods and services.
In terms of GDP, the value of a produced good or service is only validated for
recording purposes upon sale in exchange for monetary tokens. Commerce is
thus dependent on the source of creation, as well as the flow of tokens after the
point of creation.
The monetary token is also a credit that will only be exchanged for valuable
resources at some point in the immediate or extended future. The quantum of
social value represented by a monetary token is therefore highly dependent on
3.10Again, bitcoins present a useful analogy. The scope of goods available for purchase
using bitcoins depends on the scope of the society that are willing to accept them, and the
value represented by a bitcoin token (the monetary unit) is subject to enormous volatility.
Alternatively, bitcoins must be exchanged for an alternative monetary token that exists in
another monetary space, for example bank deposits (the monetary token) denominated in
Danish Krone (the monetary unit). Danish Krone bank deposits all clear through the Danish
Banking system and are a good example of a relatively limited monetary space. The value
of the monetary unit is pegged to the Euro, and maintained by the activities of Danmarks
Nationalbank, which include the rapid creation and absorption of large quantities of tokens in
order to iron out volatility in demand from the foreign sector, or for liquidity in the domestic
sector. This makes it very a useful unit for forward looking decision making and planning.
There are several features of each token that make them attractive or unattractive for different
reasons. Bitcoins, for example, transcend national borders, avoid tax systems, are largely
immune to counterfeiting and provide the holder with anonymity. They are also unregulated,
have an essentially fixed quantity and are therefore susceptible to speculative attacks and
thus far less useful for forward planning. The monetary space is geographically larger, but
the bitcoin society is much smaller than for most national monetary units. An emphasis
here is that the deconstructed definition of money presented here allows for a more complete
discussion, and is free of the constraints of functional definitions.
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the capacity of the agents within a given monetary space to be able to provide
value in the future. As Rochon & Rossi (2013) explained, the true value of
the credit is thus dependent not only on existing resources, but also the future
product of society.
3.3 The credit theory of money
This section takes a step back, and elucidates why the monetary token should
be referred to as a credit. It is also intended to probe the reader into a critical
view of the popularised explanations of the source of money. Innes (1913, 1914)
presented credit, or rather the credit relations of society, as the foundation of
money, stating that “credit and credit alone is money” (Innes, 1913, p. 392).
Innes (1913, p. 391) debunked several examples where the relative values of
goods were thought to have been determined in relation to the value of some
divisible commodity. In every case, while there may have been legal precedent
for the enforcement of contracts on the basis of a particular commodity, he
explained that a monetary unit for the assessment of value existed external
to the commodity itself. In his description, the commodity used was merely a
means of settlement rather than pricing.
He (Innes, 1913, p. 391) also presented a historical account of the progressive
development of monetary tokens, in a partial attempt to redress what he saw
as the inaccuracies of popularised commodity theories of money, particularly
those that linked the fineness of metals in coins to the quantum of social value
purchasing power that they embodied. The antithesis of Smith was largely
based on archaeological findings that Smith would not have had access to, but
Innes’ principle argument was related more to the nature of money as a concept,
and to monetary origins in principle. He assessed that,
“Adam Smith’s position depends on the truth of the proposition
that, if the baker or the brewer wants meat from the butcher, but
has (the latter being sufficiently supplied with bread and beer)
nothing to offer in exchange, no exchange can be made between
them.” . . . “Assuming the baker and the brewer to be honest
men, and honesty is no modern virtue, the butcher could take from
them an acknowledgement that they had bought from him so much
meat, and all we have to assume is that the community would
recognise the obligation of the baker and the brewer to redeem these
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acknowledgements in bread or beer at the relative values current
in the village market, whenever presented to them, and we at once
have a good and sufficient currency. A sale, according to this theory,
is not the exchange of a commodity for intermediate commodity
called the”medium if exchange," but the exchange of a commodity
for a credit."
Although Innes refers to honesty and social custom above, what he emphasises
is that the acknowledgement provides the holder of the acknowledgement with
access to the provider’s goods at some point in the future. He (Innes, 1913,
p. 378) argued that, “In both instances in which Adam Smith believes that
he has discovered a tangible currency, he has, in fact, merely found – credit.”
In contrast to the commodity theory of money, he presented the foundations
of trade in terms of the acknowledgement of indebtedness, which, as noted by
Ingham (1996), requires a social context3.11.
“The value of a credit depends not on the existence of any gold or
silver or other property behind it, but solely on the”solvency" of the
debtor, and that depends solely on whether, when the debt comes
due, he in his turn has sufficient credits on others to set off against
his debts. If the debtor neither possesses nor can acquire such credits
which can be offset against his debts, then the possession of those
debts is of no value to the creditors who own them." (Innes, 1913, p.
378)
The importance of Innes’ statement is that, as noted in the introduction, in
any transaction for a good, where goods are not directly exchanged, it is an
acknowledgement of debt and credit that balances the trade. The value of gold
and silver coins was not held in the practical uses of the metals, but in the vast
quantities of social resources that could be acquired by exchanging the coins
with other members of society. Precious metals are a truly unfortunate element
in the evolution of money, as they confuse the intrinsic value and usefulness of
valuable metals with the fundamental value that society can provide in exchange
for the credit that gold and silver coins represented3.12. That credit is then
3.11Although Ingham agreed with the principles of Innes discussion, he emphasised that in
the absence of certain social constructs, the “honesty” referred to by Innes, or the recognition
of the obligation by a community, could not exist – this is explored in greater detail later.
3.12Gold coins are a lot more valuable in a thriving society with an abundance of produced
goods than they would be in a barren country in the midst of a famine. The reason for which
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represented in some way or form, either as a tangible token or in a record
keeping system. Rather than considering “money” as the object of desire, Innes
(1913), [pp. 392] presented the underlying source of the perceived value; credit.
“A first class credit is the most valuable kind of property. Having
no corporeal existence, it has no weight and takes no room. It can
easily be transferred, often without any formality whatever. It is
movable at will from place to place by simple order with nothing but
the cost of letter of a telegram. It can be immediately used to supply
any material want, and it can be guarded against destruction and
theft at little expense. It is the most easily handled of all forms of
property and is one of the most permanent. It lives with the debtor
and shares his fortunes and when he dies, it passes to the heirs of
his estate. As long as the estate exists, the obligation continues, and
under favourable circumstances and in a healthy state of commerce
there seems no reason why it should ever suffer deterioration. Credit
is the purchasing power so often mentioned in economic works as
being one of the principal attributes of money, and, as I shall try to
show, credit and credit alone is money. Credit and not gold or silver
is the one property which all men seek, the acquisition of which is
the aim and object of all commerce.”
The parallels with the functional definitions commonly presented for the money
asset are immediately obvious (As noted by Chick (1978, p. 41), “durability,
recognisability, portability, divisibility” and so on), as are the reasons why a
generally accepted monetary token, that met the requirements for the above
description of credit (no corporeal existence, no weight, takes up no room, etc.,
such as an electronic record in a bank account), might possess the much lauded
property of liquidity while carrying relatively low levels of risk of loss.
This analogy can be extended to the aggregate case if one considers the creditor
or lender to be society as a whole. Since credits created in the present are
intended for settlement at some point in the future, the “estate” of the debtor
can then be extended to the current and future assets and the current and
future product created by or supported by all indebted participants of society.
Since almost all recorded economic activity in modern society is validated by
is that the credit represented by the gold coin depends not on the properties gold, but on the
product of society.
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monetary payment, it follows that all measurable economic activity is implicitly
validated through the repercussions of the act of borrowing at some point in
the immediate or distant past. If a credit for social value could be conceived
as a perfectly homogeneous credit of purchasing power, of all items for value
for sale within a given monetary space, then any token created to represent
that credit would inherit some of those characteristics. As Innes asserted, it is
also irrelevant what the token is, as long as the intrinsic value thereof does not
exceed the value of the purchasing power that the credit represents (in which
case the tangible token would be of greater value that the credit).
As noted by Chick (1978, p. 41), money, or rather monetary tokens, rely on
confidence, but in contrast to many assertions, it is not the quality of issuer of
the tokens that determines the value that those tokens possess, but the capacity
of those who are indebted (and the beneficiaries of their spending) to provide
value when those tokens of credit are presented for settlement – in this case,
all those willing to provide goods and services within the monetary space, or
“society”, both in the present and in the future. The trade of monetary tokens
for goods or services is therefore a transfer of goods or services in exchange for
a credit position against the current and future product of society (recalling
that society is defined by those who participate in the monetary space).
It also follows that those institutions or agents empowered with the capacity
to create such tokens are able to create perfectly homogeneous credits against
society (a significant capability, and thus responsibility). Hypothetically, in
exchange for such a credit, a debtor provides a promise to create sufficient value
within society to be able to sell their products or services in the future, and in
doing so accumulate sufficient credits to settle their original debt. This will be
explored in greater detail below.
3.3.1 The creation of monetary units and tokens
As noted in the introduction, economic agents are bound to both monetary units
and monetary tokens as an integral aspect of thinking and planning. How then
are the monetary unit and monetary token maintained and created in modern
economies? From the outset it is important to emphasise that modern tokens
are only ever created in exchange for the creation of a debt. For all intents and
purposes, since the establishment of the nation state, the homogenisation of
monetary tokens and denomination thereof in a state nominated monetary unit,
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generally accepted monetary tokens have been created by banking institutions.
To categorise broadly, tokens have been created on behalf of one of two groups,
state (governmental) or private borrowers.
3.3.2 Private creation of monetary tokens
Innes (1914, p. 152) described the creation and usage of monetary credits in
the private banking process as follows,
“. . . in practice it is not necessary for a debtor to acquire credits on
the same persons to whom he is debtor. We are all both buyers and
sellers, so that we are all at the same time both debtors and creditors
of each other, and by the wonderfully efficient machinery of the banks
to which we sell our credits, and which thus become the clearing
houses of commerce, the debts and credits of the whole community
are centralized and set off against each other. In practice, therefore,
any good credit will pay any debt. Again in theory we create a debt
every time we buy and acquire a credit every time we sell, but in
practice this theory is also modified, at least in advanced commercial
communities. When we are successful in business, we accumulate
credits on a banker and we can then buy without creating new debts,
by merely transferring to our sellers a part of our accumulated
credits.”
To settle a debt, one could therefore simply instruct a transfer of credits from
your own account of record to that of another, thus effecting payment. From a
trade perspective, it also became custom that a purchase or sale transaction
could be completed by the intermediated transfer of credits held at a third-party
bank3.13. It is therefore important to understand how these credits are created.
While many examples exist of credit-based banking systems in Europe prior
3.13When a debt to a bank is created, the borrower provides the bank with a contract of
indebtedness, and in return the bank creates credits (deposits) which initially are provided to
the borrower in a simultaneous debt and credit transaction. In effect, the bank has created
tokens of credit against society. The initial borrower is formally indebted to the bank, but
once the credits have been spent it is the duty of the borrower to try to re-acquire those same
(or similar) credits from society through the sale of either goods or services. It is only in
the process of spending that the borrower effectively becomes a debtor to society in general.
The bank has simply served as a medium (and gatekeeper) in the process. This process has
recently been validated by publications from the Bank of England, the Bundesbank (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 2017; McLeay et al., 2014; Werner, 2014) and an extensive Post Keynesian
monetary literature.
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to the 1700s, the progression of the English monetary system prior to the
establishment of the Bank of England in 1694 was particularly important, as it
pre-empted the harmonisation of state and private debt and credit.
As noted by Ingham (2004, p. 193), in reference to Usher (1953 [1934]: 292)
the practice of private bank lending for the creation of monetary tokens, and
the acceptance of these counterparts of private bank records of debt as a means
of payment occurred earlier, and was a critical step.
“This creation of credit money by lending in the form of issued
notes and bills, which exist independently of any particular level
of incoming deposits, is the critical development that Schumpeter
and others identified as the differentia specifica of capitalism. The
issue of credit money in the form of notes and bills requires the
depersonalisation of debt which enables the transferability of paper
promises to pay that can then circulate as credit money outside of
the network of any particular banks and its customers.”
The establishment of public banks and central banks, the centralisation of
clearing and settlement, and the homogenisation of all private bank created
credits (notes, or “promises to pay”), and state endorsement thereof, then
facilitated the acceptability of privately created and government created notes
and deposit records as means of payment. The critical development, as noted by
A P Faure (2013, p. 50), and Ingham (2004, p. 195) was the transformation of
the role of banking institutions from physical deposit takers (of less sophisticated
forms of monetary token) to creators of an accounting debt record in exchange
for the creation of book keeping (intangible) monetary tokens. As explained by
A P Faure (2013, pp. 50–59), the result of this was the creation of (transferable)
bank records of deposit in exchange for private domestic loan extension, or
loans to the non-bank private sector (NBPS). The banker owned the rights to
the underlying items of value3.14 through the debt contract, and the borrower
or government could utilise the deposit records (monetary tokens) to transact.
Ingham (2004, p. 214) thus noted that,
“the capitalist monetary system’s distinctiveness is that it contains
a social mechanism by which privately contracted credit relations
are routinely ‘monetised’ by the linkages between the state and
3.14More specifically, a quantum of value, expressed in terms of monetary tokens, representa-
tive of the value of the underlying contracts, goods or items.
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its creditors, the central bank, and the banking system. Capitalist
‘credit money’ was the result of the hybridisation of the private
mercantile credit instruments (‘near money’ in today’s lexicon) with
the sovereign’s coinage, or public credits. The essential element is
the construction of myriad private credit relations into a hierarchy
of payments headed by the central or public bank which enables
lending to create new deposits of ‘money’ - that is the socially valid
abstract value that constitutes the means of final payment.”
An essential aspect of the capitalist system described above, is that the “mon-
etisation” process requires homogenisation of credits into a single medium. As
a result, an established and generally accepted monetary unit is also required.
Essentially, the debt to banks of larger institutions (and later of individuals)
were counterbalanced by depersonalised, homogeneous, divisible, and fully
transferable credits against all items or services of value available for purchase
within the specific sovereign monetary space. The importance of this cannot
be overstated - it meant that all credits were equalised and that credit created
by a private borrower, became equivalent to credit created by a business or
government. The quality of each counterpart debt, however, continues to differ
significantly. Monetary tokens created when an individual overspends on an
overdraft facility have ever since carried the identical purchasing power capacity
to monetary tokens created when a government deficit spends.
Post Keynesian literature provides a substantial pool of literature to explain
the dynamics of private debt driven creation of monetary tokens. It is explained
that in modern monetary systems, bank lending (commercial, retail, and central
bank3.15) creates bank deposit records3.16, and that these are by far the most
prolific form of modern monetary tokens3.17. Members of the non-banking
3.15With notable exceptions in specific countries for certain types of lending. For example in
Denmark, where mortgage lenders are required to fully absorb money from the non-banking
private sector through the sale of debt securities in advance of the extension of the mortgage
loan (Frankel, Gyntelberg, Kjeldsen, & Persson, 2004, p. 100). In principle, however, even
though the aggregate level of money in circulation remains constant in such circumstances,
money is still created in the lending leg of the process.
3.16It should be noted here, that monetary tokens in circulation in the domestic economy
are affected by international trade and capital movements, particularly through the purchase
and sale of foreign exchange. This affects the composition of ownership of domestic monetary
tokens, and possibly the extent to which those monetary tokens are likely to circulate back to
the original borrower.
3.17There are also institutions that classify as third-party asset transformation institutions
that accumulate funds in order to re-lend them, for example building societies in South Africa.
These institutions are excluded from the definition of banks, especially as they do not typically
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private sector then have the opportunity to convert those deposits (credits) into
physical notes and coin provided by central banks.
In contrast to the money multiplier story of deposits creating loans, the so-
called ‘reverse causality’, which runs from debt creation to money creation in
modern economies has, amongst others, been demonstrated through: qualitative
descriptive explorations of bank and central bank processes (A P Faure, 2013;
Kock, 1954; Le Bourva, 1992), institutional mechanisms (Arestis & Eichner, 1988;
Dow, 2006; Lavoie, 1996, 2006) and the temporal ordering of lagged fractional
reserve accounting (Godley & Cripps (1983); W Godley & Lavoie (2007));
formal causality tests (Moore, 1983b); historical records of the development of
money and the creation of money (A P Faure, 2013); micro-theoretic models of
banking (Moore, 1983b, p. 541); the historical development of banking systems
(Chick, 1993; A Pierre Faure, 2013); detailed pedagogical demonstrations of the
balance sheet impacts of bank lending (Faure, 2014); and comprehensive stock
flow accounting models of entire economies (Godley & Lavoie, 2012). Simple
pedagogical explanations were also provided as early as 1983 by Moore, and
in 1962 by Jacques Le Bourva, and more recently by McLeay et al. (2014) of
the Bank of England, and Werner (2014) who is reported to have influenced
members of the Bundesbank in Germany to publish a similar report (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 2017).
In summary, the records of credit that appear in a borrower’s bank account
when a loan is extended do not come from another depositor’s account. Those
credits are new credits, homogeneous credits, that enable the holder to access
the resources of all of society. They are created by a bank simultaneously with
a loan agreement (of identical size) against a specific borrower. The borrower
then typically transfers the ownership of those newly created credits to another
person or organisation in exchange for something valuable. The borrower thus
absorbs value from society (spending credits in exchange for valuable goods
or services). The borrower is then in a predicament: they have a debt to a
bank and an agreement as to how quickly that debt must be repaid. The debt
agreement requires that they must return to the bank the same homogeneous
credits as were created on their behalf. Since all bank-created monetary token
credits are homogeneous, it does not matter who the initial borrower was. Only
that the tokens can be acquired.
have access to central bank accommodation services in modern monetary systems.
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If the borrower’s initial spending generates additional value in the form of a
product or service, then the borrower might be able to sell that product or
service in order to acquire tokens of credit. Alternatively, if the borrower has
a skill-set that is particularly valuable to society, they are likely to be able to
acquire credits by providing (selling) their own labour. As Innes (1913, p. 393)
noted “it is through selling, I repeat, and by selling alone - . . . - that we acquire
the credits by which we liberate ourselves from debt, and it is by his selling
power that a prudent banker estimates his client’s value as a debtor.” The goal
of course is to sell for more credits than were initially borrowed.
A numerical example is presented below as a thought experiment. In Figure 1
below, Jo borrows 100 credits from the bank. Instantaneously Jo has both a
credit of 100, and a debt of 100 perfectly identical units (represented by the
green and red solid bars respectively). In the second week Jo spends all of the
credits on setting up a shop and buying stock (absorbing value from society).
Each week Jo earns 20 credits in income, spends an additional 2 units in stock
and wages, and pays back 15 units of debt (except in the last week when only
10 units of debt remained), and keeps the remaining 3 credits (of profit).
As can be seen it takes Jo 9 weeks to fully repay the loan. Jo has also accumulated
26 extra credits of profit. Jo was obviously able to provide greater value than
was initially borrowed, as is demonstrated by society’s willingness to transfer
their credits to Jo in exchange for the good / service. There is, however, a
problem. Only 100 credits were created, 100 units were repaid, and Jo still
has 26 units! All of the units created for Jo have since been destroyed upon
repayment of the debt, thus the units must have come from creation of credits
on behalf of another party. More importantly, that party incurred a debt upon
creation. This principle applies equally at an aggregate level. The credits
earned represent value created by Jo that was validated through monetary
transaction. Since monetary tokens can easily be re-spent, it is possible for one
token to validate several units of value (linked to the velocity of money, and
the Keynesian multiplier principle).
What remains true, however, is that monetary tokens are initially created
in a finite quantity and, as noted by Bossone (2001), that quantity excludes
interest3.18. It also means that at any credit held by a party that is not a
3.18Which means that all interest payments constitute an initial transfer of resources from
society to the banking sector, and the payment of wages by the banking sector to households
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debtor to a bank represents a friction in the flow of credits back to the original
borrower. “Savings” of money, therefore, do not finance lending, but quite the
opposite. This is not a statement of macroeconomic causality, but of micro-
causal necessity. This explanation emphasises the problematic nature of the
demand for and retention of money for the monetary circuit3.19.
constitutes a counterbalancing flow to interest payments and fees. Whether or not the banking
sector extracts excessive rents is beyond the scope of discussion here. The focus is on the
initial point of creation, as a finite quantity that excludes future costs of borrowing as per the
interest defined in the loan contract.
3.19According to Bossone (2001), and in the opinion of the author, this was an important
aspect of Keynes’ general theory, but has subsequently been misinterpreted as an optimisation
problem within the demand and supply framework of AS/LM. In addition, while Keynes
represented the demand for money in terms of positive, intelligent intertemporal behaviour, it
seems far more likely to the present author that money is retained by the vast majority of
people for far less flattering reasons. In addition to transactions, precautionary and speculative
demand one could add laziness, a lack of knowledge about alternatives and a general lack of
interest in exploring alternative investment opportunities (ignorance and incompetence), fear
of change and distrust of those offering alternatives, and a misguided understanding of the
aggregate benefits of saving monetary tokens of credit. If deposits are not accumulated in the
accounts of savers, the likelihood of them returning to the original borrowers is higher, and
the full term of a debt contract potentially shorter; which extends the term for which interest
rent can be extracted. This may or may not be understood by the banking sector, but the
possibility certain makes one question the motives for selling long term deposit securities to
deposit holders – at significant interest spread below the cost of borrowing.
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3.3.3 Figure 1: Jo’s loan, profits and savings
Figure 3.1: Jo’s loan, profits and savings
3.3.4 Governmental creation of monetary tokens
Of all parties on behalf of which credits are created, government is by far the
largest. The Post-Keynesian literature has focussed largely on the creation
of monetary tokens by commercial banks on behalf of private individuals and
firms, where the demand for a loan precedes the creation of monetary tokens,
which then results in an increase in reserves held by banks in their settlement
accounts. Government driven money creation, on the other hand, is somewhat
neglected.
Wray (2001, 2010, 2015), Fullwiler et al. (2012) and Bell (2001) have filled this
gap, and over the past two decades presented Modern Money Theory (MMT) as
an collection of thoughts of similar authors (including Knapp, Keynes, Lerner,
Minsky and Godley) that emphasises the role of the state - incorporating both
the credit understanding of money and the social structural conditions within
which monetary systems exist. As explained by Wray (2001), government debt
and credit creation is essentially the same process as described above in the
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private case.
As he noted, governments spend by debiting their own bank account and
crediting the account of the service or product provider. In the absence of
any specific legal limitation, it is irrelevant whether the government account
balance is positive or negative (that is, whether the government has previously
accumulated credits through tax or borrowing or not). If the account balance is
negative, each unit of credit that is transferred to a service or product provider is
simultaneously created against an identical debt record on behalf of government.
The service provider receives a credit, and the government records a debit in
their accounts. The credit is transferred to the product / service provider just
as it would be from a private person’s overdraft facility on a checking account.
The one major distinction is in the capacity of the “state” to impose liabilities
on the population. Where a private person must be able to sell in order
to accumulate credits against their peers, a government can impose a tax
liability3.20.
The value added by government to society
Governments provide value less directly. In addition to the services that citizens
might benefit from directly, governments have the capacity to develop the
supporting conditions that might be required for the expansion of social value.
This is typically through the employment of labour and resources for the
development of physical and social infrastructure and institutions (such as
education, roads, legal institutions, healthcare, electrical infrastructure etc.)
from which positive externalities can emerge – such as reduced crime rates,
self-governance, collectivism, artistic expression, etc. The benefits of a stable
and well-functioning governmental system that could provide high quality multi-
generational education, healthcare and financial security, would be difficult if
not impossible to measure3.21, but the scope of value for which a monetary
3.20The irony of income tax is that it is only those that are able / capable / willing to provide
or generate additional social value that are made liable. Consumption tax through VAT as
the exception. Alternatively, one could perceive tax of the high-income earner to be “giving
back” part of the long-term benefits accrued from society.
3.21The benefits of government spending programs cannot be received equally by all social
participants. Some will be in a better position to receive those benefits than others, and thus
will move forward. Others will be less able, and thus fall behind. The ability of the state to
tax within a social welfare system is thus perhaps far less perverse than a purely capitalist
system, where those who benefit from accumulated social capital over multiple generations
are most likely to move further ahead, and those who fall behind are likely to fall further
behind.
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token (credit for social value) could be exchanged, would very likely be broader
than in a poorly governed society.
This also raises the important question of what aspects of society are of value
in the long run, and what the goal of our enquiry into economics and macroe-
conomics is. Is something only of value if private individuals are willing to
purchase it with their privately acquired monetary tokens? Is the study of ethics
or morality, or history valueless if there are no buyers? It is difficult to believe
that the necessary components of a sustainable society can be identified by the
general population in the absence of knowledge accumulation and dissemination
(learning and education). It is also difficult to believe that those that find
themselves in positions of power will automatically behave in the interests of
equality or fairness, as illustrated by Akerlof & Shiller (2015), the profit seeking
or maximisation motive is often completely disconnected from social values.
If we are interested in the sustainable well-being or welfare of all persons (or
possibly other species), rather than a laissez-faire economy, it may be necessary
to accept a degree of social engineering – which would require significant central
decision-making and social control practices.
3.3.5 Limitations of a finite means of value validation
This process of money creation presents a conundrum, as society is implicitly
dependent on debt creation. Why is this? Social value is only validated upon
a purchase or sale. In a society where all purchases and sales take place in
exchange for monetary tokens, one party must have monetary tokens before
any transaction can take place. To explain this, the analogy of the 9 week loan
above, can be extended to the economy as a whole. Value validation requires
the transfer of monetary tokens (credits), for a given quantum of monetary
tokens and a given rate of transfer, any additional validation this requires
additional tokens. These tokens are not distributed, except possibly through
helicopter money policies3.22, but rather are created through one or another
form of lending. In the private sector they are created on demand for any party
that meets creditworthiness requirements. In the public sector they are created
as growth in deficit spending (or indirect additional private borrowing, if the
government cannot outright deficit spend, as in the USA).
3.22Referring here to policy driven instantaneous expansion of broad money through the
credit of bank accounts, as explained by Bützer (2017).
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The third and final method is through a positive change in the external balance
of payments (BoP), in which case the debt sits with the counterpart trading
country. The monetary accounting system in a sovereign monetary space is
a closed system, in that at an aggregate level, the total quantum of debts
created should balance with the total quantum of credits in existence. Growth
in economic activity, as validated by aggregate purchases or sales (expenditure
or income), in the absence of declining prices, consequently necessitates the
expansion of either private, public or external sector debt. For example, if a
government maintains a balanced budget, and there is a negative or balanced
BoP, an expansion of the quantum of monetary tokens requires expansion of
private sector debt.
3.4 Discussion
This section has two purposes, the first is to discuss some of the implications
of a social value theory of money, and the second is to provide some insights
into how the alternative definition of money presented above can be used to
understand modern economies. First, we discuss economic possibilities and the
achievement of optimal resource utilisation. Second, private sector access to
credit creation facilities is discussed, together with some implications for wealth
distribution. Thirdly, is a short note on the necessary wastage of resources.
Forth, are some implications for fiscal policy, and fifth and finally is a note on
the current role of central banks as implementers of monetary policy.
3.4.1 Economic possibilities and the validation of a future society
Validation of activity and assets
The capacity to immediately validate value within the economy through the
creation of monetary tokens (either publicly or through the private sector) and
subsequent purchase of goods or services presents an enormous opportunity. In
the presence of idle or untapped resources, the creation of monetary tokens can
stimulate the employment of labour or production of goods. As explained by
the Post Keynesian and circuit theory of money schools of thought, the creation
of monetary tokens can thus be seen as the initial trigger for the production
process. J. Keynes (1933) first presented this theory as the monetary theory of
production (MTP). This he later (Keynes, 1936) contrast to a the dichotomy of
the Theory of Value and Distribution on one hand, and the Theory of Money on
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the other. A simple explanation of the theory is that the extension of monetary
token debt permits the borrower (in the MTP a firm) to access the resources
of society in order to produce something of greater value than the inputs. In
contrast, if all resources, both human and otherwise, are already employed and
functioning at their optimal maximum level of productivity (full employment),
it is unlikely that additional stimulation would result in excess value creation
for the future.
Balance, sustainability and contribution to social value
The composition of the debt, the quality of the borrowers, and the use of the
credits are crucial factors to consider, and the sustainability of the creation
of monetary tokens is a question of balance. In terms of social value, the
borrowing (creation) of monetary tokens involves the promise of the borrower to
provide at least as much value to society as is consumed when using the newly
created monetary tokens. A general rule, however, is that if the credits are
used purely to consume resources, and not used to generate additional value (at
least equivalent value), society will experience a net loss, and the borrower will
most likely be unable to recover the credits originated on their behalf. Innes
(1913, 1914) assessed money to have always been a credit relationship but, in
contrast to Innes (1913) and Rochon & Rossi (2013), credit (monetary tokens)
and debt cannot be regarded as synonymous in modern economies. The major
distinction is that the quality commercial bank debt is subjectively determined
by the quality of the borrower, whereas the quality of a credit is non-specifically
determined by society as a whole.
Survival of the most desired (and therefore demanded) goods and service providers
A powerful advantage for society is that a unified form of credits allows for
intertemporal adjustment and connectivity, and facilitates natural selection of
products and companies. Homogeneity of monetary credits across time, means
that it is irrelevant for what purpose or when a credit was created when one is
trying to acquire them. A credit from a baker, builder or government borrower
are entirely indistinguishable. Therefore, the original debtor is also irrelevant
when it comes to accumulation. Credits created in a current period, to produce
an undesired good, are likely to be transferred to a producer of a good or
service that is desired – and in theory, only the most desired products and
services will prevail. Debts created for unsuccessful borrowers are written off as
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irrecoverable, and settled either against credits of the banking sector, or the
government (society as tax payers). When banks receive tax payer bailouts,
such as in 2009-10, it is to cover wasteful borrowing, and thus poor lending
decisions.
Validation of socially desirable institutions
Balance can also be found in the preservation of certain social institutions that
provide less direct benefits, or those that might prevent social deterioration.
Philosophers may be needed to assess the ethical and moral implications of
social actions, or sociologists, anthropologists and historians to help prevent
the repetition of social ills – if there is no active private market for such
cultural capital, there must be a central system that validates and sustains
those aspects of society that would otherwise disappear. If individuals are relied
upon to make prioritisation decisions (purchases) with their own resources, other
more predictable needs might also be neglected, such as antenatal guidance,
healthcare, parental guidance, access to public knowledge institutions, education
systems, or poverty alleviation.
Just as the long-term benefits of a stable society are almost impossible to
measure, the damage caused by cumulative degradation of portions of society
over multiple generations is equally difficult to assess. The harmonisation of
public and private sector credits allows cognisant governments to validate a
wide array of such indirect forms of social value that can help to prevent social
decay. Such decay can result in economic exclusion and political instability, as
illustrated by Guy Standing in The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class.
3.4.2 Private sector access to credit creation facilities and wealth
distribution effects
Private individual borrowers typically promise to achieve the balance between
value consumption and value provision through the provision of labour (through
employment) through the course of their lives. Firms and entrepreneurs promise
to achieve this through the production of goods and services, through the
acquisition of (employment of) labour and resources. In both cases the private
sector is obliged to generate and sell value.
Socially beneficial outcomes, or the lack thereof
As Innes (1913, p. 393) so clearly identified: “it is by his selling power that a
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prudent banker estimates his client’s value as a debtor”. Selling, however, is not
only a question of product quality, but also of the ability to manipulate human
impulses, stimuli, desires and fears. A concept wonderfully illustrated by George
Akerlof (2015), where the proverbial impulsive monkey on your shoulder drives a
large part of personal resource allocation. There is absolutely no guarantee that
the economic agent best at selling will provide the best outcomes for society, nor
that the purchasing decisions of society will validate the most socially beneficial
goods and services3.23. Regardless of whether the intention is good or not, the
ability to sell, and thereby acquire homogeneous credits against society, is the
primary determinant of economic successes in the private sector of a liberal
capitalist economy. The corollary of which is access to resources to produce
the goods or services that will be for sale, and to pay for marketing expertise.
Such access is granted to borrowers that can demonstrate the above-mentioned
success in selling – either in the form of a proven track-record, or in the form of
ownership of assets of value (i.e. a strong balance sheet).
Capital gains, bubbles, and redistributions of wealth
Unfortunately, solvency of a private individual is therefore also linked to prices
of assets, which are subject to demand – demand that can be satisfied by
purchase with monetary tokens. Credits that are created for the purchase
of such assets, based on expected capital value returns – which are in turn
dependent on price appreciation – can quickly fuel a circular, self-fulfilling
process of price escalation that is completely disconnected from underlying
social value (a bubble).3.24 In addition, the rapid expansion of monetary tokens
3.23Examples of successful selling that has detracted from social value include the worldwide
sale of asset backed securities prior to the 2007, the abundance of Ponzi schemes, the exorbitant
wealth of leaders of commercialised religious groups (such as Kenneth Copeland, Edir Macedo,
Creflo Dollar etc.), countless internet and eBay fraud schemes, and the proliferation of fast
food chains such as MacDonald’s, and the enormity of the international narcotics industry.
3.24The most recent example is the 2008-2009 financial crisis, which was predicated on the
extension of credit, (and thus money creation) which fuelled a process of financialisation. As
noted by Lavoie (2012), “[f]inancialisation transformed a growth regime based on high real
wages and high business investment into a regime based on high consumption spending and
ever-rising household gross debt, justified by high prices in the stock and real estate market.”
Money creation was permitted on the self-fulfilling prophesy of improved household balance
sheets (as asset prices rose), and the prospect of future financial capital gains (driven by
price increases that were in tern driven by the extension of credit). As Buffet once said, it’s
only when the tide goes out that you discover who’s been swimming naked. The information
required to foresee the crisis, and who exactly was swimming without their bathing suits, was
available in the disproportionate balance sheet accounting data of the various sectors of the
US economy. The unwinding of the financial crisis has once again revealed the irresponsible
nature of lenders, as well as the need to understand the aggregate effects of the process
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can result in a shift in the proportional distribution of credits for social value
– in much the same way as a corporate rights issue can dilute proportional
shareholding in a company, inflationary monetary expansion can redistribute
a greater proportion of underlying social value to the beneficiaries of credit
expansion.
In the presence of idle resources, access to credit can also permit the borrower
to gain ownership and control of assets that generate substantial value in the
future. Access to borrowing opportunities thus not only affect the type of
project that will be supported and the proportional distribution of social value
credits, but also the distribution of access to wealth generating resources – and
thus very likely the distribution of income and wealth within society.
Value creation and validation without borrowing
Fortunately, due to homogeneity and the non-specificity of monetary token
credits, it is also possible for resourceful economic agents, who do not have
access to debt financing to create value in advance of acquiring monetary tokens.
Provided that monetary tokens do not become idle (i.e. sit dormant in savings
accounts), it remains possible for new forms value to be validated in the private
sector, regardless of the borrowing source of creation. In the presence of any
holding of monetary tokens as “savings”, the potential for tokens to flow back
to the original borrower is reduced.
Ultimately, however, and regardless of the degree of ingenuity of economic
agents, selling is dependent on spending, and spending is dependent on the
possession of credits, and the existence credits depends on debt creation. This
puts those with access to debt creation at an economic advantage.
3.4.3 Necessary wastage in monetary economic systems
As explained above, it is not only the present, but the future assets and product
of society that will determine the aggregate level of social value in a given
monetary space. Since social value is subjective, and there is no way of knowing
the future wants or needs of people, the measure of what will or will not be
of credit extension, together with a holistic understanding of the interactions between the
balance sheets of various economic agents. As Bezemer (2009) concluded, looking forwards,
within the current system of collateralised lending, “the balance sheets of firms, households
and governments, and the regulations of the economics system on what sorts of balance sheets
are being allowed, co-determine what forms new credit flows can take, how much there can
be of it to different sectors, and consequently how the economy will evolve.”
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considered valuable cannot not be known entirely in the present. It may be
possible to guess at some things, but they will never be known for certain.
Technological innovation, changes in tastes and changes in social dynamics are
just a few of the possible reasons why present expectations might turn out to be
wrong. Since not all inventions will be successful and not all innovations useful,
there must necessarily be some wastage of the resources of society progress is
desired – a process that is linked to the inter-temporal connectivity mentioned
above. This does not mean, however, that the selection of which ideas to
support, or which borrowers should be eligible to receive a credit against society
should be reckless.
3.4.4 Fiscal policy and forms of governmental debt
In a similar manner, society entrusts government to spend in a fashion that
facilitates the generation of additional social value. As mentioned previously,
governments are unique in that they are both able to create money through fiscal
spending, and to impose liabilities through taxation3.25. In terms of government
spending and debt, for a country with a sovereign currency there is essentially
no limit to the extent of domestic deficit debt creation. One of the major
concerns with government spending as a source of creation of monetary tokens
is that it is possible that an excessive expansion in the quantity of monetary
tokens held by the NBPS might have inflationary consequences.
In terms of social value, as governments spend, and create debt and monetary
tokens, they essentially become indebted to society as a whole. If they are unable
to develop the physical and intellectual resources of the country sufficiently,
they may never be able to retrieve those monetary tokens through taxation.
This may result in what proponents of the quantity theory of money would
describe as an excess quantity of tokens chasing a limited quantity of valuable
goods and services, and consequently inflationary processes. In order to manage
the inflationary impact of government spending, as noted by Fullwiler et al.
(2012, p. 6), governments and central banks have at least four debt instrument
3.25This is not withstanding specific legal limitations and institutional arrangements. For
example in the US, government is only allowed to spend money if there is a positive balance
in the governmental accounts. This very ironically means that the tokens must be created
on behalf of a non-governmental party, and can later be borrowed by the US government
through the sale of bonds. Thus creating a legislative necessity for private debt creation to
fund future government spending expansions.
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sale alternatives to choose from3.26, none of which are a necessary means of
financing. The fact that certain governments (such as the US government) are
required to hold positive balances in their account before spending is a matter
of legislative and political convention.
This also sheds some light on the debt crisis and subsequent economic stagnation
in Europe since the 2008 financial crisis. Where resources lie idle, governments
of economically depressed countries that do not have control of a sovereign
monetary unit and token, are not able to create monetary tokens to facilitate
or stimulate additional social value creation. This is not to suggest that
governments of all countries should have access to a sovereign currency. The
government of Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2008 utilised monetary tokens purely
for the consumption of existing resources. Corruption and self-enrichment of
political figureheads, and the simultaneous destruction of social and physical
institutions resulted in the creation of an enormous quantity of monetary tokens
against a rapidly declining quantum of social value3.27. The Zimbabwean dollar
was abandoned shortly afterwards, and the US dollar was introduced initially
through black-market usage, and later as the official trading currency.
The focus on balanced government budgets as an element of austerity measures,
as implemented after the 2008-09 financial crisis, might be explained by fears
of similar events occurring in European countries with a substantiated risk of
systemic corruption.
3.26In addition to the issuance of long term debt instruments (bonds), they note that other
options include matching the interest paid on reserve balances with the target rate, the
issuance of short-term T-Bills, and lastly, simply setting the rates on a variety of short,
medium and long term bills, and letting the private sector purchase as many as they wish to
hold.
3.27A P Faure (2013, p. 11) provided examples of excessive government borrowing resulting in
extremely large quantities of monetary tokens that were wasted by irresponsible governments.
The consequence of which has typically included extreme levels of price inflation in terms of
the monetary unit, the worst two examples of which were 41 900 000 000 000 000% per annum
in Hungary in 1946, and 7 000 000 000 000 000 000 000% per annum in Zimbabwe in 2008.
This does not mean that there is a predictable relationship between the nominal quantity
of monetary tokens in circulation and prices under relatively stable conditions, although, it
would be equally naïve to think that the defensive liquidity management practices of central
banks do not affect the quantity of monetary tokens in circulation. It could be argued that
the liquidity management operations of a central bank are essentially quantitative, but that
they are ex post reactions to large scale changes in the quantity of monetary tokens demanded
and in circulation.
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3.4.5 The hamstrung role of central banks in modern economies
Since private agents and modern states both utilise banking services (central
or commercial) to create monetary tokens, all modern monetary tokens are
originated in the banking sector. One would thus expect that central banks
would maintain a significant role in the direction of validation of economic
value within modern societies. In contrast, many modern central banks are
officially disconnected from both fiscal policy decisions and the lending decisions
of private banks, and limited to the primary objective of the maintenance of
price stability. The irony of this is that that the true value of the monetary
unit is as much dependent on the developmental effects of fiscal spending as
it is on the effective implementation of monetary policy. This is because the
value of the underlying society is the product of multi-generational tangible,
institutional and intellectual capacity development.
It is all of society that entrusts commercial bankers to conduct credit assessments
of would-be borrowers, and it should be to all of society that bankers are
accountable to for their lending decisions. It is hard to believe that the incentives
and interests of a large profit oriented, and highly competitive private banking
sector will be aligned with the interests of society in general. Over the course of
history, private banks have repeatedly demonstrated innovation and ingenuity,
and on the other hand, had a tendency towards greed and instability A P Faure
(2013). At the very least, the central bank should be in a position to protect
society from the ineptitude and greed of irresponsible bankers3.28. By and large,
central banks limit their activities to the internal and external maintenance
of the value of the monetary unit, with little or no attention given to the
compositional distribution or access to the creation of monetary tokens.
Private banks and governments (through central banks and democratic decision
or sovereign decree) alone have the capacity to create monetary tokens. They
thus stand as the gatekeepers to access to borrowing of credits from society
as a whole. They share the role of assessing the viability of projects and
ideas, and the importance of investments into socially beneficial infrastructure
3.28Until recently, private debts to a bank were entirely non-transferable. Banks, however, have
devised the means to package and remove debts from their own balance sheets – consequently
obscuring responsibility for lending decisions. There should be great concern when the
only institutions permitted to extend universal credits within a monetary space attempt to
obfuscate accountability. The recent subprime lending crisis in the USA is a perfect example
of the provision of massive sums of credit to borrowers that could never generate sufficient
social value to settle the debt.
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and institutions. Inadvertently, this means that they are also responsible for
the assessment of the potential addition to social value that might occur if
a particular good or service is validated through the expenditure of newly
manufactured monetary tokens (credits).
Money is created in exchange for debt, which means that is is created because
the demands of the borrower cannot be satisfied from the resources that they
already have. The accumulation of debts by individuals can otherwise be defined
as a net financing requirement. If the income of an individual is not sufficient
to cover the cost of their demand, they are required to accumulate liabilities
to finance their purchases. The relevance for economic analysis is related to
the endogenous money theory, which argues that money is not neutral. The
function that money serves as a unit of account, and the stability of the value
of the unit of account, allow money to be used as tool for pricing. The valuable
inputs to production can thus be priced in terms of money, and by convention or
by law, the means of production can be remunerated with money. It is therefore
argued that it is the ability of institutions to create money in exchange for a
debt contract that is in-turn the basis of financial expansion.
Money creation and debt creation are the foundation for the development of
a money-based society. These functions are also the catalysts for financial
expansion and for the allocation and development of resources in an economy.
Money, when defined as credit, or as a claim on the goods and resources of all
others who are willing to accept money, becomes the foundation for a system of
accumulation, or account. Money balances held as “savings” are considered to
be a friction, and not to finance investment. Rather, they slow the return of
tokens to the borrower. This is not a statement of macroeconomic causality,
but of micro-causal necessity. Sector level savings cannot be allocated by any
one member of the sector, and so any notion that the private sector as a whole
is able to mobilise savings is to conflate savers with investors when they may
be entirely different and separately motivated agents.
The credit based monetary system permits those with access to credit creation
facilities to direct the generation of and maintenance of social value in society
(through transaction), and in so doing, to determine what aspects of society
will be “validated” and thus maintained in exchange for monetary tokens. This
highlights the importance of the stock of resources that might be mobilised if
further credit were created - in the absence of spare capacity, inflation is a risk.
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Resources in this case are the skills and technical capacity of labour, physical
inputs to production, intellectual property, and technological resources. With
endogenous money creation for investment purposes, it is possible to expand
the capital or possibly the labour stock (labour defined here as the special
labour value of higher skilled workers, not purely in units of time), however, the
development of labour skills and materialisation of benefits from the investment
are expected to take many years, but proper investment in the capabilities of
the population will create greater pools of resources for activation in the future.
It is therefore concluded that money and money creation should be an integral
part of the public finance and public choice debate.
To the extent that the economy grows over time, and that an increase in
the quantity of money required for expansion to take place, there is a strong
argument (particularly with regard to the terms of borrowing) that it would
be a more optimal scenario for an appropriate portion of debts to be held by
government rather than against private borrowers. This is not to suggest it
would always be the case, but where government investment can be carried out
responsibly and efficiently, it should at least be part of public debate. Much like
the issues of equitable distribution of income, or optimal taxation, as noted by
Rosen (2002, p. 14), these are normative questions that “cannot be answered
without a statement of ethical goals.” Unfortunately it is difficult to find
common ground on these ethical goals, the present lack of political consensus
on climate policy, environmental protection or the reduction of pollution as
current examples.
Beyond the political and ethical differences, it is not only a question of Pareto
efficiency, in terms of the of the current allocation resources. It is also the
long-term implications for the availability of resources, that can be activated in
the future with the use of new money. The neoclassical theory of crowding out
of private investment, as discussed by Rosen (2002, p. 24) assumes that there
are limited capital and labour resources, this fails to consider the possibility that
the pool of possible resources can be enlarged by appropriate public investment.
Furthermore, the credit nature of money and money creation is important
as it affects the allocation of power over and accountability for the use of
resources in society. It is thus argued that the present reliance on the capacity
to demonstrate a profitable business concern, or the ownership of collateral
(possession of wealth or assets as a prerequisite) are likely to exacerbate the
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ever growing problems of income and wealth inequality.
3.5 Concluding remarks
Chick (1978 PP. 37) recognised that “our concentration on money’s role in
exchange has limited our understanding of the operation of money economies.
Money not only affects the efficiency with which we conduct trade, but also
influences the rate of capital accumulation, the commodity composition of
output, and relative prices.” A major reason for this, is believed here to be a
failure to appreciate the underlying nature of money. Any asset can be used
in exchange, but only the monetary token exists as a homogeneous record of
credit against the resources of all society. As noted earlier, Innes provided the
vital connection between interpersonal credit, debtor productivity and general
purchasing power. Ingham and Wray have since provided a historically sound
theory and record of the origins of a monetary unit, with particular focus on
the fundamental necessity and instrumental impact of centralised institutional
developments and decisions. Rochon and Rossi then provided a clear description
of the record keeping function of the banking sector. Post Keynesian literature
provides a detailed understanding of how personalised debt contracts permit
the creation of monetary credits in modern society and MMT explains the role
of the state and the usage of government debt securities for the management of
liquidity and interest rates.
It is accepted that the monetary unit most likely emerged as a result of the
actions of a central authority, with emphasis on the role of a government
like authority in the development. It is then from the credit relations between
economic agents, within a specific socio-structural context, that monetary tokens
emerge with socially dependent value. The interrelationships between specific
social structural contexts and progressive banking and monetary development
facilitated the emergence of credit based ‘capitalist monetary tokens’, specifically
homogeneous, depersonalised representations of an abstract quantum of social
value.
The monetary token is, as Ingham has argued, the representation of a social re-
lation. That relation is a debt and credit relationship, and in modern economies,
the debt is homogeneous in substance, but personalised, specific and dependent
on the quality of the debtor. Credit, on the other hand, is homogeneous and
depersonalised, while both the debt and the credit are harmonised by their
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denomination at par in the monetary unit. Borrowers provide a personalised
debt agreement in exchange for general credit against society. Upon spending,
those borrowers, while officially only indebted to a single entity (probably a
bank), are in fact indebted to all participants in the monetary space, society.
Society lends resources to the borrowers for their usage. They are required in
the future to acquire identical, homogeneous credits from other members of
society in order to settle their personalised debt, and can only do so by means
of the sale of goods, services, assets, or labour – i.e. by the provision of value to
society. What is emphasised is that the monetary token represents a socially
accepted right to the resources of other members of a society within a particular
monetary space.
This theory is presented with full acknowledgement of the benefits of competi-
tive markets such as the contribution to specialisation and division of labour,
elimination of monopolistic pricing, enhanced innovation and the diversification
of product offerings. It cannot, however, be accepted that money – the monetary
unit, token, or space – emerged from the cost minimising quest for efficiency
of the market system. As Post-Keynesians might say, the progression and
emergence of money was not a deterministic process. An accurate record of the
historical origins of the components of modern monetary systems necessitates
the acknowledgement of temporal ordering of events, social structures and
institutions in the assessment of economic problems and the determination of
our future societies.
Money can also not be regarded as a neutral lubricant. It must be considered
as a contextually dependent asset, the value of which depends not only on the
general ability of those within the monetary space to provide value, but also on
the effective decision-making of those permitted to issue monetary tokens and
manage the monetary system, and to coordinate public and private interests,
hopefully towards the common goal of prosperity.
The origins and nature of money are relevant for more than just academic interest.
Our beliefs regarding the nature of money directly affect the mechanisms chosen
to manage the monetary system in a country, which can be also linked to different
political ideologies or ulterior motives – leaving the direction of causality out
of the discussion for now. The quantity, monetarist and neutrality theories
of money can be linked to minimalist government and privatisation ideologies
(possibly liberalism or neoliberalism), while the production and credit theories
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of money can be linked to big government and collectivistic ideologies such as
the welfare state, socialism or social democracy.
Different explanations of money are also supportive of distinctly different eco-
nomic paradigms. For example, neo-classical theory is compatible the former,
while Keynesian and post-Keynesian theory is compatible with the latter. De-
pending on the current state of affairs, one might favour one or the other theory.
In the pursuit of equality under a dictatorial monarchy, one might be fully
supportive of neoliberalism, whereas in a country dominated by a powerful
elite private class one might prefer a Keynesian-like approach. The purpose of
this article is not to explore the theoretical associations of different theories of
money, but to present money conceptually.
Some important considerations that have not been discussed here include:
Implications for foreign exchange in terms of underlying social value of inputs
and the volatility of relative monetary prices; the distortionary impacts of linking
the monetary unit and monetary token, and the possibility for a valuation system
that is disconnected from institutions that have the capacity to expand the
quantum of credits; the possibility for a global monetary unit, or possibly a
value reference system – possibly with an interest in mitigating the risk of
exploitation of labour; and, alternative mechanisms for credit management
within economies – particularly non-productive consumer credit.
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4 Article 2: Sectoral balance analysis: Evi-
dence from Scandinavia
Introductory remarks
Article 1 explores the sources of change in financial balance sheet, and argued
that there were a number of ethical and moral implications for the creation of
debt. It was further argued, that the accumulations in each sector are dependent
on the decisions to borrow by the other sectors. Thus linking the source of
change and potential connection between sectors at an aggregate level. The
second article follows from this, and addresses the second objective, to establish
empirical evidence of interactions between the sectoral balances. As noted in the
introduction, the objective of the article is to investigate the interaction between
sector level net lending requirements for Denmark, Norway and Sweden between
1950 and 2017. It considers whether, or to what extent, each sector is in control
of their net lending positions. This is in order to gain an understanding for
sector interdependencies. Finally it addresses the question of how generalisable
the findings for each of the Scandinavian economies really are, and whether
generalised theories should be used to justify general economic policy.
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Abstract
This paper explores the sectoral balances for the private sector, the public
sector and the foreign sector for Denmark, Norway and Sweden from a historical
perspective. The use of the sectoral balance approach for Scandinavian countries
is largely ignored in both the contemporary and historical economic literature.
From a sectoral balance point of view, two important changes in the Danish
economy from 1975-2016 are identified; the status of the current account and the
Great Recession. Sweden (1950-2016) similarly exhibits two important changes;
the opening of financial markets and the banking crisis. For Norway (1978-2016),
two related events are behind a major change in the economy; the production of
oil, with associated revenues for government, and the creation of the Norwegian
Petroleum Fund and the associated property income flows. In combination with
idiosyncratic historical events for each country, and supplementary observations
of macroeconomic indicators, it is possible to paint a rich picture of the evolution
of each country. All three exhibit strong automatic stabilisation mechanisms, as
expected from welfare states. In addition, all three emerged from the late 1990s
into strong current account positions. The internal structure of the domestic
balances within the three countries, however, diverge significantly.
4.1 Introduction
The System of National Accounts (SNA) is the backbone of macroeconomic
investigation4.4, but the accounting structures embedded the SNA have been
neglected by recent empirical research. According to Bergman (2015), “A
rather common view is that academics and other economic analysts do not
fully comprehend the whole potential of the SNA . . . SNA is often not seen as
the prevailing tool for economic analysis.” As he emphasises, the information
contained in the SNA can easily be reframed to provide alternative, highly
insightful perspectives on the status of an economy. Both historically and in
recent years, there has been much attention paid to inter-country imbalances,
though it is important to recognise that an imbalance towards rest of the world
is necessarily reflected in the interactions of the domestic sectors and thereby
imbalances between the domestic sectors within a country. If, for example,
domestic national savings exceed domestic national investment, the country is
4.4An early attempt at such social accounting frameworks can be traced back to François
Quesnay when he published the two-sector circular flow model in his 1758 book Tableau
èconomique.
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by definition running a current account surplus. Therefore, an imbalance in
the domestic sector balances is met by an equal imbalance towards rest of the
world. Since the sum of the imbalances by definition is zero, not all sectors of
an economy can be net savers or net borrowers at the same time. When one
sector is in sectoral surplus at least one other sector must be in sectoral deficit.
Following the tradition of Keynes, Minsky, Godley and others, the approach of
sectoral balances analysis has gained more interest and impact among economists.
The main sectors analysed are the government sector (GOV) the private sector
(PRI) and the rest of the world sector4.5 (ROW). Krugman (2009) is one
of the few attempts to use the sectoral balances approach (SBA) to explain
what happened in the American economy from a historical point of view. He
specifically draws attention to a major difference between the Great Recession
and the Great Depression looking at the sectoral balances. SBA has also been
used as a tool to discuss the sustainability and consequences of developments
in specific sectors4.6.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the SBA can be used on
historical data to identify and explain major shifts in the post-war Scandinavian
economies.
The choice to use the Scandinavian countries, can be summarized by two main
arguments: i) the long history of reporting reliable national accounting data.
Data reaching back to 1950s for Sweden and 1970s for Denmark and Norway
for the sectoral balances has more recently been made available. ii) the lack
of Literature using SBA on Scandinavian economies. To a large degree, recent
research involving the national accounts can be split between large quantitative
empirical analyses, and in-depth historical accounts of the developments in
given countries. Our approach tries to combine elements of both, where data
regarding the interactions between sectors could provide a crucial overview of
persistent trends and patterns over time.
The reasons for choosing the SBA are, as suggested above, manifold. First, due
4.5The balance for the ROW is viewed from the ROW perspective. A current account
surplus for the domestic country (for example Denmark) is therefore a deficit for the ROW.
4.6In his 1999 analysis, Godley identified 7 unsustainable processes in the American economy
and in the period from 1999 to 2006 he warned against a forthcoming crisis several times.
He argued, that as soon as the deficit (and exploding debt) in the private sector abated, the
American economy would go into a recession – unless the public sector (and the interaction
with the rest of the world) changed its behaviour dramatically.
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to the underlying accounting structure of the approach, it allows us to check the
logic behind a specific argument. Let us assume we have a country with either
a current account deficit or even a current account of zero. In this situation,
an argument stating that both the private and the public sector should target
deleveraging at the same time, can easily be proven to in illogical. Second, using
a simple Keynesian theoretical foundation behind the SBA, an explanation
of how different sectors react to a certain change in one other sector can be
provided. Thirdly, long run patterns in net balances result in the accumulation
of stocks, and the financial implications of these build-ups can be extreme, vis a
vis the recent global financial crisis, and subsequent recession. Fourth, the sector
balances are residuals of one another, and are thus interdependent, therefore
the analysis of events in the absence of a systemic framework can be biased and
misleading. Fifth, financing requirements for economic development are crucial
for economic policy, and sector balances provide a poignant summary of the net
financial position of each sector. Finally, the incorporation of financial balances
allows for a much richer understanding of the evolution of the Scandinavian
economies.
The key contributions of this paper can be summarized by three points. Firstly,
to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to use the SBA on historical
data for the three Scandinavian countries. Secondly, we use the SBA with a
retrospective investigative focus, as opposed to the more common prognostic
purpose. Finally, for the period of 1995 and onwards we integrate a stock
element (sectoral wealth) into our analysis, which helps us to highlight the
importance of incorporating stock-flow-consistency in the analysis.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 4.2 provides a contracted histori-
cal review of various contributions regarding national accounts for the three
Scandinavian countries, and notes some core accounting identities. Section 4.3
recognises some of the recent contributions to, and uses of, the SBA. Section 4.4
presents sectoral balances data for the three countries, and Section 4.5 presents
the analysis, and Section 4.6 and Section 4.7 respectively provide an interna-
tional comparative and discussion of the data presented. Finally, Section 4.8
concludes.
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4.2 Sectoral Balances approach
This section offers first a brief introduction to the development of a system of
national accounts seen from a historical point of view. Secondly, the principle
of sectoral balances is derived from national account identities, presenting some
important accounting relations.
4.2.1 Background
As stated in Ark (1995), the history on using national accounts concepts dates
back many years4.7. However, works on national accounting would await the
Keynesian Revolution before featuring significantly in macroeconomic works.
With Keynes and the Keynesians, a need for using national accounting data
developed. Especially the need to be able to forecast the economic performance
of modern Western economies became important in particular, with the aim
of trying to identify what trajectory performance they were likely to take in
the near future. Would the economy be expected to perform rather poorly or
was the economy rather heading towards a boom phase? With a Keynesian
strategy on economic policy matters, the need of introducing fiscal and monetary
changes was, in general, a major priority on the political agenda. However,
in order to make effective policy decisions, macroeconomists and politicians
alike needed a tool, and that tool was found in developing macroeconometric
models. However, to be able to do this, one needed to have the necessary data
on relevant macroeconomic variables at hand. This triggered work that resulted
in further data collection and eventually in the development of national account
systems, following the international guidelines given by the United Nations
System of National Accounts (SNA).
Christensen et al. (1995) surveyed the Nordic National Accounts since the 1880s.
In general, the focus of their article was on the development of the national
accounts, focusing on the real side of the economy (covering for instance a
discussion on the commodity-flow method, early input-output computation and
the consequences of the Kuznets project). They dated the first attempts to
calculate the national income back to the end of the 19th century for Denmark
4.7Ark (1995) presented an interesting discussion on both the purpose of doing historical
national accounting in general and the problems one faces (e.g.problems with getting the
right benchmark years, various weighting procedures, how to treat the service sector correctly
and how to make useful cross-country comparisons). However interesting these aspects and
problems may be, it is beyond the scope of the present article to explore these detailed aspects.
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and Norway and to the beginning of the 20th century for Sweden, using an income
statistical method based mainly on tax data. As pointed out by Christensen et
al. (1995, p. 31), in general, these early estimates, in comparison to the more
modern Historical National Accounts (HNA) studies of the Nordic countries,
seem to underestimate the economic development of these countries4.8.
In the 1920s and the 1930s, the commodity-flow method inspired the work
in Sweden (a research team led by Erik Lindahl); in reality, a sort of basic
input-output computation. The project was titled “Wages, Cost of Living and
National Income in Sweden, 1860-1930”. Originally, this work was initiated by
Gösta Bagge, and beside the construction of historical national accounts, it was
supplemented by series on wage data, cost of living indices and demographic
data. As such, according to Christensen et al. (1995) this work was pioneering in
an international context making “Sweden unique in the development of national
income statistics”; op. cit. p. 33. Likewise, in the 1920s, Danish statisticians
also began using output statistics rather than income statistics. With Viggo
Kampmann (whom in the 1950s as a Social Democrat became Minister of
Finance, and later, Prime Minister in Denmark), national accounting was put
on the agenda as a main task for Statistics Denmark further developing the
output-statistical method (constructing input-output tables, use of input-output
techniques and calculating series not only in current prices but also in constant
prices)4.9.
However, they (Christensen et al., 1995, p. 35) did mention that Ragnar Frisch,
already as early as the 1930s, emphasized the need to distinguish between
real (goods and services) and financial aspects (claims and counterclaims). A
work by Frisch that finally became completed in the 1940s with his “Eco-circ
System”4.10. However, the line of work done by Lindahl and Kampmann seems
to have been preferred in Norway as a project was started in this tradition on
National Income in Norway for the period 1935-1943.
Despite the point made by Frisch on the need to focusing also on financial aspects,
4.8However, they mention that the calculations of the British statistician Mulhall, for the
case of Denmark, “show levels of income in 1878, 1880, 1890 and 1895, which are very close
to those in the latest historical series”.
4.9As concluded by Christensen et al. (1995, p. 34), “the Danish series for the 1930s is a
thorough work, containing series for gross as well as net domestic product, calculated both in
factor and market prices and with many separate series for both consumption, investment,
productions branches ect.”.
4.10For more details on this system by Frisch see for instance Bjerve (1986).
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work on national accounts in this period hardly addressed the financial side4.11.
Later, the demand for financial data increased, leading to the development of
the flow of funds accounts, which is now an integrated part of the SNA4.12. With
the 1968-SNA standardization, the financial balance sheet was added to the
national account system. It was, however, not before the implementation of SNA
93 guidelines that a fully specified system of financial accounts, including the
revaluation account, were established. According to Abildgren (2008), Statistics
Denmark integrated financial account stock and flow data in the SNA statistics
from 2001. Series on financial data were provided at a later stage, which date
back to 19954.13.
Abildgren (2012) constructed quarterly national accounts in current as well
as in constant prices for Denmark covering the period 1948-71 to supplement
existing quarterly data made available by Statistics Denmark and the central
bank of Denmark (Danmarks Nationalbank) from 1971 and onwards. He also
made a collection of 17 other important key quarterly macroeconomic indicators
(including several key financial variables) from 1948 to present time. Using
these data in a VAR analysis4.14, Abildgren argues that the volatility of the
real GDP component in the Danish business cycle has been substantially lower
from the beginning of the 1980s compared to earlier decades up to the resent
crisis4.15. He finds that “the unemployment rate tends to lag the business cycle
4.11The lack of information on the financial side of the economy was not only a concern for
Frisch, but also a concern for Copeland in the US and Denitez in France. As expressed by
Copeland (1949, p. 254), “When total purchases of our national product increase, where does
the money come from to finance them? When purchases of our national product decline, what
becomes of the money that is not spent?”
4.12This kind of standardization resulting in the first SNA from the United Nations in 1947
followed as a natural consequence of the requirements of the Marshall Plan and OEEC. As
pointed out by Christensen et al. (1995), although the Nordic countries fully accepted the
international guidelines, they somehow also tried to stick to their own long Nordic tradition.
However, in the 1960s initiatives were taken in both Denmark, Norway and Sweden to extend
the NA-systems. Furthermore, inspired by the Kuznets-project work on Historical National
Accounts took on in these countries. As an example, in Norway, series were constructed back
first to 1900, then to 1865 and later on in the 1970s back to 1835.
4.13A Danish case study of how to construct a set of historical financial account data is given
in Abildgren (2008). In this study, Abildgren focuses only on stock data rather than flow
data and only on major financial assets and liabilities.
4.14Using this kind of method, Abildgren (2012, p. 66) argues: “Since the dynamic interactions
between the financial sector and the real economy are rich and complicated, a VAR approach
seems particularly useful for studies of financial instability due to the few a priori restrictions
imposed on such models”.
4.15Moreover, this is not only a Danish phenomenon. With Abildgren (2012, p. 65): “Similar
results have been found for other countries, and the reduction in volatility has been termed
‘the Great Moderation’ ”.
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component in the real . . . GDP, whereas interest rates, share prices and money
tend to lead the cycle in output”; op. cit. p. 51. In addition, Abildgren (2012)
also presents important feedback mechanisms between the real economy and the
financial sector of the economy. As such, he finds that “The results of the VAR
analysis . . . indicate that periods of financial crisis have been characterised by
an extraordinary large increase in the banking sector’s write-down ratio and a
related persistent decline in real GDP . . . which indicates that the economic
recovery after a banking crisis tends to be slower than normal”; op. cit. p. 524.16.
The shocks that are identified as significant by his VAR-model are located in
the years of the early 1990s and 2008, precisely when the Danish, and many
other European banking sectors faced particularly difficult times.
In Fløttum, Halvorsen, Simpson, & Skoglund (2012) a thorough examination
of the development of national accounts in Norway is given. There, as in
Christensen et al. (1995), the pioneering work of Ragnar Frisch as well as that
of Odd Aukrust (who led the National Accounts Unit as Statistics Norway,
established in 1946), is highlighted. As such, Norway is given credit for being
one of the first countries that early on from 1952 integrated input-output tables
in their annual national accounts4.17. By use of this tool, much analytic work on
various aspects of national budgeting and macroeconomic planning was founded
in the 1960s with the aim of developing better macroeconomic models of the
Norwegian economy. Furthermore, in 1990 the Norwegian national accounts
system was updated with the purpose of fulfilling the recommendations in
the SNA 1993 Inter-Secretariat Working Group of the European Communities
(1993) and the more recent European standards of ESA 1995 Eurostat (1996)4.18.
Regarding the sectoral balances, two important aspects were thereafter taken
into account. First, the institutional sectoral accounts were established, which
separated the economy into five sectors (non-financial corporations, financial
corporations, public sector, households and rest of the world). Secondly, the
4.16Later on he explains further that: “a financial crisis is characterised by an extraordinarily
large increase in the write-down ratio of the banking system - that is a larger increase than
the economic development would normally warrant - and that this increase is related to a
decline in domestic credit and real GDP”; Abildgren (2012, p. 72).
4.17With Fløttum et al. (2012, p. 30): “input-output tables were not just important for
the use of national accounts, but also for compiling national accounts to ensure consistency
between figures. This role in the compilation is still held in Norway, while most countries do
not have such a tradition”. See Simpson (2009) for a thorough presentation on the Statistics
Norway’s use of input-output tables.
4.18During the years, Statistics Norway has made six major revisions of the national accounts;
the last one in 2011.
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financial part of the national accounts was improved significantly. However,
according to Fløttum et al. (2012), during the period of 1950s to 1990, although
the work on incorporating the financial part of the national accounts was
initiated, the focus was especially on how to develop the real side of the
economy in the national accounts4.19.
As indicated earlier, Sweden has a long tradition of conducting research in the
area of national accounting. As an example, the work done on the commodity-
flow method in the 1920s and 1930s inspired the methodology of national
accounting in both Denmark and Norway. As such, Bohlin (2003, p. 74), who
in part surveys the more recent contributions to the Swedish Historical National
Accounts (HNA), partly discusses how these new data have updated the views
on Swedish economic growth since the early nineteenth century4.20, might be
justified in claiming that “Sweden is a pioneer in national accounting”, as many
contributions have been made to estimate historical national accounts in order
to study the historical development of economic growth in Sweden as a core
element in economic history.
Waldenström (2016) presents his Swedish National Wealth Database, which
shows data on national wealth and sectoral net lending from 1810-20144.21. As
such, his database includes major asset as well as liability categories and a
set of sectoral gross and net saving rates; allowing him to provide an analysis
of aggregate balance sheets in Sweden for the past two centuries. With his
particular focus on net wealth aspects, Waldenström (2016, pp. 37–39) provides
a contracted but very interesting presentation of previous work on national
accounts in Sweden. Undoubtedly, Waldenström’s own work should be seen as
a modern major continuation of these earlier contributions.
From 1880 to 1901 both Karl Daniel Bollfras and Pontus Fahlbeck gave some
estimates on the stock of wealth (and debt) in Sweden for PRI and GOV in total.
In 1912 Flodström presented and in-depth investigation of Sweden’s national
wealth in the year 1908. Later, in the 1950s and 1970s, more attempts were
4.19In Fløttum (1981) the stock of a number of financial assets can be seen at a sector-level
decades earlier, but without the financial account being a part of this statistic.
4.20As such, in highlighting the historical growth pattern of Sweden, which led Sweden
to become one of the richest countries in Europe, Bohlin (2003, p. 91) noted that future
revisions of older GDP estimates might well “lead to higher output figures since new research
generally incorporates the output of productive activities that had been neglected in earlier
calculations”.
4.21For a more detailed presentation and discussion of this database, see Waldenström (2015).
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made to estimate the balance sheet of the household sector, but without much
attention to the other sectors of the economy4.22. In 1993, Lars Werin collected
a database on financial assets and liabilities, creating a financial balance sheet
for all the sectors from 1945-19904.23. Waldenström also refers to the work done
by Statistics Sweden in constructing official series of national wealth and points
to Bergman, Djerf, & Lindström (2010) analysis examining household balance
sheets between 1970 and 2008 as important contributions in the line of work on
wealth matters4.24.
Aside from presenting evidence on previous work, Waldenström (2016) conducts
a thorough and very enlightening analysis of the development of the Swedish
national wealth - split in three parts: an analysis of private wealth, government
wealth and national wealth - for a rather long period of two centuries.
Alongside Waldenström, Lindmark & Andersson (2016) also focus on how to
assess historical Swedish wealth patterns. In doing so, they point to the fact
that most HNA based research focus on economic flows rather than trying
to analyse the process of economic growth from a capital stock or an asset
perspective. Thus, they aim to highlight various aspects of the development of
the Swedish capital stock in the period 1830-20104.25. Contrary to Waldenström,
they explored different patterns of return between four sectors (the primary
sector, the manufacturing sector, the sector of transport and communication and
4.22Waldenström (2016, p. 38): “A follow-up on Flodström’s investigation was made by
Englund (1956) to capture national wealth in 1952) . . . In the 1970s, Spånt (1979) published
an extensive study of the evolution of the Swedish household wealth distribution since 1920
. . . An important contribution is Lennart Berg’s estimation of annual household balance
sheets made for the period 1950 onwards”.
4.23Following the recommendation in the development of SNA and ESA, Statistics Sweden
offers both national and financial accounts for all institutional sectors in the economy.
4.24As such, Bergman et al. (2010) considers alternative perspectives on the SNA for the
Swedish economy. As they point out, such work has historically not been given the right
attention. In Sweden, as elsewhere, work on balance sheets has not attracted much attention
when doing national accounts. This is probably due, as they argue, to a number of reasons.
One important reason is that such methods did not hitherto seem to have played a significant
role in economic analysis of the Swedish economy. However, because of the resent global
financial crisis, the authors expect that more attention will be drawn to this kind of analysis
in the future in an effort to try to unfold the important interactions between an economy’s
financial and real economic variables (stock and flow wise).
4.25They deal in particular with two main questions: “what characterises the scope and
the structure of capital stock over time and across sectors? . . . and . . . how does the
ratio of income to capital evolve over time, and is the return on capital equal over time and
across sectors”; Lindmark & Andersson (2016, p. 123). Regarding these questions, they
conclude that the capital ratio level of Sweden has followed that of other European countries.
Furthermore, the capital return grew significantly during the period of industrialisation with
the manufacturing sector playing the key role in improving the capital return in total.
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private services). In addition, Schön & Krantz (2012) investigated early modern
economic growth. In their study, some detailed information and estimation on
Swedish GDP data from 1560 and onwards is presented with a particular focus
on the period prior to 1860 giving new estimates of Sweden’s growth from the
mid-sixteenth to the nineteenth century. As indicated in Schön & Krantz (2012,
p. 539), the level of GDP per capita in the period 1560 to 1860 is remarkably
steady, showing hardly any growth (however, with yearly fluctuations). As such,
Sweden seems to fit well with the continental pattern of long run GDP per
capita stagnation up to the early nineteenth century.
4.2.2 Accounting
In this section, the concept of net lending (NL) across different sectors is
introduced both from the real side and the financial side of the economy.
To understand the properties of NL we start with the composition of GDP:
GDP = C + IP + IG +G+X −M (4.1)
Where C is PRI consumption, Ip is PRI investment, Ig is GOV investment, G
is GOV consumption, X is exports and M is imports.
If public investment is integrated into G this now represent public expenditures
on final goods, the equation can be written as:
GDP = C + IP +G+X −M (4.2)
By taking net income and net transfers from abroad into account, the gross
national income can be expressed as:
GNI = GDP +NIA = C + IP +G+X −M +NIA (4.3)
where NIA is the net income and current transfers received from abroad.
By introducing transfer payments across the domestic sectors, NT expresses
the tax payment from PRI to GOV net of transfer payments and subsidies paid
by GOV to PRI. If saving in PRI, Sp, is determined as the disposable income
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Sector Balances: Historical, (4):12
not spent on consumption, the three-sector balance can be derived as,
(SP − IP ) + (NT −G) + (M −X −NIA) = 0 (4.4)
The first bracket expresses the NL or sector balance for PRI, the second bracket
expresses the sector balance or NL for GOV, and the third bracket represents
the NL or sector balance for ROW4.26.
Equation (4.4) clearly shows, why all sectors cannot be net savers or net
borrowers at the same time. If one sector is in sectoral deficit, at least one
other sector needs to be in sectoral surplus. It is important to notice, that
nothing can be said about causality from this national account identity. As
stated by Brink (1983), the changes in NL can be initiated in all sectors, and
each of the sectors has a life on his own, implying that the ultimate annual net
position is largely a residual of the cumulative activities in each sector. The
concept of NL can also be derived from the financial side of the economy, where
it measures the differences in and transaction of financial assets and liabilities
for the different sectors.
NL = FAtr − FLtr (4.5)
Where, FAtr are the collective transactions in financial assets, while FLtr are
the collective transactions of financial liabilities. Since the sum of NL across the
three sectors is zero, the total transaction value of financial assets and liabilities
are equal: if one sector accumulates more financial assets than financial liabilities
at least one other sector must accumulate the counterparts.
The accumulation of both financial assets and liabilities and non-financial assets,
affects the stock of financial wealth in all sectors. Positive NL increases, ceteris
paribus, the stock of wealth for the individual sector, which can be written as,
V = Vt−1 +NL+ CG (4.6)
4.26We use the terms net lending and saving surplus as synonymous, despite the fact, that
the two terms diverge due to capital transfers and acquisitions less disposals of non-produced
non-financial assets. These two accounts are however very small. The values for net lending
and saving surplus are thus very close to one another.
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where V is the net wealth, NL is net lending, and CG is any capital gains (or
revaluations). As pointed out by Waldenström (2016) and Knudsen (2017),
fluctuations in net wealth over time are mainly due to changes in NL (net
accumulation of financial assets) rather than capital gains, whereas short run
fluctuations can be due to capital gains. Since the description of the three
countries is based on a longer time perspective, capital gains are ignored in the
descriptions in Section 4.4 below.
It is however important to point out, that while Equation (4.6), for wealth
accumulation, indicates that NL affects wealth, the causality of course runs
in both directions, since the NL also depends on the stock of wealth. This is
largely due to financial and real property rental incomes and expenses. This
means, that in order to analyse the NL behaviour correctly, the financial status
(net wealth) of a given sector must also be taken into account.
4.3 Literature Review
The SBA as a tool for analysis, has received some attention in recent years,
and is based on the system of national accounts (SNA)4.27. The British and
American history of the standardised system of national accounts employed
today can be traced back to James Meade and Richard Stone in the UK, and to
Morris A. Copeland in the USA, who contributed greatly to the establishment of
the 1953 United Nations System of National Accounts4.28. As noted by Godley
& Lavoie (2012, p. 24), the initial interest of Copeland in the 1940s was to
investigate the financing requirements of economic activity between and across
the national sectors4.29. The SBA approach could be described as a continuation
4.27An early attempt to try to use a technique somewhat similar to the SFB is given by
Mishkin (1978). Using US household balance sheets, Mishkin tried to shed new light on the
Great Depression. As such, he emphasises the crucial interaction between the real economy
and the financial sector. To Mishkin, the financial position of the household sector was a
very important factor in patially explaining why the Great Depression happened and how
it evolved through time. For instance, he pointed out that “The early years of the Great
Depression stand out as a period when the consumer suffered a significant deterioration in his
financial position . . . The improvement of household’ financial status until 1937 coincides
with the recovery from the trough of 1933 . . . The comparison of the movement in real gross
national product and changes in the balance sheets of households indicates that there might
be more than a coincidental relationship between them”; Mishkin (1978, pp. 923–924).
4.28Glötzl & Rezai (2017) trace the development of the SNA back to an article published
by Meade and Stone at the Great Britain Treasury – although they allude that inspiration
should be attributed further back to Keynes.
4.29Adequate data for such a presentation of the financial side of the economy only became
available much later in the 1970s and 1980s and was formalised in the System of National
Accounts in 1993 (Inter-Secretariat Working Group of the European Communities, 1993).
13
Sector Balances: Historical, (4):14
of Copeland’s goals with the aid of modern technology. The work of Wynne
Godley together with other key authors, (see Godley & Cripps, 1983; Wynne
Godley, 1999b; W Godley, 1999; Godley, 2004; Godley & Lavoie, 2001, 2012;
Godley & Zezza, 1989, 1992), is recognised by many economists, e.g. by Bezemer
(2009) and Fiebiger (2013), as the instigating factor in the re-emergence of
SBA. In light of the relatively recent availability of comprehensive and relatively
accurate data on the financial side of the economy, Godley, together with several
collaborators, conducted pioneering work in integrating the real and financial
sides of the economy in a unified, stock-flow consistent macroeconomic modelling
framework.
As highlighted by Tissot (2016), as a consequence of the global financial crisis
of 2007-09, the development of financial sectoral accounts has been high on
the political agenda, as efforts to perform various financial stability analyses
became a core concern of monetary authorities. As such, much work has been
done to ensure access to the needed financial data4.30. It was realised that the
crisis had underscored at least three aspects: 1) debt plays a central role in the
build-up of crises; 2) focus should be given to the many innovations that are
carried out within the financial system, as these innovations evolve constantly
as well as rapidly; and 3) the fact that financial imbalances often occur more or
less simultaneously across countries.
Despite the fact that the sector balances are often discussed, surprisingly few
empirical analyses can be found in the literature. Recent studies using this
approach are presented below. In a recent paper, Glötzl & Rezai (2017) present
an analysis that follows the work presented by Barbosa-Filho et al. (2006)
& Barbosa-Filho et al. (2008), where they use sector NL to discuss possible
causalities between the sectors.
In Glötzl & Rezai (2017) the analysis covers 22 European countries using
quarterly data from 1999 to 2013. The authors show, how the NL of the single
sectors behave concerning the business cycles for the 22 countries focusing on
These accounts were revised again in 2008, and for the European Union, the most recent
version is the European regional and sector accounts 2010 (Statistical Office of the European
Communities., 2013), and was published in the official law journal of the European Union in
2013 (Euponean Union Commission, 2013).
4.30Tissot (2016, p. 9) noted that “public authorities have realized that important information
had been missing on the financial system and had to be collected . . . As a result, all the
G-20 economies have developed plans to improve their financial accounts statistics. A data
template on sectoral accounts was finalised in 2012”.
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which sectors lag or lead the business cycle, as proxied by the output gap. The
analysis is numerically driven, and does not lend itself to an in-depth exposition
of each country.
Regarding Denmark, their analysis shows that the NL of the household sector
(HH) and financial corporations sector (FC) seems to lead the business cycle,
while NL of non-financial corporations sector (NFC) and ROW seem to react as
a response to the business cycle. GOV shows no evidence of either lag or lead.
In Sweden on the other hand, NL of GOV (and NFC) seems to lag the business
cycle, whereas NL of HH seems to lead the business cycle. In both Denmark
and Sweden, net borrowing of HH and NFC is pro-cyclical, while net borrowing
in GOV is counter-cyclical. For Denmark NL of ROW is counter-cyclical and
NL of financial corporations is pro-cyclical, neither of which show significant
patterns for Sweden4.31.
Barbosa-Filho et al. (2006) present a graphical illustration of NL of the five
institutional sectors (HH, FC, NFC, GOV and ROW) for both the US, covering
the period of 1947-2004, and a panel of developing countries, with data for the
years 1980-2002, also to investigate possible explanations for the link between
the sectors.
Ali Abbas, Bouhga-Hagbe, Fatás, Mauro, & Velloso (2011) performed a sub-
stantial empirical analysis of the potential relationship between public sector
spending and current account net balances. Their presentation allows for a more
nuanced understanding of the effectiveness of different policies given prevailing
conditions in trade, with financial openness, and the monetary/exchange rate
regime.
These above-mentioned papers are primarily focused on either to test the validity
of suggested causalities in a group of countries or on efforts trying to explain the
effects of fiscal policy in general. None of these papers try to provide information
of specific events using the SBA as a tool.
With regards policy analysis, Semieniuk, Treeck, & Truger (2012) conducted
empirical analysis of the three sector balances to discuss the possible outcomes
of the European Stability Pact program from 2011-2014. The authors use the
SBA to question the reliability of the predicted results from the European
Commission of the Stability Pact.
4.31Norway is unfortunately not a part of the sample in any of the analysis presented here.
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Looking further back in time, Brink (1983) used arguments analogous to the
present NL discussions. He argued that the major reason for the persistent
GOV deficit in Denmark during the 1970s and 1980s was low demand from
abroad due to the global economic downturn and financial consolidation in PRI.
In accordance with this view of sector inter-relations, Krugman (2009) more
recently noted that governmental deficits are often a consequence of the workings
of the automatic stabilizers rather than as a result of expansionary fiscal policy
changes – both apparently portraying GOV balance as somewhat passive to
changes in the other sectors. This, however, does not imply that discretionary
policy changes have no effect on the sector balances, as policy changes directly
affect the balances in PRI and ROW. In case of a lower propensity to import
in GOV compared to PRI, an increase in GOV consumption financed by an
increase in taxes leads to an increase in NL in PRI, while the NL in ROW falls
– that is, one would see an improvement on the current account.
Tissot (2016) used the banking crisis in Sweden in the early 1990s as a case for
highlighting the relevance of a SBA. As a result of the crisis, PRI in Sweden
began to deleverage (reduce debt), which can be seen by the steep increase in
NL in PRI in Sweden following the crisis4.32. As a result of this deleveraging in
PRI, GOV was massively affected. The lack of demand from PRI is explained to
have led to a deterioration of the GOV balance. After the initial phase the need
for deleveraging in PRI faded out, which coincided with a gradual improvement
in the GOV balance.
Finally, a working paper from Statistics Sweden, Bergman et al. (2010) analysed
the changes in balance sheets across the different sectors of the economy during
2008-2009, following the recent financial and economic crisis. Focusing on
foreign debt, Bergman et al. (2010) linked the changes in balance sheet across
time with NL of ROW. Despite continuously negative NL for ROW, the Swedish
debt to ROW has not fallen to the same degree. He explained this discrepancy
with capital gains; the consequences of a revaluation of the Swedish stock of
liabilities held abroad.
This review of the literature working with sectoral balances highlights a gap
in the literature in the use of the SBA in explaining the development of an
4.32There is some debate as whether this reduction is driven primarily by demand (for credit)
or supply (of credit) factors. See for example Bernanke & Gertler (1995), Bernanke (2007),
and Disyatat (2011).
16
Sector Balances: Historical, (4):17
economy in retrospect.
4.4 The Three Economies
Before the sectoral balance approach can be used on the Scandinavian Economies,
it is relevant to provide a short empirical presentation of the developments in
NL as well as the net financial position of the three economies. In this section,
the presentation is done individually for each country, starting with Denmark
and followed by Sweden and Norway.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show NL, net financial wealth (NFW) and percentage growth
in GDP for the three main sectors for Denmark. Overlaid in the background is
real GDP growth as a fine red dotted line.
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Figure 4.1: DK: Net Lending
Source: Eurostat, ADAM macroeconomic database, authors own
workings. Lines represent annual net lending to GDP ratios.
As shown above in Figure 4.1, NL for GOV was negative from 1975 to the late
1990s, with the exception of a few years of positive NL in the late 1980s. In
the years leading up to the Great Recession, GOV shows positive NL of up
to 5% of GDP, clearly breaking away from former patterns of NL for GOV.
After the crisis, NL turned negative again, which resulted in a warning from
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the European commission in 2010, after which, the NL for GOV has moved
more towards zero.
NL of PRI has been more volatile over the years, however, since 1990, NL of PRI
in Denmark has been almost entirely positive. The only exception being the
years shortly prior to the Great Recession, where the level of PRI investment
exceeded the level of savings. In the aftermath of the crisis, NL of PRI remained
positive in every year at a rather high level of around 10% of GDP.
NL of ROW can be divided into two sub periods of time; before 1989 and after
1989. Before 1989 the Danish economy faced a current account deficit. Starting
from the beginning of the early 1960s, Denmark experienced a prolonged
period of more than 25 years of current account deficits, which resulted in
the accumulation of foreign denominated GOV debt, and an associated net
foreign liability position to ROW. After 1990, the situation changed significantly,
indicating an important structural change in Denmark. As such, the NL of
ROW has since remained negative for all the following years, except for 1999.
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Figure 4.2: DK: Net Financial Wealth
Source: Eurostat, ADAM macroeconomic database, authors own
workings. Lines represent annual net financial wealth to GDP ratios.
Figure 4.2 shows NFW of the individual sectors. Although the introduction of
capital gains in general is beyond the scope of this paper, capital gains can be
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seen as the reason for the misalignment between the result in Figure 4.2 and an
accumulation of the NL data presented in Figure 4.1. The effect of accumulated
liabilities resulted in foreign denominated GOV debt right up to the beginning
of the 1990s. The persistent foreign deficit, and the debt related to it, became
a fundamental problem for Denmark during those years.
The net financial wealth (NFW) of GOV was -40% of GDP in 1995. Between
1995 to 2005 the net financial deficit was reduced more or less to a neutral
position and remained fairly stable afterwards.
The NFW of ROW in Denmark declined continuously throughout the period,
from 30% of GDP in 1995 to –50% of GDP at the end of the period. As such,
from being a net borrower, Denmark became a net lender to ROW. Finally, the
NFW of PRI illustrates what appear to be two entirely different regimes. The
first period with a steady decline between 1995 and 2007, where total NFW
was negative between 2007 and 20094.33. The second period shows a rapid
accumulation following 2009, where the sector as a whole increased its financial
NFW to 60% of GDP — a dramatic consolidation of the sector4.34.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show NL, percentage growth in GDP and NFW for the
three main sectors for Sweden. Historically, as can be seen in Figure 4.3, NL for
the Swedish economy fluctuated around 0% of GDP for all three sectors from
1950 to the middle of the 1970s with a slightly downward trend for PRI.
4.33Data for PRI lending illustrate accelerated expansion of debt leading up to 2007, in
conjunction with a collapse in financial asset prices following the crisis in 2008-9. The ratio
of financial assets to liabilities in PRI is somewhat neutralized by the offset of sub-sector
holdings against one another, specifically FC holds the counterclaims of both HH and NFC,
and NFC equity represents a counterclaim of many HH and FC assets.
4.34The recovery of financial asset prices following the crisis appears to have benefited PRI
for all three of the countries in the analysis. Denmark in particular seems to have benefited
from this process, with equity prices having risen by 228% since 2010 — followed closely by
Norway and Sweden.
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Figure 4.3: SE: Net Lending
Source: Eurostat, ADAM macroeconomic database, authors own
workings. Lines represent annual net lending to GDP ratios.
For both PRI and GOV the fluctuations increased until the first half of the
1990s, where a glut in PRI credit was followed by a banking crisis, and GOV
was forced into a bailout. NL in PRI was nearly 10%, while NL of GOV was
almost –10%.
After the imbalance connected to the banking crisis in the beginning of the
1990s, NL of GOV returned closer to zero, but with two periods of surplus
budget positions in the early 2000 and 2007-2008. NL of PRI took a small dip
in the middle of the 1990s but has remained positive at around 5% of GDP
since this period. NL of ROW fluctuated between 5% and –5% in the period of
1975 to the end of the 1990s. Since 2000 NL of ROW has maintained a negative
annual balance of more than 5% of GDP.
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Figure 4.4: SE: Net Financial Wealth
Source: Eurostat, ADAM macroeconomic database, authors own
workings. Lines represent annual net financial wealth to GDP ratios.
For Sweden the NFW position of PRI was negative in 1995, but unlike the case
of Denmark, the position remains negative throughout the period in Figure 4.4.
This could contrast with what might be expected from the positive NL balance
of the sector over the entire period of 1995 to 20164.35. The trend in the net
asset position of ROW, however, follows the NL position, which is negative
throughout the period. GOV NL in marginally positive and its NFW position
improves throughout, initially negative, and gradually moving to positive 20%
of GDP.
In Figures 4.5 and 4.6, NL as well as NFW for the three main sectors for Norway
can be seen.
4.35This negative position can be explained by closer inspection of the underlying components
of the net balance sheet positions of the sub-sectors of PRI. A detailed exposition of the
underlying components of the net balances is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
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Figure 4.5: NO: Net Lending
Source: Eurostat, ADAM macroeconomic database, authors own
workings. Lines represent annual net lending to GDP ratios.
In Figure 4.5 NL for all the three sectors of the Norwegian economy is markedly
different from the Danish and Swedish cases. In contrast to Sweden and
Denmark, NL of GOV does not fluctuate around zero, and has been significantly
positive for almost the entire period except for a short period in the beginning
of the 1990s4.36. NL for ROW was positive before 1980 and in the last half of
the 1980s. In the first half of the 1980s and after 1988, the NL of ROW was
negative.
NL of PRI was negative from 1978 to 1990, after which it has fluctuated around
zero with changing positive and negative values. In the 2000s, the NL of PRI
changes quite substantially from having an upward trend to downward trending
until around 2008 where PRI once again begins to rise slightly, converging once
again towards zero. Up to the crisis, the imbalances of NL in both GOV and
ROW increased in size, thereafter both balances show decreasing tendencies,
trending closer to balanced positions, but remaining negative and positive on
an annual basis respectively.
4.36Note the significant change in scale of the vertical axes for Figures 4.5 and 4.6 for the
Norwegian case.
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Figure 4.6: NO: Net Financial Wealth
Source: Eurostat, ADAM macroeconomic database, authors own
workings. Lines represent annual net financial wealth to GDP ratios.
From the NL of the institutional sectors of Norway, the expectation is to have
an increase in the NFW position GOV, an equivalent decline for ROW, and
marginal changes for PRI. This is confirmed by Figure 4.6 , for GOV and ROW,
although PRI experienced a steady decline in NFW, from roughly -40% to -80%
of GDP, despite having periods of positive NL.
As can be seen from the above description of the three countries in Figures
4.1 to 4.6, during the period some major changes have occurred in the three
Scandinavian countries, where especially the changes in the current account
for all three countries calls on attention (all three being in the negative terrain
for the later part of the period). In the next section a chosen number of these
major changes are analysed with the use of SBA.
4.5 Analysis
In this section, the developments in NL as depicted in Section 4.4 are analysed for
each of the three countries. From the data presented graphically in Section 4.4,
some basic statistical properties can be calculated to support the analysis. NL
for PRI for all three countries shows a negative correlation with economic
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activity. NL of GOV increases with economic activity and for ROW no clear
story can be told, since the correlation values are mostly insignificant4.37. In all
three countries the correlation between changes in NL for PRI and ROW are
negative. Furthermore, for Denmark and Sweden, the correlation between NL
for PRI and GOV are both negative, while this relationship is insignificant in
Norway. The correlations between NL for GOV and ROW in Norway is negative,
while these relationships are insignificant for both Denmark and Sweden.
As noted earlier, the purpose here is examine whether the SBA can be used
on historical data to identify and explain major shifts in the three countries
identified above. The analysis therefore discusses the major shifts identified
by the empirics presented in Section 4.5. Rather than provide an exhaustive
investigation, the intention is to highlight the benefits of the SBA in providing
insight into how events unfolded, and to motivate future researchers to use
SBA as a compliment to historical investigations. In addition to NL and NFW
data, the discussions are supplemented by consulting key economic indicators,
including GDP, employment data, consumption, investment (both PRI and
GOV), government consumption expenditures, imports and exports. The last
part of this section provides a comparison of the three countries, together with
a brief comparison with some larger industrial nations.
4.5.1 Explanation of net lending in Denmark
Based on the empirical evidence in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, two periods of time
attract attention and call for further explanation: firstly, the period around 1989,
where the Danish economy is transformed from an economy with persistent
current account deficit to an economy with current account surplus. Second,
the period after 2003, where the sectoral balances diverged a persistent trend
in several aspects.
In the period from 1976 to 1989, Denmark struggled with a current account
deficit, which increased foreign debt throughout period. In general, the target
of economic policy during this period continuously switched between stimu-
lating the domestic economy and improving the status of the current account,
which was characterized by a ‘stop and go’ fiscal policy, shifting between both
stimulative and contractionary effects on aggregate demand, with a keen eye
4.37The results of these correlation coefficients can be seen for all three countries in the
appendix, in Section 4.9.
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to the development of the current account as the size of the deficit needed to
be controlled. For example, in the mid-1970s a temporary reduction in the
VAT for six months was introduced to stimulate consumption and investment
activities, which contributed to an increase in aggregate demand but also to
greater level of imports, which deteriorated the current account deficit further.
In the first half of the 1980s, PRI experienced a consolidation of its accounts,
reflected by positive NL. This, combined with the lack of demand from abroad,
worsened the financial balance of GOV, which declined to a deficit of almost
10% of GDP during this phase. In 1980s two initiatives were introduced to
restore both the internal as well as the external balance: 1) the suspension of the
‘cost of living adjustment’, which should improve international competitiveness
through a slow-down in wage inflation, and 2) stabilisation of the exchange rate,
introducing an economic strategy to refrain from further devaluations within
the European exchange rate arrangement. In 1985 and 1986, PRI consumption
and investment activities increasingly stimulated imports. This corresponded
with a deterioration in the current account and, simultaneously, largely due
to high PRI expenditures, a substantial PRI NL deficit. On the other hand,
NL of GOV, as the counterpart, improved significantly. The remedy at the
time was believed to be tight fiscal policy, and the so-called ‘potato diet’ was
introduced to reduce consumption and thereby imports (DØRS, 2008; Gaard &
Kieler, 2005). This change in behaviour of the PRI can be seen from Figure 4.1,
resulted in positive NL. The Danish trade balance had already turned positive
in the mid-1980s, following rising foreign demand for Danish goods. This,
together with lower demand for imports, marked a turning-point in the Danish
international position, as the current account deficit shifted to surplus. This
shift was reinforced by increased emphasis on export activities, which added
to the income of the domestic sectors. PRI thus trended gradually towards
positive NL4.38. Unsurprisingly, the suppressed activity in PRI together with
high levels of unemployment, automatic fiscal stabilisers and stagnation in
public consumption, was accompanied by negative NL for GOV.
The second episode highlighted in this analysis is the period after 2003. From
2003, PRI reflected improved optimism regarding the future, with increasing
PRI expenditures (both consumption and investment) and negative NL. This
4.38A major contribution to this positive NL can be found in the expansion of the labour
market pension scheme as a part of a collective bargaining agreement in 1991, see e.g. Autrup,
Kramp, Pedersen, & Spange (2015).
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of course boosted aggregated demand. The high growth rate in the economy
increased the demand for labour, which affected employment positively and
thereby affected both the income and social expenditures of GOV. As a result
of the high demand, the automatic stabilizers forced NL in GOV, despite the
use of expansionary fiscal policy, to climb as high as 5% of GDP before the
2007-8 crisis hit Denmark.
From 2007, growth in imports and exports seem to follow the same trend,
which indicates that the improvements in the current account were driven
by income generated by NFW held abroad, which can be seen in Figure 4.2.
Net financial wealth held abroad was negative from 1995-2005, as a necessary
consequence of the prolonged period of current account deficits, but has been
positive since 2009. Despite positive net income from abroad, PRI appears to
have continued the consolidation in the wake of the crisis, wherein the NFW
in PRI was negative4.39. This means, that a smaller portion of income is used
for consumption and investment, coinciding with a dramatic increase in NL (to
almost 10% of GDP) in PRI and thereby a fall in the debt-to-income ratio for
the sector. This reticence in PRI together with the lack of expansionary policies
appears to have kept GDP growth rates at low levels, resulting in negative NL
for GOV, as reflected by small annual deficits.
4.5.2 Explanation of net lending in Sweden
From Figures 4.3 and 4.4, two periods of time call for further investigation: the
period preceding the banking crisis in the early 1990s, where sectoral imbalances
increased continuously from the 1950s, and the period after the recent crisis,
which appears to be imperceptible from the sectoral balances.
From an SBA point of view, the sectoral imbalances in the period from 1950
to 1970 were small compared to the imbalances identified in later periods. In
general, a negative co-movement between PRI and GOV can be seen for almost
the entire period.
While the period from 1950-1960 was characterized by a sectoral surplus for
PRI and deficit for the two other sectors, the situation changed from 1960
to the first oil crisis, where PRI was in a financial deficit. Englund (1999)
4.39The negative net asset position can be explained by a significant accumulation of debt,
and capital losses during the financial crisis. With Danish household debt to disposable
income peaking at just over 300% in 2009.
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argued that Sweden in the post-war period was quite a closed economy, where
Keynesian-rooted policies mainly focused on supporting the domestic economy,
creating high levels of economic activity.
After the oil crisis in the early 1970s, Sweden, like most other economies, faced
high inflation rates, which, together with fixed exchange rate arrangements,
resulted in steady real exchange rate appreciation and declining competitiveness
of Swedish firms. In an attempt to restore the competitiveness, the Swedish
Krona, like the Danish Krone, was devalued several times. At the end of the
1970s and beginning of the 1980s, the growth rate of real GDP fluctuated more
dramatically, coinciding with a consolidation of PRI accounts, as indicated by
low expenditures on both consumption and investment leading to a positive
NL balance, while GOV, most likely due to the behaviour of PRI and the
small deficit on the current account, went into financial deficit. This sectoral
deficit lasted until the second half of the 1980s, where the high level of demand,
mainly from PRI, created higher levels of economic activity and, via automatic
stabilizers, a financial surplus in GOV.
Iversen & Larsson (2011) and Englund (1999) both noted extensive deregulation
of Swedish capital and financial markets between 1970 and 1990, including
deregulation of international capital flows and the establishment of a new money
market with options and derivatives. These deregulations permitted Swedish
HH to take advantage of the low interest rate environment, stimulating PRI
activities. This ultimately led to a boom in the Swedish economy, driven
primarily by increases in both asset and property prices. When the housing
bubble burst in 1989, the banks in Sweden faced extensive losses. Englund
(1999) explained that 1992 saw massive credit losses in PRI, which he ascribed
to the debt boom and deregulations that preceded.
Combined with an international economic slowdown, a European currency crisis
and a GOV financial crisis, this was followed by the reconstruction of the tax
system. As a consequence of these events, the Swedish Krona departed from the
fixed exchange rate system. This led to a massive depreciation of the Swedish
Krona and triggered the worst crisis in Sweden since the 1930s, resulting in
a substantial decline in GDP, forcing shrinkage of GOV and, via a collapse
in imports, improved the current account from a deficit to a surplus position.
The fall in inflation in 1990-1992 resulted in an increase in the real interest
rate and affected the value of real assets negatively. Through what appears to
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have been a balance sheet recession, both PRI investment and consumption fell,
corresponding to an increase in PRI savings, as seen in Figure 4.3. As explained
by Tissot (2016), the expansionary fiscal policy changes related to the banking
crisis shortened the recovery phase in comparison with other crises. Because of
the consolidation in PRI during and after the crisis, GOV needed to intervene
in order to prevent a dramatic fall in economic activity.
This expansionary policy led to a deficit for GOV, but it made the essential
deleveraging process in PRI possible, and made a considerable contribution to
the rapid recovery of the Swedish economy. It also marked a change in the
composition of the three sectors; from then on, the current account remained
in a surplus position, and PRI changed to persistently positive NL. The net
financial debt for PRI increased from 1995 to 2000, despite positive NL, which
can be explained by the liability counterpart of capital gains4.40. From 2000, the
positive NL can be seen as a consolidation, since net financial debt decreased in
this period. Because of the persistent current account surpluses, the NFW for
ROW fell constantly, becoming negative in 2015. NFW for GOV was negative
in the first half of the period, but became and remained positive in the second
half of the period.
Focusing on the recent crisis, in 2009, where the real GDP fell by 5.2%, it is
remarkable that only small changes in the sectoral balances can be identified. In
PRI, real consumption even increased, albeit a minor increase, which resulted
in a fall in aggregate savings. Contrarily, investment fell by more than 13%,
which created an increase in NL of PRI. Despite a huge fall in imports, the
current account declined in 2009, mainly as the result of a sharp drop in the
exports associated with the global economic crisis that year. In the case of
GOV, increases in real GOV consumption indicated slightly expansionary fiscal
policy, which, together with a fall in tax income following automatic stabilizers,
created a fall in NL of GOV.
4.40Equities represent extensive liabilities for issuers, these are held primarily by the NFC.
The counterpart to these equities is to a large extent inventories, which are not included in
the financial account, and thus are not offset against financial liabilities. Equity market gains
since 2010 have been substantial in all three of the Scandinavian countries reviewed here.
The increase in the OECD share price indices from 2010 to 2016 were respectively, Denmark
123%, Norway 79%, Sweden 76%. (OECD, n.d.)
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4.5.3 Explanation of net lending in Norway
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 present the data for Norway. The events identifiable from
the sector balances include, firstly, the changes in the composition of the sectoral
balances in the period preceding 1990. Secondly, the reasons for persistent twin
surplus on the current account and GOV after 1990, which is fundamental in
understanding the recent evolution of the Norwegian Economy.
As indicated in Figure 4.5, in the period from 1978-1990 PRI ran a persistent
financial deficit, while the GOV had a financial surplus. For ROW the balance
fluctuated between being positive and negative. With a positive trade balance
throughout the period, the current account deficit can only be explained by
negative net income from abroad. Positive net exports increased aggregate
demand in the Norwegian economy, which boosted the income of PRI, thereby
increasing PRI consumption. The high level of economic activity in these years
affected not only the income of PRI positively, but also, again due to automatic
stabiliser mechanisms, NL of GOV.
As was the case in Sweden, the Norwegian economy was affected by the choice
of exchange rate regime. According to Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (2013),
in 1978 Norway decided to leave the currency snake and link the Norwegian
Krone to a trade-weighted basket of currencies; see Alstadheim (2016). In
the first half of the 1980s, several devaluations were enacted due to reduced
competitiveness of Norwegian firms. In 1986, the Krone was devalued again
as a result of sharp reversal from a current account surplus to a deficit, partly
explained by lower oil prices and partly due to a surge in domestic demand,
together with diminished cost competitiveness, both increasing the demand for
imports.
In the latter half of the 1980s, the combination of low domestic demand (lower
imports) and high demand abroad (not only for petroleum, but also for Nor-
wegian goods and services) gradually gave rise to a surplus on the current
account4.41, which remained so for the rest of the period.
In 1990, the Government Petroleum Fund was founded, and as noted by Davis,
4.41The export of oil and gas can be seen as an important aspect of this transition, which
can be demonstrated by looking at the history of the Norwegian oil production. In 1974 the
export and oil and gas amounted to 2.4% of the total export of goods; 10 years later, in
1984, the share was increased to more than 50%, which was still the case in 2013; Norwegian
Petroleum Directorate (2013).
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Fedelino, & Ossowski (2003), this changed the state of the Norwegian economy.
The surplus from oil production was invested abroad, which detached investment
returns from the performance of the Norwegian economy. Furthermore, the
interest and property income of the Fund could be used to stabilise the economy
in times with low economic activity4.42. For a brief period, from 1990 to 1992,
the Krone was pegged to the ECU, before switching to a managed floating
exchange rate regime, not only to avoid speculative attacks on the currency,
but also to avoid a depression after the European banking and currency crisis,
see Jonung (2009) and Alstadheim (2016).
Since the Government Petroleum Fund is owned by GOV and the revenues
related to oil production, for example different production taxes, act as an
inflow to GOV, a clear link between production of oil, the status of the current
account and the GOV financial situation can be established. Despite revenues
related to oil, GOV ran a negative NL balance in the beginning of the 1990s,
whereafter it became positive for the rest of the period. This negative NL can be
explained by both an expansionary fiscal policy and the behaviour of PRI, the
latter of which entered a phase of financial consolidation, while GOV intervened
during the banking crisis in 1991 and 1992. After the banking crisis, the current
situation in the Norwegian economy from a sectoral point of view was formed.
The economy stabilised with a substantial twin surplus. Reflecting a persistent
current account surplus and positive NL in GOV. Unsurprisingly, the two
balances show a high degree in co-movement from the beginning of the 1990s.
The persistent current account surplus gave rise to a large GOV owned, foreign
denominated asset, the Government Pension Fund Global. As stated above, the
production of oil and gas created enormous revenues for GOV. This revenue,
together with the income from foreign investments (including both financial
and non-financial assets), boosted the income of GOV. The increase in net
exports from 1986 to 2001 stimulated aggregate demand, which in turn created
an increase in the income and consumption of PRI.
In the period from 1995-2000 the NFW of PRI fell marginally, while the changes
in the NFW of the two other sectors were more dramatic; see Figure 4.6. Due
to current account surpluses, the NFW position of the ROW towards Norway
4.42The decision to invest the surplus, rather than stimulating the economy immediately, was
also to avoid overheating the economy and to preserve the oil revenues for future generations.
Oil revenues take several forms for the Norwegian GOV, including oil taxes, licenses for
exploration, dividends from the co-ownership of Statoil and interest from foreign investments
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went from slightly above zero in 1995 to substantial negative positions. GOV,
as the primary counterpart to that deficit, exhibited a continuous rise in NFW
throughout the period.
The current account surplus was quite stable between 2000 and 2010, while
NL of PRI and ROW changed significantly. In the period prior to the Great
Recession, PRI moved from positive NL to a negative NL, which coincided
with expansion of domestic aggregate demand and thus positively affected the
balance in GOV via both the income and the expenditures channels. While the
NFW positions have changed dramatically when it comes to ROW and GOV,
the situation differs for PRI, which exhibits a small decline in its NFW position.
The negative NFW position for PRI in Norway diverges significantly from the
situation in Denmark, where the NFW is very large and positive4.43.
4.6 Comparison
This section is included to allow us to draw some comparisons both amongst the
three countries in the analysis, and with four larger industrial countries, namely
Germany, France the UK and the USA4.44. The comparisons are structured in
two parts. The first is comparison of annual flows, that is, the composition of
NL within each country. The second part is a focus on the effects that these
flows have on the accumulation of stocks, which inevitably have feedback effects
to flows.
For the Scandinavian countries, the most significant change to flows was with
regards the change in NL of ROW, where all three economies moved into a
persistent period of current account surplus around 1990s. Relying on this
accounting identity, the shift in all three countries from a country with current
account deficit to current account surplus also changed the conditions for the
domestic balances. For the domestic sectors this resulted in a positive aggregate
NL position. This represents a flow inwards of funds, or viewed differently, a
flow of credit from the domestic sectors to ROW. The source of this positive
NL, however, diverged amongst the three countries. In Denmark and Sweden,
the activities of PRI were the main driver behind positive domestic NL, while
4.43This can possibly be seen as an artefact of the choice by GOV to retain ownership of the
large public pension fund, which, for all intents and purposes, could be reflected as an asset
of PRI.
4.44See Appendix A2 for charts of NL, NFW and GDP growth for each of Germany, France,
the UK and the USA.
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for Norway, GOV interaction with ROW was the main driver. The result for
Norway should not come as a surprise, taking the revenues from oil and gas into
account. The different contributions to the flows are then neatly captured by
annual NL figures. The similarities and differences in the sectoral balances across
the three countries can be summarised with use of the estimated correlation
coefficients for NL of the various sectors. In all three countries the correlation
between changes in NL for PRI and ROW are negative. Moreover, for Denmark
and Sweden, the correlation between NL of PRI and GOV is negative, while
this relationship is insignificant in Norway. The correlation between NL for
GOV and ROW in Norway, for reasons discussed above, is negative, while these
relationships are insignificant for both Denmark and Sweden. While simplistic,
these statistics provide a useful point of departure.
In the comparison countries, Germany most resembles the Scandinavian coun-
tries, with a large current account surplus. The USA and the UK exhibit
negative NL for GOV (that is, a government deficit) and a current account
deficit for almost all periods, whereas the French current account improved
from 1990 to around 2000 and has deteriorated since.
Another similarity between the three Scandinavian countries can be deduced
from the analysis in Section 4.5, that is, the size and relevance of automatic
stabilizers. As stated by Krugman (2009) the NL position of GOV is often a
result of automatic stabilizers rather than discretionary policies. Related to this
topic is the discussion on causality. In Glötzl & Rezai (2017) GOV is presented
as the passive sector, mainly absorbing the actions from the rest of the economy.
Evidence for this can be found in Denmark from 2004-2007, where the NL in
GOV was higher than ever before, despite slightly expansionary fiscal policy.
The extra aggregate demand generated from sectoral deficits in PRI and ROW
generated additional income to GOV (mainly through taxes on income), while
at the same time, the high level of demand kept GOV expenditures, on, for
example, unemployment benefits, down. This combination forced GOV NL into
a sizable surplus. This might lead to the impression that NL for GOV fluctuates
around zero for countries with powerful automatic stabilizers. A quick review
of the Norwegian case illustrates why this cannot be assumed. For Norway,
the income flow of GOV depends heavily on both property income from the
continuously increasing GOV NFW, and the revenues from the production of
oil and gas. Consequently, the effects of domestic automatic stabilizers on the
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balance for GOV are much smaller when compared with Denmark and Sweden.
The size and relevance of different flows would perhaps be a better gauge than
any one size fits all rule.
A similarity between France, US, Denmark and Sweden is the status of PRI.
For all four countries NL of PRI is positive in almost all periods. One way
to interpret this is as a flow of credit each year from the PRI towards other
sectors. For Denmark and Sweden this flow of credit is mainly directed towards
ROW to finance the sectoral deficit of ROW. The effect of this flow of credit on
the NFW however, is quite different between the two countries. In Denmark it
affected the NFW significantly before 2005, where a stock market crash led to a
significant fall in NFW. From 2009 the NFW increased rapidly for PRI, partly
because of positive NL and partly because of capital gains. In Sweden on the
other hand, the longstanding positive NL of PRI seems not to have changed
the NFW for the sector.
For France and the USA, the flow of credit from the PRI has mainly gone
towards the GOV, reflected in large annual deficits. At the same time, because
of the current account deficit, a flow of credit from ROW to GOV also existed.
The effect of this flow of credit is an increasing indebtedness of GOV both
towards the domestic economy and abroad. If these two economies are compared
with Norway, the differences become even more pronounced. While the general
tendency for France and US is a current account deficit, surplus in PRI and
deficit in GOV. For Norway the situation is different: current account surplus,
surplus on GOV and a PRI fluctuating around zero, where France and US
witness a twin deficit, the Norwegian economy has a twin surplus.
In terms of stocks, the accumulation processes connected to current account
imbalances are self-reinforcing. During extended periods of current account
deficits, the domestic sectors build up foreign debt (reflected by increasing
NFW of ROW), which creates an outflow of property income for the domestic
economy. This outflow of property income can be seen as a reduction in the
income available for consumption or investment. Just as the inflow of property
income from positive NFW abroad (i.e. negative NFW for ROW) adds to
income.
For the Scandinavian countries, and for Germany, prolonged periods of current
account surplus have resulted in the accumulation of NFW against ROW, and as
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a consequence, property income inflows to the domestic economy have increased
over time.
For the Norwegian economy the national NFW already went positive around
1995 and increased steadily to more than 200% of GDP in 2015. This resulted
in enormous inflows, mainly to GOV as owner of the Petroleum Fund. For
Denmark the persistent current account surplus resulted in a falling NFW
position for ROW, which turned negative around 2009. This coincided with an
improvement of the NFW position of PRI, resulting in large property income
flows each year from ROW to PRI. For Sweden, the story differs, since the
NFW of ROW, despite a continuous fall, was positive until 2015. At the same
time, GOV has improved its NFW position, while the NFW position of PRI
remained fairly constant around -20% of GDP. This results in a property income
outflow from PRI towards both ROW and GOV. This example clearly shows the
importance of stock-flow-consistency in an analysis, since these property income
flows affect the NL of each sector, illustrating the interdependence between
stocks and flows4.45.
In the comparison countries, the effects of prolonged current account deficits
can easily be observed in the NFW charts for each country, where France, the
UK and USA all have net GOV debt approaching 100% of GDP. Continuing
from the analysis of flows above, positive PRI NL has resulted in substantial
accumulation of NFW, ranging from 76% of GDP for France to 122% of GDP
in the USA. With substantial increases in PRI NFW to GDP in all countries
since 2010.
This comparison with other economies clearly highlights a key element of the
sectoral balance approach, despite the fact, that the interdependency between
the sectors secures the sum of the NL to be zero, the composition amongst the
sectors is driven by both country-specific characteristic as well as time-specific
effects. A general theory of the composition of sectoral balances (aside from
the accounting principle behind the sectoral balance approach), without taking
idiosyncratic country and time effects into account cannot be formulated.
4.45It should be noted however, that although imbalances in flows contribute to stocks and
vice versa, the size of net differences say nothing of the composition of or counterparts to the
actual balance sheets of each sector – I.e. From a simple SBA, there is no way of knowing the
composition of property income flows, that would be the subject of a far more comprehensive
modelling exercise. The point made here is that substantial imbalances in flows and stocks
contribute to and reinforce one another.
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4.7 Discussion
To move beyond simple accounting identities, towards a more useful analysis,
some foundation on the behaviour in the individual sectors must typically be
included. To this extent, we observe two different methods could be used. 1)
combining the accounting identities from the SNA with behavioural equations
in a system of equations to set up a formal model, 2) to use basic descriptive
statistics to establish fundamentals on how NL of different sectors acts or
reacts to changes in other sectors or changes in key macro indicators, such as
output. The first method is widely used in simultaneous equation models, mainly
following the tradition of Wynne Godley (1999b). Within this tradition, models
are built using a Keynesian theoretical background and a closed accounting
framework, securing a stock-flow-consistent model. The second method, is
the one used in this paper, relying on statistical evidence on how the NL
of the three sectors interact with each other and a central macroeconomic
variable – GDP. As presented in the beginning of the analysis and shown in
the appendix. The conclusion derived from these correlation analyses is clearly
supported by conventional economic theory. The correlations presented in the
appendix between the sectors can be classified as long run relationships, which
illustrates another method of identifying major changes in the three economies.
Introducing rolling correlation over the business cycle (for example, 4, 6 or 8
years) capture short run deviations from the long run correlations previously
identified. The identification of short run deviations from long run relationships
is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper.4.46
The choice to use the SBA in this paper to highlight major changes in the three
economies provides an alternative to understand the historical evolution of an
economy. The use of the sectoral balances, as opposed to more traditional key
macroeconomic variables, such as GDP or the level of unemployment, reveals
other stories. As an example, the seemingly high growth rates in the Danish
economy in the middle of the 1980s would typically be held to indicate strong
developments in the Danish economy. From an SBA perspective however, these
high growth rates came at the expense of an increase in the net credit flows
between the three sectors and thereby large imbalances for the single sectors.
GOV NL fell as far as -10% of GDP, accompanied by hefty credit flows to
4.46An formal identification and explanation for short run deviation from the long run
correlation is a topic of the paper that follows in this dissertation.
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GOV a rapid accumulation of offshore debt. In 1987 the situation inverted,
at that point, the growth in GDP relied on a negative NL of just over 5% of
GDP, however, at that stage it was PRI that acquired credit inflows. In this
way, the use of SBA tells a crucial story about the net flow of credit between
the different sectors of the economy; a story that cannot be captured using
traditional macroeconomic indicators.
4.8 Conclusion
A more effective use of the SNA as a tool of economic analysis has recently
been requested by several authors, (Bergman (2015), Glötzl & Rezai (2017)
and Krugman (2009)). In this paper, we try to respond to this call by using
the SBA to analyse Denmark, Norway and Sweden from a historical point of
view. The use of the SBA seems to be largely ignored in both theoretical and
empirical contributions, and in particular when it comes to the Scandinavian
economic literature, both in contemporary and historical research.
The SBA combines the accounting principles from the SNA with empirical
observations for each sector, allowing for some theoretical behaviours to be
suggested. In this paper we follow a similar approach, presenting some descrip-
tive statistics in the appendix as supporting evidence. In isolation, the sectoral
balances tell whether NL of a specific sector is positive or negative in a given
year, which identifies imbalances in the economy, and reveals the net flow of
credit between the underlying sectors.
From a sectoral balance point of view, two important changes in the Danish
economy can be identified; the status of the current account and the Great
Recession. The period from 1975-1989 was characterised by a persistent current
account deficit and a negative NL in GOV, which resulted in an increase foreign
GOV debt. The period from 1990-2007 is characterised by a current account
surplus and positive NL in PRI, with the exception of 2003 to 2007. In the
period after the Great Recession, the situation changed dramatically for the
domestic economy. The current account remained positive, but PRI began
consolidation of debt at an aggregate level.
For the Swedish economy two important changes can be found; the opening
of financial markets and the banking and fiscal crises in the early 1990s. In
the first period from 1950-1975 the Swedish financial and capital markets were
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relatively closed, which resulted in only small net flows of credit between the
sectors, and thereby small imbalances. From a sectoral balance point of view,
the banking crisis in the beginning of the 1990s together with the transition
to current account surplus indicated a major change in the Swedish economy,
leading to the present conditions of a persistent current account surplus, and
positive NL in both PRI and a GOV.
In the case of Norway two related events are behind a major change in the
Norwegian economy from a sector balance point of view: the status of the
current account and the creation of the Norwegian Petroleum Fund. In the
period from 1978-1988 the Norwegian economy was characterised by a net credit
flow to the PRI, which boosted the demand and the income of GOV. With the
export of oil as an important factor, the current account went into a persistent
surplus from 1989, which created a huge inflow of capital to the GOV, especially
after the Norwegian Petroleum Fund was established in 1991. The formed the
present situation in the Norwegian economy with a current account surplus, a
positive balance of GOV and a PRI fluctuating around zero.
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4.9 Appendix
4.9.1 DK: Correlation results
Table 4.1: DK: Cross-correlation table: Long run correlations
ROW GOV PRI OGap
ROW -0.24 -0.70 *** 0.27 *
GOV -0.24 -0.52 *** 0.73 ***
PRI -0.70 *** -0.52 *** -0.77 ***
OGap 0.27 * 0.73 *** -0.77 ***
Table 4.2: DK: Lagged correlations with the output gap
PRI GOV ROW
-3 0.11 -0.17 0.01
-2 -0.20 0.17 0.08
-1 -0.52 *** 0.49 *** 0.19
0 -0.77 *** 0.73 *** 0.27 *
1 -0.66 *** 0.61 *** 0.24
2 -0.37 ** 0.35 ** 0.13
3 -0.07 0.07 0.02
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4.9.2 NO: Correlation results
Table 4.3: NO: Cross-correlation table: Long run correlations
ROW GOV PRI OGap
ROW -0.83 *** -0.48 *** -0.05
GOV -0.83 *** -0.09 0.45 ***
PRI -0.48 *** -0.09 -0.61 ***
OGap -0.05 0.45 *** -0.61 ***
Table 4.4: NO: Lagged correlations with the output gap
PRI GOV ROW
-3 0.40 ** 0.04 -0.26 *
-2 0.04 0.20 -0.20
-1 -0.34 ** 0.38 ** -0.14
0 -0.61 *** 0.45 *** -0.05
1 -0.62 *** 0.34 ** 0.05
2 -0.42 *** 0.24 0.03
3 -0.11 0.22 -0.13
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4.9.3 SE: Correlation results
Table 4.5: SE: Cross-correlation table: Long run correlations
ROW GOV PRI OGap
ROW -0.25 ** -0.59 *** -0.04
GOV -0.25 ** -0.63 *** 0.71 ***
PRI -0.59 *** -0.63 *** -0.56 ***
OGap -0.04 0.71 *** -0.56 ***
Table 4.6: SE: Lagged correlations with the output gap
PRI GOV ROW
-3 0.06 0.17 -0.24 **
-2 -0.15 0.37 *** -0.20
-1 -0.38 *** 0.58 *** -0.13
0 -0.56 *** 0.71 *** -0.04
1 -0.52 *** 0.51 *** 0.11
2 -0.22 * 0.11 0.17
3 0.07 -0.26 ** 0.18
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5 Article 3: Sectoral balance analysis: Short
run deviations from long run patterns
Introductory remarks
Article 2 investigated the long run interactions between the sectors, and sug-
gested that the extent to which sectors interact with each other is heavily path
dependent. The historical developments in each country created a particular set
of economic circumstances, resulting in shifts in the balance of flows for each
of the broad sectors. Institutional factors, such as counter-cyclical income and
unemployment protection, then played a powerful role in how the net lending
of the sectors co-moved. The following article further addresses the second
objective of the thesis and provides additional empirical evidence. In particular,
it uses rolling correlation windows to explore the persistence of the long-run
relationships established in Article 2.
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6 Article 4: Sektorbalancer i Danmark efter
krisen
Introductory remarks
On the basis of the analysis presented in articles two and three, there appear to
be both long and short-run dynamics that need to be considered when using
SBA for economic analysis. This article extends the SBA approach by disaggre-
gating PRI into HH, NFC and FC in order to evaluate the logic of the Danish
austerity policies introduced after the GFC. The article focuses on the automatic
stabilising functions built into the Danish welfare state, and the decomposition
of PRI permits a more complex description of the flows between the sectors.
This takes the analysis a step closer to understanding HH accumulations in
a macroeconomic context. In so doing, it predominantly addresses the third
objective, to explore some of the implications of the interaction of sector level
balances previously identified. Like articles two and three, it also contributes to
the structural knowledge required for the fourth objective, to examine economic
transmission mechanisms.
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6.1 Indledning
“Alt for ofte i den økonomisk politiske debat overses det
grundlæggende forhold, at der til ethvert sektoralt underskud per
definition må eksistere et sektoralt overskud af præcis samme
størrelse.” (Jespersen, 2011)
Ovenstående rationale er taget ud fra Jespersens vurdering af regeringens 2020
plan, hvor han problematiserer det ensporede fokus på underskuddet i den
offentlige sektor i stedet for ligeledes at fokusere på fx overskuddet i den private
sektor6.3. Netop denne form for analyse af en enkelt sektor i isolation kritiseres
ligeledes i Glötzl & Rezai (2017) for at medføre en inkonsistent og biased
fortolkning af de faktiske dynamikker i økonomien. I stedet bør en analyse tage
udgangspunkt i den samlede økonomi, hvor en ændring i én sektor medfører
ændringer i mindst en anden sektor: er der sektoralt underskud i én sektor,
må det samlede sektorale overskud i de resterende sektorer have en tilsvarende
størrelse. Selvom der er tale om en nationalregnskabsidentitet, hvor summen af
balancerne er 0, er ingen af balancerne ifølge Wynne Godley et al. (2007) et
residual af de andre; alle balancerne har gennem en given adfærd deres eget liv.
Overført til diskussionen i Jespersen (2011) medfører dette, at underskuddet i
den offentlige sektor ikke kan analyseres individuelt, men i stedet må analyseres
i sammenhæng med situationen såvel i den private sektor, som i udenlandssek-
toren. Mens de hjemlige sektorer under ét har haft et opsparingsoverskud over
for udlandet, påpeges især det faldende niveau for investeringer i den private
sektor, sammen med den øgede opsparingstilbøjelighed, som hovedårsagerne
til det store opsparingsoverskud i den private sektor, i kølvandet på den sen-
este økonomiske krise. Hvordan medfører dette et sektoralt underskud i den
offentlige sektor? Den faldende efterspørgsel i den private sektor medfører et
stigning i arbejdsløsheden, hvilket rammer den offentlige sektors budgetter på
såvel indtægtssiden som udgiftssiden gennem højere sociale udgifter og lavere
skatteindtægter. Genopretningen af det offentlige budget går derfor igennem
en genopretning af beskæftigelsen i specielt den private sektor.
Underskuddet i den offentlige sektor kan derfor ikke analyseres isoleret set, men
må i stedet for analyseres i sammenhæng med situationen i såvel den private
sektor som udenlands-sektoren. Mens de hjemlige sektorer i Danmark under ét
6.3Begreberne sektoralt overskud, nettofordringserhvervelse og opsparingsoverskud anvendes
trods forskellige opgørelsesmetoder, som synonymer i dette papir.
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har haft et opsparingsoverskud over for udlandet siden slutningen af 1980’erne,
medfører især det faldende niveau for investeringerne i den private sektor
sammen med den øgede opsparingstilbøjelighed et stort opsparingsoverskud
i den private sektor i kølvandet på den seneste økonomiske krise. Hvordan
medfører dette et sektoralt underskud i den offentlige sektor? Den faldende
efterspørgsel i den private sektor medfører en stigning i arbejdsløsheden, hvilket
rammer den offentlige sektors budgetter på såvel indtægtssiden som udgiftssiden
gennem højere sociale udgifter og lavere skatteindtægter. Genopretningen af
det offentlige budget går derfor igennem en genopretning af beskæftigelsen i
specielt den private sektor.
I flere tilfælde er det dog ikke tilstrækkeligt at se på effekten i den private sektor
under ét, i stedet bør der her foretages en mere disaggregeret analyse, hvor den
private sektor opsplittes i tre undergrupper: de ikke- finansielle virksomheder,
de finansielle virksomheder og husholdningerne. Denne disaggregering øger
naturligvis kompleksiteten af en samlet analyse af en given økonomi, idet antallet
af sektorer er forøget fra tre til fem. Omvendt kommer denne kompleksitet med
muligheden for at analysere interessante udviklinger i de enkelte sektorer, fx
husholdningernes adfærd eller de ikke-finansielle virksomheders adfærd.
I denne artikel diskuteres nødvendigheden af at analysere alle sektorerne si-
multant samt sammenspillet mellem disse sektorer for at forstå udviklingen
i den sektorale balance for de enkelte sektorer. I afsnit 2 præsenteres de tre
overordnede sektorer i den danske økonomi: den offentlige sektor, udlandet samt
den private sektor. Herefter disaggregeres den private sektor i finansielle virk-
somheder, ikke-finansielle virksomheder samt husholdninger. Til slut fremføres
en række konkluderende bemærkninger i afsnit 4.
6.2 Sektorale balancer
Forståelsen af de sektorale balancer kan udledes direkte af nationalregnskabsi-
dentiteterne. For at holde det simpelt, udledes kun sektorbalancerne for den
aggregerede økonomi med tre sektorer: den private sektor, den offentlige sektor
og udlandet. Startende med forsyningsbalancen
Y = C + Ip + Ig +G+X −M
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Hvor Y er den samlede efterspørgsel, C er det private forbrug, Ip de private
investeringer, Ig de offentlige investeringer, G er det offentlige forbrug, X er
eksport, mens M angiver import.
Ved at introducere overførsler på tværs af de enkelte sektorer samt inkludere
offentlige investeringer i det samlede offentlige forbrug G, kan tre-sektor-balancen
udledes:
(Sp − Ip) + (NT −G) + (M −X −NIA) = 0
Hvor Sp angiver privat opsparing, udtryk for forskellen mellem den disponible
indkomst og forbruget i den private sektor. NT den offentlige sektor nettoskat-
teindtægter, når der er taget højde for alle former for overførsler.NIA angiver
nettooverførsler modtaget fra udlandet. I dette tilfælde angiver udtrykket i
første parentes den sektorale balance for den private sektor, sektorbalancen for
den offentlige sektor udtrykkes i anden parentes, mens tredje parentes udtrykker
sektorbalancen for udenlandssektoren.6.4
For at kunne analysere udviklingen i de enkelte balancer, bør en række karak-
teristika ved de enkelte nøglevariable diskuteres, fx hvordan forventes de enkelte
balancer at reagere i forhold til ændringer i den samlede økonomiske ak-
tivitet? I Knudsen (2017) diskuteres adfærden i de enkelte sektorer fra et
empirisk synspunkt. Investeringer i den private sektor svinger ifølge Knudsen
medløbende med konjunkturerne; en stigning i output medfører en stigning i
investeringerne. Den private opsparing, derimod, udviser den stik modsatte
adfærd af investeringerne, idet den som følge af en procyklisk forbrugeradfærd
udviser en modcyklisk adfærd i forhold til den økonomiske aktivitet. I den
offentlige sektor reagerer opsparingen modsat den private sektor, idet lavkon-
junktur er forbundet med lav opsparing i den offentlige sektor som følge af
lavere skatteindtægter og et højere niveau af overførsler. Knudsen (2017) finder
dog ingen tydelig sammenhæng mellem udviklingen i offentlige investeringer og
konjunkturerne.
I Mikael Randrup Byrialsen & Smith (2018) (Article 2) undersøges korrelationen
6.4Udlandets nettofordringserhvervelse er ligeledes et udtryk for status på betalingsbalancens
løbende poster for den danske økonomi – dog med modsat fortegn. En negativ nettofor-
dringserhvervelse for udlandet er derfor lig et overskud på betalingsbalancens løbende poster
set fra et dansk synspunkt.
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mellem nettofordringserhvervelsen i de enkelte sektorer og output gappet, hvor
ovenstående adfærd bekræftes; nettofordringserhvervelsen i den private sektor er
negative i højkonjunktur, men nettofordringserhvervelsen i den offentlige sektor
er positiv i højkonjunktur. Der findes imidlertid ikke en klar sammenhæng
mellem nettofordringserhvervelsen for den udenlandske sektor og konjunkturud-
viklingen i Danmark. Resultatet fra disse undersøgelser vil i næste afsnit blive
anvendt til diskutere situationen de danske sektorer de seneste ti år.
6.3 Situationen efter krisen
I dette afsnit analyseres situationen fra et sektoralt perspektiv for den danske
økonomi. Indledningsvist vil der blive vist data for nettofordringserhvervelsen
for de overordnede sektorer i den danske økonomi, hvorefter denne udvikling vil
blive diskuteret med udgangspunkt i en simpel keynesiansk analyseramme.
I nedenstående figur illustreres udviklingen i nettofordringserhvervelsen for de
tre overordnede sektorer i den danske økonomi i perioden 2006-2016, hvor den
private sektor, den offentlige sektor og resten af verden er illustreret.
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Figure 6.1: Tre-sektor-balance for Danmark 2006-2016
Fokus er i denne fremstilling at se på situationen efter krisen, hvorfor der
udelukkende ses på data efter 2006. Fælles for alle tre kurver er, at der sker
store fluktuationer i løbet af tidsperioden, hvor balancen for den offentlige
sektor går fra et relativt stort overskud til at have et konstant underskud;
med undtagelse af 2014, hvor der var et lille overskud. Den private sektor
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var i 2006-2008 i sektoralt underskud, men har siden udvist et stabil stort
opsparingsoverskud på omkring 10% af BNP. Den sidste balance, udlandets
nettofordringserhvervelse er negativ gennem hele perioden, dog med et stigende
underskud, hvilket illustreres gennem det store overskud på betalingsbalancens
løbende poster for den danske økonomi.
Som påpeget i Jespersen (2011) afhænger den offentlige sektors balance af
balancerne i de to andre sektorer: det store overskud på den offentlige balance
i 2006 var således ikke et udtryk for en meget kontraktiv finanspolitik, men
derimod nærmere et udtryk for ‘overforbrug/overinvestering’ i såvel den private
sektor som udlandet. Denne øgede efterspørgsel hævede beskæftigelse i den
danske økonomi og påvirkede dermed såvel den offentlige sektors indtægtsside
som udgiftsside til fordel for den offentlige sektor. Følges samme argumentation,
vil en austerity-orienteret finanspolitik ikke pr. definition forbedre de offentlige
finanser, hvilket kan illustreres gennem en simpel keynesiansk analyse.
(NT −G) = (Sp − Ip)− (M −X −NIA)
For at holde analysen så simpel som muligt antages det, at niveauet for det
offentlige forbrug og investering bestemmes udelukkende af politikerne (er ekso-
gent bestemt), ligesom niveauet for eksporten ikke kan påvirkes af udviklingen
i den danske økonomi. De resterende variable antages alle at afhænge af den
økonomiske aktivitet i den danske økonomi i overensstemmelse med resultaterne
fra Knudsen (2017) og Mikael Randrup Byrialsen & Smith (2018).
Hvordan påvirkes de enkelte sektorers balancer af et fald i det offentlige forbrug?
Et fald i det offentlige forbrug vil i en simpel keynesiansk analyse medføre et
fald i den samlede efterspørgsel og dermed i den samlede økonomiske aktivitet,
hvor den samlede effekt afhænger af størrelsen på indkomstmultiplikatoren. Den
direkte effekt af dette er et fald i den samlede indkomst (bl.a. pga. øget arbejd-
sløshed), hvilket påvirker såvel indkomsten i den private sektor som importen i
nedadgående retning. Faldet i indkomsten sænker såvel den disponible indkomst
(og herigennem forbruget), som skattebetalingen. En del af faldet i indkomsten
kompenseres dog gennem forskellige overførsler fra det offentlige, fx dagpenge.
De store automatiske stabilisatorer vil således sikre, at faldet i den økonomiske
aktivitet mindskes. Som nævnt tidligere reagerer opsparingen i den private
sektor modcyklisk i forhold til den økonomiske aktivitet, hvorfor opsparingstilbø-
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jeligheden bør forventes at stige. Investeringerne derimod, forventes at reagere
procyklisk, sådan at niveauet for investeringerne via acceleratorprincippet falder
i perioder med faldende økonomisk aktivitet.
Dette betyder i henhold til overstående ligning, at opsparingsoverskuddet i
den private sektor bør forventes at stige efter faldet i det offentlige forbrug,
mens opsparingsoverskuddet i udlandet reagerer negativt, som følge af lavere
dansk efterspørgsel efter import. Da de to effekter dermed er modsatrettede,
gives dermed ingen entydige forventning til den samlede effekt for den offentlige
sektor.
Den offentlige sektor påvirkes således gennem såvel indtægter (lavere skatter)
som udgifter (flere overførsler). Ses der isoleret på den offentlige sektors balance
afhænger den samlede effekt af et fald i det offentlige forbrug derfor af en række
faktorer, bl.a. størrelsen på indkomstmultiplikatoren (herunder skattesatsen,
forbrugstilbøjeligheden og importtilbøjeligheden), påvirkningen på niveauet for
arbejdsløsheden samt dagpengesatsen.
I en velfærdsstat med en høj indkomstmultiplikator vil de automatiske stabil-
isatorer som følge af et fald i det offentlige forbrug således medføre en belastning
af det offentlige budget. Overstiger denne forværring faldet i det offentlige
forbrug, vil opsparingsoverskuddet(underskuddet) i den offentlige sektor således
blive forværret stik mod ambitionen. Om forværringen overstiger faldet i det
offentlige forbrug, afhænger dog, som nævnt ovenfor, af en lang række faktorer.
Selvom ovenstående ræsonnement er baseret på en simpel analyse, illustreres
alligevel hvordan udviklingen i den offentlige sektors balance er afhængig af
udviklingen i de andre sektorer.
Som illustreret i Figur 1 og problematiseret i Jespersen (2011), så kræver en
genopretning af den offentlige balance et fokus, der ikke kun begrænses til at
se på den offentlige sektor, men også en forståelse af årsagerne til det store
opsparingsoverskud i den private sektor siden krisen: hvordan skal det store
opsparingsoverskud i den private sektor forstås?
Eftersom privat opsparing historisk set reagerer modcyklisk og privat investering
reagerer procyklisk, er det ikke så overraskende, at det samlede opsparingsover-
skud for den private sektor er positiv under en lavkonjunktur som set siden
krisen. Selvom opsparingen i den private sektor er steget siden krisen, så skal
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hovedårsagen til stigningen i opsparingsoverskuddet findes i det lave invester-
ingsniveau i den private sektor siden krisen. Specielt den markante ændring fra
2008-2009 skal findes i det store fald i investeringerne i den private sektor. Det
store fald i investeringerne mindsker dermed den samlede efterspørgsel og dermed
forstærker den økonomiske lavkonjunktur, som via acceleratorprincippet vil
sænke investeringsniveauet yderligere. Såvel stigningen i opsparingstilbøjelighe-
den og faldet i investeringerne kan ligeledes tilskrives den øgede usikkerhed, der
fulgte med den økonomiske krise. Usikkerheden medfører, at fx husholdningerne
vil forbruge mindre, og i stedet prioritere at spare op. Såvel virksomhedernes som
husholdningernes investering påvirkes negativt, da den store usikkerhed dæmper
investeringslysten. Er forventningerne til fremtiden samtidig pessimistiske, vil
dette lægge en endnu større dæmper på investeringerne i den private sektor.
En opdeling af den private sektor i ikke-finansielle virksomheder, finansielle
virksomheder og husholdninger kan give en mere dyb forklaring af den pludselige
ændring i opsparingsoverskuddet efter krisen. I 6.2 ses umiddelbart, at opspar-
ingsoverskuddet hos de finansielle virksomheder er positiv over hele perioden.
Selvom den udviser stigning fra 2006 til 2009, er det dog ikke der, den inter-
essante historie skal findes. Nettofordringserhvervelsen for de ikke-finansielle
virksomheder derimod har historisk set været positiv svingende omkring 5% af
BNP, men faldt i løbet af 00’erne og var endda negativ i 2007, hvorefter den
har fundet tilbage mod sit gamle niveau. Også husholdningerne har ændret
deres adfærd; i hele perioden fra 1995 til 2010 er nettofordringserhvervelsen
for husholdningerne negativ, men herefter har den stabiliseret sig omkring 0,
ovenikøbet med en marginal opadgående trend. Forklaringen på denne udvikling
følger den generelle forklaring for den private sektor: opsparingen stiger under
lavkonjunktur (som følge af lavere forbrug), mens investeringerne falder.
For husholdningernes vedkommende kan dette forklares på flere måder. Stignin-
gen i opsparingen skal hovedsaligt findes i husholdningernes forbrug, hvor den
øgede usikkerhed har medført aftagende vækstraterne og i enkelte perioder
negative vækstrater siden krisen. Samtidig er investeringsniveauet stadig lavere
end niveauet før krisen, hvor specielt 2005-2006 var kendetegnet ved store væk-
strater i investeringsniveauet. Denne adfærdsændring kan som nævnt ovenfor
tolkes som et udtryk for en øget usikkerhed til fremtiden hos husholdningerne,
hvor forventningerne fremadrettet ikke er positive, som før krisen. Denne
tilbageholdenhed, både hvad angår forbrug og investering, kan således udtrykke
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et øget behov for at konsolidere sig efter krisen, hvor husholdningerne (og
virksomhederne) er mere fokuseret på at nedbringe de gældspositioner, som er
opbygget i tidligere år. I Danmarks tilfælde er husholdningernes rate mellem
gæld og disponibel indkomst faldet kraftigt siden 2009, hvilket skyldes kombi-
nationen af stagnation i beholdning af finansielle passiver og en stigning i den
disponible indkomst, [Madsen & Byrialsen (2017). Mens selvsamme gældsrate
for virksomhederne ser ud til at være stabiliseret.
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Figure 6.2: Privat-sektor-balance for Danmark 2006-2016
Af ovenstående fremgår således, at årsagerne til den store stigning i opspar-
ingsoverskuddet for den private sektor i kølvandet på den økonomiske krise
kan lokaliseres til de ikke-finansielle virksomheder samt til husholdningerne. I
regeringens 2020 plan fokuseres på genopretning af den danske økonomi gennem
balance på de offentlige budgetter, der kommer via en reduktion i det offentlige
underskud. Som illustreret i denne artikel, så medfører et negativt opspar-
ingsoverskud i den offentlige sektor at summen af opsparingsoverskuddet i den
private sektor og udlandet er positivt. Empirisk set, (Mikael Randrup Byrialsen
& Smith, 2018), er der en negativ korrelation mellem opsparingsoverskuddet
i den private og offentlige sektor, hvorfor underskuddet i den offentlige sektor
associeres med et overskud i den private sektor. I stedet for at fokusere på at
nedbringe underskuddet i den offentlige sektor, bør politikere og økonomer i
stedet overveje, hvorledes opsparingsoverskuddet kan nedbringes i den private
sektor, fx via mindre usikkerhed, hvilket forøger privat forbrug og investeringer.
Dette er ligeledes konklusionen i Jespersen (2011), hvor han dumper regeringens
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2020 plan og bidrager til diskussionen med ordene:
“Hvor ligger så nøglen til genopretningen af dansk økonomi? Hertil
må svaret blive primært i den private sektor. Hvis der kan komme
gang i de private investeringer og den private opsparing kunne
reduceres, så ville det have en genoprettende effekt på de offentlige
budgetter.”(Jespersen, 2011)
6.4 Afrunding
Siden den seneste økonomiske krise har fokus, ikke kun i Danmark men også i eu-
rozonen, været rettet mod underskuddet på de offentlige budgetter. Spørgsmål
som, hvordan der sikres balance i det offentlige budget? har været centrale.
Som det kan udledes direkte fra nationalregnskabsidentiteterne, så medfører et
opsparingsunderskud i den offentlige sektor, at et tilsvarende opsparingsoverskud
findes i økonomiens resterende sektorer. I dette papir illustreres dette entydige
fokus på en enkelt sektor gennem Jespersens kritik af regeringens 2020-plan, hvor
der udelukkende ses på, hvorledes der skabes balance på de offentlige budgetter
gennem en reducering af det offentlige underskud. I dette papir sættes opspar-
ingsunderskuddet i den offentlige sektor i relation til opsparingsoverskuddet
i de resterende sektorer i økonomien med den konklusion, at hovedudfordrin-
gen for den danske økonomi ikke udelukkende findes i den offentlige sektor,
men derimod i det store opsparingsoverskud i den private sektor. Så længe
opsparingsoverskuddet i den private sektor overstiger opsparingsunderskuddet i
udlandet, vil den offentlige sektor ligeledes have opsparingsunderskud. Balance
i det offentlige budget skal således ikke findes gennem reduktion af offentlige
forbrug eller udgifter, men i stedet gennem en stigende efterspørgsel i specielt
den private sektor, som allerede forklaret af Keynes tilbage i 1933:
“You will never balance the Budget through measures which reduce
the national income. The Chancellor would simply be chasing his
own tail – or cloven hoof! . . . It is the burden of unemployment and
the decline in the national income which are upsetting the Budget.
Look after the unemployment, and the Budget will look after itself.”
(John Maynard Keynes, 1933, pp. 149–150)
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7 Article 5: Flexible rate mortgage loans: An
SFC model of the impact of mortgage credit
innovations on Danish balance sheet stability
Introductory remarks
The next and final step in the objectives of this thesis is to assimilate the
behaviours and structural limitations identified in the preceding articles, together
with a number of additional resources, into a cohesive framework. The aim
is then to use that framework to investigate the innovations to the mortgage
financing industry in Denmark leading up to the GFC, with a focus on the two
key risk factors identified in the introduction: an increase in interest rates; and,
a possible property market response.
The interactions between sectors observed in the preceding articles allude to
a combination of accounting artefacts and causal relationships. On the one
hand, accounting rules dictate that there are some components of the national
accounts that are simply related to one another by way of an accounting identity.
On the other, over the course of time, certain economic developments drive or
facilitate developments in other areas of the economy. In both cases, the effects
will be observable in the data.
These two kinds of dependency are quite different when events are considered
in real time. Accounting artefacts can further be subdivided into unobservable
(simultaneous) bilateral accounting transactions that happen between two parties
for each transaction in real time, and the observable accounting relationships at
the aggregate level, which are an ex post aggregation of economic transactions.
It is these aggregate measures that will be used in the analysis that follows.
Accounting relationships are simply identities, and are true by construction.
The second type of relationship, causal relationships, refer to drivers that trigger
initial transactions, or transmit effects through the system. In contrast to
accounting relationships, these are the subject of human behaviour, and are
thus sequential when considered in real time. For example, a borrower for house
purchase must first desire a house, then borrow money, then purchase the house.
Those funds are received by the seller, who can only then make a decision on
what to do with those funds. These relationships are the subject of economic
SFC: Mortgage innovations
theory, about which there are substantial disagreements in economic literature.
At least part of the trouble is caused by aggregation from microeconomic
behaviour, which may (or may not) be observable in real time, to macroeconomic
inter-relationships, which are only observable after the collection and validation
of data is completed. In addition to the time aspect of data, the content is also of
great importance. Since the establishment of the System of National Accounts,
the definitions of fundamental economic terms affected and have been directly
affected by the nature of data that could be collected in order to represent them.
This was recognised by Copeland (1935, p. 381) prior to the establishment of
the national accounts. To be sure, the following analysis considers economic
definitions in the now broadly accepted “narrow sense”, as he described, they
“conceive our society and its organic and inorganic environment in collectivist
terms as a system, a system serving exclusively human wants, and serving only
those human wants the means of satisfying which can be measured in Dollars.”
This implies that only economic activity that has triggered some kind of mone-
tary transaction is considered for this analysis. He also responded to those that
might object to such definitions that, “statistical measurement of wealth and
value-production is not responsible for the ethical nature of these concepts; the
concepts of economic theory were just as ethical before data and techniques
of measurement were available; the techniques only define the nature of these
concepts more precisely.” (Copeland, 1935, p. 381)
Aggregate economic data, and by extension economic models, necessarily neglect
significant parts of society that are of great social and economic importance.
They are agnostic to institutional developments in law, property rights, politics,
infrastructure, education and all other aspects of culture in an economy. They
are equally unable to capture any work or activity that was unpaid, or did not
result in a monetary record of transaction. This is simply to say, that it is
within the very limited scope of macroeconomic monetary interactions that any
conclusions should be drawn from the present model.
With that strong caveat in mind, this article is the main contribution of this
thesis, and addresses the risks related to Household debt within a post-Keynesian
SFC framework. With the use of the System of National Accounts (SNA), the
article implements a fully empirical stock flow consistent (SFC) model of the
Danish economy, estimated on data for the period 1995 to 2016.
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Abstract
Innovations in mortgage lending options have expounded in recent decades,
resulting primarily in a reduction in the initial monthly costs associated with
borrowing, and made home ownership possible for socio-economic groups that
were previously excluded from the market. These changes have also drastically
changed the composition of household balance sheets, both at a micro and a
macro level, and the volume of outstanding debt relative to household income
expanded aggressively leading up to the global financial crisis in 2007-8. The
innovations unfortunately also simultaneously transferred significant risks to
borrowers. This paper investigates the present day macroeconomic consequences
of the change in composition from fixed- to adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM)
debt that occurred in Denmark between 2003 and 2009. A state-of-the-art
Stock-Flow Consistent model is adapted to allow for changes in the composition
of debt, and to permit shifts in the proportion of debt between fixed-interest
and ARM products. The risks to financial stability are evaluated through the
imposition of two plausible shocks to the economy: the first is a two percentage
point rise in borrowing costs; and, the second is a 20 per cent decline in property
prices. The model allows for a clear observation of the transmission channels,
and the stocks and flows most at risk, and the results suggest that the expansion
of ARM mortgage credit has increased the instability of the household sector.
An interesting observation was that a positive net lending response can be
misinterpreted as positive developments in the absence of the broader economic
context. The paper is supplemented by a new presentation method for SFC
model responses, where a cross-section of proportional responses are ranked,
ordered and categorised in tabular form.
7.1 Introduction
Private sector debt continues to be a concern in many developed countries, in
particular mortgage debt. Debt levels expanded in most developed countries
during the period leading up to the financial crisis, in the household sector
this was driven primarily by the extension of mortgage credit (as can be seen
in Figure 7.30, Section 7.9.1). The proportion of mortgage debt to total debt
increased in all countries from around 1960, but accelerated dramatically during
the 1990s and 2000s (Jordà, Schularick, & Taylor, 2017). That growth was
unfortunately not matched by growth in household incomes, and debt-to-income
2
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continued to expand for all countries until the great financial crisis in 2007-08
(see Figure 7.31 in Section 7.9.2). In most countries, the supply of credit slowed
or even reversed as liquidity in overnight markets dried up during the financial
crisis7.2.
The growing debt, particularly relative to income, carries several significant
risks to financial stability. These include several demand related risks, such as
the future need to deleverage and the associated intertemporal substitution of
demand (Justiniano, Primiceri, & Tambalotti, 2015; Raberto, Teglio, & Cincotti,
2012; Seppecher & Salle, 2015), deterioration of balance sheets and potential
risks to refinancing requirements (Bernanke, 2007; Disyatat, 2011; Scanlon et
al., 2008), and sensitivity of interest payments to rate changes (Sheehy, 2014).
There are also possible contagion effects across financial markets of default (or
non-performance on loans), asset price adjustments and possible deterioration of
financial intermediary capital positions (Danmarks Nationalbank, 2016). As seen
in credit-default-swap market during the 2007-08 financial crisis, the possible
collapse of liquidity in certain markets can also generate global instability.
At a sectoral level there is also the general risk of the accumulation of large
imbalances, such as government or foreign deficits, that can take many years to
unwind.
While there are a number of parallels between various housing finance systems,
the stability of each is unique to a variety of in and out of country conditions.
The European Network of Housing Research (ENHR) (Lunde & Whitehead,
2014) found that Political, geographical and institutional factors were not
sufficient to explain significant differences in developments across 21 OECD
countries since 1989. They (Lunde & Whitehead, 2014, p. 4) noted that
“housing finance systems are very specific to each country, reflecting different
histories, legal systems, institutions, economic conditions, policies and politics.”
It is therefore necessary to explore the particular dynamics that are at play in
each country.
This paper focuses on the Danish system, which makes an excellent country
for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Danish housing finance system has been
no stranger to innovation, with a number of legislative and product changes
7.2It should also be noted that since GDP fell in 2007-08 in most countries, the peak in
debt-to-GDP ratios in 2007-08 does not necessarily represent growth in debt, but partly a fall
in GDP.
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introduced since 2003. It is also a relatively small and open economy with
strong international trade ties and close ties with the European Union. Thus, a
number of parallels can be drawn between the Danish system and several other
countries with advanced mortgage financing systems. Denmark is also one of
the very few countries that has reliable data for institutional sector balance
sheets in granular detail from 1995, and sub-sector level data from 2003. This
data allows one to study the problem from comprehensive empirical data. It
also allows one to construct a model that integrates the complex interactions
and feedback mechanisms of the five institutional sectors that is founded on
observable empirical relationships7.3.
In this paper I modify an existing empirical stock flow consistent (SFC) model for
the Danish economy first presented by Byrialsen & Raza (2019). As explained by
Godley & Lavoie (2012), these models maintain strict stock and flow consistency,
in the sense that all flows are accounted for in a complete system of accumulations
in the stocks of all five major institutional sectors. It attempts to capture
the aggregate drivers of macroeconomic interactions as they happen in real
time, although it uses ex post aggregate accounting values to estimate these
relationships.
The completeness of the model requires that some of the variables in the
model are passive to changes in others. The choice of the active variables over
the passive (residual) variables is determined by a combination of accounting
identities and economic theory, in this case, Post Keynesian theory. The grounds
for this decision are discussed in Section 7.2.
Since the household sector is at the core of the analysis in the model, most
sectors are passive to changes in the household sector, and it combines the
attractive features of econometrics (structural econometric models, SEMs) with
path dependency and Post Keynesian behaviours. In the strict sense the model
does not demonstrate causality. Rather, it estimates the expected co-movement
of certain economic aggregates based on historical evidence and theoretical
expectations. These estimates inform several parameters in a medium sized
system of equations7.4.
7.3In addition, administrative registers make it possible to explore the trajectory of various
product ranges in far greater detail, although these are only available after 2009 for mortgage
bond debt.
7.4This model has 131 equations, there are thus 131 endogenous variables (including checks)
and 78 exogenous. There are in also several equations included as checks and balances, but
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The core focus of the investigation in this version of the model is the Danish
mortgage system, and the expected macroeconomic consequences of innovations
in the mortgage product range offered to Danish borrowers. The model in
Byrialsen & Raza (2019) is the most advanced empirical SFC model available
for Denmark, and thus provides the best possible point of departure. The model
is under continuous development, and there are some limitations imposed by
the largely exogenous nature of rates of return (including interest rates) and
asset prices. A secondary goal is to identify any potential improvements to the
existing model with respect to mortgage credit markets.
The original structure is modified to include a split in household debt between
fixed and flexible rate products. This allows for the evaluation of the effects
of proportional shifts in credit composition. In particular, to investigate the
short-term implications for the accumulation of stocks in the household sector
of a shift in the proportion of debt from flexible-interest-rate debt to fixed-
interest-rate debt, and vice versa7.5. The exogenous nature of rates of return
and financial asset prices is both an advantage and disadvantage. On the one
hand they allow for specific channels in the model to be highlighted, free of
disturbance of from inter-connected markets. On the other hand, it implies
that market rates and price fluctuations are not propagated automatically. This
makes the overall model results less realistic.
One of the major benefits of the SFC framework is that it allows for path
dependent accumulation of imbalances. Although there are some limitations
(as discussed below), it is thus possible to fully account for feedback effects
from accumulations in selected asset classes, albeit within a simple structure.
The analysis that follows may also be of value in the assessment of mortgage
financing structures in a macroeconomic framework, and contributes to the
growing literature on empirical SFC models.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows, Section 7.2 presents
a review of the literature, and Section 7.3 provides context for the Danish
mortgage market. Section 7.4 describes the model, and explains some of the key
which do not impact the functioning of the model.
7.5By making a simple split in the proportion of debt in flexible and fixed rate instruments,
and adjusting the rate of interest on each separately, it offers a relatively simple means by
which to incorporate a wide variety of credit market and macro-prudential policy tools into an
empirical SFC model - many of which can be achieved via a weighted proportional adjustment
of the interest rate on each of the debt types.
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innovations made in this paper, and Section 7.5 explains the scenarios for shocks
applied to the model. In Section 7.6 the effects of the shocks are described for
each of the scenarios, taken from the perspective of each of the main institutional
sectors. Section 7.7 contains a discussion of the main observations from the
model, and Section 7.8 concludes. The first appendix, Section 7.9, contains a
number of additional charts and figures, and the second appendix, Section 7.10,
provides a full exposition of the model employed, together with explanations
for the major innovations.
7.2 Literature and theory
7.2.1 Stock flow consistent models
Stock flow consistent (SFC) models are a relatively new branch of macroeconomic
model, and as mentioned above, are characterised by strict adherence to double
entry accounting rules. They resemble structural econometric models, but the
expected behaviours that are modelled are typically informed by Post Keynesian
theory. W Godley & Lavoie (2007)7.6 is widely regarded as the catalyst for the
recent growth in research using the SFC framework, and since 2007 the number
of models has grown rapidly.
As noted by Nikiforos & Zezza (2017, p. 3), “accounting consistency is just
one side of the SFC approach, with a demand-led economy and an explicit
treatment of the financial side being the other.” Dos Santos (2006), Caverzasi
& Godin (2013), Caverzasi & Godin (2015b) and Nikiforos & Zezza (2017)
provide surveys of the literature, each progressively covering the most recent
publications. These studies provide a comprehensive review of both the topic
and methodological coverage of SFC research. SFC models can be separated
into three broad categories; theoretical models, which are typically much simpler
and are used for the exploration of theoretical propositions; simulated calibrated
models, which are larger models that are constructed to have similar features
to real economies, but where the underlying data is constructed for illustrative
purposes; and, empirical models, where the entire model is based on real-world
data. While each form presents challenges, empirical models face additional
challenges with regards availability and reliability of data. Where data is
available, the researcher is faced with the challenge of appropriate aggregation.
7.6The original work has been revised and re-published as Godley & Lavoie (2012).
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There are relatively few fully empirical SFC models in the literature, and the
number of models for which comprehensive data was available is even lower.
The model presented below is an empirical model, based on the one constructed
by Byrialsen & Raza (2019). Unlike many other empirical SFC models, it is
constructed from the ground up, rather than adapted from one of the more
broadly used Godley & Lavoie (2012) models. This approach mirrors that
suggested by Zezza & Zezza (2019), where the full complexity of national
accounts data is used as the point of departure. The explicit treatment of the
financial side entails significant simplification of the wide variety of financial
instruments that are available.
Much like many other modelling forms, the complexity of an SFC model has
implications for how easily the results can be interpreted. The greater the
number of interdependent features, the lower the transparency of transmission
mechanisms. In summary of a central banker forum, Pill (2001, p. 25) noted that
some participants argued that large “eclectic” macroeconomic models often “lack
the simplicity, internal consistency and intuitive appeal which are prerequisites
for providing good policy advice”. In contrast, others “suggested that preparing
policy guidance in the context of a single model allowed a holistic and rich
picture of the economic situation to be obtained.” This conflict between holistic
context and intuitive simplicity was a key part of the decision to keep rates of
return exogenous in the present model. It also provides some explanation of the
aggregation process. A careful investigation of the size and relative importance
of various stocks and flows was conducted to render the model to workable size.
Further details regarding the actual aggregation of different categories financial
and real flows are provided in Section 7.4.
This process requires detailed data, particularly in terms of the balance sheets
and flow-of-funds between the institutional sectors. This data is available for
very few countries for a long enough time-period to be able to estimate statistical
relationships, and Denmark is one of those countries. The model is based on
annual data from 1995 to 2017, and there are thus a maximum of twenty two
observations in any estimation and the extent to which the model effectively
follows the data is comprehensively illustrated in Byrialsen & Raza (2019).
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7.2.2 Post Keynesian theoretical foundations
The theoretical basis of the model informs the behaviours in and ordering of
equations. Since the publication of Godley & Lavoie (2012)’s first edition in
2007, the number of SFC models developed globally has grown exponentially,
and due to the Post Keynesian roots of the framework, the bulk of these models
could be referred to as Post Keynesian Stock Flow Consistent models (PK-SFC
models), PK will henceforth be used refer to the “Post Keynesian” school
of thought. PK theory is typically juxtaposed with the New Neo-Classical
synthesis, or New Keynesianism in order to highlight the points of difference.
Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this paper7.7, and a brief summary of
the key characteristics of PK systems will need to suffice here, with a special
focus on those parts used to inform the model below.
In terms of the trajectory of the economy, PKs typically reject the notion of a long
run equilibrium in favour of path dependency, and argue that present decisions
and institutional structures materially change the nature of the economy in the
future. For the present model, this is reflected in the focus on short to medium
term (typically the first period or two after a shock, but up to approximately
5 years). They argue also that the economy is significantly more complex
than the sum of its parts (Chick, 2003), and sometimes liken it to an organic
entity, or the complex interactions of an ecosystem. Economic trajectories can
therefore be altered by active intervention and long term historical averages are
therefore not predictive of future events. This is reflected in the model below
by a lack of long-run mean reversion or stabilising elements in the model. The
most significant omission relative to mainstream literature is the inter-temporal
optimisation of household consumption. There are no utility functions, and
there is no long-run or inter-temporal optimisation of behaviour.
For economic policy concerns, the implication is that financial and social
imbalances cannot self-correct (at least not without significant social, political
or economic consequences), and market mechanisms are not able to manage
these issues automatically. To the contrary, unchecked imbalances that are
perpetuated by market structures are problematic. Just as the accumulation of
poor quality private debt prior to the 2007-08 GFC proved to be.
PKs often refer to Keynes (1937), who stated that the future is fundamentally
7.7For a full discussion of these comparisons the reader is referred to Dow (1985), Dow
(2001), Chick & Dow (2001) and Chick (2003).
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uncertain. It is therefore crucial to understand the economy as it presently
stands, and to have some idea of what future economic conditions are desirable.
It should thereafter be possible to actively plan for and develop a desirable
future economic landscape, without the need for projections of the distant future,
or acceptance of any long-run equilibria or natural rates. From a modelling
perspective it is therefore not necessary that a model be stationary in order to
be useful, it is more important that it should be representative of the present
reality.
In terms of the sequence of events inside PK models, they emphasise the
importance of demand (or rather effective demand7.8) in the economy, and
are predominantly demand driven rather than supply driven - although, more
recent works have put more emphasis on supply side constrains (Ryoo & Skott,
2008). Keynes’s animal spirits and short term expectations drive investors to
either increase or decrease investment. This is also related to the PK theory of
an endogenous demand and supply of money in the economy. The demands of
possible borrowers are tested against credit worthiness and all viable demand
for credit is (or can be) accommodated by the banking sector. New lending
creates new money, and therefore the demand for investment funding drives
the growth in money. In this model, this analogy is applied to the household
sector in that the demand for new housing investment drives the demand for
mortgage credit.
There are several estimated equations in the model, and the motivations for
each are discussed in a full presentation of the model in Section 7.10, in the
appendix. The structure of the estimated equations are informed by PK and
country specific literature, and refined to reflect the reality of the data.
7.2.3 Credit markets and global financial conditions
From a broader international perspective, the period leading up to the crisis has
been called “the great moderation” (as noted by, Buttiglione, Lane, Reichlin, &
7.8Intended here to include both consumption and investment, as explained by Keynes
(1937). A slightly broader definition than Smith (1776, p. 73)’s effectual demand, which
refers to commodity purchase, but with a very similar line of reasoning, where in Smith’s
commodity markets buyers with the capacity to pay for a good “may be called the effectual
demanders, and their demand the effectual demand; since it may be sufficient to effectuate
the bringing of the commodity to market. It is different from the absolute demand. A very
poor man may be said in some sense to have a demand for a coach and six; he might like to
have it; but his demand is not an effectual demand, as the commodity can never be brought
to market in order to satisfy it.”
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Reinhart (2014, p. 28)) and was an extended period of unprecedented economic
growth and apparent stability of financial markets. As noted by Englund (1999),
this was accompanied by the relaxation of lending requirements and credit
worthiness checks, and as Scanlon et al. (2008) identified, rising property prices
and expectations of capital gains. There was a gradual reduction of interest
rates, and the cost of borrowing (the long-run cost of capital falling steadily from
the 1970s). According to Scanlon et al. (2008), a simultaneous development
on a global scale was an increased belief in the market mechanism, extensive
privatisation and deregulation of financial markets7.9. The onset of the global
financial crisis (GFC) later revealed significant flaws and systemically risky
interdependencies between markets. Even though the initial effects were felt
by all countries, the effects, both in terms of intensity and real economic and
financial trajectories, differed greatly. (Lunde & Whitehead, 2014)
In the post-crisis period, there have been significant changes to the regulatory
landscape, and the extent of mortgage lending has slowed or reversed in many
countries. At the height of the crisis, liquidity in key financial instruments,
particularly credit default swaps, dried up almost instantly (Nationalbank,
2009). Ultimately this triggered quantitative easing (QE) policies in both the
USA and Europe, with the Fed and the ECB buying immense quantities of
financial assets and market-making with the assistance of larger banks. On the
regulatory front, banking prudential and capital adequacy requirements were
tightened significantly. The period from 2009 to 2018, while not as extreme as
the period preceding the crisis, has however, continued to show strong growth
in property prices, with more than half of the OECD countries in the sample
showing year-on-year growth rates of over 2%, as can be seen in 7.4.
US and European QE policies also led to excess liquidity in global financial
markets. The low short-term rates have gradually resulted in record low
long-term rates of return, placing added pressure on fund management and
investment companies to search for yield in unconventional investments7.10.
7.9One such development in Denmark was the 1993 relaxation of home equity extraction
laws (Andersen & Leth-Petersen, 2019).
7.10Where performance guarantees have been provided, such as for defined benefit pension
schemes, some institutions face negative spreads and the risk that they might not be able to
foot the bill at the end of the day. Now in 2019, eleven years after the financial crisis, ECB
(2019) announced, on 12 September 2019, a further reduction of ECB deposit facility rates to
−0.5%, and the marginal lending facility to remain at 0.25%. In addition, net purchases of
financial assets will begin again in the “asset purchase programme (APP) at a monthly pace
of €20 billion as from 1 November”.
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These policies and other commitments by European central banks and the ECB
have contributed significantly to persistent low interest rates in market based
mortgage lending systems. While the rate of growth in the level of debt relative
to income appears to stabilised in many countries, the magnitude of household
debt continues to expand. The risks associated with this debt depend not only
on the magnitude of the debt, but also very strongly on its composition.
A correlated development has been the expansion of the product range offered
by mortgage lenders. Leading up to 2007, innovations were made to almost
every aspect of mortgage lending, and the vast majority of these changes
have contributed to a reduction in the initial payments on mortgages for the
borrower. According to Scanlon et al. (2008), while the innovations were
different according to each specific country, some broader characteristics were
similar across developed nations. Two key aspects to these innovations were that
they made initial payments on mortgages cheaper, and secondly, they increased
the flexibility and range of options available, and thus transferred significant
elements of risk to the borrower. André (2016) also explains that house price
bubbles are often related to periods of financial de-regulation, and highlights
the introduction of interest-only (periods without capital repayments) loans in
Denmark in 2003 as an example.
These international developments were not applied uniformly to all countries,
or even in specific geographical areas. Lunde & Whitehead (2014) found, rather
surprisingly, that in contrast to a geo-political grouping, for example with other
Scandinavian countries, Denmark was closer to Finland, Poland and Russia
in terms of real economic and housing financing conditions after the 2007-08
financial crisis. An additional point was that the introduction of adjustable
rate mortgage (ARM) products introduced a small but significant possibility of
systemic risk to the Danish mortgage system7.11. ARMs were first introduced
in 1996, but and are just one of several innovations that were introduced to the
Danish market.
Affordability of housing also became a prominent issue and tax incentives for
interest payments on mortgages were common. According to Scanlon, Lunde, &
Whitehead (2011), real house prices in Denmark fell 14.9% from the peak in 2007
7.11In particular, they referred to potential for market failure through liquidity risks for
products with 30 year loan guarantees but with interest reset each year. Lunde & Whitehead
(2014)
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to Q4 2008. House prices rose in all OECD countries from 2000 to 20077.12, with
Slovakia (22.41% year-on-year (yoy)), Ireland (16.65% yoy), Estonia (15.89%
yoy), Hungary (13.52% yoy) and Latvia (11.22% yoy) as the most extreme
examples, while Denmark rose at 3.11% yoy. From 2007 to 2009, house prices
stabilised in most countries, and collapsed in a few with Estonia (-17.06% yoy)
and Ireland (-12.57% yoy) showing the largest collapses. As noted above, Danish
house prices reached a trough in Q4 2008 at -14.9%.
The asset and property price bubbles and collapses of recent years appear
therefore to be closely related to developments in credit markets, and as is
briefly explained below, the over-extension of private balance sheets and the risk
of significant declines in property prices (the bursting of a bubble) could have
serious consequences for both individual borrowers and the broader economy.
Some of the key credit market innovations that occurred are discussed in the
next section, together with some of their main advantages and disadvantages.
7.2.4 Key innovations and developments in product scope
Amongst the most common innovations noted by Scanlon et al. (2008) included
the following. The introduction of flexible-interest rates, and a variety of length
of interest rate fixation periods. The introduction of interest-only periods,
where repayment of capital or principal are postponed temporarily. Full term
interest-only loans, with the principal payable on maturity - these are sometimes
linked to investment vehicles designed to accumulate greater capital than the
amount contributed (i.e. with an expected positive spread above the rate of
interest). Longer terms of debt, some up to 50 years. Reduced up-front cash (or
own) contribution requirements. Increased percentages allowed to be allocated
to bond financing, typically at a significantly lower interest rate than would
otherwise be available from a bank. Exceptionally low interest rate levels have
also seen some innovations in terms of price. Zero-interest 20 year fixed-rate
loans as well as negative interest rate flexible-rate (ARM) bonds are at the time
of writing available in the Danish market.
Some of the key drivers of these innovations were, as noted by Alpanda &
Zubairy (2017), the availability of new technology, which permitted significantly
more complex products to be managed effectively. Government deregulation,
7.12Data for OECD countries for the periods 2000 - 2007, 2007 - 2008, and 2008 - 2018 can
be seen in Table 7.4, in Section 7.9.3.
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and the associated greater market orientation. Rising asset prices and problems
with housing affordability. In the post-crisis period, innovations have been driven
by some additional factors, including record low interest rates and quantitative
easing. Interest rates in developed economies, particularly northern Europe,
have been set to record low levels. This has had the dual impact of reducing
the cost of borrowing and significantly reducing lender revenues.
7.2.4.1 Advantages of innovations
The advantages of these innovations have been felt most by borrowers, partic-
ularly those groups of borrowers that were previously unable to afford initial
payments on home loans (Scanlon et al., 2008). As mentioned above, mortgage
repayments are in many countries now more affordable in the short term. The
flexibility of repayment options has made it possible for borrowers to structure
their mortgages according to their expected cash flow requirements, this is
especially helpful for borrowers with irregular incomes.
The introduction of interest-only periods, allow borrowers that have limited
capacity to change their income levels, particularly the elderly, to maintain a
stable standard of living (Scanlon et al., 2008) - in effect consuming part of their
home equity without the need to liquidate the asset. Interest-only periods also
allow younger families to absorb temporary increases in living costs, without
necessitating the sale of the family home. For example the cost of children,
education, or other foreseeable and unforeseeable expenses.
The lengthening of the term of mortgage debts also reduces payments for the
full term of the debt, making housing more accessible to groups that would
otherwise not have been able to afford it. More sophisticated investors also
have the opportunity to benefit from the innovations, where in very low interest
environments, they might be able to borrow and invest at higher rates of return
than the cost of borrowing. Unfortunately these advantages come with a cost.
7.2.4.2 Disadvantages of innovations
The disadvantages described below are considered as compared with a standard
fixed-rate annuity mortgage. In general, the innovations in mortgages place
significantly greater onus on the borrower to fully understand the product that
they choose to take. Several of the benefits described above are also only true
for the initial stages of the debt contract, as principal repayment is often built
13
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into later stages. These products also introduce additional risk in several forms,
including interest rate risk, credit risk, market risk and significant potential
opportunity costs - each will be discussed briefly below.
Interest rate risk
Perhaps the simplest and most direct effect, which would not be felt by a fix
interest rate borrower, is that flexibility of interest rates expose the borrower to
future increases in interest expenses, and therefore negative effects to disposable
income if interest rates rise.
Credit risk
Interest-only periods may reduce monthly outlays, but they also prevent the
accumulation of equity by the borrower. This means that there is less of a
buffer, making them more sensitive to negative shocks. Negative shocks may
include an increase interest rates, the loss of income, illness of self or family
members, breakdown of relationships (possibly divorce) or a fall in property
prices.
Market risk
Borrower solvency is determined on the basis of outstanding debt relative to the
value of the property held as collateral, or loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. In the case
of property price declines, traditional borrowers would have built a buffer to
absorb a decline in collateral value. By contrast, the lack of equity accumulation
for interest-only borrowers means that the outstanding debt would not have
fallen relative to collateral. Any borrowers with LTVs close to the limit would
risk falling into negative equity, and possibly insolvency. Scanlon et al. (2011)
found that the groups that were most likely to be negatively affected in a crisis
were those who had withdrawn equity (potentially via refinancing), or those
who had bought close to the top of the market - resulting in high loan-to-value
ratios and increased probability of falling into negative equity.
Opportunity cost
Taking Denmark as an example, the borrower is endowed with several rights,
one of which is that any mortgage bond is callable at any time, and at which
time, the borrow can choose to either pay the remaining par value of debt,
or to repurchase the same (or similar) bond sold at time of borrowing. What
this means is that if interest rates rise after the date of borrowing, there is an
opportunity for mortgage borrowers to settle their debt at a significantly reduced
14
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capital value. This reduction of debt can also be accomplished by refinancing
at a later stage if interest rates were to rise sufficiently to outweigh the costs of
refinancing. Borrowers with flexible rate mortgages lose this opportunity, since
interest rates on flexible rate bonds are reset more frequently basis, and thus
price adjustments are negligible.
In summary, the increased complexity introduced by innovations requires the
borrower to have a more sophisticated knowledge of financial matters and to
take on more responsibility for the security of collateral and repayment of
capital. As has been reported by Scanlon et al. (2008), it is doubtful whether
most borrowers are sufficiently equipped to deal with these challenges. Where
they do not have sufficient knowledge or skill, households become dependent
on financial advisers and service providers to ensure that they have the most
appropriate products.
The credit-asset-price virtuous cycle
The self-reinforcing cycle of ease in credit markets and growth in asset prices is
well documented. Bernanke, Gertler, & Gilchrist (1999) and Disyatat (2011)
explained this in the context of the financial accelerator, rising property, and
asset prices more generally, incentivise borrowing via balance sheet improvements
and positive sentiment. In some cases borrowing is speculative, in order to
benefit from the rising tide. Low interest rates and greater ease of access to
mortgage debt simultaneously increase the pool of participants that demand
assets, driving prices progressively higher. This virtuous cycle is mirrored by a
similar decline in property prices and availability of credit on the way down.
Conditions in credit markets and asset prices are thus difficult to separate.
7.3 Mortgage credit in Denmark
As mentioned above, the Danish mortgage lending market has also experienced
a number of the innovations, and is a particularly interesting case due to a
relatively unique approach to mortgage lending. The system is characterised
by what is called the balance principle, which Laustsen (2009) describes as a
traditional fund matching principle for mortgage lending. Denmark is unique in
that this traditional principle has been respected for over 200 years. As noted by
Laustsen (2009, p. 1), it results in “Transparent pricing in the form of a direct
transfer of market-based prices to the individual borrower and market-based
15
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prepayment terms. And to the issuer: Limited and transparent risks.”7.13 As
noted by Haldrup (2017, p. 2), a mortgage deed in Denmark is a “money-
creating debt contract”, but in Denmark, this is financed from the existing
money stock7.14.
These stable mortgage lending and covered bond markets have, since 1996, expe-
rienced a number of product7.15, operational7.16 and legislative7.17 innovations.
The IMF (Sheehy, 2014) conducted an assessment of the risk related to the
structure of mortgage debt in Denmark in 2014, and found that there was a
strong shift after 2003 towards flexible rate mortgages. This strong shift was
warned against, and the financial supervisory authority, in collaboration with
banks, began to reduce the exposure of HH to flexible rate products. While
the problem was recognised, the level of flexible rate mortgage bond exposure
remains high, with roughly 70% of outstanding mortgage debt to be repriced
within the next five years. As in most other countries, the rights and protections
of the borrower have been enhanced by several additional legislative changes7.18,
7.13The mitigation of risk includes differences in term structure of assets and liabilities,
refinancing risk, option risk across variations of bond type, liquidity risk, foreign exchange risk,
and interest rate risk. The instruments issued include SDOs (særligt dækkede obligationer,
covered bonds), SDROs (særligt dækkede realkreditobligationer, covered mortgage bonds) or
ROs (traditionelle realkreditobligationer, traditional mortgage bonds). (Laustsen, 2009)
7.14Another important consideration is that mortgage bond financing is only available for
a portion of the debt, depending on the nature of the property, and the nature of the
purchase. See Falch, Sørensen, Holbek, Østergaard, & Andersen (2017) and Skinhøj, Kunde,
& Rasmussen (2018) for a detailed description of the covered bond and covered mortgage
bond market in Denmark. Further information is available on similar Nordic products in
Holbek et al. (2017).
7.152003, loans with interest-only (IO) periods. 2004, loans with interest rate caps and
adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs, or floating-to-fixed rate options). 2007, ratchet coupons.
7.162006 additional auctions in March and September. 2014, additional auction in June.
7.17English translations of financial regulation acts are available from https://www.dfsa.dk/
en/Rules-and-Practice/Translated_regulations/Acts, however, there have been additional
alterations since then. Legislation permitting multiple purpose use of mortgage debt against
fixed property was introduced as early 1993.
7.18As noted by Laustsen (2009, p. 12), these include 1.) EU Capital Requirements Directive
(CRD) and the UCITS Directive together set out the EU’s definition of covered bonds. EU
Directive 2006/48/EC of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business
of credit institutions, and EU Directive 2006/49/EC of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy
of investment firms and credit institutions (dubbed the Capital Requirement Directive –
CRD). 2.) Executive Order no 718 of 21 June 2007 – Executive Order on bond issuance,
balance principle and risk management. 3.) The par rule, applied from the final report of
the committee on business and commerce of the Danish parliament prior to the adoption of
the act in May 2007. Prepayment of loans funded by SDO issuance must “. . . take place on
reasonable terms and according to a practice that does not deviate from the terms applicable
to housing loans today. this means that prepayment may take place by way of a buyback of
the underlying bonds or at a price that does not deviate significantly from par, in part out of
consideration for ARMs-like products. If a loan is not linked to listed bonds, prepayment
may take place at par.” 4.) Act no 577 of 6 June 2007 – Act amending the Financial Business
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several of which have been implemented in order to keep up with the rapid
innovations in mortgage markets described above.
7.3.0.1 Composition of Danish mortgage debt
The composition of Danish real estate debt is rather complex to measure in its
entirety, as there is a strong possibility that first-time home buyers will take an
additional bank loan against their physical property for approximately 15% of
the market value. In the data below, this portion of the debt is not included,
and thus, the total debt outstanding represents a somewhat lower total than
that official measures of total household debt used in the model that follows7.19.
The following data are constructed from administrative registers, which allows
for a more granular view of recent developments than is typically available.
The actual data are significantly more detailed than that presented here, but
further disaggregation makes visual comparison difficult due to the relative
(in)significance of some subcategories of debt. The two main dimensions on
which we are interested in splitting mortgage debt are the term remaining on
the debt and the length of time for which the interest rate is fixed (referred to
as ‘interest fixation’ below). The interest fixation for ARM products shortened
dramatically leading up to 2007, but has lengthened somewhat since the crisis,
Unfortunately, the detailed micro-data is only available after 2009, which means
that details during the expansion of mortgage debt are not available.
At a national level, the total level of debt split by interest fixation, can be seen
in Figure 7.1. The first thing to note is that the nominal level of mortgage debt,
in panel (a), has continued to rise throughout the period from 2009 through
2017.
Act and various other acts (SDOs) – and pertaining explanatory notes and final report.
7.19The data used for the model is aggregate data sourced from Eurostat, and does not
provide the level of granularity presented here. It does, however, separate long- and short-term
debt, and the majority of bank loans for the purpose of property purchase are included in the
long term category. These bank loans are also flexible-interest rate products, and could thus
be included in the flexible portion of mortgage debts outstanding. Unfortunately we do not
have data that makes it possible to identify this debt separately, and thus it is excluded in
the present section.
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(b) Proportional split
Figure 7.1: Mortgage debt in Denmark: All term lengths
This can also be considered in proportional terms, where the percentage of debt
outstanding in each category is easier to read. As can be seen in Figure 7.1
part (b) above, the 30-fixed category, which covers all fixed rate products7.20,
was still in decline as a proportion of total outstanding mortgage debt from
2009 to 2012.
The most concerning factor, and one raised by Sheehy (2014), in an IMF
stability report, was the growing proportion of debt that would reprice within
relatively short intervals. At the start of 2011, debt with an interest fixation of
less than and up to 1 year (the green line) was by far the largest contributor.
This was recognised by both domestic and foreign prudential regulators as
a risky development, and in collaboration with the banking sector and real
estate finance companies a variety of measures were implemented to reverse
this trajectory. (Sheehy, 2014)
These patterns can further be decomposed into a variety of term structures. As
can be seen from Figure 7.2, the proportional composition of debt is significantly
different for each of the term groupings7.21. We will not explore this too deeply,
7.20Due to the choice of data categorisation in the real-kredit register from Statistics Denmark,
all contracts with fixed-interest are recorded as a 30 year fixation period.
7.21Debt is separated by term to maturity of between 0 and 10 years, from 10 to 20 years,
from 20 to 25 years and those with a term greater than 25 years.
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as the relative importance of each category varies dramatically.
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Figure 7.2: Composition of mortgage debt in Denmark: Split by term
Figure 7.3 illustrates the total outstanding debt in each of the term categories,
it can quite easily be seen that by far the largest portion of debt has a term to
maturity of over 25 years. In Denmark, the maximum term for which mortgage
debt can be acquired is 30 years, thus all debt in this category in each year was
issued under five years prior to the year in question. Roughly only one sixth of
all outstanding mortgage debt has a term to maturity of less than 25 years.
Of the debt with greater than 25 years to maturity, it can be seen from Figure
7.2, that only approximately 30% of this outstanding debt has an interest
fixation period of longer than 5 years. This together with approximately half of
the other 15% results in a total of just over 37% of all outstanding mortgage
bond debt. This means that the remaining 63% of mortgage debt will adjust
together with interest rates. The outstanding mortgage bonds will also adjust
in price, which effectively means that in the event of an increase in interest
rates, nominal debt outstanding will remain fairly constant for the 63% that has
flexible interest products, and debt service costs will rise commensurate with
the rise in rates. The aggregate opportunity cost related to capital adjustments
for borrowers in this case is potentially very large.
By 2017, the proportion of debt with an interest fixation period of 1 year or
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less had fallen to approximately 25% of all outstanding debt. A significant
improvement from just under 50% for 2010 and 2011.
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Figure 7.3: Levels of mortgage debt in Denmark: Split by term
Based on the distribution that can be seen in Figure 7.3 above, the remainder
of the paper uses a much simpler term and interest fixation categorisation. In
order to capture all long term debt, all outstanding debt with a term longer
than 10 years is included in long term debt, while all shorter terms maturity
are included in the short term category. Similarly, interest fixation periods of
less than 10 years are included in the short fixation period category, of which
the overwhelming majority is fixed for less than five years. All interest fixation
periods of longer than 10 years are included in the fixed-interest category.
Because the level of mortgage debt with a shorter term is so low (largely
irrelevant), this additional categorisation is dropped. Any shorter term mortgage
debt is also likely to have similar characteristics of longer term debt that has
short interest fixation periods. As such, it is assumed that the only fixed interest
debt held by HH is held in the form of mortgage debt. It is therefore possible
to categorise all debt in terms of the “interest fixation” dimension.
This is supported by Figure 7.4, where the proportion of debt in the shorter term
category is essentially negligible in comparison with the longer term outstanding
portion.
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Figure 7.4: Composition of mortgage debt in Denmark: Simplified, panels by
term
Figure 7.4 shows the nominal outstanding amounts in the short and long term
to maturity categories. As can noted above, the short-term-to-maturity debt to
the left is of negligible interest for the analysis that follows, and so most of the
figures below focus purely on the long term-to-maturity (10+ category) to the
right.
Figure 7.5, part (a), reflects the relative proportions of fixed and flexible-interest
fixation periods in each interest fixation category. The debt with interest-fixation
periods of less than 10 years will be referred to as adjustable rate mortgages
(ARMs) or flexible-rate mortgages below.
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(a) Outstanding debt
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(b) Interest payments
Figure 7.5: Outstanding mortgage debt and interest payments: Term of 10+
years
The cost of the outstanding debt has not followed the same pattern. Figure 7.5
part (b) above, shows that the total interest expenses paid on shorter ARM
debt has declined in nominal terms from roughly equivalent to the fixed-interest
debt in 2011 to just a fraction of total interest paid on fixed-interest products
by the end of 2017.
This can then be represented as an average rate of interest by calculating
the amount paid divided by the total outstanding debt. In Figure 7.6, the
short-term-to-maturity characteristics are shown on the left to illustrate the
these products follow market rates more closely. Again, however, it is the panel
to the right that we are most interested in, where it is possible to see that
longer term ARM debt paid an average rate of just under 0.5%, while fixed rate
longer term debt paid on average approximately 2.4% in 2017. The spread has
interestingly remained relatively constant between the two average rates, but
the proportional decline in the ARM average rate has been approximately -86%,
while the same for fixed rate products has been approximately -50%. It appears,
from this illustration, that a fall in official interest rates has passed through to
mortgage markets at roughly the same speed in fixed and ARM products7.22.
7.22Although it is beyond the scope of this study, a useful experiment would be to estimate
the total expected effect on household equity positions for an increase in interest rates, taking
refinancing opportunities into account. Unfortunately data is not available to simply measure
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Figure 7.6: Interest paid per cent of mortgage debt outstanding: By term
As can be expected, in the Danish environment, as interest rates fall and the
option to refinance remains available to households, the rate of interest on
fixed-interest securities has followed the flexible rate of interest downwards -
with a relatively constant spread of approximately 2% points. Unfortunately we
do not have data on how this spread alters during a rising interest rate period.
It can be seen that there was some delay in convergence in shorter terms to
maturity. This is expected as the costs associated with refinancing existing
contracts are likely to outweigh the benefits of a reduction in interest expense on
smaller capital values, or on products with shorter terms to maturity (i.e. fewer
interest payments remaining).
In a rising rate environment borrowers again have the incentive to refinance in
order to take advantage of falling bond prices, since in Denmark the borrower
has the option to either pay back the cash capital value or to repurchase an
equivalent bond to the one issued on the date of borrowing (otherwise known
as a prepayment or buy-back option). If interest rates rise sufficiently to make
it profitable, and if they have accumulated sufficient equity, the borrower has
the opportunity to make a substantial reduction in the outstanding capital
amount. Thus, unless rates remain unchanged, or only vary marginally, for
an extended period of time, the proportion of outstanding debt that has been
recently refinanced will typically be quite high7.23.
this impact directly, but it could be accomplished with reasonable assumptions. Measuring
interest payments relative to debt in isolation unfortunately cannot capture this effect.
7.23This is indeed the case at present, after interest rates declined gradually, but ultimately
to a record low level in 2019. At the time of writing it is possible to borrow at a fixed rate
for 30 years (the longest term to maturity available at present) of 0.5% p.a. against 80%
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7.3.0.2 Affordability of debt
The debt-service ratio (DSR) is shown in Figure 7.7, and calculated as the ratio
between total outgoing property income payments to annual HH disposable
income. In aggregate terms, it is unsurprising that the DSR has fallen contin-
uously for the Danish household sector since the GFC. It is presently at the
lowest level since 1995, and according to data collated by Abildgren (2017),
the lowest level ever. Thus in relative terms, while debt may be at record high
levels relative to income, the aggregate cost of servicing that debt is at an all
time low.
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Figure 7.7: Debt-service ratio: Denmark
This paradox between the level of debt outstanding and the declining DSR is
discussed in analysis in Section 7.6 The implications for the economy as a whole
and for the household sector depend on the macroeconomic linkages between
the sectors and the drivers of agent decision-making in the model structure.
7.4 The model
The model implemented in this section is based on Byrialsen & Raza (2019),
which is at the time of writing the most advanced empirical Stock-Flow-
Consistent (SFC) macroeconomic model of Denmark. The full model together
with an explanation for each equation and the logical connections between each
of the sectors, flows and stocks is provided in Section 7.10, in the appendix.
of the market value of a primary residence. As can be seen from Figure 7.3 in the text
above, approximately 85% of mortgage debt outstanding has more than 25 years remaining to
maturity. In other words, 85% of all mortgage contracts in Denmark (by value) were issued
inside of the previous 5 years.
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Throughout this section some of the equations and explanations thereof are
duplicated for explanatory purposes. It will provide only a brief summary of
the core features of the model, and the highlight the main changes made for
this analysis.
The model consists of the five main institutional sectors, namely the household
sector (HH) non-financial corporate sector (NFC), the financial corporate sector
(FC), the general government (G), and the rest of the world (ROW). It was
developed between 2017 and 2019 with a focus on the Danish HH. As such, the
behaviours of all sectors are significantly simplified, except in so far as they
engage directly with HH. The model is fully empirical, in the sense that all
variables included in the model are available as a dataset, against which the
performance of the model can be tested.
One feature is worth noting up front. As mentioned in the introduction, the
full model has 131 endogenous and 78 exogenous variables. Included in the
exogenous variables are all rates of return and all financial asset prices. The
most important implication is that correlated asset price and market movements
are not endogenous in the model, and this limits the analysis to very short-term
model responses.
7.4.1 Data
The data used for the model in this article is sourced from a combination
of Eurostat data, OECD data, and AMECO data. The period for which
annual data is available in sufficient detail is from 1995 to 2017. This data is
then processed in a series of aggregations. The data and the model accounting
structures follow the ESA 2010 (Statistical Office of the European Communities.,
2013) accounting structure, and the contents of the financial balance sheet can
be summarised as:
Monetary gold and special drawing rights (F1), Currency and deposits (F2),
Debt securities (F3), Loans (F4), Equity and investment fund shares (F5), Insur-
ance, pensions and standardized guarantee schemes (F6), Financial derivatives
and employees stock options (F7) and Other accounts (F8). These data are
aggregated according to Table 7.1.
The financial markets are thus highly aggregated in the model with effectively
only three asset classes. IB covers all securities that provide a financial return
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Table 7.1: Aggregation of ESA balance sheet categories
Assets Eurostat Code (ESA 2010)
Interest bearing (IB) F1, F2, F3, F4, F7 or F8
Net interest bearing (NIB) F1, F2, F3, F4, F7 or F8
Net equities (NEQ) F5
Pension (PEN) F6
that is analogous to interest, as does NIB. The only difference is that for NFC,
GOV and ROW, as part of the aggregation process, only the net position in
these assets and liabilities are considered.
The other two major asset classes are equities and pension funds. All except
HH equities are expressed as net equity assets and liabilities, NEQ, and for HH
they are expressed as equity assets, EQA, as they cannot issue equity liabilities
by definition. Pension assets are expressed as PEN , and are recorded as net
pension assets (NPEN) for ROW.
7.4.2 Major changes
The most significant change in this version of the model is the introduction of
a split between fixed and flexible rate mortgage debt. This relatively simple
alteration allows one to test the sensitivity of HH balance sheets to a change in
debt composition. The drivers of debt remain the same, and the rates of return
on all other assets have been left unchanged.
This is to isolate the channel through which the change in the cost of borrowing
affects households in the short term. This makes it possible to identify the
transmission channels and magnitude of each shock more clearly. It is one of
the advantages of fully exogenous rates of return and asset prices, but comes at
the cost of more realistic inter-market (“pass-through”) responses.
7.4.3 Balance sheet and transactions flow matrices
As with all SFC models, the balance sheet matrix represents the distribution of
ownership of assets (+) and liabilities (−) in the modelled economy. As can be
seen from Table 7.2, the sum of all rows, with the exception of fixed capital,
are zero. This reflects that each asset (except fixed assets, K) is exactly offset
by a liability held by another sector.
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The financial asset classes mentioned above are assigned to each sector according
to assumptions of which sector issues or holds each type of security. FC holds
the majority of counterpart financial securities, and in all sectors except HH,
financial assets and liabilities are recorded in net terms (assets minus liabilities).
The interest bearing liabilities of HH are, as noted in the previous section, by a
vast majority, long term debt. This is separated into fixed-interest (IBL(FI)F )
and flexible-interest (IBL(FL)F ) (or, ARM) mortgage liabilities.
Horizontal consistency captures the idea that all accounts are recorded as dual
entry accounting records, and the sum of all sector positions in any financial
asset class should be zero. Vertical consistency represents the financial position
of each sector, where financial net wealth (FNW ) is the sum of all assets and
liabilities and will either be a net positive or negative value. The sum across
sectors of the FNW of all sectors is also zero.
Table 7.2: Balance sheet matrix: BSM
Stocks NFC FC GOV HH ROW Σ
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Financial Stocks
Interest bearing (IBA / IBL) −IBLF +IBAH 0
Interest bearing Fixed +IBA(FI)F −IBL(FI)H 0
Interest bearing Flexible +IBA(FL)F −IBL(FL)H 0
Net interest bearing (NIB) NIBN NIBF NIBG NIBW 0
Net equities (NEQ) NEQN NEQF NEQH NEQW 0
Pensions (PEN) −PENF +PENH NPENW 0
Financial net wealth (FNW) FNWN FNWF FNWG FNWH FNWW 0
Fixed Stocks
Fixed assets (K) KN KF KG KH KT
The transactions flow matrix is presented below. This matrix, much like the
balance sheet matrix presented above, observes the requirements of horizontal
and vertical consistency. In this table, all items that result in a positive flow of
funds for the sector in question are marked with a plus sign (+), and all those
that result in a flow outwards of funds are marked with a minus sign (−).
The expenditure approach to GDP is captured in the first five lines of the table,
and can be captured as,
Y = C + I +G+ (X −M) (7.1)
Where C is consumption, I is investment, G is government expenditure, X is
exports and M is imports. All in nominal terms to reflect the actual flows of
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funds in each period. The income approach to national expenditure is captured
in the following six lines in the table up until the row called Savings. Each
row name reflects the flow that is applicable to each sector. The full detail
of how these flows are defined can be found in the full model description in
Section 7.10, in the appendix.
Capital income (rK), transfers (STR), capital transfers (KTR), acquisitions
less disposal of fixed assets (NP ) and net lending (NL) are presented without
a particular sign attached to each sector. The reason for which is that each
sector both receives and pays social transfers, and although GOV is the primary
counterpart for all of these, the size and net sign of these transfers can change
over time. The same is true for KTR and NP . Net lending (NL) is a passive
(residual) value and is determined by the balance of funding requirements
between the sectors over time, and can therefore also swing between negative
or positive as a flow.
Table 7.3: Transactions flow matrix: TFM
Flows NFC FC GOV HH ROW Σ
Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital
Private consumption +C −C 0
Government consumption +G −G 0
Investment +I −IN −IF −IG −IH 0
Exports +X −X 0
Imports −M +M 0
GDP Y 0
Taxes −TN −TF +TG −TH −TW 0
Gross operating surplus −B2N +B2F +B2G +B2H 0
Wages −WBN +WBH WBW 0
Capital income rKN rKF rKG rKH rKW 0
Transfers STRN STRF STRG STRH STRW 0
Pension adjustments −CPENF +CPENF 0
Savings (per sector) −SN +SN −SF +SF −SG +SG −SH +SH −SW +SW 0
Capital transfers KTRN KTRF KTRG KTRH KTRW 0
Acquisitions less disposal FA NPN NPF NPG NPH NPW 0
Net lending NLN NLF NLG NLH NLW 0
Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The three rows after the Savings row illustrate adjustments to the level of
savings (S) as a result of capital transfers (KTR), purchase and sale of fixed
assets (NP ) and (from the third row of the table) the level of investment (I) of
each sector - summed vertically in the capital accounts column for each sector.
The sum of all of these items is reflected in a net financing requirement for each
sector, in the table is called Net lending. The sum of all net lending positions
in the economy is again necessarily equal to zero, as one sector’s surplus is at
least one other sector’s deficit. The sum of all columns and all rows are thus all
equal to zero, and this criterion is respected by the data collected from Eurostat
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on an annual basis.
Financial and fixed assets in the model are subject to both transactions and
revaluations (or capital gains or losses). The accumulation of certain types
of assets or liabilities depends in part on the action of the sector in question
and in part on the effects of the other sectors. As can be read in the full
model description in the appendix, the nominal values that are sourced from
the Eurostat database and or AMECO can then be deflated using appropriate
price indices. There are 19 different price indices used in the model, some
of which are calculated, but the majority of which are sourced either from
Statistics Denmark, AMECO or the OECD. The details of the model structure
and the performance of the model relative to the data available can be found in
Byrialsen & Raza (2019), and the details of the behavioural equations available
in Section 7.10, in the appendix.
What we are most interested in here, however, is the specific channels through
which the scenarios proposed below transmit. As mentioned above, the model
contains active behaviours and passive behaviours. In each period, in order to
ensure closure in the model, there is one variable in each sector that is passive
to the budget constraints of each year.
The passive accumulator flows (or residual, buffer variables) for each sector are
as follows: transactions in net interest bearing securities for NFC (NIBTRNt ),
GOV (NIBTRGt ), and ROW (NIBTRWt );and, transactions in interest bearing
assets for HH (IBATRHt ). While specific behavioural equations determine the
holding of all other financial assets, NIB securities act as a catch all category
for NFC, GOV and ROW. The sum of those positions is then absorbed by FC.
As will be discussed below, the final closure of the model is provided through
the indirect provision of equity assets to HH by FC on demand. This is fitting,
since HH purchases of mutual funds or unit trusts are likely to be fulfilled by
FC, rather than directly by NFC.
7.5 Scenarios
This section briefly explains the four scenarios investigated using the model.
Apart from alterations to the structure of household mortgage liabilities, the
model operates in the same manner as in Byrialsen & Raza (2019). The shocks
presented below are measured as a percentage change from the baseline scenario.
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This allows for a simpler comparison between scenarios, and the aggregate
nominal and real values of stocks and flows are illustrated where relevant.
The first shock (and Scenario 1) is an increase in interest rates in 2020, the
second shock (and Scenario 2) is a decline in property prices in 2022. Scenario
3 compounds the first two, in that the first shock is kept in the model before
the shock to property prices is imposed. The last scenario, Scenario 4, is a
reduction in the level of ARMs in 2017. Effectively, the last scenario changes
the pre-conditions for the first two shocks, but applies them in exactly the same
manner. It is therefore possible to make a direct comparison between Scenario
3 and Scenario 4, given two different starting points.
This ordering allows the answer to a counter-factual question: What if HH had
not taken on as much flexible rate mortgage debt? How would this shift in
interest rate exposure affect outcomes, both for HH and the broader economy?
In essence, what might have been the case if the innovations leading up to 2003
had not impacted borrowing decisions to the same degree? There are however,
some limitations to the current model that are relevant for this exercise.
7.5.1 Limitations for interpretation of results
Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs) typically do not adjust immediately
As noted above, the bulk of ARMs in Denmark adjust fewer than 5 years into
the future. This allows households an extended period of time to observe interest
rate fluctuations and make a decision regarding refinancing or property sale. It
also means that the effects of an interest rate change will only impact HH cash
flows after between one and five years.
A decline in house prices is unlikely to happen in isolation
A fall in house prices is not expected to occur in isolation. Unlike in the model
below, a collapse in property prices is unlikely to be an isolated event. It would
more likely accompany broader systemic problems or be triggered by some form
of financial or economic crisis.
The structure of the economy at end 2017 is integrated with the volume and
structure of household debt
For the fourth scenario, it is assumed that we can simply shift the structure of
debt and leave the remainder of the economy unchanged. In reality, the total
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level of debt outstanding would probably be significantly lower if ARM and
interest-only products had not been made available. This would have affected a
significant array of economic variables, not least of all, domestic demand and
house prices. Although this is true, HH have already accumulated significant
levels of debt. As such, Scenario 4 is less a question of, what if things had
been different, and more a question of how to structure policy in order to best
influence future refinancing decisions of HH.
Interest rate changes would change the composition of debt
Refinancing in response to interest rate changes in Denmark is extensive. In a
rising interest rate environment, the incentive is to repurchase the previously
issued bond at a reduced price, settle the older debt, and then refinance at
similar monthly instalments, but with a lower capital value outstanding.
With falling interest rates, the incentive is to refinance at lower monthly in-
stalments, and if possible using a bond with fixed-interest, thus creating the
opportunity to refinance if rates rise significantly in the future, and thus reduce
the level of debt outstanding. It is therefore unlikely that the structure of
debt would remain constant after a shift in rates7.24. Due to the costs involved
in refinancing, a change in interest rates is expected impact debt structures
gradually, remaining fairly stable for the first year or two, and adjusting to a
greater degree in the medium term (approximately up to 5 years).
7.5.2 Scenario 1 - An increase in interest rates
The first shock is a simple interest rate change. The point is to illustrate the
expected impact on the level of household disposable income and the household
balance sheet.
In this shock we consider a 2 percentage point (2% points) rise in official rates.
This is assumed to be passed through perfectly to ARM mortgages (interest
7.24Micro-level contractual data is presently only available from 2009 onwards, thus at an
individual level, there is no data that can be used to model household behaviour in response
to an increase in interest rates. If the home owner intends to sell their property inside of 5
years, interest rates must fall dramatically for it to be financially beneficial to refinance due to
the costs involved. In a rising interest rate environment, a fixed-interest bond holder that sells
their property will always be able to benefit from capital losses on their outstanding bond,
but might face difficulties in selling their property as demand is expected to be suppressed
due to higher borrowing costs. In the same situation, a fixed rate borrower will again need
quite significant changes in the level of interest rates for a prepayment or buy-back operation
to be profitable in under 5 years.
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rate on flexible-interest-rate mortgage debt, i.e. flexible rate products, with
subscript (FL), (rHL(FL)t). The cost of fixed-interest mortgage debt (r
H
L(FI)t) is
increased by a proportionally lower adjustment of point five percentage points
(0.5% points) to reflect lower sensitivity of adjustments of the overall stock of
fixedinterest rate products. This is a strong assumption, and is not likely to
hold over longer periods of time, fixed-interest rate debt holders are expected to
retain their debt at lower interest rates, while the majority of flexible-interest
rate holders are expected to participate fully in the rise in interest rates after a
period of three years7.25.
In the model baseline, the current rate is calculated as interest payments relative
to outstanding debts. This gives a weighted average at the end of 2017 of 1.41%
for all debts7.26. After the shock, the adjustment is from this average rate
upwards - thus flexible-interest rates are adjusted up to 2.41% and fixed-interest
rates up to 1.91%. This constitutes a 141.75 per cent increase in flexible rates,
and taking into account changes in the level of outstanding debt in 2021, a
136.29% increase in interest payments. For fixed-interest debt, it constitutes a
35.44 per cent increase in fixed rates, and a 32.38% increase in interest payments.
The interest rates in the model include, interest on fixed (rHL(FI)) and flexible
rate (rHL(FL)) mortgages, and the counterpart assets (rFA(FI), rFA(FL)), the general
rate of return on net interest bearing assets (rN ), and the return on interest
bearing assets for households (rHA ). The other rates of return are the domestic
and foreign rate of return on equities (χt), and pension assets (ψt). All rates
of return in the model are determined exogenously, which means that any
adjustment must be applied manually. As noted above, the change is limited to
the cost of borrowing for HH only.
7.25These time periods are purely for illustrative purposes, since, as mentioned just above,
the Danish market is expected to have extensive refinancing as rates shift. This is however
expected to be somewhat muted by the expectation that the demand for new debt, and
therefore the demand for houses are expected to fall - potentially leading to a fall in house
prices, or at the very least, slower capital gains. Selling conditions are generally expected to
be worse in a higher interest rate environment, where the rise in the cost of house purchase
will naturally exclude a large number of potential buyers.
7.26As noted earlier, interest rates are currently at historically low levels. The actual average
rates of interest paid on flexible and fixed-interest mortgage products were 0.29% and 2.29%
per annum at the close of 2017. These values, however exclude a variety of debt types such as
bank debt, vehicle finance and consumer credit. The use of the average payment on all debt
types is a simplification that is made to suit the aggregation of data, and the reader should
be aware that this does not take into account the multitude of behavioural incentives that
apply to each underlying debt type.
32
SFC: Mortgage innovations, (7):33
In the case of household debt, it is FC that holds the counter-balance assets.
Thus,
rFA(FI)t = r
H
L(FI)t
and,
rFA(FL)t = r
H
L(FL)t
FC receives rFA(FI)t−1(IBA
F∼H
A(FI)t−1), and the two interest rates are simply made
equivalent. An increase in rates results in an increase in costs for HH and an
increase in revenues for FC.
Figure 7.8 illustrates, in part (a) the actual monthly interest rates available
for new debt on Danish mortgage markets since 2013 (separated by term of
interest fixation). Part (b) shows the progression of official interest rates in
Denmark since 2000, where the “Mortgage bond” rate is the dark-red line, and
is comparable with Fixed mortgage bonds in panel (a), the purple line, from
2013 onwards. Part (c) illustrates the impact of the shock to interest rates in
the model in 2020.
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Figure 7.8: Interest rates in Denmark
As can be seen from part (a), the rates available to fixed rate borrowers
have followed market rates downwards throughout the period, although this
illustrates only those rates available, rather than those paid. Figure 7.6 showing
the amounts actually paid in the section above, however, illustrates that the
amount paid has also declined at a similar pace, although with a marginal delay.
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The interest rates in the model are split into fixed and flexible rates for the pur-
pose of testing the effects of a shock to interest rate on alternative compositions
of mortgage debt. The baseline value of interest rates remains just below 1.5%
on average for all debt.
The expected outcome is that where the proportion of fixed-interest outstanding
debt is higher, the effects of a shock will be weaker, and vice versa. This of
course can only have an impact in the case where mortgage debt is itself split
into fixed- and flexible-rate debt.
The total level of outstanding IBL for HH is split into fixed-interest (IBLFI)
and flexible-interest bearing liabilities (IBLFL). The proportion of interest
bearing assets held as IBLFI is α.
IBLHFIt = α(IBL
H
t ) (7.2)
and thus,
IBLHFLt = (1− α)(IBL
H
t ) (7.3)
The level of α is calculated from data acquired from multiple data sources at
Statistics Denmark, and varies over time. The split was first introduced in 1996,
but initial volumes were low. As discussed in Section 7.3, while the composition
of this debt is significantly more complex than this, a strong argument can
be made for an aggregation up to just these two categories. This split has no
effect on the model prior to the shock in 2020, as the rate of interest on each is
considered to be equal to the average rate used in the baseline scenario up to
that point.
It is also possible to shock all other rates of return to a similar degree. Given the
integration of financial markets, this would produce results in the model that are
more realistic. Unfortunately, it would also conceal the effects that are purely
due to dynamics linked to the interest cost of borrowing for households7.27.
7.27Several alternative formulations of the shock were tested, but the inclusion of changes to
other rates of return require a number of additional assumptions. For example, an increase in
domestic bond rates are only likely in Denmark if European interest rates also rise. Also, the
speed and proportion to which rates pass through from official rates to each market are likely
to differ across products, but also over time.
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7.5.3 Scenario 2 - A fall in house prices
The second scenario is a fall in house prices. This is effected through a negative
twenty per cent adjustment to the house price index (−20%). This is a large
change to house prices, but is equivalent to the stress test applied by the IMF
(Sheehy, 2014). At a national level, Figure 7.9 illustrates that the average
nominal house price index (HPI) for dwellings in Denmark has risen at a
relatively steady pace since the GFC.
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Figure 7.9: National House price index (HPI), 2006 = 100
This follows a collapse of house prices during the GFC, where prices of Danish
dwellings fell approximately 20% from the peak in 2006 to the trough in 2011.
This average was not uniform across property types or regions. As shown
in Figure 7.10, the prices of owner occupied flats in the Capital and North
Denmark Regions have risen at roughly the same pace as prior to the GFC. This
is not predictive of a correction or price collapse, but does suggest a possible
housing price bubble in those markets. All other regions, appear to have only
just recovered to pre-crisis prices7.28.
7.28The capital region holds a disproportionately large share of real estate assets by value,
and thus the impact of property prices there carry a greater weight for an average for the
country as a whole.
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Figure 7.10: House price index (HPI), 2006 = 100
A more serious concern for potential borrowers is that several markets, partic-
ularly those for weekend cottages (otherwise known as summer houses) have
not recovered in the period following the GFC. Thus, any property purchased
between 2005 and the collapse in 2007 would have a high probability of falling
into negative equity7.29.
In this model, households are only permitted to make productive investment
in housing, which, as in Zezza (2008), Fontana & Godin (2013) and Beckta
(2015), is considered only as a primary market. The major difference here is
that households are assumed to produce the houses, whereas firms are housing
producers for all three of the above-mentioned studies. The secondary market
for houses is assumed to affect prices, but not the demand for additional housing
investment. Demand for housing investment is determined by by a Tobin’s-Q-
like function, partially driven by changes in disposable income and previous
period housing investment, and partially driven by a relative shift in sales price
(PHt−i) and construction cost (P it−i) indices.
Real investment in fixed assets (dwellings), in Equation 7.4, is estimated as a
log-linear function that depends on conditions in previous periods. This assumes
that the decision to invest in houses occurs based on recent developments, but
that actual changes in investment in fixed assets takes some time to materialise.
It thus takes one period before the effects of the house price shock can be
observed.
7.29Although the risk that the LTV ratio rises above 1 is lower for cottages, since the cap on
bond financing has until very recently been significantly lower than for primary residences
(60% as opposed to 80%).
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ln(iHt ) = βi + βiln(iHt−i) + βiln
(
PHt−i
P it−i
)
+ βiln(ydHt−i) (7.4)
The shock imposed on the model is to the numerator of the Tobin’s Q ratio7.30.
The imposed decline in house prices affects sales prices negatively, relative to
the cost of production, and thus has a contractionary effect on the Tobin’s q
ratio,
(
PHt−i
P i
t−i
)
, and thus on HH real investment (iHt ). The shock is implemented
as a permanent decline in prices, and thus changes the value of the ratio for
all periods following the shock. Growth in house prices continues according
to the same trajectory as in the baseline in order to make for a more effective
comparison.
The nominal level of investment in housing can be calculated by inflating the
real investment in housing series (iHt ) by the investment price index (P it , which
is sourced from Statistics Denmark):
IHt = iHt (P it ) (7.5)
The nominal stock of housing (KH), as with other assets to come, follows the
simple process of previous stock (KHt−1), plus acquisition (in this case investment
in new houses), less depreciation (DHt ) plus capital gains (KHCGt).
KHt = KHt−1 + IHt −DHt +KHCGt (7.6)
Capital gains on houses, in turn, can be calculated in an ex post manner as:
KHCG = ∆PHt (KHt−1) (7.7)
Which is simply the change in the price of houses applied to the level of stock
at the end of the preceding period.
7.30In the present structure of the model, investment is regressed against real investment
of the previous period iHt−1; real disposable income yHd , and the same at t− 2 (y
H
dt−2
); the
Tobin’s Q ratio at level terms
(
P Ht
P i
t
)
, and with a one period lag
(
P Ht−1
P i
t−1
)
; a constant; and,
a trend component.
37
SFC: Mortgage innovations, (7):38
The change in house prices (∆PHt ) leading into the current period is then by
definition the same ratio proportion of capital gains to previous housing capital.
∆PHt =
KHCG
KHt−1
(7.8)
Nominal housing capital held by HH at the end of the current period can be
expressed as the price adjusted stock at the end of the previous period, plus
net investment and depreciation. Equation 7.9 is effectively a restatement of
Equation 7.6, but with greater emphasis on the variable shocked in the analysis.
KHt = KHt−1(1 + ∆PHt ) + IHt −DHt (7.9)
The deflated real capital index can then be found, as in Equation (7.10) by
dividing the series by the investment (housing) price index, from Equation (7.8).
kHt =
KHt
P it
(7.10)
Housing capital then forms part of HH net wealth, which feeds back into
consumption decisions in subsequent periods. A decline in net wealth in period
t leads to a decline in consumption in period t+ 1.
The effects of changes in net wealth (NW ), are then felt directly in the level
of HH consumption, but with a lag on one period (as can be seen in Equation
(7.58) in the appendix). Although a fall in house prices does not affect household
disposable income to a substantial degree is contributes to a decline in overall
economic activity, and therefore reduces the demand for labour in subsequent
periods. This ultimately does affect household income but the effect is not as
immediate as was the case for the interest-rate shock.
7.5.4 Scenario 3 - Combination of Scenarios 1 and 2
The third scenario consecutively applies the shocks from Scenarios 1 and 2.
First the interest rate increase in 2020, and then the decline in property prices
in 2022. This combination sets up the comparison to be introduced in Scenario
4 below.
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7.5.5 Scenario 4 - Comparison for Scenario 3, proportion of fixed-
interest debt 80%
The final alteration to the model is an increase in the proportion of mortgage
debt held as fixed debt (α) from the 2016 level of 33.42% up to 80% in 2017.
This shift allows us to test the hypothetical difference of the impact of a shock
to interest rates in an artificial scenario, where the proportion of flexible debt
amounts to only 20% of outstanding household mortgage liabilities.
7.6 Simulations
This section explains the transmission of the two shocks in the scenarios described
above. First, the components of the economy that are most dramatically affected
are identified, and thereafter the key transmission channels that cause these
effects are briefly discussed.
The key take-aways from this section are that shock 1 and 2 both propagate
through the economy as described above, and that Scenario 3 results in greater
volatility in the responses of the economy than Scenario 4. This has implications
for the stability of the balance sheets of each sector and for the economy as a
whole.
The effects of each shock are summarised in tables in Section 7.9.4 for each
of the above-mentioned scenarios7.31. This approach allows a quick summary
of the impacts of a shock. It shows all affected variables, and thus provides a
snapshot of how broadly the shock propagates. One drawback is that it is a
cross section in time, and thus is not able to show the progression of feedback
effects over time. These tables are both used as a guide to the most important
transmissions, and as a consistency check, to ensure that the model behaves
within reason.
The model responds largely as expected to the first shock, with the exception
of the rather extreme response of the financial sector. This is because FC
transactions in net interest bearing assets (NIBTRF ) absorbs all financial
7.31Those tables are organised, firstly, according to whether the affected variable is a stock,
flow, parameter, rate, or index of some kind; and secondly, in order of largest variation from
the baseline scenario (as a proportion of the baseline). Transactions in and revaluations in
stocks, which occur on an annual basis, are considered flow variables. To capture accumulation
effects, tables are provided at the end of period 2021 (t+ 1) for Scenarios 1 and at the end of
periods 2022 (t) and 2025 (t+ 3) for Scenarios 2, 3 and 4.
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transactions of the other sectors - or, stated differently, accumulates all financial
imbalances. The second shock, to property prices, has a more interesting result
with regard HH savings and will be discussed in more detail in the HH section
below.
As noted above, each of the sectors has a buffer flow that summarises the
collective effect of each shock, and each of the shocks are quite extreme in
nature. It is therefore unsurprising that the effect on the passive elements
is somewhat exaggerated. Even though shocks of the same magnitude have
occurred in the past, they are not common events and have only been used here
to enhance the potential risks associated with the different debt structures.
7.6.1 General economy
The first shock (to interest rates) has a delayed effect that is first visible in the
shift from period 2020 to period 2021; as can be seen for Scenarios 1, 3 and 4.
The second shock (to property prices) takes effect immediately in 2022, and can
therefore be seen to take effect from period 2021 to period 2022 for Scenarios
2, 3 and 4. At a broader economic level, the strongest impact on the major
components of GDP from the first shock are a decline in gross fixed capital
formation (I) of -1.25% and in imports (M) of -1.22% (and as a result, net
exports rise by just over 10.52%). Figure 7.11 shows how C, I, G, X and M
would evolve relative to the baseline, for scenarios 1 and 2, and Figure 7.12 that
shows the same for Scenarios 3 and 4.
The shock to interest rates only impacts the model at t+ 1 and so there is no
change from the baseline in year 2020, whereas the impact of a property price
shock takes immediate effect in 2022. Exports remain relatively unchanged
under both shocks, only marginally affected due to a shift in domestic prices.
Y , or GDP, is more affected by the shock to interest rates in Scenario 1 than
by property prices in Scenario 2, largely as a result of the limited impact of the
property price shock on C and M . The rapid rise in interest costs clearly result
in a decline in all demand components except for G, which is exogenous and
therefore remains completely unchanged in all scenarios.
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(b) Scenario 2
Figure 7.11: National income indicators
As described above, Scenarios 3 and 4 illustrate the compound effect of the
two shocks under two different household debt positions. In Scenarios 1 to 3,
proportion of fixed-interest debt (α) is 38.91%, in Scenario 4, α is set to 80%.
The primary impact of this shift is a reduction in the sensitivity of household
disposable income to a dramatic rise in interest rates.
As expected, the effects of the combination of the two shocks are significantly
dampened when α is higher. This is clear from the scales in Figure 7.12, where
on the left for Scenario 3, investment drops just below -6% compared with -5.5%
on the right for Scenario 4. This pattern repeats itself throughout this results
section.
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Figure 7.12: National income indicators
GDP is also somewhat better protected from the shock in the latter case. The
unemployment rate (UR) increase is a compound effect of the two shocks, and
is also significantly higher in Scenario 3 than in Scenario 4. The number of
persons employed are determined by the NFC, and is a function of the level of
Y in the previous period and changes in the size of the labour force. Exogenous
growth in the size of the labour force combined with a decline in economic
activity, drive the proportion of unemployed persons upwards. This also results
in a rise in the level of social benefits drawn by HH from GOV, but this will be
discussed in the sections for each sector below.
In many of the charts that follow, all scenarios are displayed for each of the
variables. This allows for a comparison of the impact of the shocks. The
baseline scenario is illustrated by a solid black line, Scenario 1 by a light-grey,
dashed line. Scenario 2 by a medium-dark-grey, dashed line. Scenario 3 by the
dark-grey short-dashed line and Scenario 4 by the red short-dashed line.
For each sector we will highlight the components that move most dramatically
for shocks 1 and 2, and thereafter will focus on the comparative difference of
these effects in Scenarios 3 and 4. This highlights the major transmissions
for each shock in each sector. It also allows us to compare the impact of
a hypothetical change in the allocation of debt between fixed- and flexible-
interest rate products. Essentially we are able to show the impact of financial
innovations, within the bounds of the assumptions discussed above.
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A summary of the impact of the shocks, as captured by the net financing
requirements (Net lending, NL) of each sector for each year following the
shocks, can be seen in Figure 7.13.
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Figure 7.13: Net lending
Base purely on NL, as shown in Figure 7.13, it would appear that HH are net
borrowers (have negative NL) as a result of the interest rate rise, as might
be expected, but rather counter-intuitively7.32 move into a strong net lending
position following the property price collapse in 2022. ROW moves into positive
NL in all scenarios, as does FC, with the exception of Scenario 2, which
leaves FC NL unchanged. The scale of the changes in FC’s NL are a cause
for concern, and will be addressed in the FC section below. NFC and GOV
move into negative NL in all circumstances, but NFC has much more erratic
movements.
7.32This result is perfectly logical in the context of the model, but at first glance appears to
be illogical.
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For all sectors, Scenario 4 is again similar to Scenario 3, but with significantly
less dramatic effects. The next section will help to highlight a problem with a
focus purely on NL. In summary, such a focus may not be indicative of the
actual economic consequences of these shocks for each sector.
For each sector the analysis includes a brief summary the most affected com-
ponents from each shock, plus a graphical analysis of the most important
transmission channels. For Scenario 1, these can be seen in Tables 7.5 to 7.10
for (t+ 1) 2021, and Tables 7.11 to 7.16 for (t+ 3), which is 2023.
For Scenario 2, they can be seen in Tables 7.17 to 7.22 for 2022, and Tables
7.23 to 7.28 for (t+ 3), which is 2025. Similar tables can be seen for Scenarios
3 and 4 from Table 7.29 to Table 7.52, where the effects are summarised for the
years 2021, which allows for a comparison of the first shock, and 2025, which
captures the difference in the compound effect of both shocks.
7.6.2 Effects for the HH sector
For HH, in 2021, the most obvious effect of the first shock is the increase in
interest paid on mortgage debt (or property income paid) of 95.85%. The imme-
diate reduction in transactions for new interest-bearing assets (↓ IBATRH) and
liabilities (↓ IBLTRH) by -78.28% and -73.94% respectively, and transactions
in equity assets (↓ EQATRH) fall by -68.34%. These are dramatic proportional
shifts, largely due to the very low base of the baseline figures. These changes
are not only driven by portfolio allocation decisions but also by changes in the
real economy, as aggregate demand is reduced due tot he change in interest
rates.
HH investment (gross fixed capital formation, ↓ IH , which is only houses in
this model) falls by -6.81% and savings by -10.3% (thus the decline in ↓ NL
of around -16.64%). This follows a decline in disposable income of -2.58% and
consequently in consumption of about -1.33%. In terms of stocks, households
immediately reduce holdings of IBL by -2.26% and IBA by -3.23%.
The residual financial flow for HH is transactions in interest bearing assets,
IBATRHt , which are assumed to be deposits. It is directly affected by changes
in the level of net lending (NLH), changes in transactions in IBL (IBLTRHt ),
transactions in equities (EQATRHt ) and net transactions in pension assets
(PENATRHt ). The link between new debt IBLH and new deposits IBAH is
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analogous to the PK theory of endogenous money supply since an increase in
debt is associated with an increase in deposits. This is represented in Equation
7.11.
IBATRHt = NLH + IBLTRHt − EQATRHt − PENATRHt (7.11)
The progression of each of these transaction flows is presented in Figure 7.14
below. The decline in ↓ IBATRH of -78.28% is easily discernible. The reader
should note that the scale on each plot differs, and the change to PENATRH
is largely irrelevant at less than 1%, and the declines in IBLTRH , EQATRH
and IBATRH are of far greater interest. This is appropriate, as each item
should be read independently.
Following the dark-grey dotted line describes Scenario 1, where, in all but
pension asset transactions, the initial decline is dramatic, but in subsequent
years there is a fairly rapid recovery. IBATRH is represented in the top centre
panel, and is the sum of the remaining four items. In Scenarios 1,3 and 4,
the interest rate shock results in significant negative savings, but with the
introduction of the property price collapse in 2022, for Scenarios 2 to 4, NL
swings positive. This is explored further below.
Comparing Scenarios 3 (dark-grey short-dashed line) and 4 (red short-dashed
line) reveals that the effect of the combination of the two shocks is 50% smaller
for Scenario 4 after the interest rate shock (shock 1), and roughly 10% to 20%
smaller for the property shock (shock 2).
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Figure 7.14: Households: Transactions in assets
The level of net lending NLHt is essentially driven by changes in savings (SHt )
and investment levels (IHt ). The changes in net purchases and sales of fixed
assets (NPH) and net capital transfers (KTRH) are exogenous, and so do not
differ from the baseline (this is repeated for all sectors). The level of net lending
for HH is calculated as follows.
NLHt = SHt − IHt −NPHt +KTRHt (7.12)
The IH and SH components of NL can be seen in Figure 7.15. IH (INV in the
plot) recovers in the second period after the shock but then declines again in the
fourth. SH and NL fall by about around 10% in Scenarios 1 and 3, but only
by about half of that for Scenario 4. IH (which is entirely in houses) declines
even more dramatically in Scenarios 2 with the collapse in house prices, and
this is compounded with the fall of shock 1 in Scenarios 3 and 4. There is a
decline of over 30% from baseline investment by 2023 when the level of ARM
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(flexible-rate mortgages) is allowed to remain high in Scenario 3.
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Figure 7.15: Household Net Lending components
Savings (SH) are almost entirely determined by the level of disposable income
of HH, and since the tax proportion is held constant, it is the income portion
that drives most of the changes. While savings recover in the periods after the
shock, investment activity declines further, which is the main driver behind
the correction of NL. Thus, it is unfortunately a decline in economic activity
that allows for the financial recovery. The decline in IH also means that capital
formation fails to offset depreciation, and thus, HH capital levels decline.
Equation (7.13) describes the incomes and expenditures of HH that ultimately
determine the gross income for the sector (Y Ht ). The primary sources of which
are wages (WBH , W in the plot below), profits (B2, which is exogenous),
property income (or returns on financial capital, which stems from interest
bearing assets, IBAH , pensions, PENAH , and equities, EQAH), and social
transfers (STRH , STRA in the plot below).
Y Ht =WBHt +B2Ht + rHAt−1(IBA
H
t−1)
− rHL(FI)t−1(IBL(FI)
H
t−1)
− rHL(FL)t−1(IBL(FL)
H
t−1)
+ χt(EQAHt−1) + ψt(PENAHt−1) + STRHt + εH
(7.13)
Interest rates are represented by rH , and the “A” (“L”) subscript referring
to the assets (liabilities), and (χt) and (ψt) are the rates of return on eq-
uities and pensions. As part of the key change in this model, the level of
interest paid on IBL in this model is split between fixed and flexible rate
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mortgages into rHL(FI)t−1(IBL(FI)
H
t−1) (PIP-IBL-Fixed, in the plot below) and
rHL(FL)t−1(IBL(FL)
H
t−1) (PIP-IBL-Flexible, in the plot below). A similar split
is present in the financial corporate sector (FC) below.
The εH refers to adjustments made to ensure stock and flow consistency in the
level of property income received or paid during the periods where data was
available7.33.
Figure 7.16 displays the endogenous components of HH income. Property
income received on financial assets, are labelled PIR-EQA for EQAH , PIR-IBA
for IBAH , PIR-PENA for PENAH . PIP-IBL is the sum of interest paid on
IBL(FI)H and IBL(FL)H , which is all interest paid on mortgage debt. Also
included in the figure are consumption (CH) and income tax (TH , TAX in the
plot below).
7.33This convention is used for all sectors. The returns on financial assets are estimated with
varying degrees of accuracy for each of the sectors. In order to ensure that the model is
consistent in all periods, any difference between the estimated returns and actual returns (on
a net basis for each asset class) are added to the adjustment term. These errors in estimation
are minimised in the estimation specification for each asset class individually.
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Figure 7.16: Household income components
The sum of all changes in the model accumulate in the level of Y H in the bottom
right hand panel of Figure 7.16, Scenario 2 has almost zero impact on Y H ,
while Scenarios 1, 3 and 4, which include the interest rate change, all result in
a significant net decline. PIP-IBL, in the panel to the right of consumption (C)
in the top left corner, is the total interest paid on debt by HH, and highlights
the most dramatic change. It also illustrates the key difference introduced in
Scenario 4, which is a reduction in the sensitivity of HH income to changes in
interest rates relative to Scenario 3.
The largest contributors to HH income are wages (WH) and social transfers
(STRH , STRA in the plot above). Since 2007, approximately 35% to 37%
of social transfers represent a tax funded pension income, and most of the
remainder covers medical and disability support7.34. To give a sense of scale,
7.34Based on data from Statistics Denmark, since 2007, approximately 35% - 37% of all
social benefits were for old age payments. A further 20% - 22.3% are attributed to medical
benefits, an almost constant 14.4% to disability and 10% - 13.2% to family and child benefits.
Unemployment (app. 5%), social exclusion (app. 5%), housing (app. 2%) and survivorship
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Figure 7.17 shows the actual values of the major contributors, where NPIR is a
net sum of all property income received and paid, and remains positive, but
falls by roughly 50% due to the rise in interest costs on mortgages7.35.
Wages (W ), taxes (TH , TAX) and consumption (C) all decline with Y H .
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Figure 7.17: Household savings components
From this it is possible to see that the rise in STRH is not sufficient to offset the
fall in property income. Scenario 2 is the obvious exception, where income rises
marginally. Disposable income (Yd, shown as Y-D above) declines in Scenarios
1 and 3, but in Scenario 4 only stagnates before trending upwards again. The
trend in consumption follows the shift in Yd. The effects of the shocks on the
(app. 1%) benefits making up the balance. The bulk of these transfers can be thought of as
supplementary income, rather than unemployment support.
7.35The impact of the shift in α can be seen in the two panels to the top right. PIP-IBL-Fixed,
and PIP-IBL-Flexible are drastically different in Scenario 4 to all other Scenarios. This is
because Scenarios 1 to 3 all keep the baseline allocations of debt between fixed and flexible.
The difference from baseline illustrated in Figure 7.16 above are predominantly due to the
change in α in 2017 - hence the separation prior to the first shock in 2020.
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HH financial balance sheet can be seen in Figure 7.18.
IBL-Flexible K PENA
EQA IBA IBL-Fixed
20
18
20
20
20
22
20
24
20
18
20
20
20
22
20
24
20
18
20
20
20
22
20
24
20
18
2
0
20
2
02
2
20
24
20
18
20
20
20
2
2
20
2
4
20
18
20
20
20
2
2
20
24
0%
40%
80%
120%
-0.040%
-0.030%
-0.020%
-0.010%
0.000%
-8.0%
-6.0%
-4.0%
-2.0%
0.0%
-10.0%
-5.0%
0.0%
-4.00%
-3.00%
-2.00%
-1.00%
0.00%
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
Year
P
ct
fr
o
m
b
a
se
li
n
e
Model shock
Interest rate
Property price
Scenario
Baseline
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
Source: Data: Eurostat, AMECO, OECD and present model forecast
Figure 7.18: Household balance sheet
The decline in PENA are negligible relative to the baseline, but the decline in
capital (KH) that occurs due to the shock to housing prices, has a significant
impact on both consumption and investment in subsequent periods. The
consequence of the rise in interest rates, and decline in housing investment can
be seen in the panel for K above, where Scenario 1 shows a gradual decline
relative to the baseline. The impact of a shock to housing prices, however, has
a far more dramatic impact in 2022.
In the scenario three, three years after the compounding of the property price
decline, net HH wealth falls by 3.34%, but this understates the impact on the
HH, since, as mentioned in the introduction, net measurements fail to take into
account the impact on gross balances. In gross terms, stock of interest bearing
liabilities falls by 10.6%, HH wealth in financial assets falls by 3.55% while
stock of capital held in houses falls by 12.76%. These are substantial declines in
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the total level of wealth, but probably overstates the effect on property, since
although property prices are allowed rise gradually, the recovery is more gradual
that was observed for the Danish economy. The contraction in liabilites is also
substantially higher than the modest effect observed over the GFC. One major
difference, however, is that HH benefitted from global suppression of interest
rates, which would be quite the opposite if interest rates were to rise.
In summary, on the basis of the model, an interest rate hike and a collapse in
property prices would both force the HH balance sheet to contract. The main
transmission channel that this would occur through is a direct reduction in
disposable income due to debt costs, or the credit channel. It also shows that if
it were possible to instigate a change in the composition of debt from flexible-
towards fixed-interest products, the lower sensitivity of fixed-rate debt products
might protect HH from the majority of these impacts.
7.6.3 Effects for the NFC sector
The changes in Scenario 1 for NFC are rather limited at first, as can be seen in
Table 7.7, but by 2023, as shown in Table 7.13, the effects of the shocks have
spread far enough that changes in real economic activity have an impact on the
level of employment and output.
In 2021 NIBTRN falls by -12.62%, which is equal to the fall in NL. SN falls
by -1.1%, TN by -0.2% and profits (B2N ) by -0.19%.
By 2023 the real economy effects feed into NFC, and NIBTRN has fallen by
-19.75%, which is equal to the fall in NL. IN has fallen by -0.22%, and SN
by -1.61%. TN by -0.33% and profits (B2N ) by -0.31%. The net flow of all
property income is -0.17% lower and the stock of NIBN is -1.48% lower than
baseline. There is also a -0.08% fall in total capital of NFC.
NFC’s residual financial flow is NIBTRN , and the contributors to it are net
lending (NLN ) and net equity transactions (NEQTRN ). Unlike the household
sector, the financial activity of the NFC is not modelled directly, and NEQTRN
are therefore exogenously determined for periods where data is available, and
revert exogenously to zero for all periods of estimation. NIBTRN therefore
depend only on NL.
NIBTRNt = NLNt −NEQTRNt (7.14)
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Net lending again depends on Savings and investment,
NLNt = SNt − INt −NPNt +KTRN (7.15)
Investment is estimated in real terms, and is positively dependent on real gross
income (yt−i), and negatively dependent on the real level of capital (kNt−i),
each with a variable number of lags in the estimate7.36. In this context, the
proportion,
(
yt−i
kN
t−i
)
, represents capacity utilisation.
ln(iNt ) = βi + lnβi
(
yt−i
kNt−i
)
(7.16)
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Figure 7.19: NFC Net Lending components
The major determinants of investment are therefore the major determinants of
GDP, together with previous capital accumulation in NFC (previous capital,
plus investment less depreciation). As can be seen in Figure 7.19, IN (INV in
the plot) is fist affected by Scenario 1 (interest rates) in 2022, this the change
in NL observable is 2021 is purely due to the decline in savings. Although
the shapes of the panels in Figure 7.19 are very similar, the scales are quite
different. The actual underlying values of each category are also significantly
different. Plotted as actual values in Figure 7.20, the changes would be almost
indiscernible from the baseline.
7.36In this versions of the model, kNt−i and yt−i are both estimated at t− 1, together with a
significant dummy variable for 2009.
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Figure 7.20: NFC Net Lending components
NFC savings (SNt ), can be calculated as the net sum primary and secondary
income and expenditures.
SNt =Yt −WBNt + (B2Nt −B2t) + rNt−1(NIBNt−1)
+ χt(NEQNt−1)− TNt + STRNt + εN
(7.17)
NPIR−NEQ and STRA are exogenous, and revert to zero values after the
last period of available data, 2017.
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Figure 7.21: NFC Savings components
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7.6.4 Effects for the GOV sector
For Scenario 1, in 2021 NIBTRG is -30.78 % lower than the baseline. The
source of this decline can be traced through the plots below. Figure 7.22 shows
the decline in net lending and savings.
Contributing to the decline in NLG is a decline of -11.85% in SG. The main
contributor to which is a fall in TG of -1.56%. The net issue of IBL results in
a fall in NIBG of -9.16% and for net wealth to decline by -1.3%.
By 2023 the first shock has spread through the economy and NL is -34.27%
below the baseline levels. The delayed effect of the change in interest rates
is by that stage in effect, and results in a decline in net property income of
-15.36%. This contributes to a reduced level of SG of -14.07% below. The major
contributor is a -1.47% lower level of tax revenue.
Social transfers for each sector, STRAG in the case of GOV, are a net value of
receipts less payments. STRAG declines by -1.21%, indicating that the level
of payments has increased relative to receipts. This contributes further to
the negative balance in GOV. The decline in NIBTRG above accumulates in
NIBG that is -19.27% lower than the baseline, and net wealth, NWG, that is
-4.02% lower.
Shock 2 in 2022, the property price decline, has very little impact on GOV, with
only a marginal decline in SG, flowing from limited impacts to the underlying
components. NLG falls by only -0.97%. This since tax revenues are only
marginally affected when HH disposable income remains fairly constant, and
the ultimate effect on NIBG is only -0.24%. In reality this could have been
substantially worse if the property price collapse resulted in non-performing
loans and GOV was required to step in, as was the case for the banking crisis
in Sweden in 1993. (Englund, 1999)
By 2025, the effects remain modest, with NLG only -1.93% down from the
baseline level, and NWG only -0.27% lower.
The largest changes in Scenario 1 for GOV in 2021 are in the residual financial
flow for GOV, transactions in net interest bearing assets (NIBTRG). These
changes come almost entirely from changes in NL, another term for which would
be a government deficit or surplus, for negative and positive NL respectively.
GOV issues debt (NIBTRG) to cover the deficit. These assets are accumulated
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by FC (below), together with property income flows according to the return on
these assets (rN ). As can be seen from Equation (7.18) below,
NIBTRGt = NLGt (7.18)
Government investment (IG), (and, as with NFC) NPG and KTRG are exoge-
nous, so in Equation (7.19) below, it is only changes in savings (SG) that are
influential after the shocks in each scenario.
NLGt = SGt − IGt −NPGt +KTRGt (7.19)
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Figure 7.22: GOV Net Lending components
Equation (7.20) highlights the core components of GOV income. Of these B2G+
net property income received, (rNt−1(NIBGt−1), and NPIR in the plot below)
and tax TG are the incomes received by GOV. Social transfers (STRG, STRA
in the plot below) and GOV expenditure (G). The exogenous component from
the incomes is B2, and from expenditure G.
SGt = B2Gt + rNt−1(NIBGt−1) + TGt + STRGt −Gt + εG (7.20)
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Figure 7.23: GOV Savings components
Considering Scenarios 3 and 4, the difference in the impact of shocks is about
half as strong for Scenario 4, where α is at 80%. Scenarios 1 and 3 however
result in stronger effects. The impacts to GOV are directly a result of the
deterioration in HH cash flows and needs for social support. While STRG
is the expenditure of GOV that flows to HH, based on total net benefit and
contribution flows. Rising STRG expenses are exacerbated by a fall in revenues
in the form of both net property income received (NPIR) and taxation TG
(TAX in the plot above.)
7.6.5 Effects for the ROW sector
The ROW sector is primarily driven by exports, which are exogenous, and
imports, which are endogenous to changes in the level of household income.
The sharp decline in household income causes an immediate improvement in
the current account balance, which is reflected as a negative NL balance for
ROW7.37.
For shock 1, in 2021, ROW is driven into a further deficit to Denmark, with a
decline of -10.97% in NIBTRW , which captures the -10.97% decline in NLW
and SW . This has a negative effect of -0.7% on the level of net wealth (NWW )
held by ROW in Denmark.
The deficit in NLW continues to grow, and by 2023 is -10.97% lower than the
baseline value. The net flow of property income on all financial assets is lower
7.37The flows for ROW are recorded from the perspective of ROW. Thus, if ROW net-lends,
it is the same as to say that Denmark net borrows. A positive current account for Denmark
is therefore the equivalent of a net borrowing (or, negative net lending) position for ROW.
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by %, which reflects a -1.21% fall in the stock of NIBW . From a balance sheet
perspective, there is a decline of -0.7% in net wealth (NWW ).
The second shock, to property prices has less of an impact on ROW, with
NIBTRW still lower, but in 2022, this is only by -8.14%. This is again driven
by an equal decline in SW , which leads to an equal decline in NLW . The fall
in NIBTRW is reflected as a decline in NIBW by -0.87%.
By 2025, the shock has spread through the economy, and the impact on SW ,
NLW and NIBTRW is lower again at -11.74% less than the baseline value.
The changes in interest earning assets reduce the level of property income from
NIBW by -3.14%, and from all financial assets by -1.71%. The level of NIBW
continues to fall further into deficit by -3.98% relative to the baseline. After
the three year period of accumulative effects, NWW would be -2.69% lower.
The transmission of these shocks, working backwards from the accumulative
effect on transactions in NIBW , begins with Equation (7.21).
NIBTRWt = NLWt −NEQTRWt −NPENTRWt (7.21)
Equation (7.21) describes the source of changes in NIBTRW , where NEQTRW
and NPENTRW are exogenous in the model. This leaves only NL as a possible
source of change. Unlike the domestic sectors, ROW is assumed not invest in
the domestic economy, which means that the net lending function is somewhat
simpler, with only savings as the possible source of change.
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Figure 7.24: ROW: NIBTR: Transactions in assets and net lending
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Equation (7.22) highlights the components of NL, and much like the previous
sectors, only SW is endogenous in the model.
NLWt = SWt −NPWt +KTRW (7.22)
It is therefore only savings that drives changes in NL. The total level of NL is
then, as mentioned earlier, equivalent to the current account balances - although
what is positive in the current account must be negative in the ROW NL
account.
CABt = −NLWt (7.23)
Savings are described by Equation (7.24).
SWt =Mt −Xt + χt(NEQWt−1) + ψt(NPENW t− 1) + rNt−1(NIBWt−1)
+WBWt − TWt + STRWt + εW
(7.24)
ROW is assumed to be largely independent of developments in the domestic
economy, and thus WBW , χt(NEQWt−1), ψt(NPENW t− 1), STRW , and TW
are considered to be exogenous. This is with the exception that the rates of
return on each of the asset classes is assumed to be the same as those available
domestically. The reason for this is that Denmark is a AAA rated country and
maintains a fixed exchange rate regime with the EU, and arbitrage keeps rates
of return very close to those available in neighbouring Europe.
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Figure 7.25: ROW Savings components
Imports (M) from the model are a revenue for ROW and exports (X) an
expenditure. The return on net interest bearing stocks, rNt−1(NIBWt−1), (NPIR-
NIB in the plot above) depends on whether NIBW is positive or negative.
Imports are estimated in real terms in the log-linear form in Equation (7.25),
and depend on the level of domestic demand in the previous period, and a
relative price index between domestic and foreign goods from the previous
period
(
Py
t−1
Pm
t−1
)
.
ln(mt) = βi + βiln
(
P yt−1
Pmt−1
)
+ βiln(ct−1 + it−1 + xt−1) (7.25)
As noted by Byrialsen & Raza (2019), the “export function is based on the
Armington (1969) model where the market share of the Danish exports is
explained by relative prices.”
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This relation is captured below as annual Danish exports relative to a weighted
index of all trading partners (mWt ), which should be determined by domestic
prices (the export price index, P xt ) relative to foreign prices (the import price
index, Pmt ), but moderated by price elasticity (β).
xt
mWt
=
(
P xt
Pmt
)β
(7.26)
Exports thus stay relatively stable in the model, and are only affected by minor
changes in the relative price ratio. The lower right panel in Figure 7.25 above
is a little deceptive, as the scale is very small. The most important change for
ROW is a strong decline in Danish imports, which is primarily driven by the
fall in HH disposable income
7.6.6 Effects for the FC sector
FC absorbs all of the imbalances in the other four sectors, and the relatively
extreme shock to interest rates culminates in large changes to each. Transactions
in net interest bearing assets, NIBTRF , are simply an inversion of the accu-
mulation of NIBTR in three of the four sectors (GOV, NFC and ROW), and
IBLTRF∼H is a reflection of household accumulation of deposits, IBATRH .
NIBTRFt = −(NIBTRNt +NIBTRGt +NIBTRWt ) (7.27)
The second, and rather indirect accumulation is that of equities to offset any
equity investment by HH. The full explanation is available in the appendix,
in Section 7.10.3. An abbreviated summary is that all other components of
Equation (7.28) are accounted for by accounting identities between FC and the
other sectors, and the value of EQATRH is carried into FC via IBLTRF∼H .
Once all other terms are netted out, the NEQTRF value is equivalent to
EQATRH . This equivalence is the redundant equation in the model, and is
not specified in order to avoid over-identification.
NEQTRFt = NLFt + IBLTRF∼Ht + PENLTRFt − IBATRF∼Ht −NIBTRFt
(7.28)
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Because NIBTRF captures the net flows of all other sectors, it also represents
any excess or shortfall (i.e. net lending) experienced by FC. This is because all
flows of all other sectors with each other will already be captured and netted out
by the sum of their NIBTR in Equation (7.27) above. The only unaccounted
for flow is the net value of FC flows, which is captured in NLF . Again, NPF ,
IF 7.38 and KTRF are exogenous.
NLFt = SFt − IFt −NPFt +KTRFt (7.29)
Rather than show the percentage changes, Figure 7.26 shows the actual increase
in FC NL and savings as a result of the shocks in each scenario. As can be
seen, the impact of the second shock is almost negligible. Scenarios 1 and 3
are almost identical, and Scenario 2 remains very close to the baseline level. It
is thus the interest rate change that has the dominating effect on FC’s flows
and thus balance sheet. It should be unsurprising therefore that there is a
substantial difference between Scenarios 3 and 4. In Scenario 4, where a greater
portion of HH debt is less sensitive to changes in interest rates, the transfer of
wealth from HH to FC is substantially reduced.
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Figure 7.26: FC Net Lending components
From a very low base, NLF rises by 569.17%, or is roughly five and a half times
larger. The shifts in the values of the underlying FC components are sensibly
also substantial. Transactions in most assets are net positive, and in liabilities
negative - both relative to the baseline and in absolute terms.
7.38FC investment is assumed to grow at a constant 2% per annum.
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The exception is a decline in loan assets as HH deleverage in 2021 by -3.23%.
Apart from this single entry, HH borrowing is positive in all periods. Relative
to the baseline after the first shock, IBLTRF∼H is down by -78.28%, and
IBATRF∼H is down by -73.94%. FC is a net issuer of equity and interest
bearing assets, with transactions in equity, NEQTRF , up 68.34%, and in NIB
up 61.82%. FC thus begins to accumulate assets rapidly.
In terms of property income flows, the rise in interest rates in this example is
only allowed to affect the asset returns of FC, and thus the net increase is more
extreme than if we adjusted all rates of return. The total net property income
received by FC, NPIRF , is 323.58% higher. This comes from the increase in
fixed and flexible rate interest receipts, which rise by 32.38%, and 136.29%
respectively.
As noted above, FC accumulates assets rapidly. NEQF rises by 46.26% and
NIBF by 2.02%. The fall in IBAF∼H by -2.26% and in IBLF∼H by -3.23%
almost offset each other entirely, and the final impact on net wealth of FC is an
increase of 42.82%.
Equation (7.30) highlights the income and expenditure components that con-
tribute to FC savings, and Figure 7.27 illustrates these components in nominal
values.
SFt =B2Ft
+ rFA(FI)t−1(IBA
F∼H
A(FI)t−1) + r
F
A(FL)t−1(IBA
F∼H
A(FL)t−1)
− rFLt−1(IBL
F∼H
Lt−1 ) + rNt−1(NIB
F
t−1)
+ χt(NEQFt−1)− ψt(PENLFt−1)− TFt + STRFt − CPENFt + εF
(7.30)
From Equation (7.30), B2F and TF are exogenous, and the change in FC output,
Y F , is less than -1%. Nominal values are illustrated here in order to give better
context to the changes implied by the shocks. The percentage changes that are
discussed above for Scenario 1 do not appear to be as unrealistic when viewed
in these terms.
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Figure 7.27: FC Savings components
The panel titled net property income (NPIR) in the plot above is a sum of all
property income flows, and is similar to Equation (7.30) above for SF , but with
all other terms removed. The total impact on property income helps to identify
the source of changes in FC savings. NPIR is calculated as follows.
NPIRFt = + rFA(FI)t−1(IBA
F∼H
A(FI)t−1) + r
F
A(FL)t−1(IBA
F∼H
A(FL)t−1)
+ rNt−1(NIBFt−1) + χt(NEQFt−1)
− ψt(PENLFt−1)− rFLt−1(IBL
F∼H
Lt−1 )
(7.31)
The bulk of FC flows are property income paid (PIP), property income received
(PIR), or NPIR. The representations in Figure 7.27 above are categories of these
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property income flows. NPIR-NEQ for χt(NEQFt−1) (on equities), NPIR-NIB
for rNt−1(NIBFt−1) (on net interest bearing assets with all sectors other than
HH), PIR-IBA-Fixed for rFA(FI)t−1(IBA
F∼H
A(FI)t−1) (on fixed-rate HH debt), PIR-
IBA-Flexible for rFA(FL)t−1(IBA
F∼H
A(FL)t−1) (on flexible-rate HH debt), PIP-IBL
for rFLt−1(IBL
F∼H
Lt−1
) (on deposit liabilities).
The shock to interest rates in Scenarios 1, 3 and 4 all result in positive NPIR
for FC. The substantially lower level of NPIR in Scenario 4 (the red line) can
be traced back to PIR-IBA-Fixed and PIR-IBA-Flexible. The sum of the total
revenue generated by the rise in interest rates is the summarised in NPIR. The
steady decline of net return on equities, NPIR-NEQ, is due to the systematic
issuance of equity to HH as HH demands equity. This demand is retarded
slightly in all scenarios. Equity investment by HH is dependent on previous
returns, previous returns on house investment and previous changes in the
quantity of loans acquired. For both shock 1 and 2, it is due to the reduction
in IBLTRH and for shock 2 it is also driven by a fall in returns on houses.
The effect on FC savings, SF , is to triple the value in Scenarios 1 and 3, and
double the value in Scenario 4.
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Figure 7.28: FC balance sheet
7.7 Discussion
As noted in Section 7.3, many of the innovations that occurred around the
world during the past decades also occurred in the Danish mortgage lending
system. In addition, since the GFC, interest rates have reduced to and remained
at historically low levels. These conditions provided the platform for rapid
expansion of household mortgage debt leading up to the crisis, and to continued
expansion of that debt in more recent years. This has coincided with the
rapid recovery and inflation of asset prices. Property prices are discussed in
Section 7.5.3 above, and as can be seen from panel (a) in Figure 7.29, Danish
equity prices (the yellow line) have risen over 230% from 2010 to 2018, with
only one other European country (Latvia, the blue line) with a higher increase
in its equity price index.
The main effects of the innovations that occurred were a reduction in initial
payments for borrowers, a decline in the level of payments towards the out-
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standing principal debt (and thus a decline in the level of equity accumulation)
and a significant shift of risk from investors to lenders. Danish HH responded
rapidly to the innovations, and the composition of debt changed from 100%
fixed interest debt, in 2000 to less than 30% by 2012, as can be seen in panel
(b) of Figure 7.297.39.
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(b) Fixed-interest share of debt
Figure 7.29: Share prices and mortgage composition
The major benefits of fixed interest products include stability of expenditures,
insulation against unforseen interest rate hikes, and the possibility to refinance
at various favourable instances (stemming from the buy-back, and prepayment
rights assigned to borrowers (Skinhøj et al., 2019)). Flexible interest rate
products on the other hand, provide low initial cost of borrowing, but transfer
interest rate risk to the borrower. Revisions to the coupon rate on the counter-
balancing bonds also create a significant opportunity cost for ARM borrowers
if rates rise. This is opportunity cost is enhanced if it is a distressed borrower,
or the borrower faces negative shocks, such as a loss of income or an injury. A
7.39The gradual shift out of fixed interest bonds prior to 2003 is due to the introduction of
index-linked bonds, which made up a relatively small share of less than 10% the market, and
this share reduced rapidly after 2003. There has also been a gradual move back towards more
fixed-interest rate products since 2012.
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fixed rate borrower (even without amortization) would be able to accept a lower
sale value for their property, since the bond that represents the outstanding
debt would reprice downwards as interest rates rise. In the case of an interest
rate increase, flexible rate borrowers face the same possibility of unfavourable
property market conditions, but the price of bonds outstanding will remain
relatively constant, due to the re-setting of the short-term fixation of coupon
payments. Flexible rate borrowers, and borrowers with interest-only periods
thus face a much higher risk of falling into negative equity if house prices fall.
Many of these dynamics are captured in the model presented in this article, as
are several economic relationships between the real and financial sides of the
economy. These connections make it possible to show some of the expected
“real” economic feedback effects of each shock. Although it is a highly simplified
version of the Danish mortgage market, it is still able to provide a realistic
scale for the core transmission channels for each of the shocks, and due to the
simple structure of the model, it was relatively easy to incorporate a split in
the composition of debt of HH.
One of the goals at the outset was to test the sensitivity of HH balance sheets
for different compositions of debt. Two shocks were introduced across four
scenarios. The primary effect of the first shock, an increase in interest rates by
2% in 2020, was an immediate reduction in HH income. The primary effect of
the second shock, a decline in property prices by 20% in 2022, was to reduce
the level of HH capital and the attractiveness of housing as an investment
alternative. These two shocks were then compounded in Scenarios 3 and 4, but
in Scenario 4 the level of debt held in fixed-interest products (α) was increased
from around 37% to 80%, as shown in panel (b) of Figure 7.29 above.
The model behaved as expected, and in Scenario 3, with the higher proportion
of ARMs, HH are exposed to significantly greater income volatility than in
Scenario 4, a result that is corroborated by Danmarks Nationalbank (2016) and
Skinhøj et al. (2019). This transmits to both the real and financial sides of the
economy, with lower economic output and higher unemployment as a result of
the increased sensitivity. The results in Section 7.6 above suggest that for a
significant rise in interest rates, or a collapse in property prices, HH would be
in a more favourable financial position as a sector if the proportion of mortgage
debt held in fixed-interest products (α) was higher. This suggests that policies
with a focus on increasing the coverage of fixed-interest-rate products in the
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mortgage financing system would result in a more resilient HH, and economy
as a whole.
The specific movements of variables, however, should be interpreted with caution,
as the shocks in this model are not designed to provide a comprehensive economic
response within the model structure. Especially since it is only the rates that
affect the cost of borrowing that are adjusted in shock 1.
In terms of the transmission channels in the model, HH is a key driver. The
primary transmission channel in the interest rate shock is the credit channel,
and it is clearly more impactful where interest rates are more sensitive. In a
more realistic setting, the rise in interest rates would also affect HH incomes
positively. In Denmark, pension funds hold a large portion of the outstanding
covered covered bonds on behalf of households, and fees of the mortgage lending
companies are generally a fixed rate. This would mean that increased mortgage
costs should translate directly to increased pension incomes. HH pension assets
are also substantially larger than HH debt, which means that if an interest rate
hike resulted in a rise of the rates of return on most asset classes, then HH could
experience a net gain. One argument against this is that pension assets are not
directly accessible, and therefore would not contribute to short term disposable
income of HH. HH in this case do not have discretion over the consumption of
all wealth, and therefore those parts that are inaccessible should be excluded.
The current form of the model is also important to consider. Presently, HH
consume out of wealth, and there is a positive return on IBA, which are assumed
to be deposits. If we adjust the rate of return on IBA (rHN ) upwards, it would
change relative rates of return available for HH investment allocation, and would
lead to a rapid accumulation of IBA. It would also drive a large positive effect
on HH income, which would conceal the negative effects to disposable income
that are displayed in the current form. This would, at least in the short run,
not be in line with realistic expectations regarding accessible disposable income
of HH.
Even if other asset class returns are adjusted to mitigate the fall in HH disposable
income, investment will necessarily be lower as the cost of borrowing rises. In
the case of an interest rate rise, aggregate demand and output would still
decline, pushing unemployment upwards and providing downward pressure on
the wage rate. after several years, the relative improvement in competitiveness
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in export prices would have a positive influence on exports and negative on
imports. Ultimately this would strengthen the current account balance, but at
the expense of higher unemployment in the domestic economy. The positive
feedback of rising imports on wage income and output would depend on the
elasticities of wages to changes in output, and imports and exports to relative
price changes. The effect of a fall in house prices on housing investment would
also remain in the short-term, as it is dependent on previous returns.
Another transmission channel that would be concealed is the negative pressure
that a fall in demand has on the tax base, and therefore on GOV revenues.
In the analysis above, it is clear that the fall in overall demand would lead
to a fall in employment, a fall in tax revenues and therefore a large negative
shift in the GOV net financing requirement. If the Danish GOV enforces a
balanced budget, there would need to be a reduction in GOV spending, and the
vast majority of this spending is split between a tax funded pension scheme,
healthcare, disability support, family and child support. A reduction in any of
these categories would result in a further reduction of output and ultimately in
HH income.
Even with the simplifications, it should be safe to conclude that larger portions
of debt in fixed-interest products would result in much lower volatility of HH
disposable income. The use of a more comprehensive model, rather than a
simple test of income volatility, allows us to observe the expected accumulation
effects of the two shocks for different levels of α. The exogeneity of asset prices
and rates of return are potential drawbacks, however, it is not obvious that
creating endogenous links between financial markets, assets and rates of return
(i.e. a more integrated financial sector) would be an improvement on the current
model structure. At present, the most immediate transmission channels for
each of the shocks are transparent, and because of the empirical nature of
the model, it is possible to get an accurate scale of the initial effects of the
shocks, without the complication of complex interdependencies between markets.
There is a clear trade-off between complexity with greater accuracy, and better
interpretability with greater transparency.
The more complete macroeconomic SFC model presented above requires atten-
tion to the gross levels of economic stocks and flows, and thus makes it possible
to identify that the rise in HH NL following the second shock (the fall in prop-
erty prices) was not due to positive changes in HH. Contrarily, HH experienced
70
SFC: Mortgage innovations, (7):71
a decline in investment demand, together with rising unemployment. The model
presented here helps to prevent such misinterpretations, and to provide a more
complete picture of the possible impact of shocks7.40.
The model unfortunately does not presently incorporate some key issues from
the mortgage system, including the effect of changes in loan-to-value (LTV)
ratios, or second round credit risk effects that might occur due to loss of income
due to unemployment. The inclusion of a measure of non-performing loans
or some other measure of credit risk might be able to capture these effects.
Perhaps the most relevant omission, for the present discussion, is the effect of
refinancing behaviour on the composition of debt, although this is not a simple
matter to include, as noted by Skinhøj et al. (2019, p. 19), “The stochastic
modelling of prepayment behaviour is a complex task and is outside the scope
for most international investors.”
The possibility to explore a variety of modifications and alterations is also
one of the major benefits that the baseline version of the model offers. It has
made it possible to explore some of the complex economic feedback mechanisms
described above. This version is also under continuous development by the
MaMTEP group7.41, and as additional economic components are explored in
greater detail it will be possible to include any alterations that strengthen the
core structure.
7.40In addition to the alterations made, the output of the model is presented in an alternative
format. The tables in the appendix provide an exhaustive list of all elements applicable to
each sector that are affected by each shock. This cross-section provides at least two things
to the modeller. Firstly it identifies the components applicable to each sector that are most
dramatically impacted. Secondly, the comprehensive list of affected components expand as a
shock propagates through the economy and assists in the identification of timing errors in the
model structure.
7.41The Macroeconomic Methodology, Theory and Economic Policy Research Group, Aalborg
University.
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7.8 Conclusion
The Danish mortgage financing system has experienced several innovations in
recent decades. Collectively these innovations have had a variety of benefits
for borrowers, but these come with a transfer of responsibility and risk to the
borrower. One of the most prominent innovations was the introduction of
adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) with periods of interest fixation of a variety
of lengths.
Access to individual level administrative data-sets allowed for the construction
of aggregate outstanding mortgage data from 2009 to 2017, and highlights the
increased concentration of flexible-rate mortgage debt. By the end of 2017, after
the introduction of ARM products, approximately 63% of all mortgage debt
outstanding was subject to an interest rate adjustment within 5 years. These
products were collectively considered to be flexible-interest rate products in the
analysis above, and the remaining debt considered to be fixed rate.
The model in this article was adapted from Byrialsen & Raza (2019) to explore
the effects of this shift on the stability of incomes and balance sheets of the
Danish economy. The primary innovation in the model was to introduce the
split in debt, and to test the effect of the changes on the overall sensitivity of
incomes and balance sheets, with a particular focus on HH. There are some
additional changes that could be incorporated in future versions of the model
that might strengthen the outputs of the model. Firstly, additional data could
be sourced to provide a further split in HH debt between mortgage institute,
bank and consumer debt. Secondly, it might be possible to actively model the
refinancing behaviour of Danish property buyers7.42. It might also be possible
to include some measure of credit supply constraints, and or borrower risk, for
example, non-performing loans. Further developments of the model could make
this possible.
The core aim of the analysis was to test the sensitivity of HH and economic
conditions of a potential shift in the composition of debt from ARM type
products to fixed-interest products. This is an intuitively simple proposition,
but the accurately scaled empirical model presented in this article provides
a clear indication of the potential scale of these impacts. For a shift in the
fixed proportion from 37% up to 80%, in the case of a 2% point increase in
7.42There is unfortunately no data available at an individual level that would be representative
of a rising interest rate environment.
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interest rates and a 20% decline in property prices, the difference in aggregate
unemployment effects could be as much as 2%. The effects discussed for each
sector mirror this increase in sensitivity. Both in the initial effects and in terms
of volatility in subsequent periods.
The results thus provide evidence to support reports made by the IMF (Sheehy,
2014), the Danish national bank (Danmarks Nationalbank, 2016) and the leading
mortgage credit institution in Denmark, Nykredit Realkredit (Skinhøj et al.,
2019), that the increased concentration of household debt in ARM (flexible-
rate) products has resulted in greater sensitivity (and thus less stability) of
both HH and the Danish economy in general. This does not imply that the
level of outstanding debt poses a systemic economic risk. Again in support of
reports presented by the above institutions, it should be noted that simultaneous
and sizable shocks to both the cost of borrowing and to property prices only
resulted in modest effects on overall output, even where the shock is restricted
to borrowing costs.
In contrast to suggestions regarding the systemic risk of household debt in itself,
the analysis suggests that the potential risks related to the present high ratio of
HH debt to disposable income in Denmark can be dramatically reduced through
a migration of HH mortgage debt away from ARM type products towards fixed
interest rate products. The all-time low levels of interest rates that are currently
available also present an excellent opportunity to support this transition.
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7.9 Appendix
7.9.1 Mortgage debt as a percentage of total loans to non-financial
private sector (nominal, local currency)
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Figure 7.30: Mortgage debt as percentage of total loans
74
SFC: Mortgage innovations, (7):75
7.9.2 Mortgage debt to GDP
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Figure 7.31: Mortgage debt to GDP
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7.9.3 House Prices
Table 7.4: OECD House price index changes, Year on year
Country 2000 to 2007 2007 to 2009 2009 to 2018
Estonia 15.89% -17.06% 11.33%
Costa Rica 08.94% 06.07% 04.11%
Austria 03.63% 03.01% 03.97%
Colombia 04.58% 04.79% 03.85%
Hungary 13.52% 08.14% 03.01%
Czech Republic 05.25% 16.46% 02.83%
United States 04.10% 01.82% 02.78%
Netherlands 03.35% 02.03% 02.62%
Ireland 16.65% -12.57% 02.50%
Finland 02.96% 00.33% 02.43%
Israel 00.55% 05.02% 02.40%
Korea, Republic of 03.01% 01.93% 02.39%
Norway 03.72% 03.27% 02.35%
Poland 08.40% 05.06% 02.23%
Mexico 06.03% 03.23% 02.15%
New Zealand 00.97% 02.29% 02.07%
Denmark 03.11% 02.95% 01.98%
United Kingdom 03.52% 02.65% 01.95%
Portugal 03.37% 02.90% 01.76%
Sweden 02.56% 02.92% 01.56%
Latvia 11.22% 03.58% 01.39%
Luxembourg 02.87% 02.79% 01.31%
Germany 01.30% 01.17% 01.23%
Canada 01.64% 01.63% 01.09%
Slovenia 12.31% 02.53% 01.00%
France 03.36% 02.15% 00.82%
Italy 03.07% 02.95% 00.80%
Switzerland 01.87% 02.46% 00.75%
Slovakia 22.41% 04.09% 00.42%
Spain 05.69% 03.72% 00.29%
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Greece 06.25% 03.82% -2.33%
Japan -0.27% -0.22% -0.31%
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Figure 7.32: OECD house prices: Year-on-year changes
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Figure 7.33: OECD house prices: Real price index
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7.9.4 Simulation most affected variables in each shock
7.9.4.1 Scenario 1: Percentage from baseline: An increase in 2020
interest rates, measured in 2021
Table 7.5: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 1, 2021:
Economy wide
Variables Type Description Change
PY Deflation index Price deflator: GDP 00.0082%
CAB Flow Current account balance 10.9700%
FAB Flow Financial account balance -10.9700%
NX Flow Net Exports 10.5161%
I-Real prices Flow Gross fixed capital formation -1.2468%
I Flow Gross fixed capital formation -1.2468%
M Flow Imports -1.2173%
M-Real prices Flow Imports -1.2173%
PRIVATE Flow Gross income -0.6908%
S-Real prices Flow Savings -0.5725%
S Flow Savings -0.5638%
Y-Real prices Flow Total income -0.2097%
Y Flow Total income -0.2016%
B2 Flow Gross operating surplus -0.1126%
ULC Rate Labour force: Unit labour cost: Price
index: Index for the price deflator with
reference to 2010 (all other price
deflator indices are referenced to 2010)
00.2021%
UL-COST Rate Labour force: Unit labour cost 00.2020%
CU Ratio Capacity Utilisation (Real GNI / real
capital stock)
-0.2098%
WS Ratio Wage share 00.0442%
Table 7.6: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 1, 2021:
HH
Variables Type Description Change
PIP-IBL-HH-
Flexible
Flow Property income paid: IBL 136.2914%
PIP-IBL-HH Flow Property income paid: IBL 95.8530%
IBA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -78.2793%
FL-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial liabilities -73.9372%
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IBL-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-73.9372%
EQA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Equity assets -68.3376%
NPIR-HH Flow Net property income received: Total -58.6600%
FA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets -54.5574%
PIP-IBL-HH-
Fixed
Flow Property income paid: IBL 32.3802%
FNL-HH Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -16.6354%
NL-HH Flow Sector Balance -16.6354%
S-HH Flow Savings -10.3028%
INV-HH-Real
prices
Flow Gross fixed capital formation -6.8066%
INV-HH Flow Gross fixed capital formation -6.8066%
PIR-IBA-HH Flow Property income received: IBA -3.2347%
Y-D-HH Flow Disposable Income -2.5806%
Y-HH Flow Total income -2.5806%
TAX-HH Flow Tax -2.5806%
Y-D-HH-Real
prices
Flow Disposable Income -2.5806%
C-HH-Real
prices
Flow Consumption -1.3327%
C-HH Flow Consumption -1.3326%
R-IBL-HH-
Flexible
Rate Rate of interest: Interest bearing
liabilities
141.7474%
R-IBL-HH-
Fixed
Rate Rate of interest: Interest bearing
liabilities
35.4369%
IBA-HH Stock Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -3.2347%
IBL-HH Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-2.2569%
IBL-HH-Fixed Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-2.2569%
IBL-HH-
Flexible
Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-2.2569%
FA-HH Stock Financial Assets -1.1087%
EQA-HH Stock Financial Assets: Equity assets -0.8157%
K-HH Stock Stock of Capital -0.2520%
K-HH-Real
prices
Stock Stock of Capital -0.2520%
NW-HH Stock Net Wealth -0.2223%
NW-HH-Real
prices
Stock Net Wealth -0.2222%
FNW-HH-Real
prices
Stock Financial net wealth -0.2044%
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FNW-HH Stock Financial net wealth -0.2044%
Table 7.7: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 1, 2021:
NFC
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-NFC Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -12.6166%
NIB-NFC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -12.6166%
NL-NFC Flow Sector Balance -12.6166%
S-NFC Flow Savings -1.1026%
TAX-NFC Flow Tax -0.2016%
B2-NFC Flow Gross operating surplus -0.1858%
NIB-NFC Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -0.5636%
NW-NFC Stock Net Wealth -0.2341%
FNW-NFC Stock Financial net wealth -0.2042%
Table 7.8: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 1, 2021:
FC
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-FC Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) 569.1674%
NL-FC Flow Sector Balance 569.1674%
NPIR-FC Flow Net property income received: Total 323.5769%
S-FC Flow Savings 275.5754%
PIR-IBA-FC-
HH-Flexible
Flow Property income received: IBA 136.2914%
IBL-FC-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-78.2793%
IBA-FC-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -73.9372%
NEQ-FC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Equity 68.3376%
NIB-FC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing 61.8225%
PIR-IBA-FC-
HH-Fixed
Flow Property income received: IBA 32.3802%
Y-FC Flow Total income -0.0442%
NEQ-FC Stock Net financial stock: Equity 46.2640%
NW-FC Stock Net Wealth 42.8191%
FNW-FC Stock Financial net wealth 23.0242%
IBL-FC-HH Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-3.2347%
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IBA-FC-HH Stock Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -2.2569%
NIB-FC Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing 02.0236%
Table 7.9: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 1, 2021:
GOV
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-GOV Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -30.7775%
NIB-GOV-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -30.7775%
NL-GOV Flow Sector Balance -30.7775%
S-GOV Flow Savings -11.8501%
TAX-GOV Flow Tax -1.5577%
FNW-GOV Stock Financial net wealth -9.1649%
NIB-GOV Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -9.1649%
NW-GOV Stock Net Wealth -1.2954%
Table 7.10: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 1,
2021: ROW
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-ROW Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -10.9700%
NIB-ROW-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -10.9700%
NL-ROW Flow Sector Balance -10.9700%
S-ROW Flow Savings -10.9700%
NIB-ROW Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -1.2091%
FNW-ROW Stock Financial net wealth -0.6953%
NW-ROW Stock Net Wealth -0.6953%
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7.9.4.2 Scenario 1: Percentage from baseline: An increase in 2020
interest rates, measured in 2023
Table 7.11: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 1:
Economy wide, 2023
Variables Type Description Change
PY Deflation index Price deflator: GDP 00.0645%
PX Deflation index Price deflator: Exports 00.0293%
CAB Flow Current account balance 19.5257%
FAB Flow Financial account balance -19.5257%
NX Flow Net Exports 18.9600%
I-Real prices Flow Gross fixed capital formation -2.3220%
I Flow Gross fixed capital formation -2.3220%
M-Real prices Flow Imports -2.3121%
M Flow Imports -2.3120%
PRIVATE Flow Gross income -1.3215%
S-Real prices Flow Savings -1.0950%
S Flow Savings -1.0518%
Y-Real prices Flow Total income -0.3939%
Y Flow Total income -0.3297%
B2 Flow Gross operating surplus -0.1848%
X-Real prices Flow Exports -0.0261%
X Flow Exports 00.0032%
UL-COST Rate Labour force: Unit labour cost 00.2739%
ULC Rate Labour force: Unit labour cost: Price
index: Index for the price deflator with
reference to 2010 (all other price
deflator indices are referenced to 2010)
00.2739%
WAGE Rate Labour force: Wage rate -0.0066%
UR Ratio Labour force: Unemployment rate 01.8221%
CU Ratio Capacity Utilisation (Real GNI / real
capital stock)
-0.3141%
WS Ratio Wage share 00.0501%
UN Stock Labour force: Unemployed persons 01.8219%
N Stock Labour force: Denmark for workers in
production
-0.0506%
NF Stock Labour force: Employed persons:
Danish waged
-0.0501%
NU Stock Labour force: Employed persons:
Danish nationals: Employed abroad
00.0066%
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Table 7.12: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 1: HH,
2023
Variables Type Description Change
PIP-IBL-HH-
Flexible
Flow Property income paid: IBL 130.9800%
PIP-IBL-HH Flow Property income paid: IBL 91.4505%
NPIR-HH Flow Net property income received: Total -59.5976%
FL-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial liabilities -40.0111%
IBL-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-40.0111%
EQA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Equity assets -37.1202%
PIP-IBL-HH-
Fixed
Flow Property income paid: IBL 29.4045%
IBA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -20.4450%
FNL-HH Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) 17.4954%
NL-HH Flow Sector Balance 17.4954%
FA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets -16.7101%
INV-HH Flow Gross fixed capital formation -12.4945%
INV-HH-Real
prices
Flow Gross fixed capital formation -12.4945%
PIR-IBA-HH Flow Property income received: IBA -5.5128%
C-HH-Real
prices
Flow Consumption -2.5833%
C-HH Flow Consumption -2.5833%
TAX-HH Flow Tax -2.3318%
Y-D-HH-Real
prices
Flow Disposable Income -2.3318%
Y-D-HH Flow Disposable Income -2.3318%
Y-HH Flow Total income -2.3317%
SCO-HH Flow Social benefit contributions -2.3195%
STRA-HH Flow Social transfers 01.9329%
PIR-EQA-HH Flow Property income received: EQA -1.2325%
S-HH Flow Savings 00.6134%
PENA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Pension assets -0.2734%
SBE-HH Flow Social benefit transfers 00.1583%
W-HH Flow Wages -0.0572%
PIR-PENA-HH Flow Property income received: PENA -0.0037%
R-IBL-HH-
Flexible
Rate Rate of interest: Interest bearing
liabilities
141.7474%
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R-IBL-HH-
Fixed
Rate Rate of interest: Interest bearing
liabilities
35.4369%
IBA-HH Stock Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -5.5128%
IBL-HH-Fixed Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-4.4541%
IBL-HH Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-4.4540%
IBL-HH-
Flexible
Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-4.4540%
FA-HH Stock Financial Assets -2.0294%
EQA-HH Stock Financial Assets: Equity assets -1.6706%
K-HH Stock Stock of Capital -0.8297%
K-HH-Real
prices
Stock Stock of Capital -0.8297%
NW-HH Stock Net Wealth -0.3508%
NW-HH-Real
prices
Stock Net Wealth -0.3508%
FNW-HH Stock Financial net wealth -0.0614%
FNW-HH-Real
prices
Stock Financial net wealth -0.0614%
PENA-HH Stock Financial Assets: Pension assets -0.0080%
Table 7.13: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 1:
NFC, 2023
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-NFC Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -19.7550%
NIB-NFC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -19.7550%
NL-NFC Flow Sector Balance -19.7550%
S-NFC Flow Savings -1.6144%
NPIR-NIB-NFC Flow Net property income received: NIB -0.6404%
TAX-NFC Flow Tax -0.3297%
B2-NFC Flow Gross operating surplus -0.3054%
INV-NFC-Real
prices
Flow Gross fixed capital formation -0.2240%
INV-NFC Flow Gross fixed capital formation -0.2240%
NPIR-NFC Flow Net property income received: Total -0.1657%
W-NFC Flow Wages -0.0567%
NIB-NFC Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -1.4829%
NW-NFC Stock Net Wealth -0.6495%
FNW-NFC Stock Financial net wealth -0.5094%
K-NFC Stock Stock of Capital -0.0801%
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K-NFC-Real
prices
Stock Stock of Capital -0.0801%
Table 7.14: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 1: FC,
2023
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-FC Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) 615.6131%
NL-FC Flow Sector Balance 615.6131%
NPIR-FC Flow Net property income received: Total 345.2026%
S-FC Flow Savings 287.2370%
NPIR-NEQ-FC Flow Net property income received: NEQ 232.6801%
PIR-IBA-FC-
HH-Flexible
Flow Property income received: IBA 130.9800%
NIB-FC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing 75.2630%
IBA-FC-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -40.0111%
NEQ-FC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Equity 37.1202%
PIR-IBA-FC-
HH-Fixed
Flow Property income received: IBA 29.4045%
IBL-FC-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-20.4450%
PIP-IBL-FC Flow Property income paid: IBL -4.8349%
NPIR-NIB-FC Flow Net property income received: NIB 04.0381%
PENL-FC-
Transactions
Flow Financial Liabilities: Pension liabilities -0.2734%
Y-FC Flow Total income -0.1069%
PIP-PENL-FC Flow Property income paid: PENL -0.0037%
NEQ-FC Stock Net financial stock: Equity 239.4789%
NW-FC Stock Net Wealth 157.9216%
FNW-FC Stock Financial net wealth 76.6691%
NIB-FC Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing 06.9344%
IBL-FC-HH Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-5.5128%
IBA-FC-HH Stock Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -4.4540%
PENL-FC Stock Financial Liabilities: Pension liabilities -0.0080%
Table 7.15: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 1:
GOV, 2023
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Variables Type Description Change
FNL-GOV Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -34.2672%
NIB-GOV-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -34.2672%
NL-GOV Flow Sector Balance -34.2672%
NPIR-GOV Flow Net property income received: Total -15.3614%
NPIR-NIB-
GOV
Flow Net property income received: NIB -15.3614%
S-GOV Flow Savings -14.0661%
TAX-GOV Flow Tax -1.4651%
STRA-GOV Flow Social transfers -1.2092%
FNW-GOV Stock Financial net wealth -19.2726%
NIB-GOV Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -19.2726%
NW-GOV Stock Net Wealth -4.0170%
Table 7.16: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 1:
ROW, 2023
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-ROW Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -19.5257%
NIB-ROW-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -19.5257%
NL-ROW Flow Sector Balance -19.5257%
S-ROW Flow Savings -19.5257%
NPIR-NIB-
ROW
Flow Net property income received: NIB -2.3317%
NPIR-ROW Flow Net property income received: Total -1.1482%
NIB-ROW Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -4.1077%
FNW-ROW Stock Financial net wealth -2.5799%
NW-ROW Stock Net Wealth -2.5799%
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7.9.4.3 Scenario 2: Percentage from baseline: Fall in 2022 property
prices, measured in 2022
Table 7.17: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 2,
2022: Economy wide
Variables Type Description Change
PY Deflation index Price deflator: GDP 00.0316%
CAB Flow Current account balance 08.1425%
FAB Flow Financial account balance -8.1425%
NX Flow Net Exports 07.9087%
I Flow Gross fixed capital formation -3.0357%
I-Real prices Flow Gross fixed capital formation -3.0357%
M-Real prices Flow Imports -0.9393%
M Flow Imports -0.9393%
PRIVATE Flow Gross income -0.5328%
S-Real prices Flow Savings -0.4415%
S Flow Savings -0.4195%
Y-Real prices Flow Total income -0.1581%
Y Flow Total income -0.1265%
B2 Flow Gross operating surplus -0.0708%
ZZ1 Index Index: House price: Imported from DST -495.5506%
ZZ-I Index Index: House price: Imported from DST -20.0000%
TOBIN-Q Index Index: House price index: Tobin’s Q =
Ratio between the house price index and
the construction cost of housing index
-20.0000%
ULC Rate Labour force: Unit labour cost: Price
index: Index for the price deflator with
reference to 2010 (all other price
deflator indices are referenced to 2010)
00.1267%
UL-COST Rate Labour force: Unit labour cost 00.1267%
CU Ratio Capacity Utilisation (Real GNI / real
capital stock)
-0.1581%
WS Ratio Wage share 00.0277%
Table 7.18: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 2,
2022: HH
Variables Type Description Change
FL-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial liabilities -62.3432%
IBL-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-62.3432%
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EQA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Equity assets -57.7498%
IBA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -37.3670%
FA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets -29.5485%
FNL-HH Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) 25.6920%
NL-HH Flow Sector Balance 25.6920%
INV-HH Flow Gross fixed capital formation -16.9799%
INV-HH-Real
prices
Flow Gross fixed capital formation -16.9799%
PIP-IBL-HH-
Fixed
Flow Property income paid: IBL -1.9007%
PIP-IBL-HH Flow Property income paid: IBL -1.9007%
PIP-IBL-HH-
Flexible
Flow Property income paid: IBL -1.9006%
PIR-IBA-HH Flow Property income received: IBA -1.5899%
NPIR-HH Flow Net property income received: Total 00.7082%
K-HH Stock Stock of Capital -8.3997%
K-HH-Real
prices
Stock Stock of Capital -8.3997%
NW-HH Stock Net Wealth -2.9289%
NW-HH-Real
prices
Stock Net Wealth -2.9289%
IBL-HH-
Flexible
Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-1.9007%
IBL-HH Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-1.9006%
IBL-HH-Fixed Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-1.9006%
IBA-HH Stock Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -1.5899%
EQA-HH Stock Financial Assets: Equity assets -0.6999%
FA-HH Stock Financial Assets -0.6383%
FNW-HH-Real
prices
Stock Financial net wealth 00.3723%
FNW-HH Stock Financial net wealth 00.3722%
Table 7.19: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 2,
2022: NFC
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-NFC Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -8.8374%
NIB-NFC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -8.8374%
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NL-NFC Flow Sector Balance -8.8374%
S-NFC Flow Savings -0.6918%
TAX-NFC Flow Tax -0.1265%
B2-NFC Flow Gross operating surplus -0.1169%
NIB-NFC Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -0.3771%
NW-NFC Stock Net Wealth -0.1397%
FNW-NFC Stock Financial net wealth -0.1330%
Table 7.20: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 2,
2022: FC
Variables Type Description Change
IBA-FC-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -62.3432%
NEQ-FC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Equity 57.7498%
IBL-FC-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-37.3670%
NIB-FC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing 22.7852%
NPIR-FC Flow Net property income received: Total -6.6143%
PIR-IBA-FC-
HH-Fixed
Flow Property income received: IBA -1.9007%
PIR-IBA-FC-
HH-Flexible
Flow Property income received: IBA -1.9006%
Y-FC Flow Total income -0.0278%
NEQ-FC Stock Net financial stock: Equity 132.1362%
IBA-FC-HH Stock Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -1.9006%
IBL-FC-HH Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-1.5899%
NIB-FC Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing 00.8395%
Table 7.21: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 2,
2022: GOV
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-GOV Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -0.9744%
NIB-GOV-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -0.9744%
NL-GOV Flow Sector Balance -0.9744%
S-GOV Flow Savings -0.3880%
TAX-GOV Flow Tax -0.0521%
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FNW-GOV Stock Financial net wealth -0.2368%
NIB-GOV Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -0.2368%
NW-GOV Stock Net Wealth -0.0415%
Table 7.22: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 2,
2022: ROW
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-ROW Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -8.1425%
NIB-ROW-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -8.1425%
NL-ROW Flow Sector Balance -8.1425%
S-ROW Flow Savings -8.1425%
NIB-ROW Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -0.8668%
FNW-ROW Stock Financial net wealth -0.5220%
NW-ROW Stock Net Wealth -0.5220%
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7.9.4.4 Scenario 2: Percentage from baseline: Fall in 2022 property
prices, measured in 2025
Table 7.23: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 2,
2025: Economy wide
Variables Type Description Change
PY Deflation index Price deflator: GDP 00.0981%
PX Deflation index Price deflator: Exports 00.0256%
PC Deflation index Price deflator: Consumption -0.0023%
CAB Flow Current account balance 11.7439%
FAB Flow Financial account balance -11.7439%
NX Flow Net Exports 11.4623%
I Flow Gross fixed capital formation -4.0697%
I-Real prices Flow Gross fixed capital formation -4.0697%
M Flow Imports -1.4791%
M-Real prices Flow Imports -1.4790%
PRIVATE Flow Gross income -0.8513%
S-Real prices Flow Savings -0.7053%
S Flow Savings -0.6449%
Y-Real prices Flow Total income -0.2493%
Y Flow Total income -0.1514%
B2 Flow Gross operating surplus -0.0852%
X-Real prices Flow Exports -0.0171%
X Flow Exports 00.0085%
TOBIN-Q Index Index: House price index: Tobin’s Q =
Ratio between the house price index and
the construction cost of housing index
-20.0000%
ZZ1 Index Index: House price: Imported from DST -20.0000%
ZZ-I Index Index: House price: Imported from DST -20.0000%
UL-COST Rate Labour force: Unit labour cost 00.0746%
ULC Rate Labour force: Unit labour cost: Price
index: Index for the price deflator with
reference to 2010 (all other price
deflator indices are referenced to 2010)
00.0746%
WAGE Rate Labour force: Wage rate -0.0193%
UR Ratio Labour force: Unemployment rate 02.2183%
CU Ratio Capacity Utilisation (Real GNI / real
capital stock)
-0.1342%
WS Ratio Wage share 00.0032%
UN Stock Labour force: Unemployed persons 02.2183%
N Stock Labour force: Denmark for workers in
production
-0.0582%
NF Stock Labour force: Employed persons:
Danish waged
-0.0576%
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NU Stock Labour force: Employed persons:
Danish nationals: Employed abroad
00.0193%
Table 7.24: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 2,
2025: HH
Variables Type Description Change
FL-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial liabilities -40.8998%
IBL-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-40.8998%
EQA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Equity assets -38.0412%
FNL-HH Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) 27.6257%
NL-HH Flow Sector Balance 27.6257%
INV-HH-Real
prices
Flow Gross fixed capital formation -23.1670%
INV-HH Flow Gross fixed capital formation -23.1670%
FA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets -9.2935%
IBA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -7.5369%
PIP-IBL-HH-
Flexible
Flow Property income paid: IBL -6.1696%
PIP-IBL-HH Flow Property income paid: IBL -6.1696%
PIP-IBL-HH-
Fixed
Flow Property income paid: IBL -6.1696%
PIR-IBA-HH Flow Property income received: IBA -3.4809%
S-HH Flow Savings 02.4518%
PIR-EQA-HH Flow Property income received: EQA -1.9534%
NPIR-HH Flow Net property income received: Total 01.8554%
STRA-HH Flow Social transfers 00.3734%
C-HH Flow Consumption -0.3563%
C-HH-Real
prices
Flow Consumption -0.3540%
PENA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Pension assets -0.3143%
SBE-HH Flow Social benefit transfers 00.2243%
W-HH Flow Wages -0.0775%
Y-D-HH-Real
prices
Flow Disposable Income 00.0467%
Y-HH Flow Total income 00.0445%
TAX-HH Flow Tax 00.0444%
Y-D-HH Flow Disposable Income 00.0444%
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SCO-HH Flow Social benefit contributions 00.0236%
PIR-PENA-HH Flow Property income received: PENA -0.0077%
K-HH-Real
prices
Stock Stock of Capital -11.5971%
K-HH Stock Stock of Capital -11.5971%
IBL-HH-Fixed Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-6.1696%
IBL-HH Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-6.1696%
IBL-HH-
Flexible
Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-6.1695%
IBA-HH Stock Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -3.4809%
NW-HH Stock Net Wealth -3.0871%
NW-HH-Real
prices
Stock Net Wealth -3.0849%
EQA-HH Stock Financial Assets: Equity assets -2.3977%
FNW-HH-Real
prices
Stock Financial net wealth 02.0247%
FNW-HH Stock Financial net wealth 02.0224%
FA-HH Stock Financial Assets -1.6886%
PENA-HH Stock Financial Assets: Pension assets -0.0136%
Table 7.25: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 2,
2025: NFC
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-NFC Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -3.9717%
NIB-NFC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -3.9717%
NL-NFC Flow Sector Balance -3.9717%
NPIR-NIB-NFC Flow Net property income received: NIB -0.7335%
S-NFC Flow Savings -0.5667%
INV-NFC-Real
prices
Flow Gross fixed capital formation -0.3277%
INV-NFC Flow Gross fixed capital formation -0.3277%
NPIR-NFC Flow Net property income received: Total -0.1786%
TAX-NFC Flow Tax -0.1514%
B2-NFC Flow Gross operating surplus -0.1411%
W-NFC Flow Wages -0.0769%
NIB-NFC Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -0.9374%
NW-NFC Stock Net Wealth -0.4605%
FNW-NFC Stock Financial net wealth -0.3047%
K-NFC-Real
prices
Stock Stock of Capital -0.1153%
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K-NFC Stock Stock of Capital -0.1153%
Table 7.26: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 2,
2025: FC
Variables Type Description Change
NPIR-NEQ-FC Flow Net property income received: NEQ 101.8950%
IBA-FC-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -40.8998%
NEQ-FC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Equity 38.0412%
NIB-FC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing 25.4575%
IBL-FC-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-7.5369%
PIR-IBA-FC-
HH-Flexible
Flow Property income received: IBA -6.1696%
PIR-IBA-FC-
HH-Fixed
Flow Property income received: IBA -6.1696%
NPIR-FC Flow Net property income received: Total -5.7659%
PIP-IBL-FC Flow Property income paid: IBL -3.2914%
NPIR-NIB-FC Flow Net property income received: NIB 03.1540%
FNL-FC Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -2.4247%
NL-FC Flow Sector Balance -2.4247%
S-FC Flow Savings -1.0750%
PENL-FC-
Transactions
Flow Financial Liabilities: Pension liabilities -0.3143%
Y-FC Flow Total income -0.0801%
PIP-PENL-FC Flow Property income paid: PENL -0.0077%
NEQ-FC Stock Net financial stock: Equity 76.7352%
IBA-FC-HH Stock Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -6.1696%
NIB-FC Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing 04.2019%
IBL-FC-HH Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-3.4809%
NW-FC Stock Net Wealth -0.5494%
FNW-FC Stock Financial net wealth -0.2333%
PENL-FC Stock Financial Liabilities: Pension liabilities -0.0136%
Table 7.27: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 2,
2025: GOV
Variables Type Description Change
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FNL-GOV Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -1.9261%
NIB-GOV-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -1.9261%
NL-GOV Flow Sector Balance -1.9261%
S-GOV Flow Savings -0.8339%
NPIR-GOV Flow Net property income received: Total -0.8226%
NPIR-NIB-
GOV
Flow Net property income received: NIB -0.8226%
STRA-GOV Flow Social transfers -0.2320%
TAX-GOV Flow Tax -0.0374%
FNW-GOV Stock Financial net wealth -1.0013%
NIB-GOV Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -1.0013%
NW-GOV Stock Net Wealth -0.2694%
Table 7.28: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 2,
2025: ROW
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-ROW Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -11.7439%
NIB-ROW-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -11.7439%
NL-ROW Flow Sector Balance -11.7439%
S-ROW Flow Savings -11.7439%
NPIR-NIB-
ROW
Flow Net property income received: NIB -3.1359%
NPIR-ROW Flow Net property income received: Total -1.7125%
NIB-ROW Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -3.9822%
FNW-ROW Stock Financial net wealth -2.6903%
NW-ROW Stock Net Wealth -2.6903%
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7.9.4.5 Scenario 3: Percentage from baseline: Combined scenario 1
and 2, measured in 2021
Table 7.29: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 3,
2021: Economy wide
Variables Type Description Change
PY Deflation index Price deflator: GDP 00.0082%
CAB Flow Current account balance 10.9700%
FAB Flow Financial account balance -10.9700%
NX Flow Net Exports 10.5161%
I-Real prices Flow Gross fixed capital formation -1.2468%
I Flow Gross fixed capital formation -1.2468%
M Flow Imports -1.2173%
M-Real prices Flow Imports -1.2173%
PRIVATE Flow Gross income -0.6908%
S-Real prices Flow Savings -0.5725%
S Flow Savings -0.5638%
Y-Real prices Flow Total income -0.2097%
Y Flow Total income -0.2016%
B2 Flow Gross operating surplus -0.1126%
ULC Rate Labour force: Unit labour cost: Price
index: Index for the price deflator with
reference to 2010 (all other price
deflator indices are referenced to 2010)
00.2021%
UL-COST Rate Labour force: Unit labour cost 00.2020%
CU Ratio Capacity Utilisation (Real GNI / real
capital stock)
-0.2098%
WS Ratio Wage share 00.0442%
Table 7.30: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 3,
2021: HH
Variables Type Description Change
PIP-IBL-HH-
Flexible
Flow Property income paid: IBL 136.2914%
PIP-IBL-HH Flow Property income paid: IBL 95.8530%
IBA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -78.2793%
FL-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial liabilities -73.9372%
IBL-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-73.9372%
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EQA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Equity assets -68.3376%
NPIR-HH Flow Net property income received: Total -58.6600%
FA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets -54.5574%
PIP-IBL-HH-
Fixed
Flow Property income paid: IBL 32.3802%
FNL-HH Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -16.6354%
NL-HH Flow Sector Balance -16.6354%
S-HH Flow Savings -10.3028%
INV-HH-Real
prices
Flow Gross fixed capital formation -6.8066%
INV-HH Flow Gross fixed capital formation -6.8066%
PIR-IBA-HH Flow Property income received: IBA -3.2347%
Y-D-HH Flow Disposable Income -2.5806%
Y-HH Flow Total income -2.5806%
TAX-HH Flow Tax -2.5806%
Y-D-HH-Real
prices
Flow Disposable Income -2.5806%
C-HH-Real
prices
Flow Consumption -1.3327%
C-HH Flow Consumption -1.3326%
R-IBL-HH-
Flexible
Rate Rate of interest: Interest bearing
liabilities
141.7474%
R-IBL-HH-
Fixed
Rate Rate of interest: Interest bearing
liabilities
35.4369%
IBA-HH Stock Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -3.2347%
IBL-HH Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-2.2569%
IBL-HH-Fixed Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-2.2569%
IBL-HH-
Flexible
Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-2.2569%
FA-HH Stock Financial Assets -1.1087%
EQA-HH Stock Financial Assets: Equity assets -0.8157%
K-HH Stock Stock of Capital -0.2520%
K-HH-Real
prices
Stock Stock of Capital -0.2520%
NW-HH Stock Net Wealth -0.2223%
NW-HH-Real
prices
Stock Net Wealth -0.2222%
FNW-HH-Real
prices
Stock Financial net wealth -0.2044%
FNW-HH Stock Financial net wealth -0.2044%
99
SFC: Mortgage innovations, (7):100
Table 7.31: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 3,
2021: NFC
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-NFC Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -12.6166%
NIB-NFC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -12.6166%
NL-NFC Flow Sector Balance -12.6166%
S-NFC Flow Savings -1.1026%
TAX-NFC Flow Tax -0.2016%
B2-NFC Flow Gross operating surplus -0.1858%
NIB-NFC Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -0.5636%
NW-NFC Stock Net Wealth -0.2341%
FNW-NFC Stock Financial net wealth -0.2042%
Table 7.32: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 3,
2021: FC
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-FC Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) 569.1674%
NL-FC Flow Sector Balance 569.1674%
NPIR-FC Flow Net property income received: Total 323.5769%
S-FC Flow Savings 275.5754%
PIR-IBA-FC-
HH-Flexible
Flow Property income received: IBA 136.2914%
IBL-FC-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-78.2793%
IBA-FC-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -73.9372%
NEQ-FC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Equity 68.3376%
NIB-FC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing 61.8225%
PIR-IBA-FC-
HH-Fixed
Flow Property income received: IBA 32.3802%
Y-FC Flow Total income -0.0442%
NEQ-FC Stock Net financial stock: Equity 46.2640%
NW-FC Stock Net Wealth 42.8191%
FNW-FC Stock Financial net wealth 23.0242%
IBL-FC-HH Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-3.2347%
IBA-FC-HH Stock Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -2.2569%
NIB-FC Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing 02.0236%
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Table 7.33: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 3,
2021: GOV
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-GOV Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -30.7775%
NIB-GOV-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -30.7775%
NL-GOV Flow Sector Balance -30.7775%
S-GOV Flow Savings -11.8501%
TAX-GOV Flow Tax -1.5577%
FNW-GOV Stock Financial net wealth -9.1649%
NIB-GOV Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -9.1649%
NW-GOV Stock Net Wealth -1.2954%
Table 7.34: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 3,
2021: ROW
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-ROW Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -10.9700%
NIB-ROW-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -10.9700%
NL-ROW Flow Sector Balance -10.9700%
S-ROW Flow Savings -10.9700%
NIB-ROW Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -1.2091%
FNW-ROW Stock Financial net wealth -0.6953%
NW-ROW Stock Net Wealth -0.6953%
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7.9.4.6 Scenario 3: Percentage from baseline: Combined scenario 1
and 2, measured in 2025
Table 7.35: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 3,
2025: Economy wide
Variables Type Description Change
PY Deflation index Price deflator: GDP 00.1865%
PX Deflation index Price deflator: Exports 00.0678%
PC Deflation index Price deflator: Consumption -0.0055%
CAB Flow Current account balance 28.0969%
FAB Flow Financial account balance -28.0969%
NX Flow Net Exports 27.3172%
I Flow Gross fixed capital formation -5.5278%
I-Real prices Flow Gross fixed capital formation -5.5278%
M Flow Imports -3.5297%
M-Real prices Flow Imports -3.5296%
PRIVATE Flow Gross income -2.0369%
S-Real prices Flow Savings -1.6873%
S Flow Savings -1.5737%
Y-Real prices Flow Total income -0.6018%
Y Flow Total income -0.4163%
B2 Flow Gross operating surplus -0.2342%
X-Real prices Flow Exports -0.0517%
X Flow Exports 00.0161%
TOBIN-Q Index Index: House price index: Tobin’s Q =
Ratio between the house price index and
the construction cost of housing index
-20.0000%
ZZ1 Index Index: House price: Imported from DST -20.0000%
ZZ-I Index Index: House price: Imported from DST -20.0000%
UL-COST Rate Labour force: Unit labour cost 00.2243%
ULC Rate Labour force: Unit labour cost: Price
index: Index for the price deflator with
reference to 2010 (all other price
deflator indices are referenced to 2010)
00.2243%
WAGE Rate Labour force: Wage rate -0.0512%
UR Ratio Labour force: Unemployment rate 05.4667%
CU Ratio Capacity Utilisation (Real GNI / real
capital stock)
-0.3077%
WS Ratio Wage share 00.0161%
UN Stock Labour force: Unemployed persons 05.4667%
N Stock Labour force: Denmark for workers in
production
-0.1435%
NF Stock Labour force: Employed persons:
Danish waged
-0.1419%
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NU Stock Labour force: Employed persons:
Danish nationals: Employed abroad
00.0512%
Table 7.36: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 3,
2025: HH
Variables Type Description Change
PIP-IBL-HH-
Flexible
Flow Property income paid: IBL 116.0762%
PIP-IBL-HH Flow Property income paid: IBL 79.0974%
NPIR-HH Flow Net property income received: Total -55.5466%
FL-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial liabilities -51.9626%
IBL-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-51.9626%
EQA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Equity assets -48.3308%
FNL-HH Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) 38.0367%
NL-HH Flow Sector Balance 38.0367%
INV-HH Flow Gross fixed capital formation -30.6438%
INV-HH-Real
prices
Flow Gross fixed capital formation -30.6438%
PIP-IBL-HH-
Fixed
Flow Property income paid: IBL 21.0548%
FA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets -10.4517%
PIR-IBA-HH Flow Property income received: IBA -8.1491%
IBA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -6.7667%
S-HH Flow Savings 03.9972%
PIR-EQA-HH Flow Property income received: EQA -3.5759%
C-HH Flow Consumption -3.0237%
C-HH-Real
prices
Flow Consumption -3.0184%
STRA-HH Flow Social transfers 02.6078%
SCO-HH Flow Social benefit contributions -2.2286%
Y-D-HH Flow Disposable Income -2.1827%
TAX-HH Flow Tax -2.1827%
Y-HH Flow Total income -2.1827%
Y-D-HH-Real
prices
Flow Disposable Income -2.1774%
PENA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Pension assets -0.7989%
SBE-HH Flow Social benefit transfers 00.5458%
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W-HH Flow Wages -0.1946%
PIR-PENA-HH Flow Property income received: PENA -0.0239%
R-IBL-HH-
Flexible
Rate Rate of interest: Interest bearing
liabilities
141.7474%
R-IBL-HH-
Fixed
Rate Rate of interest: Interest bearing
liabilities
35.4369%
K-HH Stock Stock of Capital -12.7563%
K-HH-Real
prices
Stock Stock of Capital -12.7562%
IBL-HH-
Flexible
Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-10.6191%
IBL-HH Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-10.6190%
IBL-HH-Fixed Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-10.6190%
IBA-HH Stock Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -8.1491%
EQA-HH Stock Financial Assets: Equity assets -4.1269%
FA-HH Stock Financial Assets -3.5478%
NW-HH Stock Net Wealth -3.3432%
NW-HH-Real
prices
Stock Net Wealth -3.3380%
FNW-HH-Real
prices
Stock Financial net wealth 02.3140%
FNW-HH Stock Financial net wealth 02.3084%
PENA-HH Stock Financial Assets: Pension assets -0.0388%
Table 7.37: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 3,
2025: NFC
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-NFC Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -15.5018%
NIB-NFC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -15.5018%
NL-NFC Flow Sector Balance -15.5018%
NPIR-NIB-NFC Flow Net property income received: NIB -2.4045%
S-NFC Flow Savings -1.6316%
INV-NFC Flow Gross fixed capital formation -0.6578%
INV-NFC-Real
prices
Flow Gross fixed capital formation -0.6578%
NPIR-NFC Flow Net property income received: Total -0.5855%
TAX-NFC Flow Tax -0.4163%
B2-NFC Flow Gross operating surplus -0.3880%
W-NFC Flow Wages -0.1930%
NIB-NFC Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -3.1805%
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NW-NFC Stock Net Wealth -1.3873%
FNW-NFC Stock Financial net wealth -1.0337%
K-NFC-Real
prices
Stock Stock of Capital -0.2950%
K-NFC Stock Stock of Capital -0.2950%
Table 7.38: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 3,
2025: FC
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-FC Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) 660.5146%
NL-FC Flow Sector Balance 660.5146%
NPIR-FC Flow Net property income received: Total 342.8977%
S-FC Flow Savings 292.8453%
NPIR-NEQ-FC Flow Net property income received: NEQ 186.5300%
PIR-IBA-FC-
HH-Flexible
Flow Property income received: IBA 116.0762%
NIB-FC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing 82.9489%
IBA-FC-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -51.9626%
NEQ-FC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Equity 48.3308%
PIR-IBA-FC-
HH-Fixed
Flow Property income received: IBA 21.0548%
NPIR-NIB-FC Flow Net property income received: NIB 12.3172%
PIP-IBL-FC Flow Property income paid: IBL -8.2137%
IBL-FC-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-6.7667%
PENL-FC-
Transactions
Flow Financial Liabilities: Pension liabilities -0.7989%
Y-FC Flow Total income -0.2090%
PIP-PENL-FC Flow Property income paid: PENL -0.0238%
NW-FC Stock Net Wealth 330.4677%
FNW-FC Stock Financial net wealth 140.2816%
NEQ-FC Stock Net financial stock: Equity 132.0764%
NIB-FC Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing 15.6355%
IBA-FC-HH Stock Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -10.6190%
IBL-FC-HH Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-8.1491%
PENL-FC Stock Financial Liabilities: Pension liabilities -0.0386%
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Table 7.39: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 3,
2025: GOV
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-GOV Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -33.2304%
NIB-GOV-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -33.2304%
NL-GOV Flow Sector Balance -33.2304%
NPIR-GOV Flow Net property income received: Total -22.3750%
NPIR-NIB-
GOV
Flow Net property income received: NIB -22.3750%
S-GOV Flow Savings -14.3875%
STRA-GOV Flow Social transfers -1.6202%
TAX-GOV Flow Tax -1.4130%
FNW-GOV Stock Financial net wealth -24.1332%
NIB-GOV Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -24.1332%
NW-GOV Stock Net Wealth -6.4939%
Table 7.40: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 3,
2025: ROW
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-ROW Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -28.0969%
NIB-ROW-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -28.0969%
NL-ROW Flow Sector Balance -28.0969%
S-ROW Flow Savings -28.0969%
NPIR-NIB-
ROW
Flow Net property income received: NIB -8.4498%
NPIR-ROW Flow Net property income received: Total -4.6143%
NIB-ROW Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -10.3814%
FNW-ROW Stock Financial net wealth -7.0134%
NW-ROW Stock Net Wealth -7.0134%
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7.9.4.7 Scenario 4: Percentage from baseline: Scenario 3, plus α
increased to 80% in 2017, measured in 2021
Table 7.41: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 4,
2021: Economy wide
Variables Type Description Change
PY Deflation index Price deflator: GDP 00.0047%
CAB Flow Current account balance 06.2108%
FAB Flow Financial account balance -6.2108%
NX Flow Net Exports 05.9538%
I Flow Gross fixed capital formation -0.7111%
I-Real prices Flow Gross fixed capital formation -0.7111%
M Flow Imports -0.6892%
M-Real prices Flow Imports -0.6892%
PRIVATE Flow Gross income -0.3907%
S-Real prices Flow Savings -0.3238%
S Flow Savings -0.3188%
Y-Real prices Flow Total income -0.1182%
Y Flow Total income -0.1135%
B2 Flow Gross operating surplus -0.0634%
ULC Rate Labour force: Unit labour cost: Price
index: Index for the price deflator with
reference to 2010 (all other price
deflator indices are referenced to 2010)
00.1137%
UL-COST Rate Labour force: Unit labour cost 00.1137%
ALPHA Ratio Ratio of fixed interest mortgage debt 105.5694%
CU Ratio Capacity Utilisation (Real GNI / real
capital stock)
-0.1182%
WS Ratio Wage share 00.0249%
Table 7.42: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 4,
2021: HH
Variables Type Description Change
PIP-IBL-HH-
Fixed
Flow Property income paid: IBL 174.2141%
PIP-IBL-HH Flow Property income paid: IBL 54.3337%
IBA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -51.2763%
FL-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial liabilities -49.4508%
IBL-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-49.4508%
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EQA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Equity assets -45.7057%
FA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets -35.8964%
NPIR-HH Flow Net property income received: Total -33.3311%
PIP-IBL-HH-
Flexible
Flow Property income paid: IBL -22.0419%
FNL-HH Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -9.3732%
NL-HH Flow Sector Balance -9.3732%
S-HH Flow Savings -5.8352%
INV-HH Flow Gross fixed capital formation -3.8819%
INV-HH-Real
prices
Flow Gross fixed capital formation -3.8819%
PIR-IBA-HH Flow Property income received: IBA -2.1188%
Y-D-HH Flow Disposable Income -1.4577%
TAX-HH Flow Tax -1.4577%
Y-D-HH-Real
prices
Flow Disposable Income -1.4577%
Y-HH Flow Total income -1.4577%
C-HH Flow Consumption -0.7507%
C-HH-Real
prices
Flow Consumption -0.7507%
R-IBL-SENS-
HH
Rate Rate of interest: Interest bearing
liabilities: Weighted mortgage interest
rate
195.7235%
R-IBL-HH-
Flexible
Rate Rate of interest: Interest bearing
liabilities
141.7474%
R-IBL-HH-
Fixed
Rate Rate of interest: Interest bearing
liabilities
35.4369%
IBL-HH-Fixed Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
102.4664%
IBL-HH-
Flexible
Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-67.7523%
IBA-HH Stock Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -2.1188%
IBL-HH Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-1.5094%
FA-HH Stock Financial Assets -0.7294%
EQA-HH Stock Financial Assets: Equity assets -0.5455%
K-HH Stock Stock of Capital -0.1437%
K-HH-Real
prices
Stock Stock of Capital -0.1437%
NW-HH-Real
prices
Stock Net Wealth -0.1259%
NW-HH Stock Net Wealth -0.1259%
FNW-HH-Real
prices
Stock Financial net wealth -0.1152%
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FNW-HH Stock Financial net wealth -0.1152%
Table 7.43: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 4,
2021: NFC
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-NFC Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -7.1043%
NIB-NFC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -7.1043%
NL-NFC Flow Sector Balance -7.1043%
S-NFC Flow Savings -0.6208%
TAX-NFC Flow Tax -0.1135%
B2-NFC Flow Gross operating surplus -0.1046%
NIB-NFC Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -0.3174%
NW-NFC Stock Net Wealth -0.1318%
FNW-NFC Stock Financial net wealth -0.1150%
Table 7.44: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 4,
2021: FC
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-FC Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) 321.5055%
NL-FC Flow Sector Balance 321.5055%
NPIR-FC Flow Net property income received: Total 183.4174%
PIR-IBA-FC-
HH-Fixed
Flow Property income received: IBA 174.2141%
S-FC Flow Savings 155.6643%
IBL-FC-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-51.2763%
IBA-FC-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -49.4508%
NEQ-FC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Equity 45.7057%
NIB-FC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing 34.9421%
PIR-IBA-FC-
HH-Flexible
Flow Property income received: IBA -22.0419%
Y-FC Flow Total income -0.0249%
NEQ-FC Stock Net financial stock: Equity 30.9423%
NW-FC Stock Net Wealth 24.1872%
FNW-FC Stock Financial net wealth 13.0057%
IBL-FC-HH Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-2.1188%
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IBA-FC-HH Stock Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -1.5094%
NIB-FC Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing 01.1437%
Table 7.45: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 4,
2021: GOV
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-GOV Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -17.3824%
NIB-GOV-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -17.3824%
NL-GOV Flow Sector Balance -17.3824%
S-GOV Flow Savings -6.6926%
TAX-GOV Flow Tax -0.8798%
FNW-GOV Stock Financial net wealth -5.1761%
NIB-GOV Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -5.1761%
NW-GOV Stock Net Wealth -0.7316%
Table 7.46: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 4,
2021: ROW
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-ROW Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -6.2108%
NIB-ROW-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -6.2108%
NL-ROW Flow Sector Balance -6.2108%
S-ROW Flow Savings -6.2108%
NIB-ROW Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -0.6846%
FNW-ROW Stock Financial net wealth -0.3937%
NW-ROW Stock Net Wealth -0.3937%
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7.9.4.8 Scenario 4: Percentage from baseline: Scenario 3, plus α
increased to 80% in 2017, measured in 2025
Table 7.47: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 4,
2025: Economy wide
Variables Type Description Change
PY Deflation index Price deflator: GDP 00.1487%
PX Deflation index Price deflator: Exports 00.0496%
PC Deflation index Price deflator: Consumption -0.0041%
CAB Flow Current account balance 21.1286%
FAB Flow Financial account balance -21.1286%
NX Flow Net Exports 20.5631%
I-Real prices Flow Gross fixed capital formation -4.9136%
I Flow Gross fixed capital formation -4.9136%
M Flow Imports -2.6561%
M-Real prices Flow Imports -2.6560%
PRIVATE Flow Gross income -1.5305%
S-Real prices Flow Savings -1.2678%
S Flow Savings -1.1770%
Y-Real prices Flow Total income -0.4498%
Y Flow Total income -0.3018%
B2 Flow Gross operating surplus -0.1698%
X-Real prices Flow Exports -0.0367%
X Flow Exports 00.0129%
TOBIN-Q Index Index: House price index: Tobin’s Q =
Ratio between the house price index and
the construction cost of housing index
-20.0000%
ZZ1 Index Index: House price: Imported from DST -20.0000%
ZZ-I Index Index: House price: Imported from DST -20.0000%
UL-COST Rate Labour force: Unit labour cost 00.1596%
ULC Rate Labour force: Unit labour cost: Price
index: Index for the price deflator with
reference to 2010 (all other price
deflator indices are referenced to 2010)
00.1596%
WAGE Rate Labour force: Wage rate -0.0373%
ALPHA Ratio Ratio of fixed interest mortgage debt 105.5694%
UR Ratio Labour force: Unemployment rate 04.0622%
CU Ratio Capacity Utilisation (Real GNI / real
capital stock)
-0.2331%
WS Ratio Wage share 00.0106%
UN Stock Labour force: Unemployed persons 04.0624%
N Stock Labour force: Denmark for workers in
production
-0.1067%
111
SFC: Mortgage innovations, (7):112
NF Stock Labour force: Employed persons:
Danish waged
-0.1054%
NU Stock Labour force: Employed persons:
Danish nationals: Employed abroad
00.0374%
Table 7.48: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 4,
2025: HH
Variables Type Description Change
PIP-IBL-HH-
Fixed
Flow Property income paid: IBL 152.1575%
FL-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial liabilities -50.4361%
IBL-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-50.4361%
EQA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Equity assets -46.9109%
PIP-IBL-HH Flow Property income paid: IBL 41.9197%
FNL-HH Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) 33.6388%
NL-HH Flow Sector Balance 33.6388%
NPIR-HH Flow Net property income received: Total -30.9309%
PIP-IBL-HH-
Flexible
Flow Property income paid: IBL -28.3125%
INV-HH Flow Gross fixed capital formation -27.5045%
INV-HH-Real
prices
Flow Gross fixed capital formation -27.5045%
FA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets -11.6577%
IBA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -9.5399%
PIR-IBA-HH Flow Property income received: IBA -6.9890%
S-HH Flow Savings 03.3349%
PIR-EQA-HH Flow Property income received: EQA -3.1264%
C-HH Flow Consumption -1.8803%
C-HH-Real
prices
Flow Consumption -1.8762%
STRA-HH Flow Social transfers 01.6500%
SCO-HH Flow Social benefit contributions -1.2637%
Y-D-HH Flow Disposable Income -1.2280%
TAX-HH Flow Tax -1.2279%
Y-HH Flow Total income -1.2279%
Y-D-HH-Real
prices
Flow Disposable Income -1.2239%
PENA-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Pension assets -0.5891%
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SBE-HH Flow Social benefit transfers 00.4077%
W-HH Flow Wages -0.1440%
PIR-PENA-HH Flow Property income received: PENA -0.0169%
R-IBL-SENS-
HH
Rate Rate of interest: Interest bearing
liabilities: Weighted mortgage interest
rate
195.7235%
R-IBL-HH-
Flexible
Rate Rate of interest: Interest bearing
liabilities
141.7474%
R-IBL-HH-
Fixed
Rate Rate of interest: Interest bearing
liabilities
35.4369%
IBL-HH-Fixed Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
86.1809%
IBL-HH-
Flexible
Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-70.3461%
K-HH Stock Stock of Capital -12.2667%
K-HH-Real
prices
Stock Stock of Capital -12.2667%
IBL-HH Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-9.4316%
IBA-HH Stock Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -6.9890%
EQA-HH Stock Financial Assets: Equity assets -3.6655%
NW-HH Stock Net Wealth -3.2340%
NW-HH-Real
prices
Stock Net Wealth -3.2300%
FA-HH Stock Financial Assets -3.0751%
FNW-HH-Real
prices
Stock Financial net wealth 02.1935%
FNW-HH Stock Financial net wealth 02.1893%
PENA-HH Stock Financial Assets: Pension assets -0.0279%
Table 7.49: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 4,
2025: NFC
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-NFC Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -10.5069%
NIB-NFC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -10.5069%
NL-NFC Flow Sector Balance -10.5069%
NPIR-NIB-NFC Flow Net property income received: NIB -1.6785%
S-NFC Flow Savings -1.1715%
INV-NFC Flow Gross fixed capital formation -0.5161%
INV-NFC-Real
prices
Flow Gross fixed capital formation -0.5160%
NPIR-NFC Flow Net property income received: Total -0.4088%
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TAX-NFC Flow Tax -0.3018%
B2-NFC Flow Gross operating surplus -0.2813%
W-NFC Flow Wages -0.1427%
NIB-NFC Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -2.2066%
NW-NFC Stock Net Wealth -0.9854%
FNW-NFC Stock Financial net wealth -0.7171%
K-NFC-Real
prices
Stock Stock of Capital -0.2172%
K-NFC Stock Stock of Capital -0.2172%
Table 7.50: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 4,
2025: FC
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-FC Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) 376.3513%
NL-FC Flow Sector Balance 376.3513%
NPIR-FC Flow Net property income received: Total 193.1527%
S-FC Flow Savings 166.8588%
NPIR-NEQ-FC Flow Net property income received: NEQ 163.0814%
PIR-IBA-FC-
HH-Fixed
Flow Property income received: IBA 152.1575%
NIB-FC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing 58.3658%
IBA-FC-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -50.4361%
NEQ-FC-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Equity 46.9109%
PIR-IBA-FC-
HH-Flexible
Flow Property income received: IBA -28.3125%
IBL-FC-HH-
Transactions
Flow Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-9.5399%
NPIR-NIB-FC Flow Net property income received: NIB 08.3725%
PIP-IBL-FC Flow Property income paid: IBL -6.8698%
PENL-FC-
Transactions
Flow Financial Liabilities: Pension liabilities -0.5891%
Y-FC Flow Total income -0.1533%
PIP-PENL-FC Flow Property income paid: PENL -0.0168%
NW-FC Stock Net Wealth 187.9476%
NEQ-FC Stock Net financial stock: Equity 117.3077%
FNW-FC Stock Financial net wealth 79.7827%
NIB-FC Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing 10.7212%
IBA-FC-HH Stock Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets -9.4316%
IBL-FC-HH Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing
liabilities
-6.9890%
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PENL-FC Stock Financial Liabilities: Pension liabilities -0.0278%
Table 7.51: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 4,
2025: GOV
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-GOV Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -19.8010%
NIB-GOV-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -19.8010%
NL-GOV Flow Sector Balance -19.8010%
NPIR-GOV Flow Net property income received: Total -13.0776%
NPIR-NIB-
GOV
Flow Net property income received: NIB -13.0776%
S-GOV Flow Savings -8.5730%
STRA-GOV Flow Social transfers -1.0251%
TAX-GOV Flow Tax -0.8229%
FNW-GOV Stock Financial net wealth -14.1666%
NIB-GOV Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -14.1666%
NW-GOV Stock Net Wealth -3.8120%
Table 7.52: Most affected variables: Perc change from baseline: Scenario 4,
2025: ROW
Variables Type Description Change
FNL-ROW Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance) -21.1286%
NIB-ROW-
Transactions
Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing -21.1286%
NL-ROW Flow Sector Balance -21.1286%
S-ROW Flow Savings -21.1286%
NPIR-NIB-
ROW
Flow Net property income received: NIB -6.1683%
NPIR-ROW Flow Net property income received: Total -3.3684%
NIB-ROW Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing -7.6392%
FNW-ROW Stock Financial net wealth -5.1608%
NW-ROW Stock Net Wealth -5.1608%
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7.9.5 Additional illustrations of Scenarios
7.9.5.1 Summary flows: All sectors
NFC ROW
FC GOV HH
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Figure 7.34: Savings
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Figure 7.35: Net Lending
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Figure 7.36: Investment
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7.9.5.2 Residual sector flows
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Figure 7.37: Net interest bearing asset transactions
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(a) FC: NEQ transactions
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(b) HH: IBA transactions
Figure 7.38: Residual flows for FC and HH
7.9.5.3 NW: Nominal prices: All sectors
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Figure 7.39: NW: Nominal prices: All sectors
7.9.5.4 Capital Stock: Nominal prices: HH, NFC
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Figure 7.40: Capital Stock: Nominal prices: HH, NFC
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7.9.5.5 Financial transactions: Nominal prices: HH
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Figure 7.41: Financial transactions: Nominal prices: HH
7.9.5.6 Financial transactions: Nominal prices: NFC
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Figure 7.42: Financial transactions: Nominal prices: NFC
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7.9.5.7 Financial transactions: Nominal prices: FC
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Figure 7.43: Financial transactions: Nominal prices: FC
7.9.5.8 Financial transactions: Nominal prices: GOV
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Figure 7.44: Financial transactions: Nominal prices: GOV
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7.9.5.9 Financial transactions: Nominal prices: ROW
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Figure 7.45: Financial transactions: Nominal prices: ROW
7.9.5.10 IBA and IBL: Stock: FC
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Figure 7.46: IBA and IBL: Stock: FC
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7.9.5.11 IBL: Fixed and Flexible: Stocks: HH
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Figure 7.47: IBL: Fixed and Flexible: Stocks: HH
7.9.6 Lists of variables from scenarios
Table 7.53: List of variables in scenario tables
Variable Type Description
ALPHA Ratio Ratio of fixed interest mortgage debt
B2 Flow Gross operating surplus
BETA,DATA Parameter Parameter
BOP Flow Balance of payments
C Flow Consumption
CAB Flow Current account balance
CGK Flow Capital gains
CGS Flow Capital gains
CHECK,B2 Check Consistency check: Gross operating surplus
CHECK,CTR Check Consistency check: Capital transactions
CHECK,EQ Flow Consistency check: Equity Transactions
CHECK,ERROR1 Check Consistency check: Error 1
CHECK,ERROR2 Check Consistency check: Error 2
CHECK,ERROR3 Check Consistency check: Error 3
CHECK,IB Flow Consistency check: Interest bearing
transactions
CHECK,IB,TFLOW Check Consistency check: Interest bearing: Flows
CHECK,INVEST Check Consistency check: Investment
CHECK,NEQ Flow Consistency check: Net equity
CHECK,NIB Check Consistency check: Net interest bearing
CHECK,NIB Flow Consistency check: Net interest bearing
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CHECK,NIB,TFLOWCheck Consistency check: Net interest bearing:
Flows
CHECK,NP Check Consistency check: Net purchases of
non-financial assets (NP)
CHECK,NPEN Flow Consistency check: Net pensions: Revaluations
CHECK,PEN Flow Consistency check: Pensions: Transactions
CHECK,STRA Check Consistency check: Social transfers
CHECK,TAX Check Consistency check: Tax
CHECK,WAGE Check Consistency check: Wages
CPEN Flow Financial Liabilities: Change in pension
entitlements
CTR Flow Capital transfers
CU Ratio Capacity Utilisation (Real GNI / real capital
stock)
D,1998 Dummy Dummy variable: 1998
D,200 Dummy Dummy variable: 2000
D,2004 Dummy Dummy variable: 2004
D,2006 Dummy Dummy variable: 2006
D,2007 Dummy Dummy variable: 2007
D,2008 Dummy Dummy variable: 2008
D,2009 Dummy Dummy variable: 2009
D,2010 Dummy Dummy variable: 2010
D,2011 Dummy Dummy variable: 2011
D,2014 Dummy Dummy variable: High taxes: 2014
D,2015 Dummy Dummy variable: 2015
D,2016 Dummy Dummy variable: 2016
D21 Flow Taxes on products
D29 Flow Other taxes on production
D31 Flow Subsidies D31
D39 Flow Subsidies D39
D41,P Flow Interest: Paid
D41,R Flow Interest: Received
D41B Flow Interest: Received
D42,P Flow Distributed income of corporations: Paid
D42,R Flow Distributed income of corporations: Received
D44,P Flow Other investment income: Paid
D44,R Flow Other investment income: Received
DELTA Ratio Equity to assets ratio
DEP Flow Depreciation of fixed capital
EQA Flow Financial Assets: Equity assets
EQA Stock Financial Assets: Equity assets
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EQA,R Ratio Equity ratio
EQL Flow Financial Liabilities: Equity liabilities
EQL Stock Financial Liabilities: Equity liabilities
ERROR,CHECK1 Check Error check
ERROR,CHECK2 Check Error check
ERROR,CHECK3 Check Error check
FA Flow Financial Assets
FA Stock Financial Assets
FAB Flow Financial account balance
FEE59 Ratio Danish exports to trading partners: Weighted
average total exports (imports by foreign
trading partners)
FL Flow Financial liabilities
FL Stock Financial liabilities
FNL Flow Financial Net Lending (Balance)
FNW Stock Financial net wealth
G Flow Government expenditure
GDP Flow Gross domestic product
HFHF Check Test variable: Not used
I Flow Gross fixed capital formation
IBA Flow Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets
IBA Stock Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets
IBL Flow Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing liabilities
IBL Stock Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing liabilities
IBL,RV1 Flow Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing liabilities
INFL Rate Inflation rate: Price inflation
INFL,M Rate Inflation rate: Price inflation: Foreign
INV Flow Gross fixed capital formation
K Stock Stock of Capital
K,CG Flow Capital Gains
KCG Flow Capital Gains
KCG,SUM Flow Capital Gains - Cummulative sum
LEV Ratio Leverage ratio: NFC: Funding liabilities to
GDP
LEV1 Ratio Leverage ratio: NFC: Funding liabilities
LF Stock Labour force: Total number of employable
persons
M Flow Imports
N Stock Labour force: Denmark for workers in
production
NEQ Flow Net financial stock: Equity
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NEQ Stock Net financial stock: Equity
NF Stock Labour force: Employed persons: Danish
waged
NIB Flow Net financial stock: Interest bearing
NIB Stock Net financial stock: Interest bearing
NL Flow Sector Balance
NL,CHECK Check Consistency check: Net lending
NP Flow Net purchases of non-financial assets (NP)
NPEN Flow Net financial stock: Pension
NPEN Stock Net financial stock: Pension
NPIR Flow Net property income received: Total
NPIR,NEQ Flow Net property income received: NEQ
NPIR,NIB Flow Net property income received: NIB
NPIR,NPEN Flow Net property income received: NPEN
NU Stock Labour force: Employed persons: Danish
nationals: Employed abroad
NW Stock Net Wealth
NX Flow Net Exports
OTR Flow Other current transfers
P,CGK Deflation index Price index: Capital gains
P,NEQ Deflation index Price index: Net Equity
P,NIB Deflation index Price index: Net interest bearing assets
P,PEN Deflation index Price index: Pensions
PC Deflation index Price deflator: Consumption
PE Deflation index Price deflator: Unknown
PENA Flow Financial Assets: Pension assets
PENA Stock Financial Assets: Pension assets
PENL Flow Financial Liabilities: Pension liabilities
PENL Stock Financial Liabilities: Pension liabilities
PG Deflation index Price deflator: Government consumption
PH Deflation index Price deflator: Houses
PH01 Deflation index Price deflator: Houses (Alternative)
PHI1 Flow Social contributions to income
PHI2 Flow Pension transactions to social contributions
PI Deflation index Price deflator: Investment (weighted average
of deflators for housing(pk) and all other
investment (pk)) . Proportion of dwellings in
total investment is approx 0.22, and pi closely
resembles the deflator for total investment
reported by ameco.
PIP Flow Property income paid
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PIP,IBL Flow Property income paid: IBL
PIP,PENL Flow Property income paid: PENL
PIR Flow Property income received
PIR,EQA Flow Property income received: EQA
PIR,IBA Flow Property income received: IBA
PIR,PENA Flow Property income received: PENA
PK Deflation index Price deflator: Investment (excluding
dwellings)
PM Deflation index Price deflator: Imports
PNFC Deflation index Price deflator: NFC K
POP Stock Population
PP Check Unknown
PRIVATE Flow Gross income
PROD Stock Labour Force: Labour productivity
PROFIT Ratio Profit share (Residual of wage share)
PX Deflation index Price deflator: Exports
PY Deflation index Price deflator: GDP
R,EQ Rate Rate of return: Equities
R,ERROR1 Check Property income error
R,ERROR2 Check Property income error
R,ERROR3 Check Property income error
R,IBA Rate Rate of interest: Interest bearing assets
R,IBL Rate Rate of interest: Interest bearing liabilities
R,IBL,SENS Rate Rate of interest: Interest bearing liabilities:
Weighted mortgage interest rate
R,N Rate Rate of return: Mean
R,NET,ERROR1 Check Property income error
R,NET,ERROR101 Check Property income error
R,NET,ERROR2 Check Property income error
R,NET,ERROR201 Check Property income error
R,NET,ERROR3 Check Property income error
R,NET,ERROR301 Check Property income error
R,PEN Rate Rate of return: Pensions
R,R,IBL Rate Rate of interest: Interest bearing liabilities
RHO Ratio Equity ratio
RR Rate Rate of return
S Flow Savings
SBE Flow Social benefit transfers
SCO Flow Social benefit contributions
STRA Flow Social transfers
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T Flow Taxes on products
TAX Flow Tax
TEST Check Test variable: Stock of Capital (Change in)
TOBIN,Q Index Index: House price index: Tobin’s Q = Ratio
between the house price index and the
construction cost of housing index
TOP Ratio Ratio of foreign to domestic trade
UL,COST Rate Labour force: Unit labour cost
ULC Rate Labour force: Unit labour cost: Price index:
Index for the price deflator with reference to
2010 (all other price deflator indices are
referenced to 2010)
UN Stock Labour force: Unemployed persons
UR Ratio Labour force: Unemployment rate
W Flow Wages
WAGE Rate Labour force: Wage rate
WI Rate Inflation rate: Wage inflation
WS Ratio Wage share
X Flow Exports
XR Rate Exchange rate
Y Flow Total income
Y,D Flow Disposable Income
YEAR
ZZ Index Index: House price index
ZZ,I Index Index: House price: Imported from DST
ZZ,INDEX Index Index: House price: Mark-up pricing on
construction costs
ZZ1 Index Index: House price: Imported from DST
7.10 Complete set of model equations
7.10.1 Non-Financial Corporate Sector
The following appendix is adapted from Byrialsen & Raza (2019), except
otherwise indicated. It is included here for completeness in the explanation
of the structure of the model. As in their model, the non-financial corporate
sector (NFC) is responsible for all production, where total nominal production
is represented as:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt +Xt −Mt (7.32)
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This can be rewritten in terms of sales, or rather, from an income perspective:
St = Ct + It +Gt +Xt (7.33)
The production equation from Equation (7.32) can be deflated to real prices;
yt = ct + it + gt + xt −mt (7.34)
Where the GDP deflator can be represented as:
P yt =
Yt
yt
(7.35)
Outflows for NFC include taxes paid to GOV, wages (WB) paid to domestic
and foreign households, and profits (B27.43).
WBNt = Wt(NNt ) (7.36)
The nominal wage bill is calculated as the wage rate (Wt) times the level of
employment (NNt), where NNt includes all domestic employment of citizens
plus the net employment of foreigners in Denmark and Danish citizens abroad.
Taxes paid by NFC are predominantly production based and are therefore
calculated as a proportion of total production in each period (Yt).
TNt = β3(Yt) (7.37)
It is assumed that firms target a fairly stable level of mark-up on production,
and thus B2 is calculated as an estimated proportion of Yt.
B2t = βYt (7.38)
The stock of NFC fixed capital, (KNt ), is diverse, and is calculated via the
standard accounting method, allowing for capital accumulation via investment
7.43Profits here refer to the gross operating surplus for the sector, ESA non financial transac-
tions item B2.
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(INt ), depreciation (DNt ) and capital gains (KNCGt).
KNt = KNt−1 + INt −DNt +KNCGt (7.39)
Depreciation of capital is assumed to apply to stock held at the end of the
previous period.
DNt = δ(KNt−1) (7.40)
The capital deflator (P it ) can then be used to calculate the real value of the
stock of capital in each period.
kNt =
KNt
P it
(7.41)
Investment is estimated in real terms as a function of capacity utilisation.
ln(iNt ) = βi + lnβi.
(
yt−i
kNt−i
)
(7.42)
It can then be inflated to current prices using the same capital price deflator as
in Equation (7.41), P it .
INt = iNt (P it ) (7.43)
NFC savings (SNt ), not to be confused with sales (St) in Equation (7.33), can
be calculated as the net sum primary and secondary income and expenditures.
SNt =Yt −WBNt + (B2Nt −B2t) + rNt−1(NIBNt−1)
+ χt(NEQNt−1)− TNt + STRNt + εN
(7.44)
Net lending (NLN ) takes into account the additional sources of change orig-
inating from fixed asset adjustments. In particular, NP is the net sale and
acquisition of non-financial assets, savings and investment reflect ex post portfo-
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lio decisions, and finally KTRN represents any additional capital transfers.7.44
NFC is also assumed to receive all income from production in the economy,
and thus the level of operating surplus must be adjusted to take into account
that of all other sectors, thus NFC retains (B2Nt −B2t) gross operating surplus.
The εN refers to adjustments made to ensure stock and flow consistency in the
level of property income received or paid during the periods where data was
available7.45.
NLNt = SNt − INt −NPNt +KTRN (7.45)
The calculation of stocks for each of the classes held by NFC are in equations
(7.46) and (7.47).
Net equities:
NEQNt = NEQNt−1 +NEQTRNt +NEQNCGt (7.46)
Net interest bearing stocks:
NIBNt = NIBNt−1 +NIBTRNt +NIBNCGt (7.47)
Net interest bearing assets, like several others in this model, are determined by a
combination of previous stocks (NIBNt−1), transactions (NIBTRNt ) and capital
gains (NIBNCGt). The transactions component of interest bearing assets for
NFC is determined passively. It is calculated as the remainder of Savings, after
capital transfers, and after portfolio allocation towards equities. Transactions
in equities (NEQTRN ) are thus the active component of the composition of
the NFC balance sheet portfolio.
7.44This structure follows for each of the sectors, with the exception of the rest of the world
sector (ROW), where ownership of fixed assets is not included, and therefore, by definition,
neither is investment. NP is determined exogenously, and is for the most part of negligible
size.
7.45This convention is used for all sectors. The returns on financial assets are estimated with
varying degrees of accuracy for each of the sectors. In order to ensure that the model is
consistent in all periods, any difference between the estimated returns and actual returns (on
a net basis for each asset class) are added to the adjustment term. These errors in estimation
are minimised in the estimation specification for each asset class individually.
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NIBTRNt = NLNt −NEQTRNt (7.48)
Since NFC only holds these two financial assets in the model, the sum constitutes
the financial net wealth (FNWN ) of NFC.
FNWNt = NIBNt +NEQNt (7.49)
This is different to the total net wealth (NWN ), which also includes the fixed
capital (KN ) owned by NFC.
NWNt = FNWNt +KN (7.50)
7.10.2 Household Sector
The household sector (HH) is the primary focus of this model, in particular
the interest bearing liabilities of the household sector, and the drivers thereof.
It is therefore the sector with most endogenous components. Equation (7.51)
describes the incomes and expenditures of HH. The primary sources of which are
wages (WBH), profits (B2), property income (or returns on financial capital,
which stems from interest bearing assets, IBAH , pensions, PENAH , and
equities, EQAH), and social transfers(STRH).
Y Ht =WBHt +B2Ht + rHAt−1(IBA
H
t−1)
− rHL(FI)t−1(IBL(FI)
H
t−1)
− rHL(FL)t−1(IBL(FL)
H
t−1)
+ χt(EQAHt−1) + ψt(PENAHt−1) + STRHt + εH
(7.51)
Interest rates are represented by rH , and the “A” (“L”) subscript referring to
the assets (liabilities), and (χt) and (ψt) are the rates of return on equities and
pensions. As part of the key change in this model, the level of interest paid
on IBL in this model is split between fixed and flexible rate mortgages into
rHL(FI)t−1(IBL(FI)
H
t−1) and rHL(FL)t−1(IBL(FL)
H
t−1). A similar split is present
in the financial corporate sector (FC) below.
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Social transfers received by the households in the above equations is the sum of
social contribution (SCONH) paid by the households, social benefits (SBENHt ),
and other transfers (OTRH) received by the households: Social transfers:
STRHt = SBENHt +OTRHt − SCONH (7.52)
Total taxes paid by households are a relatively constant proportion of income
over time, and are deducted from total income to give disposable income:
Y DHt = Y Ht − THt (7.53)
The total value of tax payment by households is assumed to be a constant
portion (βi) of household primary and secondary income.
THt = βi(Y Ht ) (7.54)
The level of social contributions are a proportion of disposable income, adjusted
over time.
SCONHt = β7(Y DHt−i) (7.55)
The largest components of SBENH are pension and medical payments. Byri-
alsen & Raza (2019), modelled changes in benefits against changes in the the
wage rate and the level of unemployment. Although not directly related to the
main components of benefits, they appear to be good proxies for changes in
pension distributions, which in some cases may be based on emoluments.
ln(SBENHt ) = βi + βiln(UNt ) + βiln(WHt−i) (7.56)
Since 2007, approximately 35% - 37% of all social benefits were for old age
payments. A further 20% - 22.3% are attributed to medical benefits, an almost
constant 14.4% to disability and 10% - 13.2% to family and child benefits.
Unemployment (app. 5%), social exclusion (app. 5%), housing (app. 2%) and
survivorship (app. 1%) benefits making up the balance.
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Figure 7.48: Social benefits by category
The old age category, as can be seen from Figure 7.49, is then dominated
by tax funded pension payouts (app. 50% in 2017), old age accommodation
and care (app. 15%) and civil (app. 11%) and other pension schemes (app.
12%), with the declining anticipated pension allocations (app. 5.2% in 2017)
and growing labour market supplementary pension benefits (ATP7.46) (app.
5.8%) making up the balance. The full amount therefore could be considered
as pension income, but since these pension benefits are funded predominantly
by tax, rather than from assets, they are best kept separate from the capital
income on pension assets described in Equation (7.51) above. This is perhaps
with the exception of labour market supplementary pension benefits, which are
payouts from a pooled investment portfolio.
7.46ATP is an anagram for Arbejdsmarkedets Tillægspension, which translates directly to
labour market supplementary pension.
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Figure 7.49: Old age social benefits
This is not merely a question of semantics, as the old age component is also
an element of wage negotiations for the working population. A large part
of social contributions (SCONH) are also contributions towards the labour
market pension fund.7.47 SBENH is, perhaps understandably, the second
largest component of HH disposable income in Denmark. As can be seen in
Figure 7.48, this can quickly be understood to be driven primarily by healthcare
and pensions, but in a more general sense, by components of the strong Danish
welfare system. Labour market pension payouts are expected to fall (rise), as are
unemployment benefit payouts, as economic conditions improve (deteriorate).
Unemployment, as an indicator of economic distress, appears to be a good
7.47The Danish pension system is beyond the scope of this discussion, but a brief summary
may be useful here. As described by Andersen (2016, p. 2), the system is relatively complex
three pillar system, with the most recent comprehensive reform taking place in 1964. The
three pillars are: 1.) A state pension (with several minor schemes), 2.) Semi-mandatory
occupational pensions (or labour market pensions), and 3.) Personal pension savings. The
state pension and other peripheral benefits (such as old age accommodation support, heating
support etc) is tax funded and essentially a flat rate benefit for all citizens, while the second
and third pillars are savings based, and thus have been slower to mature. There have been a
range of relatively minor adjustments to the state pension system over the past few decades,
some of which are adjustments according to what other benefits or income the person has
(partially means tested). The conditions of the occupational pension system, much like much
of the labour market working conditions agreements, are determined via collective agreement.
While there are no legislated wage or pension requirements - for example there is no minimum
wage in Denmark - the coverage of collective bargaining agreements is almost universal.
(Andersen, 2016)
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proxy for expected changes in benefit payouts relative to total HH disposable
income. Equation (7.56) captures this effect, together with the effect of changes
in the wage rate. The latter because unemployment benefits and several pension
benefits are adjusted according to changes in industry wage rates, as noted by
M R Byrialsen & Raza (2018) and (2019).
Real disposable income, as will be the case for several other variables in this
model, can be calculated by dividing household disposable income by a con-
sumption price index (P c).
ydHt =
Y DHt
P ct
(7.57)
Consumption, like NFC investment, is estimated in real terms in a standard
Keynesian form, and log-linearised for stationarity. Consumption is taken to be
determined by a combination of real disposable income and household wealth of
the preceding period. Although not explicitly modelled, current consumption
thus is assumed to be based purely on expectations developed in the previous
period.
ln(ct) = β0 + βiln(ydHt−i) + βiln(nwHt−1) (7.58)
Nominal consumption can be calculated using the consumption price index to
inflate the series.
Ct = ct(P ct ) (7.59)
P c, the consumption price index is endogenous to changes in the wage rate
and the import price index from the previous period. In some way reflecting a
delayed adjustment in (or, sticky) prices, and the importance of international
prices for smaller open economies, such as Denmark.
ln(P ct ) = β0 + βiln(Wt−i) + βiln(Pmt−i) (7.60)
The following equations are related to household interactions with capital an
investment markets.
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In this model, households are only permitted to make productive investment in
housing, which, in this model, is considered only as a primary market, following
Zezza (2008), Fontana & Godin (2013) and Beckta (2015). The secondary
market for houses is assumed to affect prices, but not the demand for additional
housing investment. Demand for housing investment is determined by by a
Tobin’s-Q-like function, partially driven by changes in disposable income and
previous period housing investment, and partially driven by a relative shift in
sales price (PHt−i) and construction cost (P it−i) indices.
Real investment in fixed assets (dwellings):
ln(iHt ) = βi + βiln(iHt−i) + βiln
(
PHt−i
P it−i
)
+ βiln(ydHt−i) (7.61)
As noted by Byrialsen & Raza (2019, p. 20), “The intuition behind the above
equation is straight forward, i.e., an increase in the house prices motivates the
households to invest more in the construction of new houses, while an increase
in the construction costs would lower housing investment.”
A shift downwards in house prices would conversely reduce overall returns on
houses relative to construction costs, and thus result in a decline in the demand
for housing investment. This would result, all else equal, in an increase in
savings and a consequent rise in the demand for alternative outlets. Limited
below to the purchase of financial assets7.48.
The nominal level can be calculated by inflating the real investment in housing
series (iHt ) by the investment price index (P it ):
7.48André (2016), in a recent OECD working paper argue that while there is an obvious
connection between the availability of credit and house prices, the extent to which house prices
are affected by changes in mortgage lending is affected by a wide range of factors, including
sentiment, employment conditions, legislative changes, and a range of cyclical economic factors.
Kohlscheen, Mehrotra, & Mihaljek (2018) also note the co-movement of residential property
prices and credit as a prominent feature of models of financial cycles, although their focus
is on commonalities in financial, demographic and real economy factors. Their (Kohlscheen
et al., 2018, p. 2) findings suggest that the primary drivers are “real house prices, nominal
interest rates, demographic factors, and the state of housing supply”. The present model
captures all but demographic factors in the determination of residential (HH) investment.
They also find strong asymmetries in the effects of interest rates between boom and bust
cycles, and with rising interest rates rather than falling. This is supported by Scanlon et al.
(2008)’s findings that household mortgage lending is highly sensitive to short-term budget
implications of interest and capital repayment costs.
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IHt = iHt (P it ) (7.62)
The nominal stock of housing (KH), as with other assets to come, follows the
simple process of previous stock, plus acquisition (in this case investment in
new houses), less depreciation (or disposal) plus capital gains.
KHt = KHt−1 + IHt −DHt +KHCGt (7.63)
Capital gains on houses, in turn, are calculated as:
KHCG = ∆PHt (KHt−1) (7.64)
Which is simply the change in the price of houses applied to the level of stock
at the end of the preceding period. The change in house prices leading into the
current period is then by definition the same ratio proportion of capital gains
to previous housing capital.
∆PHt =
KHCG
KHt−1
(7.65)
Nominal housing capital held by HH at the end of the current period can be
expressed as the price adjusted stock at the end of the previous period, plus
net investment and depreciation.
KHt = KHt−1(1 + ∆PHt ) + IHt −DHt (7.66)
The deflated real capital index can then be found by dividing the series by the
investment (housing) price index, as in Equation (7.65) above.
kHt =
KHt
P it
(7.67)
The level of savings is then calculated as a residual disposable income after
consumption and net pension adjustments - the ESA 2010 (Statistical Office of
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the European Communities., 2013) definition of which is net of contributions,
disbursements and returns of pension funds.
SHt = Y DHt − CHt + CPENHt (7.68)
Net lending can then be calculated savings plus additional consideration for the
net acquisition and disposal of fixed assets (NP ) and capital transfers (KTR)
less investment (assumed here to be solely in houses).
NLHt = SHt − IHt −NPHt +KTRHt (7.69)
HH must also fund real activities and allocate any excess funds in the financial
markets. As noted above, HH is the sector with most endogenous components
in this model. It is also the sector, together with the financial corporate sector
(FC) that has the most complex financial accounts. As noted by Byrialsen &
Raza (2019), financial market changes in this model are driven primarily by the
demand for credit and assets. As they explained, transmission is from flows
to stocks. The behaviour is primarily modelled in transaction decisions, and
stocks are then calculated as the sum of these together with capital gains.
The net effect of annual changes in the financial position of HH is captured by
financial net lending. This is the sum of changes in financial assets less the sum
of changes in financial liabilities:
FNLHt = FATRHt − FLTRHt (7.70)
Household financial assets are held in interest bearing assets (IBA), equities7.49
(EQA) and pensions (PENA). Transactions in each of these sum to make up
the total transactions in financial assets.
FATRHt = IBATRHt + EQATRHt + PENATRHt (7.71)
Transactions in equities are determined by a Tobin allocation matrix, thus
enforcing a budget constraint on HH, where the investment decision of the
7.49The equity component in the balance sheets of the other sectors in this model is limited
to a net equity position. It is assumed here that HH do not issue equities.
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sector is determined at least in part by relative rates of return. One exception
is pension allocations, where a fairly constant portion of HH income is allocated
to pension investments, irrespective of the rate of return. This leaves equities
and interest bearing assets.
Demand for equities is negatively affected by increases in the returns available
on interest bearing assets in the previous period (β on rHAt−1), positively related
to returns on equities (χ), and positively related to increases in the extension
of credit (β on IBLTRH).
EQATRHt = βi + βi(χt) + βi(rHAt−1) + βi(IBLTR
H
t ) (7.72)
The link with IBL is associated with the investment incentive for more sophis-
ticated investors, where low interest rate debt can be used to arbitrage higher
returns on equities.
Pension transactions, in addition to the fixed proportion that is reflected as a
constant in the equation below, are positively affected by returns on pensions
(ψ) and the wage bill (WB). Pensions transactions can thus be affected directly
by the wage rate, or the level of employment (and thus negatively by a rise in
unemployment).
PENATRHt = βi + βi(ψt) + βiWBHt (7.73)
The demand for credit by households is where the current model differs most
from Byrialsen & Raza (2019). The total demand for new credit is captured in
the level of transactions (IBLTRH). This is positively related to the level of
demand for (new) housing (IH), negatively to the level of debt in the previous
period, positively to the total level of transactions in equities (for the same
investment reason described above), and negatively related to the interest cost
on loans (rHLt−1) in the previous period.
IBLTRHt = βi(IHt−i) + βi(IBLHt−i) + βi(FATRHt ) + βi(rHLt−1) (7.74)
The primary change to the model is the introduction of adjustable rate mortgage
products in a fairly generic form, where the total level of outstanding IBL is
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split into fixed-interest (IBLFI) and flexible-interest bearing liabilities (IBLFL).
The proportion of interest bearing assets held as IBLFI is α.
IBLHFIt = α(IBL
H
t ) (7.75)
and thus,
IBLHFLt = (1− α)(IBL
H
t ) (7.76)
The level of α is taken from Statistics Denmark, and varies over time. The
split is introduced in 2003, when the option was made available to HH. The
composition of this debt is significantly more complex, as discussed in Section 7.3
above. This complexity can be simplified using a combination of interest rates
and sensitivity or adjustment weights. At an aggregate level, the degree to
which flexible rate mortgages adjust to changes in official rates can be estimated
for each aggregate group of mortgage products. This is done for two broad
groups in for this model, fixed7.50 and flexible7.51. The effect is calculated as a
percentage pass-through of official rate changes. Unfortunately it is not possible
to compare rising and falling pass-through rates to existing mortgage holders
prior to 2009. For the 2009 to 2017 period, however, fixed and flexible average
interest rate payments, relative to outstanding nominal capital (cash) amounts,
appears to have followed a very stable spread of approximately 2%. This is
fairly easy to explain in a falling rates environment as borrowers take advantage
of the option to refinance debt.
The composition of debt and the expected pass-through rate have a combined
effect on the sensitivity of HH balance sheets and incomes to a shock to either
interest rates or property prices. This simple modification is able to capture
the two most dramatics innovations in the Danish mortgage debt system: the
introduction of ARMs and of delayed amortization (or interest-only period, IO
loans) loans.
The incentive to borrow for the purchase of a house, as in Equation (7.61)
above, is partially driven by interest rates. The available interest rate is then
adjusted according to the weighted average interest rate observed for each of the
7.50Group 1, called “fixed-interest” includes:
7.51Group 2, called “flexible-interest” includes:
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two groups (flexible and fixed). The second is the introduction of interest-only
periods, as explained in Section 7.2, the effect of which is to reduce the initial
cost of borrowing. Thus as the amount paid on mortgages per family falls, the
incentive to borrow rises.
An alternative is to calculate the interest rate as the total payments made by the
household towards debt, inclusive of amortization payments, as a percentage of
total debt remaining. This alternative is not employed here, but is planned for
future research. Although this would not normally be captured in the interest
rate, it is possible to artificially lower the rate of interest on the flexible rate
group in order to capture this incentive. This is similar for debt with longer
term structures, where monthly costs would reflect the reduced portion allocated
to amortization.
Unfortunately, the additional risks factors related to products with full-term
interest-only, or perpetual-interest-only loans would not be possible to capture
in this framework.
The only interest bearing asset held by households in the model is deposits,
which are calculated as the residual effect of transactions in the other assets.
debt and net lending contributing positively, and outflows for equities or pension
investment contributing negatively.
IBATRHt = NLH + IBLTRHt − EQATRHt − PENATRHt (7.77)
The current stock of each asset is then the sum of the stock from the preceding
period, plus any transactions (positive or negative), plus any capital gains (or
losses). The same is true for all assets and liabilities.
IBAHt = IBAHt−1 + IBATRHt + IBAHCGt (7.78)
Equities:
EQAHt = EQAHt−1 + EQATRHt + EQAHCGt (7.79)
Pensions:
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PENAHt = PENAHt−1 + PENATRHt + PENAHCGt (7.80)
Interest bearing liabilities:
IBLHt = IBLHt−1 + IBLTRHt + IBLHCGt (7.81)
The sum of financial assess (liabilities) provides the total financial assets (liabil-
ities).
FAHt = IBAHt + EQAHt + PENAHt (7.82)
Since the only financial liability for households in this model interest bearing, it
makes up the total.
FLH = IBLHt (7.83)
Net financial wealth is the difference between total assets and liabilities.
FNWHt = FAHt − FLHt (7.84)
The inclusion of fixed assets provides the total net wealth for each sector, which
both in this model and in reality are dominated by dwellings for the household
sector.
NWHt = FNWHt +KHt (7.85)
This can be deflated to provide wealth at constant prices, where real financial
net wealth:
fnwHt =
FNWHt
P ct
(7.86)
And, where real wealth, are the result of deflation by the consumption prices
index P ct
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nwHt =
NWHt
P ct
(7.87)
7.10.3 Financial Corporate Sector
The financial sector acts as the provider, and thus counterpart of newly created
credit in this model. The financial corporate sector (FC) is comprised of banks,
insurance and pension companies, as well as several services related to the
financial markets. Property income made up just below 75% of FC inflows,
and approximately the same proportion of outflows in 1995, and falling to just
above 50% in 2017 - with positive flows higher than negative flows, reflecting
the rental income spread extracted by the sector.
Savings, according to the national accounts can be expressed as the sum of the
net capital income, gross operating surplus (B2Ft ) (received), social transfers
(STRF ) minus taxes paid to the government (TF ), and the changes in pension
entitlements (CPENF ) paid to the households.
This model adjusts the inflow to FC to take into account the split in debt in
the household sector between flexible and fixed, where the average interest rate
on each category is applied to the outstanding level of fixed or flexible debt
respectively.
SFt =B2Ft
+ rFA(FI)t−1(IBA
F∼H
A(FI)t−1) + r
F
A(FL)t−1(IBA
F∼H
A(FL)t−1)
− rFLt−1(IBL
F∼H
Lt−1 ) + rNt−1(NIB
F
t−1)
+ χt(NEQFt−1)− ψt(PENLFt−1)− TFt + STRFt − CPENFt + εF
(7.88)
Where, rFAt−1 , and r
F
Lt−1
are average interest rates on assets and liabilities where
the household sector is the counterpart, this is noted using the superscript on,
for example, interest bearing assets, IBAF∼H , to indicate that these assets are
held by FC and that the counterpart is HH. rNt−1 is a generic rate of return
applied toall other interest bearing assets and liabilities in the form of a net
interest bearing (NIB) position.
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Fixed assets are again determined as the stock of the preceding period, less
depreciation, plus additional investment and capital gains.
KFt = KFt−1 + IFt −DFt +KFCGt−1 (7.89)
Net lending can be then be expressed as the net savings after taking investment
net sales and acquisitions of fixed property and any capital transfers into
account.
NLFt = SFt − IFt −NPFt +KTRFt (7.90)
The financial equivalent, financial net lending, takes into account any trans-
actions in the financial assets and liabilities held by the sector. Again the
superscript denotes the sector, and for IBA and IBL, the counterpart sector.
FNLFt = IBATRF∼Ht +NIBTRFt +NEQTRFt − IBLTRF∼Ht −PENLTRF
(7.91)
In the cases of both IBATR and IBLTR, the counterpart sector is HH, and
the values for these flows are by definition equal
IBATRF∼Ht = IBLTRHt (7.92)
IBLTRF∼Ht = IBATRHt (7.93)
FC is thus passive to the demands and capacity of HH to borrow in each of
these cases. All other interest bearing transactions are also determined passively
from the transactions in other sectors - where again, the net positions determine
the adjustment required by FC.
NIBTRFt = −(NIBTRNt +NIBTRGt +NIBTRWt ) (7.94)
Again the superscripts on each variable refer to the originating sector, where G
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refers to government, N to NFC, W to ROW.
As in the household sector, financial stocks are determined as the closing value
from the preceding period, plus net transactions, plus (less) any capital gains
(losses). This is repeated for the other asset classes.
IBAF∼Ht = IBAF∼Ht−1 + IBATRF∼Ht + IBAF∼HCGt (7.95)
Although in this model IBAF∼H is split into fixed IBAF∼HFI and flexible
IBAF∼HFL rate products, the accumulation of stocks is calculated in advance
of the split. This ensures stock-flow consistency in a simple fashion, and still
allows the change in property income and expenditure to influence accumulation
over time.
IBL on the other hand is simply the counterpart of the accumulation of deposits
by households.
IBLF∼Ht = IBLF∼Ht−1 + IBLTRF∼Ht + IBLF∼HCGt (7.96)
The calculation of the stock at the end of the current period follows the simple
standard structure.
NIBFt = NIBFt−1 +NIBTRFt +NIBFCGt (7.97)
Pension assets include a domestic and relatively small and exogenous interna-
tional component, which accumulates to offshore denominated assets.
PENLTRFt = PENATRHt +NPENTRW (7.98)
The equity asset transactions for FC are the residual flow, in that equity
transactions are not modelled directly, but contributes positively or negatively
depending on the relative sizes of NLF , and the transactions in other assets. FC
is fully passive in this regard as all other financial asset and liability components
are equally passive to the behaviours generated in other sectors, as discussed
above.
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To explain the source of the changes in the value of net equity transactions in
FC, we need to refer back to HH. Equation (7.99) is a repeat of Equation (7.77)
in the HH section, and is shown here to identify the closure of the model.
IBATRHt = NLH + IBLTRHt − EQATRHt − PENATRHt (7.99)
IBLTRHt , EQATRH and PENATRH are all estimated directly, and NLH is
endogenous to the changes in HH income and expenditures. The only component
that is not specified as for closure in any other sector is the level of EQATRHt
The full effect of IBATRH is also absorbed directly into FC via IBLTRF∼H ,
which is specified as equal to IBATRH , which includes the value of EQATRH ,
as captured by Equation (7.100).
IBLTRF∼Ht = IBATRHt (7.100)
IBLTRH , PENATRH and IBATRH are all directly offset in the FC via
identities for IBLTR, PENATR and IBATR, all of which are captured in
Equation (7.101). The only financial transaction component that is unaccounted
for in the equation is EQATRHt .
NEQTRFt = NLFt + IBLTRF∼Ht + PENLTRFt − IBATRF∼Ht −NIBTRFt
(7.101)
Since NLF is equal to NIBTRF , NEQTRF is necessarily equal to EQATRH .
This is the redundant equation, which, if specified, would cause the model to
be over-specified.
Calculating the accumulation of net equity by FC, like NIBF , follows the
simple standard method.
NEQFt = NEQFt−1 +NEQTRFt +NEQFCGt (7.102)
Again, financial net wealth can be calculated as financial assets less liabilities.
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FNWFt = NIBFt +NEQFt + IBAF∼Ht − IBLF∼Ht − PENLFt (7.103)
And total net wealth can again be calculated with the inclusion of fixed assets.
FC fixed assets are minor relative to financial assets, with a total of 6% of GDP
in 1995, and falling to 4% of GDP in 2017.
If desired, these can both be calculated in real terms using the consumption
price index, but the repetition is excluded here for brevity.
NWFt = FNWFt +KF (7.104)
7.10.4 Government Sector
Denmark has a strong welfare system and as a result, a relatively large public
sector (GOV. Government consumption, made up largely of wages to public
sector employees, made up between 25% and 30% of GDP, and social transfers
(made up largely of pension and medical expenditures) contributed a further
15% to 20% of GDP between 1995 and 2017. The total expenditure of GOV
varied between 58% and 48% of GDP between 1995 and 2017, ending on 50.4%.
Thus, roughly half of total GDP can be attributed to government expenditures.
The bulk of these expenditures are financed by taxation, although a relatively
small of GOV income is generated from semi-private enterprises (between 2%
and 3% of GDP, and roughly 5% of total positive GOV flows).
The taxes of all other sectors are combined to calculate total tax revenues.
TGt = TNt + THt + TFt + TWt (7.105)
Social transfers are also combined for all other sectors. The largest of which
are to households via old age and medical categories. Old age transfers predom-
inantly comprise tax funded pension payments, with the exception of ATP, a
supplementary labour pension, funded by an investment portfolio.
STRGt = −(STRHt + STRNt + STRFt + STRWt ) (7.106)
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Savings can then be calculated from government spending, which as in Byrialsen
& Raza (2019), remains exogenous in this model, gross operating surplus,
interest on net interest bearing stocks, taxes and social transfers.
SGt = B2Gt + rNt−1(NIBGt−1) + TGt + STRGt −Gt + εG (7.107)
Government (or public) investment was between 2.6% and 3.5% of GDP between
1995 and 2017, and contributes to government capital stock in the same way as
for the other sectors. The on-going stock of capital is then calculated as per
the sections above.
KGt = KGt−1 + IGt −DGt +KGCGt (7.108)
Net lending is also calculated in the same manner as previously.
NLGt = SGt − IGt −NPGt +KTRGt (7.109)
All financial flows in GOV are passively balanced by transactions in the level of
net interest bearing stocks. The assumption here is that any deficit or surplus
will be reflected in a change in these stocks. A deficit will be financed by the
issue of debt and a surplus will finance the redemption thereof. NIBTRGt is
thus the barometer of public sector finance effects of any shock.
FNLGt = NIBTRGt (7.110)
The financing requirements of government are thus fully captured in NIBTRGt ,
the trigger for any need to finance a deficit or invest surplus funds is the net
financing requirement generated in the real sector, net lending (NL).
NIBTRGt = NLGt (7.111)
The change in the stock of NIB follows the same pattern as other financial
assets in the previous sectors.
150
SFC: Mortgage innovations, (7):151
NIBGt = NIBGt−1 +NIBTRGt +NIBCGt (7.112)
This concludes the behavioural equations of GOV.
7.10.5 The rest of the world
The foreign sector, like GOV, remains unchanged from Byrialsen & Raza (2019).
The model reflects that the Danish economy is small and open, and thus is
exposed to relative price differentials with trading partners. In this model the
gap in price differences is reduced to zero after the date at which the first shock
is introduced - this is a marginal difference from Byrialsen & Raza (2019), but
one worth noting.
Because it affects the levels of import and export growth relative to Byrialsen
& Raza (2019)’s baseline model, there is also an impact on the speed of
accumulation of foreign assets. This is artificially accelerated in their model
in order to capture the growth of foreign sector assets. Although unrealistic
in the long run, the mechanism acts as a buffer in that it eliminates the risk
that a shock to interest rates will unnecessarily complicate relative prices, and
that Denmark continues to maintain a positive trade balance (as appears to be
realistic from data).
Imports are estimated in real terms in the log-linear form below.
ln(mt) = βi + βiln
(
P yt−1
Pmt−1
)
+ βiln(ct−1 + it−1 + xt−1) (7.113)
As noted by Byrialsen & Raza (2019, p. 27), the “export function is based on
the Armington (1969) model where the market share of the Danish exports is
explained by relative prices.”
This relation is captured below as annual Danish exports relative to a weighted
index of all trading partners (mWt ), which should be determined by domestic
prices (the export price index, P xt ) relative to foreign prices (the import price
index, Pmt ), but moderated by price elasticity (β).
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xt
mWt
=
(
P xt
Pmt
)β
(7.114)
Some simple algebra allows this relation to be written in log linear form, with
exports as the dependent component.
ln(xt) = β35 + β36ln
(
P xt−1
Pmt−1
)
+ β38ln(mWt ) (7.115)
Both imports and exports can be inflated using their relevant price indices to
for current prices.
Mt = mt(Pmt ) (7.116)
Xt = xt(P xt ) (7.117)
In this model, actual prices of imports are expressed as the number one (1),
and export prices are estimated as a function of import prices and unit labour
costs. According to Byrialsen & Raza (2019), this is due to the fact that a
large portion of imports to Denmark are intermediate goods. Kristoffersen
& Spange (2016) investigated the effect of effective nominal exchange rate
pass-through, and found that while domestic consumer prices were slow to
adjust, the relationship between nominal exchange adjustments and import
prices was stronger but weakening over time7.52. The influence on export prices
depends more dramatically, however, on the composition of exports in terms
of intermediate imports. Bo, Burman, Winther, & Jensen (2018) discuss the
complexities in identifying the ultimate trading partners, and suggest the trade
in value added (TiVA) method7.53, but also point to the source of value added in
7.52They attribute the decline in pass-through of exchange movements to the growing relative
importance of the Euro-zone, with which Denmark maintains a fixed exchange rate, together
with increased invoicing in Euros and enhanced global adherence to inflation targeting
monetary policy.
7.53They discuss the alternative interpretations of international trade in goods, balance of
payments in goods, international trade in services, balance of payments in goods and services,
balance of payments in direct exports and trade in value added by final destination. The
relative importance of various trading partners shifts according to the choice of measure, but
Germany, the USA, the UK, Sweden, China, Norway, France and the Netherlands comprise
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Danish exports, where approximately 58% of export value is generated outside
of the country7.54. As such, the model allows external price adjustments to
inform part of export prices.
ln(P xt ) = β39 + β40ln(Pmt ) + β41ln(ULCt−1) (7.118)
The savings of the foreign sector (rest of the world, ROW) are expressed from
the perspective of ROW. Thus imports from the model are a revenue for ROW
and exports an expenditure. Net pension flows are either positive or negative,
depending on levels of contribution and disbursements. Interest on NIB and
returns on NEQ depend on whether the net stock is positive or negative, wages
and social transfers received are positive, and taxes paid are an expenditure.
SWt =Mt −Xt + χt(NEQWt−1) + ψt(NPENW t− 1) + rNt−1(NIBWt−1)
+WBWt − TWt + STRWt + εW
(7.119)
The rates of return on equities (χt) and on pension assets (ψt) are assumed
to be the same as for domestic assets. Danish pension funds invest a large
proportion of assets outside of the country, largely as a result of the limited
size of the Danish financial markets. As with the previous sectors, net lending
can be calculated by taking net acquisitions and disposals of fixed assets, and
capital transfers into account. The only difference here being that ROW is
assumed not to make investment in Denmark.
NLWt = SWt −NPWt +KTRW (7.120)
Net lending is taken to reflect the current account balance for each period.
CABt = −NLWt (7.121)
just over 50% off all export. Germany the largest share at 11.1%.
7.54Germany (11.1%), Norway (10.1%), US (9.5%), Russia (8.7%), the United Kingdom
(7.9%), Sweden (6.4%) China (4.3%), and all others (42%)
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The financial net lending account is again the sum of transactions in net financial
stocks.
FNLWt = NIBTRWt +NEQTRWt +NPENTRWt (7.122)
The present stock of each asset class is again determined by the simple method
of preceding period stock, plus net transactions and capital gains (or less losses).
NIBWt = NIBWt−1 +NIBTRWt +NIBWCGt (7.123)
NEQWt = NEQWt−1 +NEQTRWt +NEQWCGt (7.124)
NPENWt = NPENWt−1 +NPENTRWt +NPENWCGt (7.125)
The residual asset class for ROW is net interest bearing assets, largely because
national liability positions are predominantly held as international debt.
NIBTRWt = NLWt −NEQTRWt −NPENTRWt (7.126)
Net financial wealth can then be calculated as in the previous sectors, as the
sum of net assets.
FNWWt = NIBWt +NEQWt +NPENW (7.127)
Since ROW does not own fixed assets, as per the system of national accounts,
net wealth would be identical to financial net wealth, and is therefore excluded
here.
7.10.6 The labour market
The final market that must clear in the model is the labour market. The size of
the labour market is determined by the level of demand in the model, reflecting
the Post Keynesian structure. GDP at factor costs (taken to be total labour
costs plus gross operating surplus - profit - for the nation) is then used to
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calculate the adjusted wage share, from which the unit labour cost (ULC) is
calculated.
Y Ft = WBNt +B2t (7.128)
The adjusted wage share can then be calculated as the wage bill relative to Y Ft .
WSt =
WBNt
Y Ft
(7.129)
Finally, ULC is calculated as the ratio between the wage component and total
factor costs.
ULCt =
WSt(Yt)
Y Ft
(7.130)
Employment is then determined by the number of persons that are part of the
labour force, but are not employed. Or, the difference between the total labour
force (LF ) and the number of persons that are employed (N).
UNt = LFt −Nt (7.131)
UN as a proportion of LF provides the rate of unemployment.
URt =
UNt
LFt
(7.132)
Employment (N) is estimated using actual population data and lagged real
GDP.
ln(Nt) = βi + βiln(yt−1) + βiln(LFt) (7.133)
A combination of domestically and foreign employed persons provides the total
level of employment (NNt )
NNt = Nt +NWt (7.134)
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Returning to the income of HH, wages (WBH) for domestic employees are a
product of locally employed persons and the local wage rate, which is in-turn
estimated as a negative relation with the rate of unemployment.
WBHt = Wt(Nt) (7.135)
Wt = β0 + βiURt−i (7.136)
This reflects falling bargaining power in unions as unemployment rises, but also
the relative over-supply of labour.
The number of foreign employed persons is then calculated as the average wage
rate into the total foreign wage bill.
NWt =
WBWt
Wt
(7.137)
7.10.7 Lists of variables from the model
Table 7.54: List of model variables from equations
variable description
α Ratio of fixed interest mortgage debt
β Parameter
χ Return on equity
ε Property income adjustment term
ψ Return on pension stocks
B2 Gross operating surplus
c Consumption: Real prices
C Consumption: Nominal prices
CAB Current account balance
CPEN Financial Liabilities: Change in pension entitlements
D Depreciation of fixed capital
EQACG Financial Assets: Equity assets: Capital gains
EQA Financial Assets: Equity assets
EQATR Financial Assets: Equity assets: Transactions
FA Financial Assets
FATR Financial Assets: Transactions
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FL Financial liabilities
FLTR Financial liabilities: Transactions
FNL Financial Net Lending (Balance)
FNW Financial net wealth
G Government expenditure
i Gross fixed capital formation (Investment): Real prices
I Gross fixed capital formation (Investment): Nominal prices
IBAF ∼H
A(F I) Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets: FC on HH: Fixed
interest
IBAF ∼H
A(F L) Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets: FC on HH: Flexible
interest
IBAF ∼HCG Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets: FC on HH: Capital
gains
IBAF ∼H Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets: FC on HH
IBACG Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets: Capital gains
IBA Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets
IBATRF ∼H Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets: FC on HH:
Transactions
IBATR Financial Assets: Interest bearing assets: Transactions
IBL(FI) Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing liabilities: Fixed interest
IBL(FL) Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing liabilities: Flexible
interest
IBLF ∼HCG Financial Assets: Interest bearing liabilities: FC to HH:
Capital gains
IBLF ∼HL Financial Assets: Interest bearing liabilities: FC to HH
IBLF ∼H Financial Assets: Interest bearing liabilities: FC to HH
IBLCG Financial Assets: Interest bearing liabilities: Capital gains
IBLF I Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing liabilities: Fixed interest
IBLF L Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing liabilities: Flexible
interest
IBL Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing liabilities
IBLTRF ∼H Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing liabilities: FC to HH:
Transactions
IBLTR Financial Liabilities: Interest bearing liabilities: Transactions
k Stock of Capital: Real prices
K Stock of Capital: Nominal prices
KCG Stock of Capital: Capital gains
KTR Capital transfers
LF Labour force: Total number of employable persons
m Imports: Real prices
M Imports: Nominal prices
N Labour force: Denmark for workers in production
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NEQCG Net financial stock: Equity: Capital gains
NEQ Net financial stock: Equity
NEQTR Net financial stock: Equity: Transactions
NIBCG Net financial stock: Interest bearing
NIB Net financial stock: Interest bearing
NIBTR Net financial stock: Interest bearing: Transactions
NL Sector net lending balance
NP Net purchases of non-financial assets (NP)
NPEN Net financial stock: Pension
NPENCG Net financial stock: Pension: Capital gains
NPENTR Net financial stock: Pension: Transactions
NW Net Wealth
OTR Other current transfers
P c Price deflator: Consumption
P i Price deflator: Investment (excluding dwellings)
Pm Price deflator: Imports
Px Price deflator: Exports
P y Price deflator: GDP
PENACG Financial Assets: Pension assets: Capital Gains
PENA Financial Assets: Pension assets
PENATR Financial Assets: Pension assets: Transactions
PENL Financial Liabilities: Pension liabilities
PENLTR Financial Liabilities: Pension liabilities: Transactions
rN Rate of return: Mean
rA(F I) Rate of interest: Interest bearing assets: Fixed interest
rA(F L) Rate of interest: Interest bearing assets: Flexible interest
rL Rate of interest: Interest bearing liabilities
rA Rate of interest: Interest bearing assets
rL(F I) Rate of interest: Interest bearing liabilities: Fixed interest
rL(F L) Rate of interest: Interest bearing liabilities: Flexible interest
S Savings
SBEN Social benefit transfers
SCON Social benefit contributions
STR Social transfers
T Taxes on products
ULC Labour force: Unit labour cost: Price index: Index for the
price deflator with reference to 2010 (all other price deflator
indices are referenced to 2010)
UN Labour force: Unemployed persons
UR Labour force: Unemployment rate
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W Wage rate
WB Wage bill
WS Wage share
x Exports: Real prices
X Exports: Nominal prices
Y Total income: Nominal prices
y Total income: Real prices
Y D Disposable income
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8 Future research perspectives
Introductory remarks
This section is a compilation of further research possibilities that have arisen
during the process of completing this thesis, and are primarily related to the
SFC model presented in Article 5. It would be particularly interesting to
further develop the empirical SFC model for the Danish economy to include a
more complete pensions sector, and integrate this with the advances made to
the mortgage market. The groundwork for these advances has been partially
completed in the form of a core literature review of the Danish pension system,
and some suggestions for how to apply the changes within the present framework.
Two additional modifications are also considered: firstly, the integration of
household refinancing; and secondly, the integration of credit risk, defaults and
loan to value ratios. These additions intended to guide future macroeconomic
research on the Danish economy, particularly within the Post Keynesian SFC
framework. These insights may also prove useful to researchers from other
paradigms that have an interest in understanding the intricacies of the Danish
pension and mortgage credit markets.
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8.1 Introduction
This paper is a collection of potential further research possibilities, or rather
further developments that could be applied to the SFC model presented in
Article 5, forthwith referred to as “FlexFix”. Some have been developed to a
more mature stage than others, but are not yet complete. The first proposal is
the integration of household (HH) refinancing patterns in response to changes
in interest rates. FlexFix currently does not include any reactionary behaviour
by households, and so may over or understate the risks associated with the
shocks applied in scenario testing. The second is the integration of credit
risk, potentially through the introduction of supply side constraints. The
motivation for this is that the financial corporate sector (FC) in FlexFix currently
accommodates any level of demand for debt from HH. As will be discussed
briefly, this is not reflective ofw the realities faced by HH and firms in the years
following the global financial crisis (GFC), where credit was not available for
many non-financial corporates (NFC) and HH that demanded it.
The third proposed change is to implement a circular flow of funds for HH. In
summary, HH pay interest and fees through mortgage-debt products to FC,
and many of those fees are then transferred from FC to pension funds. Those
pension funds are in turn owned by HH, but the returns and assets held are
only accessible at some point in the future. In a sense, the interest paid on any
mortgage bonds held in this manner constitute inter-temporal substitution of
consumption (or saving) made by HH. The motivation to pursue this addition
to FlexFix is the relative size and importance of HH pension assets, which
make up roughly 50% of all HH financial assets. The pension system is also
an integral part of the Danish economy and contributes to the stabilisation of
income and expenditure patters of Danish persons throughout the life-cycle.
Each of these suggestions are discussed in some detail below, and for each, some
details are provided about how the issue relates to the Danish economy.
8.2 Integration of household refinancing
The first possible addition is to integrate HH debt refinancing into FlexFix. The
following brief section provides an introduction to refinancing (pre-purchase /
buy-back) of Danish mortgage bonds, as well as a short explanation of why it
is possible, and wy it is so relevant to consider. Particularly in relation to the
borrowing conditions faced by Danish HH. Thereafter, some possible means of
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including this phenomenon in FlexFix are suggested.
Danish HHs actively monitor and adapt their debt in reaction to market changes.
This can be observed in Article 5, in the migration from a 100% allocation
in fixed-interest mortgage products in 2000 to an allocation of over 70% in
adjustable-rate mortgage products by 2012. The vast majority of mortgage
products are not held to maturity, and there are multiple incentives in the
Danish mortgage finance system for borrowers to adjust their debt portfolio in
relation to market changes.
In practice, refinancing is the act of settling an existing debt contract, and
simultaneously entering a new contract under different terms of borrowing. In
the data, refinancing can be identified from a material change in terms of the
debt contract from one period to another, while property ownership records
remain unchanged. Adjustments that are part of the original contract are
excluded, for example, adjustments to the interest rate at previously agreed
periods.
The reason that HHs are able to adapt to market changes is that they are
endowed with the right to settle debt at par or to settle (buy-back)8.2 an
equivalent mortgage bond to the one issued in the borrowing process. These
options are legislated rights of mortgage credit institute borrowers (Laustsen,
2009). The covered bond market in Denmark is both large and highly liquid,
and covered bond interest rates track the yield on government 10 year bonds
with a spread of around 2% points, as can be seen from panel (b) in Figure 8.1
below, although this spread has risen since 2010 - and especially so after the
introduction of negative short-term interest rates. This spread should capture
the market perceived risk premium that is priced into the spot price on long
term mortgage bonds, over and above the risk on Danish sovereign 10 year
issues. Some Danish covered bonds8.3 and all government bonds are rated in
the highest quality categories of the most prominent global ratings agencies,
8.2A callable bond is a security, sold by or on behalf of a borrower, where the borrower
reserves the right to settle the debt at any time. The option is officially referred to as the
“buy-back” option or delivery option, and applies to all mortgage bonds (whether callable or
not) (Skinhøj et al., 2019). In Denmark, there are specific dates during the calendar year
at which borrowers are able to call their bonds. For most of these bonds, notice must be
given of cancellation of the bond two calendar months prior to the date of the next auction.
The auction dates are 01 January, 02 April, 01 July, 01 October. The action taken by the
borrower to buy a bond back prematurely is also referred to as pre-payment.
8.3This status is not applicable to all covered bond issuances, but as noted by Skinhøj et al.
(2019) all major issuers in Denmark currently have AAA rated bonds available.
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including Moody’s, S&P and Fitch (Skinhøj et al., 2019). This is in part due to
the Danish Government, which has maintained the highest quality rating since
2000 and onwards, even throughout the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-08
(Cailleteau & Lindow, 2008; Cailleteau, Lindow, & Mousavizadeh, 2005; Lindow
& Oosterveld, 2011; Moody’s Investor Services Ltd., 2000). The motivation
for the strong rating was repeatedly noted as stable government finances and
budget, stable and even income distribution and a commitment to the reduction
of Danish national debt. These strong economic factors are also contributors to
the stability of Danish HHs and their associated debt portfolios.
According to Skinhøj et al. (2019), the Danish covered bond market is also
strategically important for the banking sector, as the government bond market
is not large enough to provide the liquid assets needed by banks. This added
emphasis on the market contributes to the ongoing liquidity and competitiveness
in bond pricing, taken together with the balance-principle (or match-funding)
this results in lower lending rates for borrowers.
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Figure 8.1: Official interest rates in Denmark
As can be seen from panel (b) above, in the years preceding the GFC in 2007-08,
the spread between the yield on government 10 year bonds and mortgage bonds
compressed to less than 1% point. The crisis triggered a substantial increase
in the risk premia attached to mortgage backed securities (MBS, or covered
4
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bonds), pushing the spread up to just over 3% points. The European debt crisis
coincided with the 2011 and 2013 rise in the spread, and later in 2015, and
2016 concerns of potential rate hikes by the Federal reserve in the USA affected
global debt markets. This may have played a roll in the spread during and up
to 2017. Overall, however, HH face very favourable borrowing rates relative to
“risk-free” government securities.
The opportunities available to HHs for prepayment are also dependent on several
other factors. The first is the “balance principle” which ensures that all lending
by mortgage credit institutes is funded directly by the sale of an equivalent
bond in the open market, as discussed in Article 5. In order to ensure that
borrowers have access to borrowing rates that are as low as possible, the market
for covered bonds should be liquid, and the quality of the bonds should be high
enough to minimise the risk premium paid by borrowers.
In Denmark risk premiums are kept low for the working population by substantial
unemployment benefits, a flexible labour market, and strong support systems
for skills development and re-entry into the labour market (commonly referred
to as “flexicurity”8.4, see M R Byrialsen & Raza (2018)). For the retired
population, there are several pension and retirement systems in place, as will be
discussed below. This stability of HH income reduces credit risk substantially
and contributes to the quality of covered bonds.
As noted, and as illustrated in Figure 8.1 above, the liquidity of the covered bond
market keeps rates low for borrowers. It also makes Danish covered bonds an
attractive investment opportunity, as liquidity risk is relatively low. One concern
with the market, however is that prepayment behaviour can dramatically change
the nature and structure of a bond investment portfolio. Skinhøj et al. (2019,
p. 19), in relation to a covered bond investment portfolio explained that “[t]he
stochastic modelling of prepayment behaviour is a complex task and is outside
the scope for most international investors.” In a macroeconomic modelling
scenario, however, this can be simplified significantly.
To incorporate this behaviour in FlexFix, due to the high level of aggregation,
it is not neccessary to model the exact structure of each product, or the effect
on each bond issue. One option would be to estimate an expected proportion
of bond holders that would be likely to engage in prepayment for a given
8.4It should be noted, however, that, as noted by M R Byrialsen & Raza (2018), these
supports have been eroded somewhat in recent decades.
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shift in interest rates. Although a very rough measure, it would provide some
information of the potential to shift borrowers from one product to another. In
the dynamic environment of FlexFix, various scenarios and sequences of rate
changes could be investigated. For example, if we were to first shift interest
rates downwards, it might encourage a greater portion of borrowers to switch
to fixed-interest rate products. This might result in a more stable HH sector,
that could withstand greater upward shifts in interest rates later.
Models, such as FlexFix, that do not take this behaviour into account are at
risk of overstating the impact of changes in interest rates on the net lending
position of HH, and the associated incomes received by FC. If possible it should
be included in future versions.
8.3 Integration of credit risk, defaults and loan to value
ratios
The second possible addition to FlexFix is the possible inclusion of supply
side constraints to the credit (debt) creation process. At present, all debt
demand in FlexFix is accommodated in full by FC. The level of demand for
additional debt, particularly for HH, is then only constrained by the level of
demand for investment. The section that follows below notes that credit supply
constrains were recognised as an issue by several Post Keynesian (PK) authors,
and notes some evidence of constrianed credit in Denmark after the GFC. Credit
limitations can have serious consequences for any economic participants that
over extend their balance sheets. Where over-extension is endemic, it can cause
systemic fragility.
It would be necessary to investigate the nature of contraints in Denmark further
before including them in FlexFix, but some possibilities are suggested below. In
contrast to HH refinancing, credit supply constraints have been investigated by a
number of SFC studies, some of which are used to inform possible ammendments
to FlexFix in the section to follow.
This is a factor that was raised in the Post Keynesian (PK) paradigm by authors
that were concerned with the realities of structural and institutional limitations.
Several authors disputed the reality of the PK argument that the money supply
curve was horizontal (Goodhart, 1989; Palley, 1991, 1996), and argued that
there were strong reasons to believe that there were limitations to the extent to
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which new lending could be accommodated. Lavoie (2006) presented a review
of this discussion and several explanations of how the money supply curve could
take many forms, depending on the length of time considered.
The concerns of the structuralists proved to be valid, even in Denmark where HH
incomes are particularly stable. In the wake of the GFC, the availability of credit
to borrowers dried up considerably, as noted by Sørensen (2015), although for
firms rather than individuals, a credit survey by Statistics Denmark8.5 showed
that prior after the crisis, the rejection rate on credit applications for firms
rose from just over 4% to over 20%. The degree to which applications were
only partially fulfilled rose to over 20% from just over 7%, and the extent
to which credit applications were approved fell from around 90% to around
55%. As he argued, the reasons for the reduction in availability of credit could
have flowed through at least two channels - the bank lending channel or the
balance sheet channel. The lack of availability for credit had the additional
effect of discouraging many firms from applying. The balance sheet channel
considers the credit worthiness of the borrower, while the bank lending channel
considers agency costs involved in lending (partially captured by the finance
premium), a more elaborate version of which is called the financial accelerator
mechanism (For extended discussions see, Bernanke & Gertler, 1989, 1995;
Bernanke, Gertler, & Gilchrist, 1994; Bernanke, 2007; Disyatat, 2011).
As noted in the literature review, several authors have constructed theoretical
SFC models that capture credit side constraints. The extent to which these
models capture the full extent of each of the balance sheet and bank lending
channels differ considerably. Effah (2012), Beckta (2015), and Nikolaidi (2015)
use non performing loans (based on a default rate) together with capital adequacy
ratios in the banking sector.
Khalil (2011) on the other hand models non-performing loans (NPL) as an
adjustable proportion of the total loans of each of the HH sectors in his multi-
country model. He includes a capital adequacy ratio in the multi-country model,
but it is unclear how this is used to moderate credit provision. The method
used by Nikolaidi (2015) includes both the securitisation of debt and a number
of supply side constraints, which may be useful for the addition considered in
8.5As he noted, firms were obliged to respond to the survey, which covered 2265 of the full
population of 13990 firms. This data was supplemented with rating agency data covering
each individual firm. Both datasets were subsequently
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Section 8.4 below, and is therefore the version illustrated below. It is possible
to separate the demand and supply of loans via the inclusion of a ceiling for
loan satisfaction. As she noted, similar applications can be found in Heron &
Mouakil (2008) and Dafermos (2012). The supply of credit restrictions could
be applied as follows.
NLH = khNLHD (8.1)
New lending to HH (NLH) is the product of a proportion of lending satisfied
(kh, which she calls the degree of credit availability) and the total level of
demand for new loans by HH (NLHD). These figures are calculated in the
Nikolaidi (2015) model for two separate HH classes, but is simplified here for
explanatory purposes and to be better suited as an adaptation of FlexFix in
Article 5.
kH = kH0 − kH1LEVW1−1 + kH2(CARt−1 − CART )− kH3BURW1−1 − kH4φ
(8.2)
The degree of credity availability is a proportion between zero and one (0 <
kh < 1) and depends positively on the leverage ratio (LEV ), and positively on
gap between the lagged capital-adequacy ratio and the target capital-adequacy
ratio of banks (which would be FC in FlexFix) (CARt−1 − CART ). It then
depends negatively on the lagged debt burden of HHs (BURW1−1) and the
default rate (φ).
Finally the capital adequacy ratio is determined as the ratio between bank
capital and the risk weighted assets of the sector.
CAR = KB
LHNS + LC + LF
(8.3)
In Nikolaidi (2015), as can be seen from Equation (8.3) above, the capital
adequacy ratio (CAR) is determined as the ratio between bank capital (KB)
and the risk weighted assets of the sector, which include loans to worker HH
(LHNS , total HH debt in FlexFix) loans to capitalist HH (LC, which would
not apply to FlexFix) and loans to firms (LF , NFC in FlexFix).
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It may also be possible to use several of the conditional structures applied by
Beckta (2015), which place some logical limitations on the manner in which
loans and defaults can adapt under different conditions. For example, he used
a fixed default rate component plus a conditional default component which
adjusted upwards if, and only if, the (lagged) HH debt to income ratio exceeded
a threshold level. This upward adjustment to default levels was fixed in his
model, but could also be scaled. To apply this method to FlexFix, however,
would require additional motivation of debt default thresholds. Alternatively
it could be modified to be conditional on additional factors, for example, a
significant decline in lagged GDP or investment levels. Other possibilities,
within the current modelling framework could be to introduce a simple debt
service ratio
(
PIPH
Y H
d
)
conditional trigger, or possibly a (per-capita average
debt service cost) / (per capita average disposable income) ratio.
One other possible trigger for changes in defaults or in credit rationing conditions
could be a breach of threshold loan to value ratios (LTV ). This mechanism
would require a reasonably accurate (endogenous) property price estimation or
determination in the model. This may be difficult to model at a macroeconomic
level, as noted by Andersen & Duus (2014, p. 4), HH LTV ratios increased
substantially after the decline in house prices after the GFC. Kuchler (2015)
reviewed the distribution of LTV ratios amongst borrowers. He found that there
was a tendency amongst HH for those with high LTV ratios were more likely
to also have selected a product type with an interest only period and flexible
interest rates. Essentially, those with the highest exposure levels were also likely
to choose the riskiest products. The trouble is that the credit risk problems are
likely to occur for a small selection of borrowers, and broad average measures
might not provide clear guidelines as to the appropriate threshold levels.
It may be relevant to model the risk of default across multiple debt categories,
as was done for the selection of fixed versus flexible interest rates in Article 5.
This could also be accomplished without direct disruption to the demand for
debt, and could be supplemented by analysis conducted on the administrative
datasets.
Within the existing model framework, the inclusion of credit supply limitations
could thus be achieved without disruption of the existing property market
dynamics. Capital adequacy is unfortunately not presently possible to model
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directly, as bank capital is not modelled as a separate entity. It may however be
possible to model some proxy for the capital levels held by banks. Elements of
credit rationing could therefore be introduced on the basis of recent economic
developments and, as in Equation (8.2) above, on an estimated combination of
leverage (LEV ), debt burden (BUR) and the default rate (φ). If a proxy for
CAR can be established then it could also be included in the estimation. Some
of the implications of these alterations are discussed in the concluding remarks
below.
8.4 Circular integration of household and pension fund
balance sheets
The third future research proposition for an alteration to FlexFix is to integrate
the mortgage lending system with the pension system. A key feature of the
Danish mortgage debt system is this circular integration of HH liabilities and
assets. This is facilitated by the balance principle, discussed in more detail
in Article 5. As noted therein, the principle ensures that all mortgage debt
issued by mortgage lending companies is (near) perfectly hedged by a pre-sale
of a covered bond. A large portion of these covered bonds are in-turn held by
large pension funds, the beneficiaries of which are HHs, many of whom are the
original borrowers. In a macroeconomic setting, the borrowers and asset owners
would be of the same sector, and therefore indistinguishable from one another.
To the extent that mortgage costs are accumulated in pension funds, and since
pension funds are not accessible until retirement, this would essentially amount
to an inter-temporal substitution of consumption.
This constellation of debt issuance, covered bond issuance and indirect ownership
is not unique to Denmark. The process of origination, packaging and resale of
debt is called securitisation in much of the academic literature. A key difference,
however is the set of rules by which the participants must abide. The balance
principle has been discussed in the sections above in relation to the behaviour of
HHs, but has not yet been addressed in terms of how it connects the borrower
to the ultimate beneficiaries. The ownership structure of the major lending
institutions, and the tax and welfare-state structures within which the lending
system sits are equally important.
At end of 2018, Stöcker & Costa (2019, p. 158) noted that Denmark was the
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largest issuer of covered bonds in Europe with € 405 991m8.6. As a relatively
small economy this is reflective of a number of features already mentioned
above. Firstly, it is a reflection of the volume of outstanding debt in the Danish
economy, and secondly it reflects the large and liquid covered bond market that
is supported by the Danish financial system (particularly the liquid asset needs
of banks). These are also reflections of the capacity of the Danish property
buyers to borrow; which, as noted above depends on income and economic
stability. FlexFix already contains many of the features of the Danish welfare
state that contribute to the stability of HH income, but presently lacks a detailed
depiction of a feature that permits Danish HHs to maintain high standards of
living throughout their lives, that is, the Danish pension system.
8.4.1 The Danish pension system
The Danish Pension System is a key aspect to understanding the Danish HH
balance sheet position. As described by Andersen (2016, p. 2), the system is
a relatively complex three pillar system, with the most recent comprehensive
reform taking place in 1964. The three pillars are: 1. A state pension (with
several minor schemes), 2. Semi-mandatory occupational pensions (or labour
market pensions), and 3. Personal pension savings.
The state pension and other peripheral benefits (such as old age accommodation
support, heating support etc) are tax funded and essentially are flat rate benefits
for all citizens, while the second and third pillars are savings based, and thus
have been slower to mature. There have been a range of relatively minor
adjustments to the state pension system over the past few decades, some of
which are adjustments according to what other benefits or income the person
has (partially means tested).
The occupational pension system, much like labour market working conditions
agreements, are determined via collective agreement. While there are no
legislated minimum wage or pension requirements, the coverage of collective
bargaining agreements is almost universal (Andersen, 2016).
8.4.1.1 Components of the Danish Pension System
The first tier, tax funded pension payments, is currently captured in FlexFix
8.6Denmark € 405 991m, Germany € 369 747m, France € 321 311m, Spain € 231 615m,
Sweden € 217 979m Italy € 168 936m.
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Table 8.1: Danish Pensions
Tiers First Pillar Second Pillar Third Pillar
State pensions and special arrangements for pensioners Occupational pensions Personal pensions
Third tier Rent pension (lifetime)
(topping up) Age pension (at once)
Rate pension (10 years)
Second tier Labour market pensions
(income maintenance) (Civil servants’ pensions )
(Company pensions)
First tier ATP: State LM Pension (funded)
(basic security) People’s pension: Basic Amount
People’s pension: Pension supplement
Supplementary pensions benefits
Preferential housing benefits
Individual supplements (heating, health, personal)
in the income received as social benefits (SBENH). It would be possible to
separate the amount in the model, but for present purposes, this may not
be worth while. As can be seen in Figure 10.30 from Section 10.5.1.2 in the
descriptive appendix below, the proportion of social transfers to disposable
income has remained fairly constant in Denmark since 1995. In addition,
the proportion of that income that originates from old age related transfers
has similarly remained almost constant, as can be seen from Figure 7.48, in
Section 7.10.2. For the purpose of identification of actual income types for
the sector, however, it is certainly relevant, as total tax funded social benefits
(SBENH) are the second largest contribution to HH income at around 22%.
Between 35 and 37% of which were old age related transfers.
Beier Sørensen & Dengsøe (2011) noted that once the second tier matures
as a component of the pension system, the extent of income replacement for
HHs with full labour market careers should be in the region of 65% to 100%,
depending on the age joined and age of retirement. As explained by Andersen
(2016), these pensions are semi-compulsory as a result of collective agreements,
but are in fact private pension providers.
In terms of taxation, Beier Sørensen & Dengsøe (2011) noted that Danish
pensions are taxed according to ETT (Exempt, Taxed, Taxed). This means that
they are taxed at two out of three points of interaction with the individual. Each
letter refers to the three components contributions, returns and distributions,
and the E for exempt, and the T for taxed. Danish contributions to pensions are
tax exempt (up to a limit), internal earnings are taxed at 15% and distributions
to pensioners is again taxed at income tax rates, depending on the amount of
the distribution.
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From a flow of funds perspective this is beneficial for Denmark in several ways.
HHs will by and large be able to maintain at least 60% of their pre-retirement
consumption patterns after retirement. From a property and covered bond
perspective, the high and stable income permits persons of retirement age to
access mortgage lending. Even though there is presently a fairly large portion of
pension payments linked to the tax funded scheme, greater portions of pension
incomes will be received from investment based sources as the second and
third tiers mature. The ETT structure of pensions then translates to larger
contributions to the tax base by the retired portion of the population.
The sheer size of the Danish pension savings necessitate that a large portion
thereof are invested internationally, and thus generate international asset hold-
ings. This has a large positive impact on the balance of payments and foreign
assets position of the country as a whole, as the net positive level of property
income for the country grows. In its current form the system should also help
to mitigate income inequality, since tax is applied on distributions (which are
received as income), and income tax is progressive. A reflection of this can be
seen in that Denmark also was tied for the fourth lowest income inequality in
the retired population in the world8.7.
8.4.1.2 Links to the covered bond market and mortgage bond fees
The typical home loan consists of at least three fee components. An interest
payment made to a mortgage institute that will be passed on entirely to the
covered bond holder (at market determined interest rates against a maximum of
80% of the market value of the property). A fee to the mortgage credit institute
(currently somewhere between 0.73% and 1.5% p.a. of total debt, depending on
the risk profile of the bond, in Danish called bidragsats). The third is a possible
interest fee to a banking institution on any shortfall in the borrowed amount
(for first-time buyers, this is often at the maximum of 15% of the market value
of the property, as a minimum of 5% must be paid in cash).
In terms of the investment portfolios of pension funds in Denmark, Falch et al.
8.7According to OECD (2019), Denmark is also one of the countries in the world with
the lowest income inequality in persons over the age of 65, measured in terms of the Gini
coefficient. The lowest being the Czech Republic (0.185), the Slovak Republic (0.202), Belgium
(0.222), Norway (0.225), Denmark (0.233), Finland (0.233) and the Netherlands (0.235). In
contrast to the worst inequality, Mexico (0.500), Chile (0.441), Korea (0.419) and the United
States (0.411).
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(2017, p. 61) noted that the bulk of bond holdings in the life insurance and
pension company sector is held in covered mortgage bonds - most likely due
to currency risk considerations and the relatively small domestic government
bond market. According to data from Forsikring og Pension (Foxman, 2018), on
average, pension companies (excluding life insurance) held approximately 41%
of their total assets in bonds8.8. Due to the need to deliver pension payments
in Danish Krone, a large portion of Danish pension fund assets are Krone
denominated. Essentially, this means that a large portion of mortgage bond
interest payments are “re-captured” by HHs in the form of pension fund income.
Exactly what portion is difficult to say, since a large portion of bonds are
held by mutual funds. If we consider the distribution of investors across the
fill spectrum of bonds issued by Danish bond issuers, the Life Insurance and
Pension companies held approximately 22.6%8.9, and mutual funds and asset
managers held an additional 18.8%. While the exact proportion is uncertain, it
would not be unreasonable to estimate that approximately 40% of all interest
paid by HHs is transferred almost directly into HH pension assets in the form
of interest income.
In addition to the interest income, a portion of the fee paid to mortgage credit
institutes is also returned to HHs in the form of profits. As noted by Skinhøj et
al. (2019) Nykredit Totalkredit is the largest of the mortgage credit institute in
Denmark (with approximately 41.3% market share of all mortgage lending8.10),
of which roughly 17% is owned by a group of pension companies directly, and
approximately 80% is owned by Forenet Kredit, which is an association of
customers. According to the annual report from Forenet Kredit (Smith &
Mogensen, 2019, p. 5), with over 80% ownership, the association has almost
complete decision-making power over the proceeds of Nykredit Realkredit. In
2019, against total earnings of approximately DKK 11 billion, roughly DKK
8.3 billion was profit. It was determined to distribute roughly DKK 3.6 billion
8.8Based on data from Foxman (2018) and the author’s own calculations, the asset holdings
of non-life insurance pension companies were as follows: Bonds (41.96%), Investment in
associated and connected businesses (24.58%), Capital portion (9.15%), Investment fund
portion (5.88%), Investable shares and unit trust / mutual fund shares (4.44%), Investment
properties (0.56%), Other securities (13.44%).
8.9According to Falch et al. (2017, p. 61), the investors in the Danish covered bonds at
the end of September 2017 were comprised as follows: Life insurance/Pension funds 22.6%,
Mutual funds and asset managers 18.8%, Financial institutions 27.9%, Foreigners 23.8%,
Non-financial corporations 3.2%, General government 2.1%, and HHs 1.7%.
8.10Realkredit Danmark A/S of the Danske Bank group (28%), Nordea Kredit Realkreditak-
tieselskab (14.1%), Jyske Realkredit A/S (11.5%), and DLR Kredit A/S (5.3%).
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in dividends, of which Forenet Kredit was the beneficiary of approximately
DKK 2.85 billion. About half of this, around DKK 1.25 billion, was transferred
back to borrowers via private and business customer rebate programmes. That
is, just over 10% of all fees. Although this is not the case for all other major
participants, a significant portion of equity and thus dividend income generated
by each of the major groups would also flow to HH via pension fund asset
holdings.
In addition to the above-mentioned return flows, an additional 30% of all interest
payments can be deducted from personal income prior to the tax calculation.
This is essentially an interest cost discount in the form of a tax deduction.
In summary, although HHs in Denmark have a significant outstanding level of
debt, a very large portion of the costs related to holding debt are returned to
the HH sector through a number of channels. The point at which the largest
part of these benefits accumulate is the pension fund system.
8.4.1.3 Possible changes to the existing model
The primary focus of the changes described in the sections above is on HH, and
therefore, only the equations that highlight key features for further use will be
elaborated below.
HH income, following Danish protocols, is separated into three categories8.11,
capital income, personal income and taxable income. Capital income is taxed
according to capital gains, dividend and interest income taxation laws, and is
thus considered separately. Personal income includes all other taxable income
sources, and total taxable income is the sum of the two (capital income and
personal income).
In addition, HHs also receive income deductions and incomes in a number of
non-taxable forms. Deductions include a universal flat rate tax deduction for
each person and deductions for any contribution to pension funds or labour
market organisations. In addition, as mentioned above, 30% of all interest cost
can be deducted from personal income in the calculation of tax payments.
The relevance of these details for the model are as follows. Tax flows to
government are affected by the level of interest payments on mortgages. HH
8.11Kapital indkomst, Personlig indkomst, Skattepligtig indkomst.
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income is positively affected by interest expense deductions, but this positive
“indirect” form of income is not taxable. Contributions to pension funds and
labour market institutions equally reduce the level of income on which tax is
calculated.
Prior to any deductions, a labour market contribution of 8% is paid. The pre-tax
contributions to pension funds (pensionsbidrag) in Denmark are paid according
to collective bargaining agreements. As a result there is a minimum of between
8% and 20% of personal wage income, of which the individual typically pays one
third (depending on the agreement in place8.12). Although these contributions
are largely tax free, there is a nominal cap on the level of contributions that can
be deducted from taxable income. The portion of taxable income remaining is
subject to high tax rates, roughly 38% of remaining income. The bulk of which
flows to local municipalities (roughly 30 of the total 38 percentage points).
There are several important consequences of this arrangement for the model. The
Danish level of disposable income is artificially lowered, making a comparison of
ratios related to disposable income somewhat misleading when compared with
other countries. A substantial portion of HH income is transferred to HH assets
prior to the calculation of disposable income or tax. Thereafter, a substantial
portion of the remaining income is paid in tax, resulting in a relatively small
portion of total income to be called disposable income.
The steady flow of pension contributions also means that pension assets accu-
mulate proportionately quickly. The primary innovation would be that while
pension assets are important for future sustainability of HH income flows, they
do not contribute directly to HH income in the short term.
In terms of HH income for each year, the return on pensions (ψt(PENAHt−1))
remains a sector income, and is included in the taxable income of HHs. It will,
however, be deducted from disposable income after tax.
8.12Called ‘overenskomster’ (plural) in Danish.
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Y Ht =WBHt +B2Ht + rHAt−1(IBA
H
t−1)
− rHLF It−1 · (IBL
H
FIt−1)
− rHLF Lt−1 · (IBL
H
FLt−1)
+ χt(EQAHt−1) + ψt(PENAHt−1) + STRHt + εH
(8.4)
Equation (8.4) is HH gross income. Taxes then should not be calculated on the
full income value, but income less deductions.
Pension distributions, which are also taxable are a stable nominal amount,
based on retired population size and wages. Although these are not an income
for the sector as a whole, since they originate from HH owned assets.
PENAdis = ω · ν ·WBh (8.5)
ω = 65% (8.6)
ν = 35% (8.7)
the retired income rate relative to the wage rate ω is set to 65% (0.65), and is
based on the expected income replacement rate of Danish retirees (OECD, 2019).
ν (0.35), is the retired population as a proportion of the working population.
Both could be set exogenously, as above, or be adjusted according to expected
cohort mortality rates.
Taxable income is equal to total income less any deductible incomes, here taken
to include pension contributions and the total deductible level of interest8.13.
Since contributions to pension funds are tax exempt, a reasonable proportion
of pension contributions (PENATRHt ) should then be deducted from the total
value of taxable income, as in Equation (8.8) below.
THt = βi(Y Ht − κ · PENATRHt −Rded + PENAdis) (8.8)
8.13HHs typically contribute up to the deductible pension limit, but not significantly above
that level. It also includes the level of income drawn from pension assets, PENAdis. Following
the ETT taxation profile.
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Where κ is the proportion of total of pension contributions that are tax de-
ductible, and is arbitrarily selected to be 95% here for illustrative purposes.
Pension contributions (PENATRHt ) are then currently modelled as dependent
on the wage bill (WB) and on the rate of return available on pension assets
(ψ), and need not change.
PENATRHt = βi + βi(ψt) + βiWBHt (8.9)
The prominence of bonds in the pension portfolio, however, suggests that ψ
should be closer to the rate available on bonds. The value of pension returns
could thus be estimated, dependent on the average rate of interest available on
mortgage bonds (rHIBLt), or interest rates in general. For example:
ψt = βi + βi(rHIBLt)) (8.10)
It should be noted, that the above changes do not introduce any direct changes
to the flow structure of the previous model. Rather, they introduce some
stabilisation mechanisms to the model via the moderation of tax flows.
In terms of the interest tax deduction, interest is initially paid in full by HH,
thus all flows of interest should remain in place8.14. For the model, at an
aggregate level, it would result in an upward adjustment of disposable income
by the value of the interest deduction. This is captured as a reduction to total
tax levels, as in Equation (8.8) above.
The total value of income deductible due to interest payments, Rded, can be
calculated as in Equation (8.8) below, where ϑ is equal to 30% (or 0.3) as per
Danish legislation.
Rded = ϑ · (rHLF It−1 · (IBL
H
FIt−1) + r
H
LF Lt−1
· (IBLHFLt−1)) (8.11)
As noted above, the net effect is to provide HHs with a marginally higher level
8.14HHs in Denmark then have the option to pre-adjust their tax and so receive the tax
benefit spread throughout the year, or to receive the benefits of the interest rates deduction
as a lump sum at the end of the year. Typically the tax authorities adjust expected taxes
in consecutive years, and so we should be able to assume that the adjustment would affect
disposable income of HHs throughout the year.
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of disposable income. Thus, in the case of an interest rate increase, the effect
will be partially offset by the positive impact on tax deductions.
Disposable income is then adjusted to include total income less total taxation,
plus income from pension distributions (PENAdis) and minus the exclusion
of returns on pension assets (ψt(PENAHt−1)). The alteration to the total tax
value is automatically adjusted for GOVT, as GOVT receives THt as income.
Y DHt = Y Ht − THt − ψt(PENAHt−1) + PENAdis (8.12)
The total value of pension assets is then determined as total pension assets
from the previous period, plus any capital gains, and plus the balance between
pension contributions (PENATRH), pension returns (ψt(PENAHt−1)) and
pension distributions (PENAdis).
In FlexFix, HHs hold PENA against FC. The main difference is that although
HHs still make contribution decisions on the basis of rates of return, an increase
in the returns on pension assets does not translate into an increase in HH
disposable income. For HHs there is thus an obligatory reinvestment of capital.
PENAHt = PENAHt−1+PENATRHt +ψt(PENAHt−1)−PENAdis+PENAHCGt
(8.13)
The returns on pensions still flow to HH from FC, and the change in pension
asset value will simply be an internal adjustment for HH.
FATRHt = IBATRHt + EQATRHt + PENATRHt − PENAdis (8.14)
These alterations would then have identical, but offsetting counterparts in FC.
The existing model therefore provides an excellent platform for some additional
relatively straight-forward adjustments. These adjustments and the underlying
composition of HH income and balance sheets could be further investigated
using the administrative micro datasets.
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8.5 Concluding remarks
For each of the proposed changes to FlexFix, there are some expected implica-
tions. The inclusion of household refinancing behaviour is expected to alter the
impacts of interest rate adjustments in FlexFix - possibly reducing the effect of
the interest rate channel. Refinancing also has the potential to substantially
change the debt-asset profile of HH. As noted above, the ordering of interest
rate adjustment could also play a significant role in the ultimate balance sheet
profile of each of the sectors. This may have significant consequences for future
borrowing capacity (via the balance sheet channel).
The second suggestion incorporates the important economic concern of financial
instability. The key concern addressed is the tendency for lenders to over-extend
their balance sheets in times of optimism and strong economic growth. As noted
by Disyatat (2011), it is not the result of a deliberate attempt to increase risk,
but rather the accommodation of greater and greater number of loans at low
interest rates (a reflection of possibly over-optimistic views on borrower credit
risk) that slowly erodes the capital buffer of the sector.
One of the key criticisms of macroeconomic models prior to the GFC was an
inability to predict or anticipate the risk that a crisis might emerge. These
dynamics might be effectively captured by the inclusion of a combination of
conditional behaviours, as implemented by Beckta (2015), together with credit
supply constraints, as done by Nikolaidi (2015). In combination with the path
dependency of the SFC framework, this may help to identify systemic risk in
the economy at an earlier stage.
The final suggestion, to integrate the Danish pension system, would provide
a more realistic idea of the risks associated with Danish household debt than
FlexFix. HH debt has received significant attention in the literature and is
often related to financial instability. The integration of HH with returns on the
covered bond market via the pension sector helps to alleviate some of the long
term risks associated with interest rate shocks, but it is not likely to mitigate
short term volatility in HH disposable income. This is particularly the case
where greater portions of debt are held in flexible rate products, as noted in
Article 5.
In conclusion, the present state of FlexFix, and mortgage lending system therein,
are incomplete, but there are several opportunities to refine it in order to capture
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the position of the Danish HH sector more realistically. As noted in the literature
review, there is a trade off between simplicity and interpretable of the results of
test on the model. It is presently uncertain whether these adjustments would
contribute to a more stable baseline model, but it is certainly possible that they
could.
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9.1 Conclusion
This thesis addresses the interaction between the sector balance sheets in
Denmark, and thus contributes to understanding the impact and transmission
of economic shocks and policies for the economy. This is particularly important
in the context of rapid financial balance sheet expansion that preceded the Global
Financial Crisis (GFC). The thesis is grounded in the Post Keynesian economic
paradigm, and the Babylonian mode of thinking, where path dependency and a
pluralist approach to method and methodology are encouraged.
As noted in the introduction, the period leading up to the GFC was characterised
by broad-scale financial liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation. In the
years prior to the crisis, it is argued that this led to the rapid expansion of
the financial balance sheets of economic participants, and the institutional
sectors to which they belong. In Denmark, it also led to the accumulation of
the highest level of household debt to disposable income in the world. From
a macroeconomic perspective, this expansion was driven by the interaction
between the institutional sectors of the economy. These interactions are crucially
important for the understanding of the transmission of economic shocks or policy
measures throughout the economy.
A significant concern in the context of the Danish economy is that although
Denmark maintains a sovereign currency, the Danish Krone is pegged to the
Euro. In order to maintain the currency peg, and to avoid currency speculation,
the Danish Nationalbank is thus compelled to keep Danish interest rates in line
with those set by the European Central Bank. The consequence of which is
that Danish interest rates are to a large extent, outside of the control of Danish
authorities. In addition, a number of innovations in products and legislation
occurred in the mortgage financing industry between 1996 and 2007, which
resulted in a dramatic shift in the composition of HH debt from 100% that
was previously borrowed as fixed-interest rate loans, to less than 30% by 2012.
In general the innovations that were introduced resulted in a decline in the
initial cost of borrowing. Although initial payments on new mortgage debt
declined, this cost reduction carried with it the transfer of a variety of risks
to the borrower. They also resulted in the rapid expansion of debt on the HH
balance sheet to the highest level relative to sector disposable income in the
world. The changes made to legislation and the interaction of HH with FC thus
had significant effects on the composition of sector level balance sheets. It is
2
Conclusion, (9):3
further expected that any significant increase in interest rates would trigger
cause some kind of property market response. If the increase in rates were
sufficiently large, property prices in Denmark would be expected to fall. The
two key risks identified were therefore an exogenously driven increase in interest
rates, and a possible decline in property prices.
To achieve this understanding it is necessary to unpack these interactions
progressively. To do so, the thesis thus addressed four key objectives: The
first is to identify what the primary source of change in sector balance sheets
is; the second is to empirically identify the connections and dependencies
(interactions) between the three primary sectors - the private sector (PRI),
the government sector (GOV) and the foreign sector (ROW); the third is
to explore the implications of these interactions, and extends this analysis
to include a disaggregated PRI - split into the household sector (HH), the
non-financial corporate sector (NFC) and the financial corporate sector (FC);
and, the fourth is to assimilate these interactions into a single macroeconomic
framework - in order to examine the transmission of economic shocks or policy
measures throughout the economy - and to use this framework to investigate
the structure and implications of the unprecedented expansion of PRI debt
relative to disposable income of Danish HH.
9.1.1 Findings
9.1.1.1 First objective: Sources of change
The first objective is addressed in Article 19.2 for financial balance sheets is
argued to be money (debt) creation. The composition of the liability side of
aggregate sector balance sheets is also recognised as an indicator of the initial
use of funds, and from these it is possible to begin to identify motives. Growth
in mortgage debt on the balance sheets of HH, for example, indicates an increase
in demand and supply of mortgage credit. The economic drivers of the change
in satisfied levels of mortgage credit can thereafter be investigated.
In terms of demand for new credit, a range of lagged correlation estimates
relative to the output gap for Denmark, Sweden and Norway, in Article 29.3, in
order to estimate the timing with which each sector net lends or net borrows
relative to economic expansion. The results showed that PRI in all three
9.2Money at first principles: A social value theory of money, in Section 3.
9.3Sectoral balance analysis: Evidence from Scandinavia, in Section 4.
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countries show growth in net borrowing as the output gap increased. Stated
otherwise, PRI borrowing was shown to be pro-cyclical with the business cycle.
The opposite was true for GOV, and the results were mixed for ROW. As
expected for welfare states, GOV and PRI were also negatively correlated in all
countries, reflecting automatic stabilising responses to changes in labour market
conditions. This implies that as incomes rise PRI demand for credit is expected
to rise with it.
From a supply point of view, the analysis in Article 59.4 suggests that increases
in the availability of credit, or innovations that permit a greater number of
borrowers to access credit, are likely to result in a higher level of credit satisfac-
tion. This is particularly the case where the initial cost of borrowing is reduced,
as was the case with the innovations in mortgage products, as such it would
appear that borrowers do not fully appreciate the additional risks associated
with such products.
In terms of implications, in so far as it is required for economic growth, Article
1 argues that it must also be assumed that additional debt must be held
(accumulate) in the accounts either PRI or GOV. In a closed economy, the
distribution of debt during and after a period of economic growth therefore
depends on the extent to which PRI demanded credit, and or the level of
borrowing undertaken by GOV (i.e. on the sources of the change). It is argued
that the criteria for debt creation are also likely to exacerbate the problems of
income and wealth inequality, which may lead to social and economic instability.
The existence of large markets for potentially socially undesirable goods, such
as tobacco or alcohol, further suggest that the ability to generate a profit
through sales may not generate the most socially desirable allocation of capital
(or resources in general). Beyond these largely normative (or political) issues,
it is also argued that effective investment in the development of human and
institutional capital will have important effects on the future pool of resources
that might be employed through future money creation. To this extent, GOV
has both the responsibility to provide public goods, and to limit behaviours
(for example pollution) that result in negative externalities (climate change or
loss of bio-diversity). It is thus suggested that there is some reasonable level of
debt that should be held by GOV in a growing economy, and that there is a
9.4Flexible rate mortgage loans: An SFC model of the impact of mortgage credit innovations
on Danish balance sheet stability, in Section 7.
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significant roll for public investment in human and institutional capital.
The source of change to balance sheet positions can thus be distilled back to the
initial demand for credit, against which a record of debt (liability) is created.
9.1.1.2 Second objective: Empirical observation
The first stage of empirical investigations into interactions between the macroe-
conomic balance sheets was to plot, in the thesis appendix9.5, the progression
of balance sheet composition of each sector over time. Thereafter, in order to
understand the behaviours behind changes in the level of some of the more price
volatile assets, the proportion of changes in equity and investment assets, were
decomposed into price related, and transaction related changes. This acted as a
guide to the source of changes in a large part of HH and NFC balance sheets.
This was followed by charts of the positive and negative flow contributions to
each of the sector net financing requirements, and to search for similarities
across the sectors in terms of scale. The data presented and used for this
analysis are sourced from national accounts data, the history and construction
of which were crucial in making this research possible9.6.
At the three sector level9.7, the literature suggests generalised theories about the
interactions, and support is provided to the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis
(REH) and Twin Deficit Hypotheses (TDH). The analysis in Article 2 followed
existing literature, and estimated long-run correlation statistics between the
sectors. It also included descriptive and historical analyses of the causes of major
changes in the net interactions. These long run correlation results appeared at
first glance to support both the REH and TDH, but it on closer inspection, this
was for the wrong reasons. The negative correlation between PRI and GOV
could be explained through automatic stabilisers, and the positive correlation
between GOV and ROW in Norway was an artefact of international oil revenue
flowing to GOV. The results also showed that the positive external balances
(or trade balances) of each country, can best be explained by the history of
investment and development in each. The use of net lending in conjunction
with more traditional macroeconomic indicators, such as GDP or the level of
9.5Appendix: Balance sheet descriptive analysis, in Section 10.
9.6A brief history of the development of the system of national accounts in provided in the
literature review, and a more detailed account of the developments in Denmark, Norway and
Sweden is provided in Article 2.
9.7PRI, GOV and ROW.
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unemployment, thus exposed new themes through the shifts in the flow of credit
between the sectors. This analysis highlighted that the balances of each sector
are interdependent, and it was argued that in the face of external deficits, it is
mutually exclusive for each of PRI or GOVs to run an aggregate surplus. It also
notes the importance of significant domestic investments and structural changes
for the future foreign earning potential - and thus the balance with ROW.
To test the stability of the long-run relationships between sector net lending
positions, correlation for rolling windows were examined in Article 39.8, and
the analysis shows that long run patterns observed at the sector level do
persist for extended periods of time, but that these patterns are also subject
major adjustments. This does not preclude certain sensible relationships from
persisting for long periods of time. The existence of certain economic institutions,
for example, a strong welfare system, manifest in strong negative correlation
between GOV and PRI for all three countries. Even this pattern, however, is
inverted at certain points - particularly during the rapid expansion that occurred
just prior to the GFC for Denmark and Norway. With reference to general
economic indicators, it is argued that these deviations can be explained by
specific economic incidents, which cause at least one sector to change behaviour
for a certain period of time. These interpretations are supported by the historical
analysis in Article 2. The leading causes of the dislocations are fundamental
changes in the demand (expenditure) patterns of one of the sectors, and that
the responses of the other sectors can be explained through standard Keynesian
economic theory. In particular, the role of GOV in response to changes in PRI
levels of NL at various stages of the business cycle. In this way, the rolling
correlation analysis provides a simple way to identify structural beaks in broad
sector patterns of behaviour.
9.1.1.3 Third objective: Implications
One of the motivations for the study was to evaluate the reliability of generalised
theories about sector level interactions that have recently been used to motivate
restrictive fiscal policy (austerity measures) in many debt burdened European
countries after the financial crisis. SBA in Articles 2 and 3 provides a new
lens through which to understand the limitations and implications of certain
economic policies. The dependent nature of sector positions means that balanced-
9.8Sectoral balance analysis: Short run deviations from long run patterns, in Section 5.
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budget public policy in the face of an external deficit will result in PRI debt
accumulation. It is thus argued that GOV budget is not necessarily a reflection
of GOV decision-making.
The analysis of the responses after the GFC in the Danish economy, in Article
49.9, show that the bulk of changes in the Danish public budget position in
recent years have been reactionary (stabiliser) adaptations to changes in the
levels of PRI income and social benefit claims. It is also noted that the driver
of those changes was a decline in PRI demand - triggered by balance sheet and
income pressures after the GFC. Both investment demand (in FC and NFC)
and consumption demand (HH) fell, leading to a fall in employment levels, and
hence the greater burden on public safety nets. Thus, while GOV is the one
sector where decision making can (in theory) be centralised9.10, it is also the
sector that is designed to be most passive to the changes in another sector (PRI
in particular). HH NL stabilised at almost perfectly balanced levels, but NFC
and FC remain in significant surplus NL positions. This sector level saving
behaviour indicates that the level of investment, and thus the creation of new
credit in the NFC sector, has fallen - in spite of record low interest rates. Some
of this is explained by credit supply restrictions faced by NFC after the crisis,
but a substantial part is also explained by suppressed demand from the foreign
sector.
In relation to austerity policies, the most important conclusion was that in
the face of a negative trade balance, if PRI does not have the capacity to
borrow, and GOV does not borrow, domestic revenues will fall and a decline in
economic activity will be inevitable. The policy implication of this is that public
borrowing and spending would be necessary to avoid a contraction - which is
directly in contradiction with the requirements of austerity measures. An added
consideration, however, is that this is only the case if the elasticity of imports
to the GOV expenditure is smaller than the domestic spending multiplier. If
import demand leads to excess expansion of external debt, the property income
demands on the domestic economy may be unsustainable.
9.1.1.4 Fourth objective: Assimilation
9.9Sektorbalancer i Danmark efter krisen, in Section 6.
9.10Although in theory it might be possible to centralise public budgets, they are in practice
determined in a highly de-centralised manner. Only a very small portion of the general GOV
expenditures in Denmark are actively controlled by the central GOV, the bulk of public
spending is managed at a regional and municipal level.
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The final objective was to assimilate the sector interactions into a single macroe-
conomic framework, in order to examine the transmission of economic shocks or
policy measures throughout the economy. A fully empirical stock flow consistent
(SFC) model of the Danish economy, based on Byrialsen & Raza (2019), was
used to investigate the paradox that the country with the highest HH debt-to-
disposable income ratio in the world had what appear to be the lowest mortgage
debt losses in the wake of the GFC. The model is constructed according to
exactly the same principles that are applied to the SBA, however, the net
balances are disaggregated into positive and negative flows. The empirical
results of Articles 2, 3 and 4, thus inform several of the estimated equations
used to model the interactions and behaviours of each of the sectors. The model
was constructed with a focus on HH, with the aim to assess the sensitivity of
HH responses to the two key risk factors described above. Unfortunately, the
aggregate data available on HH debt does not provide sufficiently disaggregated
detail regarding the relative importance of each of the innovations introduced
during the period under study. A supplementary analysis was therefore con-
ducted on Danish micro administrative datasets, and was used to develop more
appropriate aggregates of HH debt.
Four scenarios were presented and analysed in the context of the model. i)
The first reflected the interest rate risk faced by the Danish economy due to
the fixed exchange rate regime, and was a two percentage point (2% point)
increase in borrowing costs. ii) The second reflected a possible reaction of the
property market as a result of interest rate changes, and was a permanent 20%
decline in property prices. iii) The third scenario investigated the expected
compound effect of an initial interest rate shock that later leads to a fall in
property prices, and thus allowed the second shock to compound on the first
in the model. iv) The fourth, explored the hypothetical situation where the
proportion of HH mortgage debt in adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) products
was substantially reduced, and involved a preliminary shift in the composition
of debt, from an initial position of roughly 34% up to 80% allocated to fixed
interest rate products.
The shock to interest rates has the most dramatic effect, as it drives HH
income lower, together with investment. This triggers a reduction in income for
NFC and a decline in import demand (an improvement in the current account
balance), and ultimately a fall in employment. Within the limits of the model
8
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results, it is argued that HH responses to interest-rate shocks have become more
sensitive as a result of the innovations in the mortgage financing sector. It is
further argued that this increased sensitivity has significant consequences for
each of the other sectors. In response to the property price shock, the structure
of the property market in the model results in a decline in demand for property
investment as a result of the fall in property prices. The decline in investment
triggers successive declines in investment by HH, rather than disposable income
directly. It also triggers a simultaneous decline in the demand for debt, and
thus lower interest payments. The generally lower demand leads to job losses
as NFC investment responds pro-cyclically to the decline in capacity utilisation.
The net effect of which is a general economic contraction.
In terms of balance sheet effects, the property price decline provides a particularly
interesting case. In scenario 3, The initial impact on HH savings from the
increase in interest rates is negative, but after the property price collapse, it
swings positive immediately. Initial interpretations of this might be positive,
but the positive correction in HH NL was associated with a marked decline in
investment - driven by the increased cost of borrowing. The ultimate impact on
the HH sector of the combined shocks is significantly higher unemployment and
a phase of rapid consolidation of debt9.11. This effects a contraction of the HH
balance sheet; total financial assets contract by total of 2% three years after the
interest rate shock (2023). In the scenario three, three years after the shock to
property prices (2025), net HH wealth falls by 3.34%, but this understates the
impact on the HH, since, as mentioned in the introduction, net measurements
fail to take into account the impact on gross balances. In gross terms, stock of
interest bearing liabilities falls by 10.6%, HH wealth in financial assets falls by
3.55% while stock of capital held in houses falls by 12.76%. The contraction
in liabilities is substantially higher than the modest effect observed over the
GFC where a similar 20% decline in property prices was observed. One major
difference, however, is that HH benefited from global suppression of interest
rates, which would be quite the opposite if interest rates were to rise.
In terms of financial sensitivity, and economic stability - defined narrowly here
as the extent to which economic aggregates react to shocks to interest rates
- the impact of the shocks are clearly smaller for scenario four (roughly half
9.11All affected variables and the size of effects relative to the baselines scenario be read in
detail from the cross-section summary of affected variables in the appendix, in Section 7.9.4
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as large in terms of unemployment effects) than for scenario three. This is
particularly the case after the interest-rate shock, as HH disposable income is
less responsive to the property price shock, which helps to maintain demand.
On the basis of the analysis, it is argued that the change in composition of HH
balance sheets has resulted in greater income and balance sheet sensitivity to
economic shocks for HH, and indirectly for all other sectors.
In the introduction, the paradoxically low impact of the GFC on mortgage
arrears payments and foreclosures was raised. Viewed in the context of the sector
interactions of the Danish economy, particularly with reference to the strong
welfare system, where HH enjoy income protection, a stable and well provisioned
pension system and relatively equitable distribution of income, the Danish HH
sector appears to be well insulated. This insulation indirectly provides greater
stability to NFC and FC, both of which feed back into GOV and HH. As noted
in the future research section9.12, the financial markets in Denmark are tied
together in quite a complex network. As a result, some risks of contagion effects
across markets are identified (for example property prices, LTV ratios and the
capital adequacy of credit institutions), but those interlinkages also provide HH
and PRI in general with a number of protections - for example, the balance
principle drastically reduces the risk exposure of mortgage lending for FC, and
the pension system recaptures large parts of mortgage costs on behalf of HH.
The robustness of Danish HH cannot be understood or explained by any of
these factors in isolation, which brings into sharp relief the importance of sector
level interactions for macroeconomic analysis.
9.1.2 Limitations and future research possibilities
There are a number of areas where the analyses in this thesis could be expanded,
and there are equally, a number of important limitations related to the data,
methods and finally to the model. These are addressed briefly below, together
with some brief suggestions for future research.
In terms of data, the use of annual records to explain the behaviours of the real
world is not ideal, but it is the only frequency of data that is available to the
degree of disaggregation need for the analyses in this thesis. This is particularly
the case for the micro data used in Article 5. Unfortunately, the micro-data
9.12Future research perspectives, in Section 8.
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also does not contain any periods during which interest rates increased. The
choice of data and methods for the correlation analysis is addressed below.
Correlation coefficients, as used in Articles 2 and 3 are simple tools, and
many more sophisticated methods have been used to investigate generalised
interaction between macroeconomic sectors. The aim of the analysis, however
was primarily to identify sector dependencies that could be investigated through
supplementary analysis. This was especially the case in Article 2, where the aim
was to move beyond simple aggregates with a historical investigation into the
causes of structural changes in each economy. A broad multi-country historical
analysis was not feasible, and the existing literature provides a number of
excellent econometric analyses, as were discussed in the article.
It is also acknowledged that each window in rolling correlation had very few
observations (just four). This is also linked to the choice of data - more frequent
data would introduce seasonality, which is undesirable due to timing of large
structural flows, such as year-end taxation. Although short, the rolling windows
cover a period of four years, while Abildgren (2006) estimated the average length
of the Danish business cycle, since 1946, to be 5 years. Thus, while extending
the window would increase the number of observations, this could also conceal
changes in sector behaviour through a business cycle - and it is the short term
deviations that were of interest.
In terms of the model presented in Article 5, the purpose of the analysis was
to examine the impact of the change in composition of HH debt in relation
to sector level interactions, within a path dependent macroeconomic model,
with Post Keynesian theoretical foundations. There are a number of caveats
raised in the article, however, none of these should have a material impact
on the outcomes of the analysis. The concentrated focus on HH necessarily
limited the details of other sector behaviours, but it is argued here that the
behaviours included capture the broad patterns of behaviour expected by the
other sectors. The one aspect that was of serious concern during simulations,
was the exogeneity of asset prices and rates of return, but since the investigation
was concerned with the relative impacts of negative shocks between a real and
a hypothetical scenario, it was not necessary to generate specific projections of
impacts.
The restriction of the shock to only one side of the HH balance sheet appears
11
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at first glance to be unrealistic, but a closer investigation of the HH balance
sheet reveals that HH does not hold many interest bearing assets outside of
pension funds. In a more realistic setting, the rise in interest rates would also
affect HH incomes positively, but, as the model is mostly concerned with the
shorter term responses, the scale of the effect is expected to be limited to only
those assets from which the income is accessible immediately. The exogeneity
of asset prices and rates of return are potential drawbacks, however, as noted
in the article, it is not obvious that creating endogenous links between financial
markets, assets and rates of return (i.e. a more integrated financial sector) would
be an improvement on the current model structure, as it would obscure many
of the current transmission channels that are of interest.
The model is by definition an abstraction, and therefore aggregates away many
additional details about the Danish economy. Some of these details are addressed
in the future research perspectives section. The empirical model from Article 5
is called “FlexFix” for brevity. The first proposal is the integration of household
(HH) refinancing patterns in response to changes in interest rates. FlexFix
currently does not include any reactionary behaviour by households, and so
may over or understate the risks associated with the shocks applied in scenario
testing. The second is the integration of credit risk, potentially through the
introduction of supply side constraints. The motivation for this is that FC in
FlexFix currently accommodates any level of demand for debt from HH. As was
discussed in Future research perspectives, this was not reflective of the realities
faced by HH and firms in the years following the global financial crisis (GFC),
where credit was not available for many non-financial corporates (NFC) and HH
that demanded it. The third proposed change is to implement a circular flow of
funds for HH. In summary, HH pay interest and fees through mortgage-debt
products to FC, and many of those fees are then transferred from FC to pension
funds. Those pension funds are in turn owned by HH, but the returns and assets
held are only accessible at some point in the future. In a sense, the interest
paid on any mortgage bonds held in this manner constitute inter-temporal
substitution of consumption (or saving) made by HH. The motivation to pursue
this addition to FlexFix is the relative size and importance of HH pension assets,
which make up roughly 50% of all HH financial assets. The pension system is
also an integral part of the Danish economy and contributes to the stabilisation
of income and expenditure patters of Danish persons throughout the life-cycle.
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9.1.3 Contributions
The articles presented in this thesis contribute to the literature in several aspects.
Article one revives moral and ethical concerns related to the creation of money,
and promotes political discussion of public borrowing. Articles two, three
and four all contribute to the relatively limited SBA literature, and Articles
two and three introduce new applications of the SBA; firstly, for historical
analysis and secondly, for the identification of behavioural structural breaks.
The empirical model, and micro-data analysis in Article five contributes to
the understanding of the impact of innovations in housing finance from a
macroeconomic perspective, and adds to the limited set of fully empirical SFC
models. Finally, the future research perspectives offer a fairly detailed road
forward for additional contributions.
13
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10.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a bird’s-eye overview of economic developments in Den-
mark over the past decades. The first goal of this section is to illustrate the
significant expansion of the volume of financial assets and liabilities relative to
the productive activities of the economy. The second objective is to identify
which asset and liability components have contributed most to each sector’s
position. The composition of gross, rather than net, positions provide some in-
dication of the extent to which the sector positions are connected. For example,
the bulk of the equity issued by the non-financial corporate sector is held by
the household sector.
The final objective is to develop an understanding the nature of the budget
constraint that each sector faces. Although the national accounts records are
ex-post aggregations, and thus cannot inform decision-making for each sector,
the budget constraint nonetheless illustrates certain financial limitations faced
by each sector. For example, a surplus for the RoW sector (I.e. foreign trade
deficit) must be balanced by a cumulative deficit position by the domestic
sectors.
To be able to illustrate this, it is necessary to identify all flow components that
contribute both positively and negatively to the budget of each sector. It also
provides a simple visual overview of the changes in the composition of flows
over time - a feature that is very useful for identifying similarities in patterns
across sectors.
10.2 Descriptive data
The expansion of financial assets between 1995 and 2017 has been extensive
in many countries, but Denmark stands out, with the highest household debt
to disposable income ratio in the world. Aggregate levels of balance sheet
expansion reveal a continuous extension of the degree of leverage in all sectors.
Following the conventions of the United Nations System of National Accounts
(Inter-Secretariat Working Group of the European Communities, 1993), and
the European System of National Accounts (Eurostat Euponean Commission,
2013), the expansion of financial assets can be investigated for each of the five
main institutional sectors - the Household sector (Hh), the Financial Corporate
Sector (FC), the Non-Financial Corporate Sector (NFC), the Government Sector
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(Govt) and the Rest of the World Sector (RoW).
10.3 Stock composition
10.3.1 The total economy
Whether or not these developments have been or are problematic is a complex
question to answer. A common approach is to present and analyse the net
financial position of each sector, as in Figure 10.1. From the perspective of
net financial assets (I.e. assets less liabilities), relative to GDP, the solvency of
each sector is unremarkable. With the exceptions possibly of Hh with assets of
approx. 174% of GDP, and RoW, with liabilities of 52% of Danish GDP at the
end of 2017.
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Figure 10.1: National net financial wealth
Net positions are somewhat misleading for several reasons. Firstly, net positions
conceal the case where assets and liabilities expand simultaneously - I.e. gross
changes in balance sheet magnitude. Secondly, it is not possible to observe
changes in composition that occur within the asset and liability categories.
The following chart shows the gross magnitude financial balance sheets for the
institutional sectors of Denmark relative to GDP. It includes separate asset
and liability charts, together with underlying sectoral composition. Figure
3
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10.2 is a combination of stacked bar chart and a line chart. In each year the
lines represent the height of each stacked bar. In this way it is possible to
see the proportional composition of both assets and liabilities (by the size of
the bars), the sum of these proportions (the height of the stack), and to track
the progression of each of the contributing factors (the lines). In this case the
contributing components are the institutional sectors of the economy.
As can clearly be seen in Figure 10.2, the gross magnitude of the Danish financial
balance sheet has expanded dramatically. In Figure 10.2, the contribution from
each sector provides some insight into the relative magnitudes of their financial
balance sheets. These magnitudes are as important as the relative change
observed over time. The RoW and NFC sectors both started from relatively
low base in terms of both assets and liabilities, but following their progress in
Figure 10.2 reveals that RoW liabilities more than trebled to just over 300%
of Danish GDP between 1995 and 2017, while asset holdings of the RoW in
Denmark rose to just over 250%. Hence the negative net financial asset position
of around -50% of GDP in Figure 10.1.
NFC had a similarly dramatic rise in liabilities, from around 170% of GDP
to around 355% of GDP, while financial assets rose more modestly from just
over 100% to around 245% - again reflected in Figure 10.1 by the negative net
financial wealth position of the sector, at around -110% of GDP.
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Figure 10.2: Total Economy: Financial Assets and Liabilities
While Figure 10.2 is interesting, the scale is rather compressed. This is as
a result of the extreme rise in the size of the financial corporate sector (FC)
balance sheet. It was expected in advance that FC, to a large degree, holds
the counterpart assets of liabilities held by other sectors, and similarly holds
counterpart liabilities for many of the financial assets of all other sectors (NFC
equity and investment issues being an obvious exception)10.2.
All charts are nominal values, normalised by taking them as a proportion of
nominal GDP of the same year. A cursory look at the gross levels of assets
and liabilities for all sectors shows an expansion for the general economy from
roughly 750% of GDP to well over 1500%. The question that then arises as
to what the outcome of such an expansion has been. In terms of literature
in favour of capital market deepening (see for example, Apergis, Filippidis, &
Economidou (2007)), it is expected that substantial improvements should be
visible in some key economic indicators.
10.2The issuance of corporate debt is of marginal significance, as is shown in Figure 10.11 for
NFC below. Hh are not expected to issue any securities directly, although they do participate
indirectly in the (sale of) covered bonds market via mortgage borrowing.
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A simplistic explanation is that financial expansion should be used to allocate
resources effectively for the purpose of economic growth. An expansion of
financial capital then might be reflected in an expansion of tangible capital.
In order to investigate this, one could consider fixed assets relative to GDP.
Unfortunately that does not provide much insight, since, although the fixed asset
to GDP proportions have shifted marginally over time, Figure 10.3 illustrates
that the levels of fixed capital stock relative to GDP have been almost perfectly
static10.3. The dotted line in the chart illustrates real GDP growth through
the period, as measured on the right-hand axis. The sharp decline in 2009,
coinciding with the global financial crisis (GFC), can be seen to have some
impact on the household sector10.4.
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Figure 10.3: Total Economy: Fixed Assets
Another avenue or outlet for the growth in financial market debt and assets
might have been to fund investment, or in terms of the SNA, gross fixed capital
10.3N111N Dwellings (net), N112N Other buildings and structures (net) (Subcategories:
N1121N Buildings other than dwellings (net), N1122N Other structures (net)), N11MN
Machinery and equipment and weapons systems (net), N115N Cultivated biologicalresources
(net), N117N Intellectual property products (net) (Subcategories: N1171N Research and
development (net), N1172N Mineral exploration and evaluation (net), N1173N Computer
software and databases (net), N1174N Entertainment, literary or artistic originals (net),
N1179N Other intellectual property products (net))
10.4Household fixed assets showing the only notable decline around the 2009 crash, an issue
largely related to the ownership structure of agricultural land, falling agricultural land prices,
and property prices in general.
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formation (GFCF, or I). A cursory look at the data, as shown in Figure 10.4,
indicates that this might have been plausible.
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Figure 10.4: Total Economy: Gross fixed capital formation
In both Figure 10.4 and Figure 10.5, the level of GFCF illustrate nominal levels
of investment (GFCF) as a proportion of GDP. The idea being that if financial
capital was used to fund business investment, it should show up in real business
capital formation. The unadjusted level of GFCF in Figure 10.4 appears to
support this theory, with NFC GFCF at between 10% and 13%, between 3%
and 4.5% for Govt, and Hh GFCF between 3.5% and 7.5%. At times, the sum
total level of GFCF near to 25% of GDP. This, is however, only part of the full
picture.
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Figure 10.5: Total Economy: Gross fixed capital formation less depreciation
When one deducts depreciation (or consumption of fixed capital} from invest-
ment (GFCF), as shown in Figure 10.5, the actual additions to capital stocks
reflect what is shown in Figure 10.3 - that fixed capital stocks have remained
relatively unaffected. Replacement costs almost completely account for all
investment after 2009. A better explanation of the drivers of the dramatic
expansion of Danish financial balance sheets requires a further disaggregation
of the data into specific asset classes.
It should be stated that so far, a stock, the financial balance sheet, has been
compared with a flow, investment. This is potentially a misleading representation
of what has occurred over the previous decade, however it does give some
indication of the relative importance of each in comparison to nominal GDP. If
GDP had expanded as a result of the financial balance sheet expansion, then it
should be expected that the relative size of GDP would have in some way kept
pace with the financial expansion. This appears not to have been the case.
Gross fixed capital formation, as a flow, is also measured relative to GDP. By
contrast, GFCF has remained stable relative to GDP, as has the nominal level
of fixed assets. While this is certainly an imperfect measure, it is sufficient
to suggest that the bulk of the expansion of financial balance sheets has not
translated into similar developments in fixed capital. In order to explore this
8
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further, the individual sector asset and liability compositions are presented
below.
10.3.2 Household Assets and Liabilities
Household financial assets, as shown in Figure 10.6, as a proportion of GDP,
doubled from around 155% to just over 300% of GDP. liabilities, by contrast
rose from just under 100% of to a peak of around 250% of GDP in 2009 - in
which a marked decline in GDP played a significant part. Debt levels have since
declined steadily as the Hh sector has slowly de-leveraged.
The composition of the dramatic expansion of assets, as illustrated below in
Figure 10.6 is dominated by a combination of pension assets and equities and
investments.10.5 The vast majority (over 75%) of Hh assets are presently held
in a combination of equities, investments and pension funds. In considering the
potential risk to household solvency, it is worth noting that pension assets are
not immediately accessible.
The component called “Equity” in the chart, is in fact a combination of equity
and mutual fund holdings or issuances by each sector10.6. The Hh of course do
not issue either category and it thus does not feature on the liabilities side of
the Hh balance sheet.
10.5This pattern is almost perfectly mirrored by the rise in equity liability figures for the
NFC sector in Figure 10.11.
10.6The asset classes indicated follow the ESA 2010 classifications and are abbreviated in the
chart for brevity. Monetary gold and special drawing rights (SDRs) are excluded from the
analysis as the total value is negligible and is only held by FC. The full name of each asset
class is as follows: F2.Currency and deposits; F3.Debt securities; F4.Loans; F5.Equity and
investment fund shares; F6.Insurance, pensions and standardised guarantees; F7.Financial
derivatives and employee stock options; F8.Other accounts receivable / payable.
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Figure 10.6: Hh: Financial Assets and Liabilities
These developments, and those for the sectors that follow below, should be
read in the context of record low interest rates and financial capital markets
that have absorbed enormous quantities of liquid capital through what was
called unconventional monetary policy, or ‘quantitative easing’. In Denmark,
as in several other European economies, the effects on equity prices has been
remarkable. Between 2010 and 2016, Danish equity prices more than doubled.
In comparison with other European countries, as shown in Figure 10.7 below,
at the end of 2016, Denmark had the greatest equity price growth out of all EU
countries. These price developments suggest a possible explanation for where
new financial capital has been directed.
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Figure 10.7: European equity price developments since 2010
With interest rates an a historic low, there really is no further scope decreases
in the future. This poses a significant capital risk to household assets. The mag-
nitude of potential capital losses being proportional to the relative proportional
change in interest rates (rather than percentage point changes).
Fortunately, in Denmark, a large portion of the value Hh debt is linked to bond
prices. Unfortunately, since 2003 the proportion of mortgage debt linked issued
against flexible rate, or adjustable rate mortgages has increased dramatically -
effectively stabilising the nominal value of household liabilities. In addition, Hh
debt-to-disposable-income levels are the highest in the world, and peaked at
just over 300% in 2009. This expansion of household debt and the potential
risks it poses for the Danish economy will be a key focus in thesis. Certain
innovations permitted individuals to borrow more freely for the purchase of
housing after 2003, and as can be seen in Figure 10.8 this accelerated borrowing
can also be associated with price increases in residential property of all types
across Denmark. Figure 10.8 shows an index of property prices, taking 2006
(shortly before the peak of the Danish housing bubble) as the base year (index
value = 100). It therefore shows relative price movements, for one-family houses,
owner-occupied flats and weekend cottages (summer houses). The period from
2003 to 2006 in all cases resulted in around a 100% increase in property prices.
11
Appendix: Descriptive Analysis, (10):12
Region HovedstadenRegion MidtjyllandRegion NordjyllandRegion SyddanmarkRegion Zealand
2000200520102015 2000200520102015 2000200520102015 2000200520102015 2000200520102015
0
50
100
Date
P
ro
p
er
ty
P
ri
ce
In
d
ex
es
:
D
K
,
20
06
=
1
00
PropType
One-family houses
Owner-occupied flats, total
Weekend cottages
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Figure 10.9: House Price Index (HPI): Quarterly
In terms of potential means of repayment, it can be seen in Figure 10.6 that
liquid financial assets, such as money as deposits, have remained fairly stable,
although rising marginally over the period. With the evidence presented thus
12
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far, it is by no means certain that the household sector is in any immediate
danger, but it would appear that the financial position of the sector as a whole
is substantially more fragile than it was in 1995. As can be seen from 10.8,
even relatively stable house prices dropped between 5% and 25% for various
categories of property across the regions.
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Figure 10.10: Hh: Fixed Assets
10.3.3 Non-Financial Corporate Financial Assets and Liabilities
The NFC sector is equally interesting, but for two different points. As can
be seen in Figure 10.11, the first is the rapid acceleration of financial equity
liabilities, from less than 60% of GDP in 1995 to well over 200% in 2017.
13
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Figure 10.11: NFC: Financial Assets and Liabilities
The second is the dramatic increase in equity assets as a proportion of total
financial assets, and the correlated rise in equity prices. This trend of NCF
equity accumulation has several possible causes. The first, and least problematic
is a simple expansion of the issuance of equity capital in Denmark to fund
business growth. The second possible explanation, Barwell & Burrows (2011)
presented as an explanation for similar occurrences in the UK through the late
1990s and early 2000s. They noted a rapid increase in the number of merger and
acquisition (M&A) deals, and for the UK, such deals often involved the purchase
of foreign companies and the issuance of equity in order to fund acquisitions.
This created an accounting dilemma. The new equity issued stock and the
existing stock of the purchased company would be counted together towards
the equity liability of the holding company. Unfortunately it is not possible to
separate these tiered holdings in the aggregate data.
The third is that NFCs have progressively become “financialised”, by which it
is meant that NFCs have progressively migrated from productive investment
towards financial investment in order to secure returns. This is closely linked
to the “financialisation” arguments that the shareholder view took over as a
14
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dominant form of corporate governance, as opposed to the purportedly usurped
stakeholder view. The former focused purely on achieving returns to equity
holders, and the latter on all stakeholders of the corporate enterprise - taken to
include employees, up- and down-stream value chain participants and society in
general.
The fourth, and most sinister possibility, management self-enrichment buy-
backs, has been suggested by recent research conducted for the US. In this last
category, NFC companies are reported to have issued corporate debt - presently
at all time low interest rates (cost of borrowing) - with the intention of inflating
equity prices around the times that option based remuneration packages become
due to executive management. The US has seen a record rate of NFC debt
accumulation over the previous decade.
In Denmark, however, it would appear that this trend of corporate buy-backs
funded through credit channels has not developed, with gross corporate debt
levels representing a negligible value, as shown by the red line under liabilities
(L) in Figure 10.11.
Perhaps the simplest, and potentially most problematic, explanation is that
the expansion of financial capital has been used primarily to inflate the prices
of assets. Successive rounds of lending indirectly being used to support the
progressive inflation of asset prices. One option to investigate this possibility
would be to assess the degree to which the market capital changes over the past
decade have come from new issuances or from revaluations.
Charts are presented in Section 10.4.1 below for all sectors, and will be discussed
briefly there. A key take-away from Section 10.4.1 is that the NFC equities
and mutual funds (both asset and liability components) are heavily affected
by revaluations (as can be seen in Figures 10.21 and 10.22). Net issuances
contribute only a small part of the annual change in both the Equity and Mutual
funds and the Equity only categories.
15
Appendix: Descriptive Analysis, (10):16
0%
50%
100%
150%
19
9
5
19
96
19
97
1
99
8
19
9
9
20
00
20
01
20
0
2
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
2
01
1
2
01
2
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
Year
sh
ar
e
of
p
os
it
iv
e
an
d
n
eg
at
iv
e
st
o
ck
s
Cultivated biological resources (net)
Dwellings (net)
Intellectual property products (net)
Machinery and equipment and weapons systems (net)
Other buildings and structures (net)
Figure 10.12: NFC: Fixed Assets
10.3.4 Financial Corporate Financial Assets and Liabilities
The financial corporate sector (FC) is more complex to decompose, largely as
a result of the counterpart role that the sector plays in the financial markets.
One remarkable change has been the shift in importance of equity as an asset.
Figure 10.13 below illustrates this in the left hand panel as a green dotted line
(or as the green bars). The only other time in the two decade history that
equity prices have comprised such a large share of total FC financial assets was
in 2000, shortly before the dot-com bubble collapse. A similar condition applies
to equity liabilities, this may or may not be as a result of similar merger and
acquisition behaviour to that described above for the NFCs of the UK.
For a comprehensive analysis, FC should really be separated into deposit issuing
(taking) institutions and non-deposit issuing institutions, but for our present
purposes, a more detailed explanation would provide an unnecessary distraction.
While many studies and reports have dealt with the health of both types of
institutions (see for example Danmarks Nationalbank (2016)), the focus of this
research is on the financial stability of the household sector.
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Figure 10.13: FC: Financial Assets and Liabilities
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Figure 10.14: FC: Fixed Assets
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10.3.5 Government Financial Assets and Liabilities
Government financial assets have been fairly stable for the past two decades,
while financial liabilities have declined steadily. The trend in liabilities marks
the latter part of a prolonged effort by government to reduce national debt,
in particular, expensive international debts. As can be seen in Figure 10.15
below, those liabilities rose for a period over the financial crisis, presumably as
automatic stabiliser mechanisms (in the form of public transfers) increased in
response to labour market disruptions.
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Figure 10.15: Govt: Financial Assets and Liabilities
The scale of Govt financial assets relative to the other sectors is also significantly
lower, with neither assets nor liabilities ranging higher than 75% of GDP since
the year 2000.
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Figure 10.16: GOVT: Fixed Assets
10.3.6 Rest of the World Financial Assets and Liabilities
The Rest of the World (RoW) sector, viewed from the perspective of that
sector, has progressively become more and more extensively integrated with the
domestic economy. As can be seen in Figure 10.17 below, the scale of financial
balance sheets linked to RoW has risen dramatically over the previous two
decades. The liabilities component (that is, assets of RoW owned by Danish
counterparts) has increased from approximately 75% of Danish GDP to over
300%.
In net terms RoW is a creditor to Denmark, but in gross terms, it is worth noting
that RoW holdings of Danish financial assets exceed 250% of Danish GDP. The
equity component once again making up the lions share of the growth in RoW
liabilities to Denmark, and to a lesser degree the RoW assets in Denmark.
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Figure 10.17: RoW: Financial Assets and Liabilities
The expansion of equity and investment fund shares as a proportion of total
balance sheet values is a recurring theme in all sectors discussed above, and
for RoW it is no different. This expansion, as discussed in Section 10.3.3 for
NFC, the bulk of all changes to the total balance sheet values for equity and
investment fund shares can be decomposed into two broad categories. Changes
that arise from transactions, and changes that arise from revaluations.
Revaluation changes refer to changes in equity prices, and transactions refer
to net changes in the volume of stocks held by each sector. Separating these
components allows us to observe which of the two effects dominates the change
in the balance sheet value from year to year.
10.4 Equity price changes: Revaluations and transactions
This section provides charts and some key observations for the change in total
value of equity from year to year. Changes are separated into two parts.
The revaluations component (which covers capital gains and losses) and the
transactions component (which covers net purchase and sale of stocks).
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The equity and investment fund shares component (Code F5 in the ESA) is
presented first and a separate section is provided below that isolates the equity
component (Code F51 in the ESA). Unfortunately, data is only available from
2004 for the latter, and there is one component, “other changes” that has been
excluded from the charts, as in most cases the measure is not relevant and
would only serve to confuse the charts.
The charts are provided in nominal values as the purpose is to illustrate
composition. The sizes of the axes are scaled equally in order to provide a sense
of scale for comparison between the sectors.
10.4.1 Equity and investment value changes and composition
thereof
10.4.1.1 Hh: Equity and investment fund shares (F5)
Households do not issue equity or investment , and thus it is only the asset
component that is relevant. As can be seen from Figure 10.18, almost all
changes that have occurred over the previous two decades have been driven by
prices changes. The exception being 2015 and 2016 which saw Hh make net
acquisitions of Equity and investment fund shares.
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Figure 10.18: HH: Investment and Equity changes: composition
Due to the relative importance of insurance and pension fund assets to Danish
Households, a similar chart is presented for Insurance, pensions and standardised
21
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guarantees (Code F6 in the ESA) for the households sector. The picture here is
slightly different, in that there are consistent and significant ongoing acquisitions
of insurance and pension assets by Hh. This is very likely as a result of mandatory
pension investment flows.
10.4.1.1.1 Hh: Equity (F51)
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Figure 10.19: Hh: Equity changes: composition
10.4.1.1.2 Hh: Insurance, pensions and standardised guarantees
(F6)
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Figure 10.20: HH: Insurance, pensions and standardised guarantees: composition
Asset allocation of Danish pension funds in 2015, according to Danmarks
Nationalbank (2016, p. 50), included approximately 25% in listed and private
equity assets, with a strong bias towards higher yielding assets - particularly
real estate investment companies. The bulk of the remaining assets were
split between various bonds (64.5%) and land and buildings and derivatives
(14.5%)10.7.
Although these acquisitions are relatively small, the Danish equity and financial
investment landscape is relatively limited. The constant flow of funds into the
Danish market in the absence of significant issues of equity from NFC may
have reinforced the extensive appreciation in equity and investment fund share
prices.
10.4.1.2 NFC: Equity and investment fund shares (F5)
The effects of the pre-crisis boom and the post crisis collapse are clearly evident
in the composition of NFC equity and investment fund shares, both in terms
of assets and liabilities. The liability component can be interpreted as shares
outstanding, and the dramatic contributions of revaluations to the outstanding
value reflects changes in market prices. Interestingly, following four years of
10.7The asset allocation are based on a chart, are are estimated to have been as follows:
land and buildings 6%, listed shares 14%, private equity 10.5%, government bonds 22.5%,
mortgage bonds 27.5%, other bonds 14.5%, derivatives 8.5% and other 0.5.%.
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dramatic price increases, NFC net issued significant quantities of new equities
and simultaneously acquired the largest volume of listed equity and investment
fund shares per year of all years observed.
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Figure 10.21: NFC: Investment and Equity changes: composition
10.4.1.2.1 NFC: Equity (F51)
The effects observed above are simply more pronounced for the equity only
component of F5.
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Figure 10.22: NFC: Equity changes: composition
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10.4.1.3 FC: Equity and investment fund shares (F5)
In the financial corporate sector, stocks of both assets and liabilities accumulated
at a more or less steady pace throughout the period. The total value of equity
and investment fund shares fell dramatically at both the 2001 dot-com crisis and
the 2007-8 financial crisis, but this reflects very little change due to transactions.
The accumulation of assets, as noted earlier in Section 10.3.4, significantly
outpaced the issue of liabilities. In 2011 and 2012, and again in 2015 and 2016
the outstanding value of equities issued by FC fell and stagnated respectively.
Perhaps reflecting market responses to recent issues related to money laundering
in the Danish banking system.
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Figure 10.23: FC: Investment and Equity changes: composition
10.4.1.3.1 FC: Equity (F51)
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Figure 10.24: FC: Equity changes: composition
10.4.1.4 RoW: Equity and investment fund shares (F5)
For RoW, the accumulation of equity and investment fund shares and those of
equities alone appears to be almost perfectly matched. This is true with the
exception of a more dramatic revaluation effect in the latter during the 2007-08
crisis.
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Figure 10.25: RoW: Investment and Equity changes: composition
10.4.1.4.1 RoW: Equity (F51)
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Danish counterparts appear to have steadily acquired RoW assets in a majority
of each of the previous twenty years. The recent rise in RoW assets appears by
contrast to be almost entirely driven by revaluations. This is to be expected
given the dramatic rise in Danish equity prices after 2010.
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Figure 10.26: RoW: Equity changes: composition
10.4.1.5 Govt: Equity and investment fund shares (F5)
Government ownership of stocks, while important from an infrastructural point
of view for Denmark, does not play a significant role in markets for equity and
investment fund shares.
27
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Figure 10.27: Govt: Investment and Equity changes: composition
10.4.1.5.1 Govt: Equity (F51)
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Figure 10.28: Govt: Equity changes: composition
10.5 Flows analysis
These plots cover a range of comparatives in order to properly understand the
nature and evolution of the flows of each sector in Denmark. For each sector,
the flows are presented first as a proportion of GDP, then as a proportional
contribution to the total negative or positive flows for the sector respectively.
28
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For most sectors, except the NFC sector, the variabels can be read as follows:
account[sector, received/paid]
The account is the income statement account that contirbutes to either the
positive or negative side of the budget for each sector. R denotes an income,
and P denotes an expense. For example:
C[h, P ]
This is consumption expenditure, paid by the household sector. In the household
section this is simple to identify as an expenditure.
A note of caution is that in the NFC section, this variable is recorded as an
income for the NFC sector. This is done for consistency, as these flows are
identical and offsetting.
10.5.1 Household flows
Hh flows have fallen from approximately 100% of GDP in 1995, as shown in
Figure 10.29, to aproximately 90% of GDP in 2017. Figure 10.30 illustrates the
proportional composition of these flows. All negative flows appear to be fairly
constant, but with a significant decline in r[h, P ] (or, property income paid,
made up mostly of interest payments) and a relative increase in tax payments,
T, c[h, P ]. Consumtion (C[h, P ]) and tax (T, c[h, P ]) are the largest contributors
at aproximately 50% and 25% of all negative contributors.
The income side is fairly similar, with wages (WB[h,R]) at around 55% and
Social benefits other than social transfers in kind (STr, ob[h,R]) at around 20%
of GDP. Social transfer contributions paid by Hh (STr, c[h, P ]) made up roughly
half of transfers received up until around 2008. Both the Gross operating surplus
(F [h,R]) and the level of property income received (r[h,R]) declined steadily
both as a proportion of GDP and as a proportion of total positive flows between
1995 and 2017.
This decline, however, is a decline in realtive and in real, rather than nominal,
terms, as can be seen in the Figure 10.31, which shows the nominal changes in
flows. To clear up any confusion, the variable PEN [h,R] represents Adjustments
29
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for the change in pension entitlement received by Hh, rather than pension
incomes (which form part of social transfers received).
30
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10.5.1.1 Household flows: As a proportion of domestic GDP
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Figure 10.29: Hh: Composition of Flows: B9 Proportion of GDP
10.5.1.2 Household flows: As a proportion of positive and negative
totals
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Figure 10.30: Hh: Composition of Flows: B9 proportion of (+) or (-) totals
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10.5.1.3 Household flows: In level terms
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Figure 10.31: Hh: Composition of Flows: B9 in nominal levels
10.5.1.4 Household flows: As a proportion of Household disposable
income
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Figure 10.32: Hh: Composition of Flows: B9 Proportion of Yd
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10.5.2 Non-Financial Corporate flows
Reading the NFC charts is more tedious than the household charts, as the
incomes and expenditures are not as straight-forward.
In contrast to the Hh flows, NFC flows has progressively risen as a proportion of
annual GDP rising from approximately 155% of GDP in 1995 to approximately
175% of GDP at the end of 2017. The positive rise was dominated by growth in
exports (EX[nf,R]) throughout the period, while imports (IM [nf, P ]) mirrored
this rise at a lower level in the negative components. All other components
appear to remain relatively constant relative to GDP throughout.
In terms of the share of positive and negative components, the absolute rise in
exports and imports resulted in declining shares for all other variables. Most
prominently illustrated on the revenue side by declining revenue from household
consumption (C[h, P ]).
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10.5.2.1 Non-Financial Corporate flows: As a proportion of domes-
tic GDP
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Figure 10.33: NFC: Composition of Flows: B9 Proportion of GDP
10.5.2.2 Non-Financial Corporate flows: As a proportion of positive
and negative totals
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Figure 10.34: NFC: Composition of Flows: B9 proportion of (+) or (-) totals
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10.5.2.3 Non-Financial Corporate flows: In level terms
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Figure 10.35: NFC: Composition of Flows: B9 in nominal levels
10.5.2.4 Non-Financial Corporate flows: As a proportion of Non-
Financial Corporate disposable income
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Figure 10.36: NFC: Composition of Flows: B9 Proportion of Yd
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10.5.3 Financial Corporate flows
These plots cover a range of comparatives in order to properly understand the
nature and evolution of the flows of each sector in Denmark.
10.5.3.1 Financial Corporate flows: As a proportion of domestic
GDP
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Figure 10.37: FC: Composition of Flows: B9 Proportion of GDP
10.5.3.2 Financial Corporate flows: As a proportion of positive and
negative totals
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Figure 10.38: FC: Composition of Flows: B9 proportion of (+) or (-) totals
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10.5.3.3 Financial Corporate flows: In level terms
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Figure 10.39: FC: Composition of Flows: B9 in nominal levels
10.5.3.4 Financial Corporate flows: As a proportion of Financial
Corporate disposable income
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Figure 10.40: FC: Composition of Flows: B9 Proportion of Yd
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10.5.4 Government flows
These plots cover a range of comparatives in order to properly understand the
nature and evolution of the flows of each sector in Denmark.
10.5.4.1 Government flows: As a proportion of domestic GDP
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Figure 10.41: Govt: Composition of Flows: B9 Proportion of GDP
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10.5.4.2 Government flows: As a proportion of positive and nega-
tive totals
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Figure 10.42: Govt: Composition of Flows: B9 proportion of (+) or (-) totals
10.5.4.3 Government flows: In level terms
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Figure 10.43: Govt: Composition of Flows: B9 in nominal levels
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10.5.4.4 Government flows: As a proportion of Government dispos-
able income
Negative Positive
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10.5.5 Rest of the World flows
These plots cover a range of comparatives in order to properly understand the
nature and evolution of the flows of each sector in Denmark.
10.5.5.1 Rest of the World flows: As a proportion of domestic GDP
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10.5.5.2 Rest of the World flows: As a proportion of positive and
negative totals
Negative Positive
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Figure 10.46: RoW: Composition of Flows: B9 proportion of (+) or (-) totals
10.5.5.3 Rest of the World flows: In level terms
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10.5.5.4 Rest of the World flows: As a proportion of domestic dis-
posable income
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This thesis investigates the interaction between the sectoral balance sheets 
in Denmark, as they are crucial for understanding the impact and transmis-
sion of economic shocks and policies for the economy. This is particular-
ly important in the context of rapid financial balance sheet expansion that 
preceded the Global Financial Crisis. The thesis thus addresses four key ob-
jectives: The first is to identify what the primary source of change in sector 
balance sheets is; the second is to empirically identify the connections and 
dependencies (interactions) between the three primary sectors - the private 
sector, the government sector and the foreign sector; the third is to explore 
the implications of these interactions, and extends this analysis to include a 
disaggregated private sector - split into the household sector, the non-finan-
cial corporate sector and the financial corporate sector; and, the fourth is to 
assimilate these interactions into a single macroeconomic framework - in 
order to examine the transmission of economic shocks or policy measures 
throughout the economy - and to use this framework to investigate the causes 
and implications of the unprecedented expansion of private debt relative to 
disposable income of Danish households. The thesis addresses these issues 
within the Post Keynesian economic paradigm and the Babylonian mode of 
thinking, where path dependency and a pluralist approach to method and 
methodology are encouraged. This is accomplished in the form of five inde-
pendent, but progressive and related articles.
